Developing a Knowledge Infrastructure to Prepare Smaller Teams to Fly More Missions
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Low-Cost Approaches to Deep Space Missions
The past decade has brought about a radical transformation in NASA's planetary exploration program. At the beginning of this decade, NASA was focused on the Cassini mission to Saturn. Following on the heels of the successful Voyager and Galileo missions, Cassini represents the culmination of an evolution towards successively larger, more complex, and more expensive spacecraft. The Cassini spacecraft weighs in at over 5 metric tons, and carries an entry probe and a sophisticated suite of sensors supporting 27 different science investigations enabling a comprehensive scientific investigation of Saturn with a single spacecraft. The cost of this spacecraft exceeded $2B, including the cost of the large Titan IV launch vehicle. During Cassini development, NASA realized that it could no longer afford these "flagship" missions, and the agency moved aggressively towards a "faster, better, cheaper" design philosophy of focused science goals and simpler, rapidly-developed spacecraft, allowing much more frequent launches of smaller, lower-cost missions. The Mars Global Surveyor, launched in November 1996, is an example of this new paradigm. Developed in less than 3-years, MGS is only one-fifth the mass of Cassini, and only cost on the order of $220M. The reduced spacecraft mass allows use of the smaller, lower cost Delta launch vehicle. Currently in orbit about Mars, MGS carries a focused suite of six science instruments that are currently returning high-resolution remote sensing of the Martian surface. The future calls for continued even more aggressive mass and cost targets. Examples of these next-generation goals are embodied in the Mars Micromission spacecraft concept, targeted for launch in 2003. With a mass of only 200kg, this lightweight bus can be tailored to carry a variety of payloads to Mars or other inner-planet destinations. The design of the Micromission spacecraft enable them to be launched at extremely low cost as a secondary "piggyback" payload.
Squibb, G. F.↗
Review of NASA's Planned Mars Program
The exploration of Mars has long been a prime scientific objective of the U.S. planetary exploration program. Yet no U.S. spacecraft has successfully made measurements at Mars since the Viking missions of the late 1970s. Mars Observer, which was designed to conduct global observations from orbit, failed just before orbit insertion in 1993. The Russian spacecraft Phobos 2 did succeed in making some observations of the planet in 1989, but it was designed primarily to observe Phobos, the innermost satellite of Mars; the spacecraft failed 2 months after insertion into Mars orbit during the complex maneuvers required to rendezvous with the martian satellite. In fall 1996 NASA plans to launch Mars Pathfinder for a landing on the martian surface in mid-1997. This spacecraft is one of the first two missions in NASA's Discovery program that inaugurates a new style of planetary exploration in which missions are low-cost (less than $150 million) and have very focused science objectives. As can be seen in the comparative data presented in Box 1, this mission is considerably smaller in terms of cost, mass, and scope than NASA's previous Mars missions. NASA's FY 1995 budget initiated a continuing Mars exploration program, called Mars Surveyor, that involves multiple launches of spacecraft as small as or smaller than Mars Pathfinder to Mars over the next several launch opportunities, which recur roughly every 26 months. The first mission in the program, Mars Global Surveyor, set for launch late in 1996, is intended to accomplish many of the objectives of the failed Mars Observer. Like the Discovery program, Mars Surveyor is a continuing series of low-cost missions, each of which has highly focused science objectives. See Box 1 for comparative details of those Surveyor missions currently defined. Around the same time that the Mars Surveyor series was chosen as the centerpiece of NASA's solar system exploration program, the Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) designated Mars as one of four scientific targets for emphasis in future studies. It was against this background that the Space Studies Board charged COMPLEX to review whether the Mars Pathfinder and Surveyor programs, as presently conceived, satisfy the highest priorities for understanding Mars as provided in its report, An Integrated Strategy for the Planetary Sciences: 1995-2010. The present document is COMPLEX's assessment of the scientific potential of NASA's new approach to Mars exploration. This assessment considers how well the scientific objectives of the Mars Surveyor program match those of the Integrated Strategy; it also addresses some advantages and disadvantages of the smaller-faster-cheaper approach to the exploration of Mars. The capabilities of the various instruments are not discussed in detail since the Mars Observer instruments, all of which are scheduled for reflight, have already been assessed by COMPLEX2 and later instruments are, in general, not yet well defined.
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The Faster, Better, Cheaper Approach to Space Missions: An Engineering Management Assessment
NASA was chartered as an independent civilian space agency in 1958 following the Soviet Union's dramatic launch of the Sputnik 1 (1957). In his state of the union address in May of 1961, President Kennedy issued to the fledging organization his famous challenge for a manned lunar mission by the end of the decade. The Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs that followed put the utmost value on high quality, low risk (as low as possible within the context of space flight), quick results, all with little regard for cost. These circumstances essentially melded NASAs culture as an organization capable of great technological achievement but at extremely high cost. The Space Shuttle project, the next major agency endeavor, was put under severe annual budget constraints in the 1970's. NASAs response was to hold to the high quality standards, low risk and annual cost and let schedule suffer. The result was a significant delay in the introduction of the Shuttle as well as overall total cost growth. By the early 1990's, because NASA's budget was declining, the number of projects was also declining. Holding the same cost and schedule productivity levels as before was essentially causing NASA to price itself out of business. In 1992, the helm of NASA was turned over to a new Administrator. Dan Goldin's mantra was "faster, better, cheaper" and his enthusiasm and determination to change the NASA culture was not to be ignored. This research paper documents the various implementations of "faster, better, cheaper" that have been attempted, analyzes their impact and compares the cost performance of these new projects to previous NASA benchmarks. Fundamentally, many elements of "faster, better, cheaper" are found to be working well, especially on smaller projects. Some of the initiatives are found to apply only to smaller or experimental projects however, so that extrapolation to "flagship" projects may be problematic.
Hamaker, Joseph W.↗