SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This chapter discusses risks from unintentional or illicit movement of nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through international border crossing points, summarizes international efforts to build capacity and support border security, and discusses how detection equipment can be used to screen for penetrating radiation at traditional border crossing points.
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.
The NNSA Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has investigated a set of minimal-infrastructure radiation detection systems as alternatives to fixed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) for nuclear interdiction applications. These versatile and relocatable systems can improve nuclear security in missions or locations that do not warrant or support a standard fixed radiation detection system. Over 2019, a variety of relocatable detectors were characterized at the Interdiction Technologies Integration Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Evaluated detectors were diverse in their size and capabilities, ranging from backpack-sized systems to lane-spanning cargo scanning portals. Both spectroscopic and non-spectroscopic pedestrian and vehicle detection systems were characterized against uranium and plutonium sources. Signatures from the sources were modulated by both shielding and distance to quantify the performance of the relocatable systems as signal strength was decreased. Findings showed that relocatable spectroscopic detectors with isotope identification capabilities could reduce nuisance alarm rates compared to conventional fixed installation, gross-counting, radiation portal monitors. In vehicle scanning applications, detection ability generally trended with detection volume, regardless of spectral capability. In pedestrian scanning applications, several smaller backpack-sized detector systems were found to be more sensitive to detecting material than pedestrian portal monitors. The results of this characterization effort have helped inform the deployment of versatile equipment to improve nuclear security missions.
We propose a sparsity-promoting Bayesian algorithm capable of identifying radionuclide signatures from weak sources in the presence of a high radiation background. The proposed method is relevant to radiation identification for security applications. In such scenarios, the background typically consists of terrestrial, cosmic, and cosmogenic radiation that may cause false positive responses. We evaluate the new Bayesian approach using gamma-ray data and are able to identify weapons-grade plutonium, masked by naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM), in a measurement time of a few seconds. We demonstrate this identification capability using organic scintillators (stilbene crystals and EJ-309 liquid scintillators), which do not provide direct, high-resolution, source spectroscopic information. Compared to the EJ-309 detector, the stilbene-based detector exhibits a lower identification error, on average, owing to its better energy resolution. Organic scintillators are used within radiation portal monitors to detect gamma rays emitted from conveyances crossing ports of entry. The described method is therefore applicable to radiation portal monitors deployed in the field and could improve their threat discrimination capability by minimizing “nuisance” alarms produced either by NORM-bearing materials found in shipped cargoes, such as ceramics and fertilizers, or radionuclides in recently treated nuclear medicine patients.
Plastic scintillators are widely used in radiation portal monitors because of their low cost and availability in large sizes. However, due to their low density and low effective atomic number (Z), they offer low intrinsic efficiency and little spectroscopic information. The addition of high-Z constituents to these plastics can greatly increase both their total stopping power and the amount of photoelectric absorption, leading to full-energy deposition and thus useful gamma spectra. Herein, we present the performance of the latest formulation of Bi-loaded plastic scintillators showing their useful spectroscopic information up to relatively high energy (~1 MeV) due to their high stopping power compared to the current commercially available plastics. These Bi-loaded plastics use 20 weight percent (wt%) Bi-pivalate (8 wt% elemental Bi) dissolved in polyvinyltoluene (PVT) matrix and conventional fast fluors (~10 ns decay time). These Bi-loaded plastics achieve up to approximately 6000 photons/MeV and have been produced in sizes up to 17 in 3 . The performance of these Bi-loaded plastics is also demonstrated in the existing portal monitor hardware (Rapiscan Model TSA Trainer 770) showing the possibility to provide improved sensitivity as a drop-in replacement with continued scale-up.