A Multi-Mission Approach to Spacecraft Analysis
This paper describes the design of the JPL institutional Multi-Mission Spacecraft Analysis System (MSAS) and its initial adaptation to the Cassini mission.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This paper describes the design of the JPL institutional Multi-Mission Spacecraft Analysis System (MSAS) and its initial adaptation to the Cassini mission.
Molecular biology methods and technologies have advanced substantially over the past decade. These new molecular methods should be incorporated among the standard tools of planetary protection (PP) and could be validated for incorporation by 2026. To address the feasibility of applying modern molecular techniques to such an application, NASA conducted a technology workshop with private industry partners, academics, and government agency stakeholders, along with NASA staff and contractors. The technical discussions and presentations of the Multi-Mission Metagenomics Technology Development Workshop focused on modernizing and supplementing the current PP assays. The goals of the workshop were to assess the state of metagenomics and other advanced molecular techniques in the context of providing a validated framework to supplement the bacterial endospore-based NASA Standard Assay and to identify knowledge and technology gaps. In particular, workshop participants were tasked with discussing metagenomics as a stand-alone technology to provide rapid and comprehensive analysis of total nucleic acids and viable microorganisms on spacecraft surfaces, thereby allowing for the development of tailored and cost-effective microbial reduction plans for each hardware item on a spacecraft. Workshop participants recommended metagenomics approaches as the only data source that can adequately feed into quantitative microbial risk assessment models for evaluating the risk of forward (exploring extraterrestrial planet) and back (Earth harmful biological) contamination. Participants were unanimous that a metagenomics workflow, in tandem with rapid targeted quantitative (digital) PCR, represents a revolutionary advance over existing methods for the assessment of microbial bioburden on spacecraft surfaces. The workshop highlighted low biomass sampling, reagent contamination, and inconsistent bioinformatics data analysis as key areas for technology development. Finally, it was concluded that implementing metagenomics as an additional workflow for addressing concerns of NASA's robotic mission will represent a dramatic improvement in technology advancement for PP and will benefit future missions where mission success is affected by backward and forward contamination.
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) is a system designed to demonstrate automated health and status analysis for multi-mission spacecraft and ground data systems operations. Telecommunications link analysis of the Voyager 2 spacecraft is the initial focus for the SHARP system demonstration which will occur during Voyager's encounter with the planet Neptune in August, 1989, in parallel with real time Voyager operations. The SHARP system combines conventional computer science methodologies with artificial intelligence techniques to produce an effective method for detecting and analyzing potential spacecraft and ground systems problems. The system performs real time analysis of spacecraft and other related telemetry, and is also capable of examining data in historical context. A brief introduction is given to the spacecraft and ground systems monitoring process at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The current method of operation for monitoring the Voyager Telecommunications subsystem is described, and the difficulties associated with the existing technology are highlighted. The approach taken in the SHARP system to overcome the current limitations is also described, as well as both the conventional and artificial intelligence solutions developed in SHARP.
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) is a system designed to demonstrate automated health and status analysis for multi-mission spacecraft and ground data systems operations. Telecommunications link analysis of the Voyager II spacecraft is the initial focus for the SHARP system demonstration which will occur during Voyager's encounter with the planet Neptune in August, 1989, in parallel with real-time Voyager operations. The SHARP system combines conventional computer science methodologies with artificial intelligence techniques to produce an effective method for detecting and analyzing potential spacecraft and ground systems problems. The system performs real-time analysis of spacecraft and other related telemetry, and is also capable of examining data in historical context. A brief introduction is given to the spacecraft and ground systems monitoring process at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The current method of operation for monitoring the Voyager Telecommunications subsystem is described, and the difficulties associated with the existing technology are highlighted. The approach taken in the SHARP system to overcome the current limitations is also described, as well as both the conventional and artificial intelligence solutions developed in SHARP.
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) is a system designed to demonstrate automated health and status analysis for multi-mission spacecraft and ground data systems operations. Telecommunications link analysis of the Voyager II spacecraft is the initial focus for the SHARP system demonstration which will occur during Voyager's encounter with the planet Neptune in August, 1989, in parallel with real-time Voyager operations. The SHARP system combines conventional computer science methodologies with artificial intelligence techniques to produce an effective method for detecting and analyzing potential spacecraft and ground systems problems. The system performs real-time analysis of spacecraft and other related telemetry, and is also capable of examining data in historical context. A brief introduction is given to the spacecraft and ground systems monitoring process at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The current method of operation for monitoring the Voyager Telecommunications subsystem is described, and the difficulties associated with the existing technology are highlighted. The approach taken in the SHARP system to overcome the current limitations is also described, as well as both the conventional and artificial intelligence solutions developed in SHARP.
Spacecraft control centers have evolved from dedicated, single-mission or single mission-type support to multi-mission, service-oriented support for operating a variety of mission types. At the same time, available money for projects is shrinking and competition for new missions is increasing. These factors drive the need for an accurate and flexible model to support estimating service costs for new or extended missions; the cost model in turn drives the need for an accurate and efficient approach to service cost analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) provides operations services to a variety of customers around the world. HOSC customers range from launch vehicle test flights; to International Space Station (ISS) payloads; to small, short duration missions; and has included long duration flagship missions. The HOSC recently completed a detailed analysis of service costs as part of the development of a complete service cost model. The cost analysis process required the team to address a number of issues. One of the primary issues involves the difficulty of reverse engineering individual mission costs in a highly efficient multi-mission environment, along with a related issue of the value of detailed metrics or data to the cost model versus the cost of obtaining accurate data. Another concern is the difficulty of balancing costs between missions of different types and size and extrapolating costs to different mission types. The cost analysis also had to address issues relating to providing shared, cloud-like services in a government environment, and then assigning an uncertainty or risk factor to cost estimates that are based on current technology, but will be executed using future technology. Finally the cost analysis needed to consider how to validate the resulting cost models taking into account the non-homogeneous nature of the available cost data and the decreasing flight rate. This paper presents the issues encountered during the HOSC cost analysis process, and the associated lessons learned. These lessons can be used when planning for a new multi-mission operations center or in the transformation from a dedicated control center to multi-center operations, as an aid in defining processes that support future cost analysis and estimation. The lessons can also be used by mature service-oriented, multi-mission control centers to streamline or refine their cost analysis process.
Spacecraft control centers have evolved from dedicated, single-mission or single missiontype support to multi-mission, service-oriented support for operating a variety of mission types. At the same time, available money for projects is shrinking and competition for new missions is increasing. These factors drive the need for an accurate and flexible model to support estimating service costs for new or extended missions; the cost model in turn drives the need for an accurate and efficient approach to service cost analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) provides operations services to a variety of customers around the world. HOSC customers range from launch vehicle test flights; to International Space Station (ISS) payloads; to small, short duration missions; and has included long duration flagship missions. The HOSC recently completed a detailed analysis of service costs as part of the development of a complete service cost model. The cost analysis process required the team to address a number of issues. One of the primary issues involves the difficulty of reverse engineering individual mission costs in a highly efficient multimission environment, along with a related issue of the value of detailed metrics or data to the cost model versus the cost of obtaining accurate data. Another concern is the difficulty of balancing costs between missions of different types and size and extrapolating costs to different mission types. The cost analysis also had to address issues relating to providing shared, cloud-like services in a government environment, and then assigning an uncertainty or risk factor to cost estimates that are based on current technology, but will be executed using future technology. Finally the cost analysis needed to consider how to validate the resulting cost models taking into account the non-homogeneous nature of the available cost data and the decreasing flight rate. This paper presents the issues encountered during the HOSC cost analysis process, and the associated lessons learned. These lessons can be used when planning for a new multi-mission operations center or in the transformation from a dedicated control center to multi-center operations, as an aid in defining processes that support future cost analysis and estimation. The lessons can also be used by mature serviceoriented, multi-mission control centers to streamline or refine their cost analysis process.
With science team budgets being slashed, and a lack of adequate facilities for science payload teams to operate their instruments, there is a strong need for innovative new ground systems that are able to provide necessary levels of capability processing power, system availability and redundancy while maintaining a small footprint in terms of physical space, power utilization and cooling.The ground system architecture being presented is based off of heritage from several other projects currently in development or operations at Goddard, but was designed and built specifically to meet the needs of the Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) as a low-cost payload command, control, planning and analysis operations center. However, this SPOCC architecture was designed to be generic enough to be re-used partially or in whole by other labs and missions (since its inception that has already happened in several cases!)The SPOCC architecture leverages a highly available VMware-based virtualization cluster with shared SAS Direct-Attached Storage (DAS) to provide an extremely high-performing, low-power-utilization and small-footprint compute environment that provides Virtual Machine resources shared among the various tenant missions in the SPOCC. The storage is also expandable, allowing future missions to chain up to 7 additional 2U chassis of storage at an extremely competitive cost if they require additional archive or virtual machine storage space.The software architecture provides a fully-redundant GMSEC-based message bus architecture based on the ActiveMQ middleware to track all health and safety status within the SPOCC ground system. All virtual machines utilize the GMSEC system agents to report system host health over the GMSEC bus, and spacecraft payload health is monitored using the Hammers Integrated Test and Operations System (ITOS) Galaxy Telemetry and Command (TC) system, which performs near-real-time limit checking and data processing on the downlinked data stream and injects messages into the GMSEC bus that are monitored to automatically page the on-call operator or Systems Administrator (SA) when an off-nominal condition is detected. This architecture, like the LTSP thin clients, are shared across all tenant missions.Other required IT security controls are implemented at the ground system level, including physical access controls, logical system-level authentication authorization management, auditing and reporting, network management and a NIST 800-53 FISMA-Moderate IT Security plan Risk Assessment Contingency Plan, helping multiple missions share the cost of compliance with agency-mandated directives.The SPOCC architecture provides science payload control centers and backup mission operations centers with a cost-effective, standardized approach to virtualizing and monitoring resources that were traditionally multiple racks full of physical machines. The increased agility in deploying new virtual systems and thin client workstations can provide significant savings in personnel costs for maintaining the ground system. The cost savings in procurement, power, rack footprint and cooling as well as the shared multi-mission design greatly reduces upfront cost for missions moving into the facility. Overall, the authors hope that this architecture will become a model for how future NASA operations centers are constructed!
This program is a Microsoft Access program that performed statistical analysis of the colony counts from assays performed on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) spacecraft to determine the bioburden density, 3-sigma biodensity, and the total bioburdens required for the MSL prelaunch reports. It also contains numerous tools that report the data in various ways to simplify the reports required. The program performs all the calculations directly in the MS Access program. Prior to this development, the data was exported to large Excel files that had to be cut and pasted to provide the desired results. The program contains a main menu and a number of submenus. Analyses can be performed by using either all the assays, or only the accountable assays that will be used in the final analysis. There are three options on the first menu: either calculate using (1) the old MER (Mars Exploration Rover) statistics, (2) the MSL statistics for all the assays, or This software implements penetration limit equations for common micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems. Allowable MMOD risk is formulated in terms of the probability of penetration (PNP) of the spacecraft pressure hull. For calculating the risk, spacecraft geometry models, mission profiles, debris environment models, and penetration limit equations for installed shielding configurations are required. Risk assessment software such as NASA's BUMPERII is used to calculate mission PNP; however, they are unsuitable for use in shield design and preliminary analysis studies. The software defines a single equation for the design and performance evaluation of common MMOD shielding configurations, windows, and thermal protection systems, along with a description of their validity range and guidelines for their application. Recommendations are based on preliminary reviews of fundamental assumptions, and accuracy in predicting experimental impact test results. The software is programmed in Visual Basic for Applications for installation as a simple add-in for Microsoft Excel. The user is directed to a graphical user interface (GUI) that requires user inputs and provides solutions directly in Microsoft Excel workbooks. This work was done by Shannon Ryan of the USRA Lunar and Planetary Institute for Johnson Space Center. Further information is contained in a TSP (see page 1). MSC- 24582-1 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Shield Ballistic Limit Analysis Program Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas Commercially, because it is so generic, Enigma can be used for almost any project that requires engineering visualization, model building, or animation. Models in Enigma can be exported to many other formats for use in other applications as well. Educationally, Enigma is being used to allow university students to visualize robotic algorithms in a simulation mode before using them with actual hardware. This work was done by David Shores and Sharon P. Goza of Johnson Space Center; Cheyenne McKeegan, Rick Easley, Janet Way, and Shonn Everett of MEI Technologies; Mark Manning of PTI; and Mark Guerra, Ray Kraesig, and William Leu of Tietronix Software, Inc. For further information, contact the JSC Innovation Partnerships Office at (281) 483-3809. MSC-24211-1 Spitzer Telemetry Processing System NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California The Spitzer Telemetry Processing System (SirtfTlmProc) was designed to address objectives of JPL's Multi-mission Image Processing Lab (MIPL) in processing spacecraft telemetry and distributing the resulting data to the science community. To minimize costs and maximize operability, the software design focused on automated error recovery, performance, and information management. The system processes telemetry from the Spitzer spacecraft and delivers Level 0 products to the Spitzer Science Center. SirtfTlmProc is a unique system with automated error notification and recovery, with a real-time continuous service that can go quiescent after periods of inactivity. The software can process 2 GB of telemetry and deliver Level 0 science products to the end user in four hours. It provides analysis tools so the operator can manage the system and troubleshoot problems. It automates telemetry processing in order to reduce staffing costs. This work was done by Alice Stanboli, Elmain M. Martinez, and James M. McAuley of Caltech for NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. For more information, contact iaoffice @jpl.nasa.gov. This software is available for commercial licensing. Please contact Dan Broderick at Daniel.F. Broderick@jpl.nasa.gov. Refer to NPO-47803. NASA Tech Briefs, September 2013 29 This rapid response computer program predicts Orbiter Wing Leading Edge (WLE) damage caused by ice or foam impact during a Space Shuttle launch (Program "IMPACT2"). The program was developed after the Columbia accident in order to assess quickly WLE damage due to ice, foam, or metal impact (if any) during a Shuttle launch. IMPACT2 simulates an impact event in a few minutes for foam impactors, and in seconds for ice and metal impactors. The damage criterion is derived from results obtained from one sophisticated commercial program, which requires hours to carry out simulations of the same impact events. The program was designed to run much faster than the commercial program with prediction of projectile threshold velocities within 10 to 15% of commercial-program values. The mathematical model involves coupling of Orbiter wing normal modes of vibration to nonlinear or linear springmass models. IMPACT2 solves nonlinear or linear impact problems using classical normal modes of vibration of a target, and nonlinear/ linear time-domain equations for the projectile. Impact loads and stresses developed in the target are computed as functions of time. This model is novel because of its speed of execution. A typical model of foam, or other projectile characterized by material nonlinearities, impacting an RCC panel is executed in minutes instead of hours needed by the commercial programs. Target damage due to impact can be assessed quickly, provided that target vibration modes and allowable stress are known. This work was done by Robert Clark, Jr., Paul Cotter, and Constantine Michalopoulos of The Boeing Company for Johnson Space Center. For further information, contact the JSC Innovation Partnerships Office at (281) 483-3809. MSC-24988-1 Wing Leading Edge RCC Rapid Response Damage Prediction Tool (IMPACT2) Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas (3) the MSL statistics for only the accountable assays. Other options on the main menu include a data editing form and utility programs that produce various reports requested by the microbiologists and the project, and tools to generate the groupings for the final analyses. The analyses can be carried out in three ways: Each assay can be treated separately, the assays can be collectively treated for the whole zone as a group, or the assays can be collected in groups designated by the JPL Planetary Protection Manager. The latter approach was used to generate the final report because assays on the same equipment or similar equipment can be assumed to have been exposed to the same environment and cleaning. Thus, the statistics are improved by having a larger population, thereby reducing the standard deviation by the square root of N. For each method mentioned above, three reports are available. The first is a detailed report including all the data. This version was very useful in verifying the calculations. The second is a brief report that is similar to the full detailed report, but does not print out the data. The third is a grand total and summary report in which each assay requires only one line. For the first and second reports, most of the calculations are performed in the report section itself. For the third, all the calculations are performed directly in the query bound to the report. All the numerical results were verified by comparing them with Excel templates, then exporting the data from the Planetary Protection Analysis program to Excel.
Study of the multimission capability of a solar electric propulsion spacecraft. The study includes such factors as spacecraft constraints, payload variations with launch opportunity, propellant on-loading and off-loading requirements, and limitations in thrusting time, throttling range and steering. The study determined that a single spacecraft design, with P sub zero = 12 kW and I sub s = 3000 sec launched by a Titan IIIC or Titan IIID/Centaur can be used to conduct at least five diverse missions: Eros rendezvous, 1 AU out-of-ecliptic, Mercury orbiter, Jupiter flyby/probe, and Jupiter orbiter. Flight time and injection velocity vary as needed to achieve the desired payload capability. The mission analysis approach and results are presented.
Command File Errors (CFE) are managed using standard risk management approaches at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Over the last few years, more emphasis has been made on the collection, organization, and analysis of these errors for the purpose of reducing the CFE rates. More recently, probabilistic modeling techniques have been used for more in depth analysis of the perceived error rates of the DAWN mission and for managing the soft factors in the upcoming phases of the mission. We broadly classify the factors that can lead to CFE's as soft factors, which relate to the cognition of the operators and hard factors which relate to the Mission System which is composed of the hardware, software and procedures used for the generation, verification & validation and execution of commands. The focus of this paper is to use probabilistic models that represent multiple missions at JPL to determine the root cause and sensitivities of the various components of the mission system and develop recommendations and techniques for addressing them. The customization of these multi-mission models to a sample interplanetary spacecraft is done for this purpose.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
A key component of the mission ground system used for supporting NASA Goddard Space Flight Center space missions, known as the Attitude Ground System (AGS), is used to perform operational and analytical support for the spacecraft attitude con-trol system (ACS). The AGS is comprised of a real-time attitude analysis and moni-toring system, and a tool for performing offline analysis of the ACS system using key sensor telemetry collected and stored onboard and transmitted to the mission operations center. The AGS performs numerous functions, including independent ground attitude determination, attitude slew planning and commanding, attitude sensor calibration, and real-time monitoring of the health and safety of the ACS. The AGS is developed in MATLAB using a core library of utility functions called the Multi-Mission Three-Axis Satellite System (MTASS). The MTASS library has been used to support mission operations for over thirty NASA missions starting in the late 1990s. It is customized for each mission to meet specific mission requirements. In this paper we describe recent operational experience using the AGS to support the launch and early orbit (L&EO) phase of the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud Ocean Ecosys-tem (PACE) and Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) missions. Our summary of L&EO support for PACE and JPSS includes ACS sensor calibration of the alignment and scale factors for the Star Trackers, Inertial Reference Unit, and Three-Axis Magnetometers. We will also describe new capabilities for planning and executing reaction wheel momentum unloading for the Roman Space Telescope (RST) During the spacecraft early orbit phase, the AGS is operated in the mission operations center by a team of subject matter experts that also develop and configure the AGS soft-ware. This unique approach, integrating system development and operation in a sin-gle engineering team, provides valuable expertise for quick assessment of ACS per-formance and safety; critical to anomaly resolution and mission success.
This NASA Technical Memorandum (TM) is intended to capture design work that the Advanced Concepts Office (ACO) at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) performed on behalf of the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project during an SNP-driven design and mission analysis initiative in FY2025. Specifically, this TM focuses on several spacecraft design concepts intended to explore the feasibility of nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) for use in a selection of notional, unmanned space missions. While references to the missions will be made in this TM, the primary focus will be on the spacecraft design concepts themselves, the ground rules and assumptions used for designing the spacecraft, a description of the various subsystems and their performance parameters, and the methodologies used to design them. The TM will also highlight areas of future work and additional considerations that may need to be taken into account when evaluating the feasibility of NTP space systems for other applications. The report will discuss the results from ACO’s analysis as they pertain to the different vehicle concepts that were evaluated. Each discipline section in this report will discuss the discipline-specific ground rules and assumptions, the methodology and design approaches employed, and present the results along with any relevant discussion, and highlight areas of future work where applicable.