Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “standard waste box”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

DROP TESTS RESULTS OF REVISED CLOSURE BOLT CONFIGURATION OF THE STANDARD WASTE BOX, STANDARD LARGE BOX 2, AND TEN DRUM OVERPACK PACKAGINGS

The Transuranic (TRU) Disposition Project at Savannah River Site will require numerous transfers of radioactive materials within the site boundaries for sorting and repackaging. The three DOT Type A shipping packagings planned for this work have numerous bolts for securing the lids to the body of the packagings. In an effort to reduce operator time to open and close the packages during onsite transfers, thus reducing personnel exposure and costs, an evaluation was performed to analyze the effects of reducing the number of bolts required to secure the lid to the packaging body. The evaluation showed the reduction to one-third of the original number of bolts had no effect on the packagings capability to sustain vibratory loads, shipping loads, internal pressure loads, and the loads resulting from a 4-ft drop. However, the loads caused by the 4-ft drop are difficult to estimate and the study recommended each of the packages be dropped to show the actual effects on the package closure. Even with reduced bolting, the packagings were still required to meet the 49 CFR 178.350 performance criteria for Type A packaging. This paper discusses the effects and results of the drop testing of the three packagings.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hydrogen Concentration in the Inner-Most Container within a Pencil Tank Overpack Packaged in a Standard Waste Box Package

The purpose of this report is to evaluate hydrogen generation within Pencil Tank Overpacks (PTO) in a Standard Waste Box (SWB), to establish plutonium (Pu) limits for PTOs based on hydrogen concentration in the inner-most container and to establish required configurations or validate existing or proposed configurations for PTOs. The methodology and requirements are provided in this report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Standard Waste Box Lid Screw Removal Option Testing

This report provides results from test work conducted to resolve the removal of screws securing the standard waste box (SWB) lids that hold the remediated nitrate salt (RNS) drums. The test work evaluated equipment and process alternatives for removing the 42 screws that hold the SWB lid in place. The screws were secured with a red Loctite thread locker that makes removal very difficult because the rivets that the screw threads into would slip before the screw could be freed from the rivet, making it impossible to remove the screw and therefore the SWB lid.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

HYDROGEN GENERATION FROM SLUDGE SAMPLE BOTTLES CAUSED BY RADIOLYSIS AND CHEMISTRY WITH CONCETNRATION DETERMINATION IN A STANDARD WASTE BOX (SWB) OR DRUM FOR TRANSPORT

A volume of 600 mL of sludge, in 4.1 L sample bottles (Appendix 7.6), will be placed in either a Super Pig (Ref. 1) or Piglet (Ref. 2, 3) based on shielding requirements (Ref. 4). Two Super Pigs will be placed in a Standard Waste Box (SWB, Ref. 5), as their weight exceeds the capacity of a drum; two Piglets will be placed in a 55-gallon drum (shown in Appendix 7.2). The generation of hydrogen gas through oxidation/corrosion of uranium metal by its reaction with water will be determined and combined with the hydrogen produced by radiolysis. The hydrogen concentration in the 55-gallon drum and SWB will be calculated to show that the lower flammability limit of 5% hydrogen is not reached. The inner layers (i.e., sample bottle, bag and shielded pig) in the SWB and drum will be evaluated to assure no pressurization occurs as the hydrogen vents from the inner containers (e.g., shielded pigs, etc.). The reaction of uranium metal with anoxic liquid water is highly exothermic; the heat of reaction will be combined with the source term decay heat, calculated from Radcalc, to show that the drum and SWB package heat load limits are satisfied. This analysis does five things: (1) Estimates the H{sub 2} generation from the reaction of uranium metal with water; (2) Estimates the H{sub 2} generation from radiolysis (using Radcalc 4.1); (3) Combines both H{sub 2} generation amounts, from Items 1 and 2, and determines the percent concentration of H{sub 2} in the interior of an SWB with two Super Pigs, and the interior of a 55-gallon drum with two Piglets; (4) From the combined gas generation rate, shows that the pressure at internal layers is minimal; and (5) Calculates the maximum thermal load of the package, both from radioactive decay of the source and daughter products as calculated/reported by Radcalc 4.1, and from the exothermic reaction of uranium metal with water.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Hydrogen Concentration in the Inner-Most Container within a Pencil Tank Overpack Packaged in a Standard Waste Box Package

A set of steady state diffusion flow equations, for the hydrogen diffusion from one bag to the next bag (or one plastic waste container to another), within a set of nested waste bags (or nested waste containers), are developed and presented. The input data is then presented and justified. Inputting the data for each volume and solving these equations yields the steady state hydrogen concentration in each volume. The input data (permeability of the bag surface and closure, dimensions and hydrogen generation rate) and equations are analyzed to obtain the hydrogen concentrations in the innermost container for a set of containers which are analyzed for the TRUCON code for the general waste containers and the TRUCON code for the Pencil Tank Overpacks (PTO) in a Standard Waste Box (SWB).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological characterization of high Cs-137 waste items at LANL combining Cs-137 NDA results and acceptable process knowledge - 15592

Radiological characterization is an important component to disposition and disposal of radioactive waste at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Gamma and neutron based non-destructive assay systems are available at LANL's TA-54 Area G for radiological characterization and are generally very effective in quantifying the transuranic radionuclide concentration required for a TRU or low level waste disposition determination. This is routinely performed by scaling some nuclides to direct assay results using acceptable process knowledge scaling from a directly measured key TRU nuclide, e.g., for gamma systems using a standard isotopic distribution to determine the amount of Pu-240 associated with a measured value of Pu-239. However, for two groups of LANL waste items that have high levels of Cs-137, these non-destructive assay systems were unable to make a standard TRU/LLW determination. Therefore, it was necessary to apply an extension of the typical scaling technique that keyed in on the direct Cs-137 gamma assay result to effectively characterize these waste items for TRU processing or LLW disposition. Two basic types of waste packages contained the high Cs-137 waste requiring special scaling: drums and boxes. The drums included 55-gallon, 85-gallon and 110-gallon volume sizes and the boxes included a corrugated metal box, a Standard Waste Box, and several overpack boxes containing oversized waste. All of these items contained radioactive waste generated from operations at the Chemistry and Metallurgical Research facility at LANL that included hot cell, metallographic sectioning and maintenance activities. All of the drums as well as the CMB, SWB and one oversized item in a plywood box were located above-ground at LANL's TA-54 Area G, while five of the oversized items were hot cell liners in metal boxes stored below-ground in shafts. All of the items were measured in the 2013-2014 time period at TA-54 Area G with LANL NDA systems. Most of the items were counted with LLW certified far-field gamma spectroscopy systems employing portable far-field HPGe detectors and carts and some of the items were counted on WIPP certified gamma only or gamma with neutron NDA systems. In all cases Cs-137 was quantified directly with a gamma measurement but the key TRU nuclides were not detectable. Thus, for each waste item AK/PK was studied and scaling factors to Cs-137 were established and applied to provide a comprehensive radiological characterization. A total of 49 waste items were successfully characterized as LLW based on this technique. The above ground waste items were dispositioned and disposed of at an offsite LLW repository and the below ground boxes were left in place as LLW in the TA-54 Area G shafts. This NDA with scaling application has proved effective and defensible in these high Cs-137 cases at LANL and will continue to be used as applicable and appropriate for future waste characterization at LANL. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Engineering Controls for the Processing and Repackaging of Gloveboxes Contaminated with Plutonium - 19629

Gloveboxes used for processing plutonium (Pu)-238 at the US DOE Mound site in Miamisburg, Ohio, in support of the United States space mission were packaged in non-standard waste boxes and sent to the INL Site for temporary disposal. In addition to the gloveboxes, an assortment of smaller items, all with varying levels of Pu-238 contamination, were found in the non-standard waste boxes. The characteristics of Pu-238 make it especially difficult to contain and control contamination; alpha recoil phenomena and nanometer particle sizes lend to the contamination exhibiting near gas like characteristics. The Idaho Cleanup Project Core contractor, Fluor Idaho, LLC, engineered and deployed a waste processing containment with specialized ventilation and processes to characterize and disposition this waste. This paper summarizes the successes and lessons learned from processing Pu-238-contaminated waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Scoping Thermal Response Calculations of RNS Waste During Transport to and Disposal at the WIPP

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was contracted by the United States Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE-EM), Los Alamos Field Office to perform mechanical and thermal scoping calculations as part of a study seeking to understand the ignitability risk of the Remediated Nitrate Salts (RNS) waste drums during transportation from the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) facility to Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and permanent disposal of the waste at WIPP. The scoping thermal simulations described in this report pertain to thermal calculations performed with a packaging system consisting of one Standard Waste Box (SWB) loaded with drums placed inside a Standard Large Box 2 (SLB2). During transportation, the SLB2 is inside Transuranic Package Transporter Model III (TRUPACT-III), which provides the third layer of the packaging. Once at the WIPP, it is assumed the SLB2 is extracted from the TRUPACT-III and maintained above ground, and then subsequently placed underground for permanent disposal. In these proposed configurations, the space between the SLB2 and the SWB is always filled by a layer of insulation consisting of air-filled glass microbubbles except for the bottom which rests directly on the SLB2. The thermal scoping calculations described in this report specifically address whether the introduction of external heat inputs, combined with the contributions from the internally generated radiolytic decay heat and chemical reactions, lead to an unstable thermal state during the time of its movement and placement in the permanent disposal location. The external heat inputs are of two forms: 1) ambient thermal irradiation (e.g., solar and ambient storage/disposal temperatures) and 2) accident-induced fire. Three scoping calculation scenarios were derived as representative, conservative scenarios: 1A) TRUPACT-III transient transportation, 1B) SLB2 48-hour outdoor storage with solar radiation, and 2) fully-engulfing fire during SLB2 handling or emplacement following a steady-state analysis in a 38 °C environment. All the simulated scenarios are conservative relative to the operational conditions expected for handling the waste package during transportation and placement in the WIPP underground disposal unit. The predictions obtained from simulating the three exposure scenarios revealed that adding the SLB2 and the air-filled glass microbubbles to the transport and storage/disposal configurations provides additional thermal protection of the drums beyond what the SWB provides alone, both during long-term above ground insolation and underground during a fire accident. Under the current transportation/storage/disposal concepts, the degree of protection provided by the packaging concept is sufficient to prevent the waste from being ignitable. The simulation results demonstrate that there is adequate margin to safely transport and place the RNS waste from WCS to the WIPP under the current operational concept.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Upgrade and Certification of the Los Alamos National Laboratory SHENC 2011 - 12270

Nondestructive assay measurements of Transuranic (TRU) waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) required the addition of a standard waste box (SWB) assay system. A Super High Efficiency Neutron Counter (SHENC) located at Hanford was identified to be relocated to LANL. After careful evaluation of waste streams at LANL, it was determined that the current configuration of the SHENC was not sufficient to quantify certain waste streams. At LANL, there is still a large amount of waste that needs to be retrieved and repackaged within SWB's to meet agreements with the State of New Mexico. Prior to relocating the SHENC, the only assay systems available were High Efficiency Neutron Counters having only a 55-gallon drum capacity. Further analyses indicated that the SHENC system should be capable of quantitative gamma measurements that are to be linked, and combined, with the neutron measurements. The SHENC system was therefore augmented with a new high-resolution gamma spectroscopy system using BE5030 detectors and upgraded gamma electronics. The neutron side of the system was also upgraded with an advanced shift register (JSR-15), an improved Programmable Logic Controller and NDA-2000 software. This report will include calibration of both the neutron and gamma modalities of the SHENC system and how the modality results are combined to produce a single assay result. Preliminary performance results will be discussed based on both mock and real waste measurements. Discussions will also include a complete description of the adjustable parameters as well as the calibration plan, techniques and validations including calibration confirmation based on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP-WAC). The SHENC was successfully upgraded to efficiently measure the complex waste streams at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A new PLC was successfully added to the system for Add-A-Source control. A new shift register was added to the SHENC (JSR-15) which provides more flexibility if replacement is required. The addition of the density based calibration on the gamma modality of the system increases the effectiveness of the SHENC for high alpha-n producing waste. Upgrading the system to new software also helped to standardize the program at Los Alamos. Only one new procedure was initiated for the integration of the SHENC. Add-A-Source measurements were effectively integrated with the system based on the confirmation results and positive results during two Department of Energy Performance Demonstration Program Box Cycles. Total measurement uncertainty estimates were completed for both the gamma modality and the neutron modality of the system. The SHENC was reviewed by both the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency in 2011. The certification letter for the SHENC was issued on November 16, 2011. With the certification letter issued to the Central Characterization Project the SHENC can perform waste measurements on SWB's at Los Alamos for shipment to WIPP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WIPP Certification of the Retrieval Box Assay System at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant, Idaho - 16241

The Retrieval Box Assay System (RBAS) at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) is an Imaging Passive Active Neutron system supplemented with a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma system for the quantification of Pu-239 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) and transuranic (TRU) alpha activity of waste containers of various sizes up to 249 cm x 149 cm x 198 cm (Length x Width x Height). The system was originally calibrated in 2002 (with a range of surrogate matrices and radioactive sources in a 213 cm x 122 cm x 122 cm FRP box) and has been operational for over a decade. As of August 2015, the RBAS has measured approximately 18,000 boxes (50,000 m3 of waste) which has subsequently been fed into the facility's treatment process. Its success, and the wide envelope of waste that it can characterize, has led AMWTP to extend the RBAS mission to include WIPP certification. As part of this new project, the instrument must be capable of meeting WIPP's Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) which include reporting activities and masses of the 10 WIPP-tracked radionuclides. The system will be required to assay sludge and debris waste streams, shredded waste and large metal items. The container size includes Standard Waste Box (SWBs), Fiberglass Reinforced Plywood (FRPs) and large Shredder Boxes. Sludge matrices will be loaded into 210-liter (55-gallon) drums and placed inside an SWB. After assay, boxes will be over-packed into SLB-II's for shipment to WIPP. The target waste streams will contain mixtures of Weapons Grade plutonium, Heat Source plutonium (high in Pu-238 content) and Mixed Oxide (MOX). The activity of the waste is expected to encompass a wide dynamic range of activity from low-level waste (LLW) to TRU with up to several hundred grams of plutonium. Some packages will have high gamma activity associated with fission and activation products such as Cs-137 and Co-60. The existing RBAS hardware (detectors, electronics, assay chamber etc.) was retained for this project. Two lead filters were provided and installed on the existing filter wheels to attenuate the gamma ray flux from the highest activity boxes to avoid overload of the HPGe detectors. The new software suite includes PC-FRAM (Version 5), which is used for the isotopic analysis of the gamma spectra. Integration of FRAM and neutron results is performed using a software package known as RBAS WIPP Analysis Reporting Software (RWARS). This package also performs matrix dependent background adjustments. Other upgrades provided include automated tests that identify when assay parameters fall outside a predetermined range and a new Quality Checking (QC) application. Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) values were determined for the active and passive neutron modes as a function of measured matrix correction indices. The resulting Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) has been demonstrated to be less than 3700 Bq/g alpha activity (100 nCi/g). Modifications were performed to update the system TMU parameters to accommodate assay of non-standard size boxes and a wider range of matrix materials. A series of calibration confirmation, measurements were performed on site in 2014 using a representative range of surrogate boxes and radioactive sources including Pu. The WIPP WAC performance criteria were successfully demonstrated up to 157 g Pu and the system passed its first Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) cycle in the Spring of 2015. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Multi-Year Work Plan to De-Inventory TRU Waste Stored at LANL - 12121

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) continues to accelerate disposition of transuranic (TRU) waste stored at its Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility. The current focus is on complete removal of all non-cemented above-grade Legacy and newly-generated TRU waste that was in storage on October 1, 2011, by no later than June 30, 2014. This inventory of above-grade TRU is defined as 3,706 m{sup 3} of material. Legacy TRU waste containers were placed into storage up to 40 years ago, and most of the older containers must be remediated to address compliance issues before the waste can be characterized, certified as meeting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), and shipped for disposition. More than half of the remaining TRU waste volume stored above grade is contained within oversize boxes that contain waste items that must be repackaged or size reduced. Facilities and major types of equipment needed to remediate and characterize the TRU waste inventory are largely in place, but two additional oversize box processing lines are being implemented in 2012. Multiple work shifts are planned for most remediation lines in 2013. An integrated risk-based project management schedule for all disposition activities has been developed that is based on a 'Solution Package' approach. Inventories of containers that have issues in common were compiled into about 15 waste categories and about 70 'Solution Packages' that identify all of the activities needed to disposition the inventory of TRU waste in storage. Scheduled activities include all precursor activities to begin remediation, remediation processing, characterization and certification to the WIPP WAC, and shipping of containers to WIPP. Processing of the 3,706 m{sup 3} is projected to result in about 4,500 55-gallon (208 L) drums and 1,000 standard waste boxes that will be shipped to WIPP. About 385 shipments from LANL to WIPP are projected before June 30, 2014, to ship these containers, at a rate of 5 to 6 shipments a week. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations Manual (Rev. 10.2)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following CH packaging payload Drum payload assembly Standard Waste Box (SWB) assembly Ten-Drum Overpack (TDOP) Shielded Container Assembly.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CH Packaging Operations Manual (Rev. 11.0)

This procedure provides instructions for assembling the following Contact-Handled (CH) packaging payload: Drum payload assembly, Standard Waste Box (SWB) assembly, Ten-Drum Overpack (TDOP), and Shielded Container Assembly.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP) Underground and MGO Samples by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL)

Analysis of the recent WIPP samples are summarized in this report; WIPP Cam Filters 4, 6, 9 (3, 7, 11 were analyzed with FAS-118 in a separate campaign); WIPP Drum Lip R16 C4; WIPP Standard Waste Box R15 C5; WIPP MgO R16 C2; WIPP MgO R16 C4; WIPP MgO R16 C6; LANL swipes of parent drum; LANL parent drum debris; LANL parent drum; IAEA Swipe; Unused “undeployed” Swheat; Unused “undeployed” MgO; and Masselin cloth “smears”. Analysis showed that the MgO samples were very pure with low carbonate and water content. Other samples showed the expected dominant presence of Mg, Na and Pb. Parent drum debris sample was mildly acidic. Interpretation of results is not provided in this document, but rather to present and preserve the analytical work that was performed. The WIPP Technical Analysis Team is responsible for result interpretation which will be written separately.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Statistical Modeling Efforts for Headspace Gas

The purpose of this document is to describe the statistical modeling effort for gas concentrations in WIPP storage containers. The concentration (in ppm) of CO 2 in the headspace volume of standard waste box (SWB) 68685 is shown. A Bayesian approach and an adaptive Metropolis-Hastings algorithm were used.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Campaign 303 - Installation of PRDw SF on RNS Waste Containers at LANL

Waste Campaign (WC) 303 consists of 48 55-gallon drums and eight pipe overpack containers (POCs) remediated nitrate salt (RNS) daughter containers. There are a total of 60 RNS waste containers; however, this waste campaign plan will only address the 48 standard 55-gallon containers, and eight POCs in standard waste boxes (SWBs).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal evaluations for mixed organic and nitrate salt drums in interim storage at the WCS Federal Waste Facility

Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) operates the Federal Waste Facility (FWF) in Texas that is licensed to process and store certain types of mixed low-level radioactive waste packages. The specific waste currently housed at WCS includes some of the transuranic (TRU) waste that originated at the DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and are destined for disposal at the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility. The TRU waste within each Standard Waste Box (SWB) was packaged in 55-gallon drums at LANL. Some of the drums contain mixed organic and nitrate salt contents suspected of experiencing a chemical reaction. The drums (up to four drums in a SWB) were then overpacked in a SWB prior to shipment to WCS. In the most common configuration, WCS placed the SWB containing the drums on metal pallets and stored two SWBs into Modular Concrete Canisters (MCCs) in a double stacked array. The MCCs were placed in a staggered array at a segregated area of the FWF and covered with sand to mitigate the heating that occurred when stored above ground on waste pads. The temporary interment is also intended to provide additional containment of the suspect reactive waste to mitigate release of radioactivity in an incident such as that which occurred at WIPP for one such drum. Void space of each MCC was filled with 1-inch pea gravel to facilitate retrievability. Thermocouple probes were placed within each MCC to monitor heat generation from the SWBs and the MCC lids were closed. The primary objective of this analysis was to estimate the heat generation of the SWB drum contents when the SWB package temperature inside the MCC and the FWF ambient temperature were monitored.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NSRD-16: Computational Capability to Substantiate DOE-HDBk-3010 Data

Safety basis analysts throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex rely heavily on the information provided in the DOE Handbook, DOE-HDBK-3010, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, to determine radionuclide source terms from postulated accident scenarios. In calculating source terms, analysts tend to use the DOE Handbook's bounding values on airborne release fractions (ARFs) and respirable fractions (RFs) for various categories of insults (representing potential accident release categories). This is typically due to both time constraints and the avoidance of regulatory critique. Unfortunately, these bounding ARFs/RFs represent extremely conservative values. Moreover, they were derived from very limited small-scale bench/laboratory experiments and/or from engineered judgment. Thus, the basis for the data may not be representative of the actual unique accident conditions and configurations being evaluated. The goal of this research is to develop a more accurate and defensible method to determine bounding values for the DOE Handbook using state-of-art multi-physics-based computer codes. This enables us to better understand the fundamental physics and phenomena associated with the types of accidents in the handbook. In this fourth year, we improved existing computational capabilities to better model fragmentation situations to capture small fragments during an impact accident. In addition, we have provided additional new information for various sections of Chapters 4 and 5 of the Handbook on free fall powders and impacts of solids, and have provided the damage ratio simulations for containers (7A drum and standard waste box) for various drops and impact scenarios. Thus, this work provides a low-cost method to establish physics-justified safety bounds by considering specific geometries and conditions that may not have been previously measured and/or are too costly to perform during an experiment.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗