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NextGen Technologies on the FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System

This paper describes the integration, evaluation, and results from a high-fidelity human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation of key NASA Air Traffic Management Technology Demonstration - 1 (ATD- 1) technologies implemented in an enhanced version of the FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) platform. These ATD-1 technologies include: (1) a NASA enhanced version of the FAA's Time-Based Flow Management, (2) a NASA ground-based automation technology known as controller-managed spacing (CMS), and (3) a NASA advanced avionics airborne technology known as flight-deck interval management (FIM). These ATD-1 technologies have been extensively tested in large-scale HITL simulations using general-purpose workstations to study air transportation technologies. These general purpose workstations perform multiple functions and are collectively referred to as the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS). Researchers at NASA Ames Research Center and Raytheon collaborated to augment the STARS platform by including CMS and FIM advisory tools to validate the feasibility of integrating these automation enhancements into the current FAA automation infrastructure. NASA Ames acquired three STARS terminal controller workstations, and then integrated the ATD-1 technologies. HITL simulations were conducted to evaluate the ATD-1 technologies when using the STARS platform. These results were compared with the results obtained when the ATD-1 technologies were tested in the MACS environment. Results collected from the numerical data show acceptably minor differences, and, together with the subjective controller questionnaires showing a trend towards preferring STARS, validate the ATD-1/STARS integration.

air traffic management↗

Conflict Alerts for Aircraft Conducting Visual Approaches

It is common for aircraft to conduct visual and instrument final approaches to a single runway or multiple parallel runways. Useful, nonexcessive safety alerts on aircraft conducting visual approaches are helpful to air traffic controllers, though pilots are responsible for separation with the preceding aircraft. A variety of visual approaches to various runway configurations are studied, and a set of safety alert thresholds is proposed. Fast-time simulations with recorded real-world air traffic data of mostly visual approach flights are performed on a prototype tactical separation assurance system for terminal airspace. Alerts are generated -- with both the standard separation thresholds and the proposed safety alert thresholds -- and compared with those from the Conflict Alert (CA) functionality in the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS). The results show that the number of Mode-C Intruder alerts generated was reduced 76% as compared to STARS CA. The nuisance alerts generated by assuming visual to be instrument approaches was reduced by 92% when the proposed safety alert thresholds were used and visual approaches were assumed.A set of safety alert thresholds, which allow safety alerts to be provided to the controllers for aircraft conductingvisual approaches to a single runway or multiple parallel runways, has been proposed based on input from SubjectMatter Experts as well as visual approach procedures and common practices. The goal is to maximize the thresholdswithin the guidance of the procedures and common practices and to minimize the number of nuisance alerts and totalnumber of alerts with the support of flight intent information. Tests have been performed using a recently developedprototype tactical separation assurance system for terminal airspace, called Terminal Tactical Separation-AssuredFlight Environment (T-TSAFE). The input was a full day of air traffic data from Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACONwith most arriving flights conducting visual approaches. The results compare favorably with those of the ConflictAlert (CA) functionality of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS).When fast-time simulation experiment was performed using T-TSAFE with all arriving flights assumed to conductinstrument approaches, the expected large number of separation alerts were observed. When compared with STARSCA, the conflict pairs common to both T-TSAFE and STARS CA was only 21% of the total STARS CA alerts. As aresult, the nuisance-alert rate for STARS CA was estimated to be about 70%, which is comparable to a similar previously estimation of 80% nuisance-alert rate for CARTS (Common Automated Radar Terminal System) CA. The Mode-CIntruder (MCI) alerts were also reduced by 76% as compared to STARS CA.Examination of the common conflict pairs between T-TSAFE and STARS CA shows that they are valid separationconflicts with good alert lead times for T-TSAFE. However, many of them would still be considered nuisance alertsif the aircraft were conducting visual approaches. This was confirmed by another visual approach fast-time simulationT-TSAFE experiment, in which all DFW arriving flights were assumed to be on visual approaches and our proposedsafety alert thresholds were used and tested. The result of the experiment showed that the number of non-MCI alertswas less by 92% as compared to the number when all DFW arrivals were assumed to be conducting instrumentapproaches. The common conflict pairs involving aircraft conducting visual approaches to parallel runways werereduced by 93% as well. Thus, the flight intent information and the safety alert thresholds are effective in reducingnuisance alerts.T-TSAFE can thus provide separation and safety conflict alerts seamlessly in the real-world environment of mixedterminal operations with arriving flights of both visual and instrument approaches. Compared with STARS CA, TTSAFEhas fewer false alerts, larger alert lead time, and larger alert thresholds. While the nuisance alerts are reducedsignificantly with the safety alert thresholds, further work is needed to study if the alert lead time for safety alerts issufficient.

Tang, Huabin↗

Considerations for Using Autonomous Flight Termination Software in Crewed Launch Vehicles

Autonomous flight termination systems (AFTS) are being progressively employed onboard launch vehicles to replace ground personnel and infrastructure needed to terminate flight or destruct the vehicle should an anomaly occur. This automation uses on-board real-time data and encoded logic to determine if the flight should be self-terminated. For uncrewed launch vehicles, FTS systems are required to protect the public and governed by the United States Space Force (USSF). For crewed missions, NASA must augment range AFTS requirements for crew safety and certify each flight according to human rating standards, thus adding unique requirements for reuse of software originally intended for uncrewed missions. This bulletin summarizes new information relating to AFTS to raise awareness of key distinctions, summarize considerations and outline best practices for incorporating AFTS into human-rated systems.

Avionics↗

Trajectory Prediction Accuracy and Error Sources for Regional Jet Descents: Results of a 2010 Flight Trial at Denver International Airport using a Global 5000 Test Aircraft - Part I

The Efficient Descent Advisor (EDA) controller automation tool generates trajectory-based speed, path, and altitude-profile advisories to facilitate efficient, continuous descents into congested terminal airspace. While prior field trials have assessed the trajectory-prediction accuracy for large jet (i.e., Boeing and Airbus) types, smaller (i.e., regional and business) jet types present unique challenges involving different descent procedures and Flight Management System (FMS) capabilities. A small-jet field trial was conducted at Denver in the fall of 2010 with the objective of measuring trajectory prediction accuracy and quantifying the primary sources of error. This paper uses data collected onboard a Bombardier Global 5000 test aircraft to quantify the size and sources of trajectory prediction error. Error sources were quantified for the 44 runs by incrementally replacing predicted data with data collected onboard the aircraft and measuring the effect on time error. Results for en-route descents, from prior to top of descent to the meter fix 60-120 nmi downstream, indicate that the aircraft arrived an average 15 seconds earlier than predicted, with a standard deviation of 10 seconds. Target Mach and CAS deceleration were found to be the two largest error sources. If CAS deceleration error was reduced using a typical, more predictable level flight deceleration then the arrival time prediction error in 2010 would be on par with a 2009 flight trial of Airbus and Boeing revenue flights. Four of the error sources, tracker jumps, CAS deceleration, target Mach, and path distance, lend themselves to significant reductions with modest to no changes to ATC automation andor procedures. Wind error and its impact on arrival time error was significantly reduced in 2010 compared to a 1994 flight test using NASAs Boeing 737 test aircraft.

Trajectory Prediction Error↗