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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Flight Testing a Radiosonde and 3D Sonic Anemometer Configuration on a Multi-rotor Uninhabited Aerial System (UAS)

The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to establish a uniform procedure for initialization of a radiosonde, a 3D sonic anemometer, and collection of sounding data with correct sensor integration via a multi-rotor uninhabited aerial system (UAS) within the Langley Research Center’s (LaRC) Uninhabited Aerial System Operations Office (UASOO).

Tyler L. Willhite↗
NASA NTRS2017

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Preparation of an Operation & Configuration Control Plan (OCCP) of "Category B" Pressure Vessels/Systems

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the requirements and methodology for preparation of an Operation & Configuration Control Plan (OCCP) as required by JPR 1710.13 to assure safe ground pressurization and pressurization during aircraft operations of “Category B” Pressure Vessels/Systems (PV/S) at Johnson Space Center (JSC), Ellington Field (EFD) and associated NASA spaceflight/aircraft operations facilities. An OCCP is a written assessment showing that a “Category B” PV/S is safe for ground pressurization and pressurization during aircraft operations, within the bounds established by the OCCP.

Nathanael J Greene↗
NASA NTRS2010

Refractory Metal Heat Pipe Life Test - Test Plan and Standard Operating Procedures

Refractory metal heat pipes developed during this project shall be subjected to various operating conditions to evaluate life-limiting corrosion factors. To accomplish this objective, various parameters shall be investigated, including the effect of temperature and mass fluence on long-term corrosion rate. The test series will begin with a performance test of one module to evaluate its performance and to establish the temperature and power settings for the remaining modules. The performance test will be followed by round-the-clock testing of 16 heat pipes. All heat pipes shall be nondestructively inspected at 6-month intervals. At longer intervals, specific modules will be destructively evaluated. Both the nondestructive and destructive evaluations shall be coordinated with Los Alamos National Laboratory. During the processing, setup, and testing of the heat pipes, standard operating procedures shall be developed. Initial procedures are listed here and, as hardware is developed, will be updated, incorporating findings and lessons learned.

Martin, J. J.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Standard operating procedures, water immersion facility, revision B

General guideline procedures to identify those factors that are common to all spacecraft design laboratory support group emergency procedures and to establish the basic rescue plan are presented. This eliminates needless repetition of the fundamentals from the other, more specific procedures.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1995

Designing Flight-Deck Procedures

A complex human-machine system consists of more than merely one or more human operators and a collection of hardware components. In order to operate a complex system successfully, the human-machine system must be supported by an organizational infrastructure of operating concepts, rules, guidelines, and documents. The coherency of such operating concepts, in terms of consistency and logic, is vitally important for the efficiency and safety of any complex system. In high-risk endeavors such as aircraft operations, space flight, nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, and military operations, it is essential that such support be flawless, as the price of operational error can be high. When operating rules are not adhered to, or the rules are inadequate for the task at hand, not only will the system's goals be thwarted, but there may also be tragic human and material consequences. To ensure safe and predictable operations, support to the operators, in this case flight crews, often comes in the form of standard operating procedures. These provide the crew with step-by-step guidance for carrying out their operations. Standard procedures do indeed promote uniformity, but they do so at the risk of reducing the role of human operators to a lower level. Management, however, must recognize the danger of over-procedurization, which fails to exploit one of the most valuable assets in the system, the intelligent operator who is "on the scene." The alert system designer and operations manager recognize that there cannot be a procedure for everything, and the time will come in which the operators of a complex system will face a situation for which there is no written procedure. Procedures, whether executed by humans or machines, have their place, but so does human cognition.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS1991

Philosophy, policies, and procedures - The three P's of flight-deck operations

Standard operating procedures are drafted and provided to flightcrews to dictate the manner in which tasks are carried out. Failure to conform to Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is frequently listed as the cause of violations, incidents, and accidents. However, procedures are often designed piecemeal, rather than being based on a sound philosophy of operations and policies that follow from such a philosophy. A framework of philosophy, policies, and procedures is proposed.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS1994

Integrating planning and reactive control

Our research is developing persistent agents that can achieve complex tasks in dynamic and uncertain environments. We refer to such agents as taskable, reactive agents. An agent of this type requires a number of capabilities. The ability to execute complex tasks necessitates the use of strategic plans for accomplishing tasks; hence, the agent must be able to synthesize new plans at run time. The dynamic nature of the environment requires that the agent be able to deal with unpredictable changes in its world. As such, agents must be able to react to unanticipated events by taking appropriate actions in a timely manner, while continuing activities that support current goals. The unpredictability of the world could lead to failure of plans generated for individual tasks. Agents must have the ability to recover from failures by adapting their activities to the new situation, or replanning if the world changes sufficiently. Finally, the agent should be able to perform in the face of uncertainty. The Cypress system, described here, provides a framework for creating taskable, reactive agents. Several features distinguish our approach: (1) the generation and execution of complex plans with parallel actions; (2) the integration of goal-driven and event driven activities during execution; (3) the use of evidential reasoning for dealing with uncertainty; and (4) the use of replanning to handle run-time execution problems. Our model for a taskable, reactive agent has two main intelligent components, an executor and a planner. The two components share a library of possible actions that the system can take. The library encompasses a full range of action representations, including plans, planning operators, and executable procedures such as predefined standard operating procedures (SOP's). These three classes of actions span multiple levels of abstraction.

Wilkins, David E.↗
NASA NTRS2024

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Progress in Red vs. Green Propellant Operations: ASCENT Load Operations Lessons Learned

The Green Propellant Infusion Mission (GPIM) [1] is a NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) effort to establish via demonstration ASCENT propellant (Advanced Space Craft Energetic Non-Toxic propellant, formerly referred to as AF-M315E) ground operations through on –orbit performance. ASCENT was developed by Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) as an increased energy density, reduced toxicity and reduced hazard monopropellant formulation relative to hydrazine. The GPIM team was led by Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation (BATC) as Program Management and Principal Investigator with AFRL, Aerojet-Rocketdyne (AR), the United States Space Force Space and Missile Systems Center (USSF/SMC), NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) as Co-Investigators. The AFRL co-investigator role in the GPIM program was to develop the Propellant Ground Support Equipment (PGSE), associated Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Check Lists (CL), propellant load, propellant specification standard conventions and analysis methods, decontamination and waste disposal practices. This paper will discuss lessons learned in documentation, crew composition and readiness, equipment readiness, propellant readiness and potential improvements in the PGSE design.

Anthony P Zuttarelli↗
NASA NTRS2009

Towards Verification of Operational Procedures Using Auto-Generated Diagnostic Trees

The design, development, and operation of complex space, lunar and planetary exploration systems require the development of general procedures that describe a detailed set of instructions capturing how mission tasks are performed. For both crewed and uncrewed NASA systems, mission safety and the accomplishment of the scientific mission objectives are highly dependent on the correctness of procedures. In this paper, we describe how to use the auto-generated diagnostic trees from existing diagnostic models to improve the verification of standard operating procedures. Specifically, we introduce a systematic method, namely the Diagnostic Tree for Verification (DTV), developed with the goal of leveraging the information contained within auto-generated diagnostic trees in order to check the correctness of procedures, to streamline the procedures in terms of reducing the number of steps or use of resources in them, and to propose alternative procedural steps adaptive to changing operational conditions. The application of the DTV method to a spacecraft electrical power system shows the feasibility of the approach and its range of capabilities

Kurtoglu, Tolga↗
NASA NTRS2023

Safety Case for Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations at NASA Langley Research Center

This Technical Memorandum (TM) is written to provide for dissemination of the methods and safety considerations for operations of small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS)at NASA Langley Research Center. It includes the Safety Case used to acquire a BVLOS Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA and is being published to enable others to benefit from this work. The intended operations, subject to approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), will include a combination of Within Visual Line of Sight (WVLOS) and Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights, comprising of at most five sUAS operating concurrently, with no more than three operating BVLOS. Flights will occur in a subset of the Langley Air Force Base (LAFB) Class D airspace (KLFI) at a maximum altitude of 400 ft AGL. Most operations within this subset will take place in the City Environment Range Testing for Autonomous Integrated Navigation (CERTAIN) Range. The CERTAIN Range includes airspace inside the borders of NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). Additional airspace over the northern section of CERTAIN will be requested as part of the Certificate of Authorization (COA). NASA LaRC BVLOS operations on the CERTAIN Range can be broken down into five critical components needed to meet the 14 CFR § 91.113 see and avoid requirement: 1) procedural deconfliction with LAFB for UAS operations at or below 400 ft and manned aircraft at or above 900’ AGL; 2) ground equipment for detection of intruder aircraft and to support communications between crewmembers ; 3) sUAS vehicles with advanced onboard automation capable of autonomously maintaining safe separation; 4) BVLOS standardized operating procedures (SOPs); 5) and personnel to execute the flight operations in accordance with the SOPs and respond to airborne contingencies. The introduction of new ground equipment includes the use of the Remote Operations for Autonomous Missions (ROAM) UAS Operations Center, development and use of an Integrated Airspace Display (IAD), use of the L-STAR and GA-9120 radars, and the incorporation of standardized Vertiports. The ROAM Operations Center will be the central point for all BVLOS sUAS operations. All command and control (C2), voice communications and airspace awareness displays will reside inside ROAM. The IAD will provide raw data from ADS-B, FLARM, radar tracks and telemetered GPS vehicle positions for interpretation by an Airspace Monitor. The radars will search the class D airspace around the CERTAIN Range and serve as a backup to procedural deconfliction procedures coordinated with LAFB. In the event of a procedural deconfliction breakdown, radar detections of non-participating aircraft will be available so that the 91.113 see and avoid requirement can still be safely met. Finally, the incorporation of Vertiports will have video and network connectivity that enables large numbers of sUAS launches and recoveries from a single location. This is a continuation of the remote command and control of unpiloted aircraft component focused on evaluating unpiloted aircraft flight crew roles and responsibilities, control interfaces and the associated data links needed to operate a fleet of aircraft within a UAM Ecosystem. This work supports the development of future aviation operational concepts based on an Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level (UML) 4 environment (Patterson, 2020). It is assumed that future airspace will include hundreds of simultaneous aircraft operations within the airspace, therefore scalable operations are essential for enabling this future airspace to become a reality. Follow on work includes envisioned flights that expand operations beyond the CERTAIN range and lead to an effective Maritime Surveillance capability.

Matthew W Coldsnow↗
NASA NTRS2022

An Examination of the Recent Stability of Ozonesonde Global Network Data

The recent Assessment of Standard Operating Procedures for OzoneSondes (ASOPOS 2.0; WMO/GAW Report #268) addressed questions of homogeneity and long-term stability in global electrochemical concentration cell (ECC) ozone sounding network time series. Among its recommendations was adoption of a standard for evaluating data quality in ozonesonde time series. Total column ozone (TCO) derived from the sondes compared to TCO from Aura’s Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) is a primary quality indicator. Comparisons of sonde ozone with Aura’s Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) are used to assess the stability of stratospheric ozone. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of global ozonesonde network data stability and accuracy since 2004 in light of the sudden post-2013 TCO “dropoff” of ~3-4% that was reported previously at select stations (Stauffer et al., 2020). Comparisons with Aura OMI TCO averaged across the network of 60 stations are stable within about ±2% over the past 18 years. Sonde TCO has similar stability compared to three other TCO satellite instruments, and the stratospheric ozone measurements average to within ±5% of MLS from 50 to 10 hPa. Thus, sonde data are reliable for trends, but with a caveat applied for a subset of dropoff stations in the tropics and subtropics. The dropoff is associated with only one of two major ECC instrument types. A detailed examination of ECC serial numbers pinpoints the timing of the dropoff. However, we find that overall, ozonesonde data are stable and accurate compared to independent measurements over the past two decades.

Ryan M. Stauffer↗
NASA NTRS1985

Some comparison of ECMWF 3b and GFDL 3b analyses in the tropics

Owing to the problems that data assimilation procedures have in analyzing data in the tropics and to the apparent differences in the descriptions of the European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) and Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) assimilation suites, a brief comparison was done of the resulting analyses in the tropics. Three cases each were selected for Standard Operating Procedures 1 and 2 at the 200 and 850 mb levels, the wind fields for 25 deg N 25 deg S were partitioned into a rotational and divergent component, and various statistics of each were calculated.

Julian, P. R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Long-Term Changes in Atmospheric Ozone

Ozonesondes have made inexpensive, accurate measurements of ozone from the ground to 30km for more than 50 years. The data are used extensively for trend analyses and for evaluation of satellite and model data products, and are also part of climatologies that are used as a priori data for satellite retrievals. They are essential as a transfer standard when merging shorter satellite-derived time series, and are the most important source of trend-quality long-term records below about 18 km. The importance of long-term ozonesonde records as a stable reference has led to increased attention to quantifying uncertainties and changes in ozonesonde data. Based on past intercomparison data, ECC sondes show a modest (~1-5%) high bias with respect to UV-absorption measurements (including MOZAIC-IAGOS) in the troposphere, with an uncertainty of 5%, but no evidence of a change with time. Other sonde types show an increase of 5-20% in sensitivity to tropospheric ozone from 1970-1995. Agreement in the stratosphere is much better. In the past 20 years ozonesonde precision has improved by a factor of 2, primarily through the adoption of strict standard operating procedures. In addition, many of the most important ozonesonde records have been re-evaluated and corrected, and detailed estimates made of their biases and uncertainties. Corrections to historical data for known issues may reduce biases but simultaneously introduce additional uncertainties. The uncertainty budget for the ozone partial pressure reading has contributions from stoichiometry, cell background current, pump efficiency and temperature, sensing solution type and volume. The much-discussed “background current” has recently been shown to be primarily related to reaction stoichiometry. Several quality assurance issues remain, but are tractable problems that can be addressed with further research. This will be required if the present goal of better than 5% overall uncertainty throughout the global ozonesonde network is to be achieved. Finally, the importance of regular sonde intercomparisons, employing UV photometers traceable to the modern UV-absorption standard, and of regular comparison of operational station records with multiple satellite sensors, is emphasized.

Ozonesondes↗
NASA NTRS1998

A Formal Approach for Designing and Evaluating Procedures

Operator interaction with modern control systems is a topic of great concern in high-risk industries such as nuclear power and commercial aviation. The issues associated with such systems focus on the ability of the operators (e.g., pilots) to achieve mission goals safely while containing failures. Operators must be able to interact safely and reliably with highly automatic and complex systems across the full spectrum of possible operating conditions, including normal, abnormal, and emergency situations. In environments such as commercial aviation, operator interaction with the machine is specified through a set of standard operating procedures (SOP). A procedure represents a collective agreement on the 'best' way to perform a given task. The intent of this paper is to suggest a formal methodology, for designing and evaluating procedures, that is both reliable and systematic. Our approach involves two major elements: a model of the machine and a list of the operator's task specifications (goals). We use formal modeling paradigms for describing the system and super-imposing on it the operator's tasks. Such paradigms, based on recent frameworks such as Statecharts and Hierarchical Hybrid Machines appear to be adequate methods for analyzing operator interaction with modern control systems. To illustrate this methodology, we model and analyze the sequence of actions for an emergency procedure. The procedure, Irregular Engine Start, for a medium-range aircraft, specifies the sequence of immediate actions that must be performed by the crew to avoid an uncontrolled rise in engine temperature during start-up. A model of engine behavior during a hot start is constructed. It also describes the various actions that can be taken by the crew and the resulting outcomes. The model is then opened up as a tree of all possible action sequences. This action tree allows us to trace the correct sequences necessary to achieve the desired end-goal (secure and shut down of the engine). In conclusion, we argue that the current process of designing and evaluating procedures can be improved. We discuss the implications of this approach for designing and evaluating this and other types of procedures. We conclude with insights about the benefits and limitation of this methodology, and offer suggestions for future research.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS1999

Chemical Hygiene Program

The Chemical Management Team is responsible for ensuring compliance with the OSHA Laboratory Standard. The program at Lewis Research Center (LeRC) evolved over many years to include training, developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for each laboratory process, coordinating with other safety and health organizations and teams at the Center, and issuing an SOP binder. The Chemical Hygiene Policy was first established for the Center. The Chemical Hygiene Plan was established and reviewed by technical, laboratory and management for viability and applicability to the Center. A risk assessment was conducted for each laboratory. The laboratories were prioritized by order of risk, higher risk taking priority. A Chemical Management Team staff member interviewed the lead researcher for each laboratory process to gather the information needed to develop the SOP for the process. A binder containing the Chemical Hygiene Plan, the SOP, a map of the laboratory identifying the personal protective equipment and best egress, and glove guides, as well as other guides for safety and health. Each laboratory process has been captured in the form of an SOP. The chemicals used in the procedure have been identified and the information is used to reduce the number of chemicals in the lab. The Chemical Hygiene Plan binder is used as a training tool for new employees. LeRC is in compliance with the OSHA Standard. The program was designed to comply with the OSHA standard. In the process, we have been able to assess the usage of chemicals in the laboratories, as well as reduce or relocate the chemicals being stored in the laboratory. Our researchers are trained on the hazards of the materials they work with and have a better understanding of the hazards of the process and what is needed to prevent any incident. From the SOP process, we have been able to reduce our chemical inventory, determine and implement better hygiene procedures and equipment in the laboratories, and provide specific training to our employees. As a result of this program, we are adding labeling to the laboratories for emergency responders and initiating a certified chemical user program.

Mayor, Antoinette C.↗