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Results for “system verification”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Report on Field Test at INL Cask Farm of Single Detector Fast Neutron Spent Fuel Cask Verification System

Detecting diversion of spent fuel elements in dry storage casks is challenging due to the thick shielding used in cask construction. Measurements on top of the cask to map the underlying arrangement of the fuel elements and looking for anomalous changes over time has proven difficult to achieve using gamma rays due to the high scattering and attenuation from the thick steel structure, weakening information on the present or absence of fuel bundles. Simulations and laboratory experiments suggest that the high-energy neutron flux (>200 keV) measured directly above each fuel bundle is sufficient to produce a position map that enables detection of the present or absence of fuel bundles, and therefore diversion of a spent fuel bundle. A single-detector spent-fuel monitoring technique based on this principle was development at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The INL Cask Farm in the INTEC technical area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) offers the capability to test this technique on an MC-10 storage cask which has a distribution of full and empty fuel positions. An experimental test plan for the single-detector verification system was developed in consultation with INL personnel to be completed in FY2021. Due to travel advisories related to COVID-19, the experimental test plan was adapted to enable INL personnel to carry out the measurements in consultation with LLNL personnel following shipment of the LLNL system to INL. Field test measurements of the single detector verification system were successfully carried out at the INL cask farm on September 7-9, 2021. This document summarizes results of the field test.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Electrical meter probe contact verification system

A system and method verifies continuity with and measures voltage across a circuit under test (in some instances simultaneously) using two or more test probes. Two or more probe continuity circuits measure continuity through the test probes by injecting a test current through and measuring a processed test current received at each of the plurality of test probes. The probe continuity circuits measure the respective processed test current rendered by the test current flowing through the test circuit at each test probe. A voltmeter measures the potential difference across the test probes.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

On-the-fly computation of analog mixed-signal (AMS) measurements

The present disclosure generally relates to an analog mixed-signal (AMS) design verification system. In particular, the present disclosure relates to a system and method for system verification. One example method includes: obtaining an electronic representation of the circuit design; generating at least a portion of a waveform using the electronic representation of the circuit to obtain a first segment of the waveform associated with the circuit; converting, via the one or more processors, one or more measurement functions to code for performing the one or more computations on the first segment of the waveform; performing one or more computations on the first segment of the waveform using the code; and identifying when a behavior of the circuit violates a design specification based on whether a result of the one or more computations meets a threshold.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

The RF Protection Interlock System Prototype Verification

The Radio Frequency Protection Interlock system plays vital role in the LLRF related/dependent accelerator sections Protection. It’s main role is to collect information from number different sensors and indicators around nearest cavities and cryomodule and provide instant RF signal termination in case of safety thresholds violation. This submission describes newly designed RFPI system tailored to the Proton Improvement Plan II (PIP-II) requirements. The proof of concept prototype of this system has been build. The paper includes also the CMTF environment evaluation tests results and findings as an input to the next full-scope prototype design.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE Focus Area 4: Structured Decision Metrics Analysis (Final Report)

A structured decision metrics analysis was developed as one of the tasks under PROACTIVE’s Focus Area 4 (FA4) and used structured decision metrics for processes, items, and facilities (PIF) to determine the efficacy of an M&V system in meeting treaty goals and technical objectives. The method starts with the functional decomposition of a “treaty” with the M&V system overlaid on it. A Functional Decomposition Rubric (FDR) for each PIF is used to determine a score ranging from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong) for assurance, security, and burden. The individual scores are combined to provide an overall Verification System Score (VSS) which assesses the overall verification system’s suitability given goals; scores for each step of the process are also given. The outcome of the evaluation is to identify needs or modifications to the enterprise model, verification system, or proposed testbed capabilities. VeriScore was used to evaluate FA4’s Spiral 0 exercise; those results are included in this report. The VeriScore and FDR framework can also be used in a non-treaty environment, as any goal/objective/method structure will work, thus expanding its applicability beyond traditional arms control structures.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Georgetown University – SYSM 5630 Systems Integration Verification and Validation : Todd Noste

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the National Ignition Facility Optics Group, we use the systems engineering approach for project management and as a design tool. Systems engineering is used in a graded approach to design and project management that is based on risk, informing how much rigor to apply. The tools and techniques from systems engineering offer a framework to organize projects with everyone speaking the same language to provide consistent and repeatable project success that satisfies the stakeholders’ needs and meets the mission. The classes have provided a framework with tools for communicating system design, requirements, verification and validation, and an operational context.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Use of Grid-Forming Medium-Voltage Power Electronics Hub in a Microgrid Setting

This paper presents the application of a new design of a multiport, modular, medium-voltage power electronics hub (M3PE-HUB) in a microgrid setting. The M3PE-HUB system was modeled in a digital real-time simulator (DRTS) and integrated into the Banshee microgrid test system. This paper presents the preliminary DRTS simulation-based results of the M3PE-HUB system connected in a test microgrid system. Verification and validation of the M3PE-HUB architecture and controls in the test microgrid setting are the primary contributions of this work. The results of the operation during the islanding and resynchronization process indicate the feasibility of the proposed architecture in a microgrid setting. This paper also presents results for a system reconfiguration use case where the M3PE-HUB was used to reconfigure the system under a fault condition.

grid forming↗
DOE OSTI2026

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

A conservative, interface-resolved, compressible framework for the modeling and simulation of liquid/gas phase change

This paper presents a method for simulating evaporation in a compressible, interface-resolved framework appropriate for modeling problems of engineering interest. In order to achieve robustness and broad applicability, the method has been designed to discretely enforce consistent mass and thermal energy transport at the phase interface, to globally conserve mass, momentum, and energy, and to be capable of modeling compressible and incompressible systems. Verification is performed via the Sod-shock test, one-dimensional heat conduction, evaporation from a planar interface, and evaporation of three-dimensional droplets. Convergence with increasing mesh resolution is demonstrated in all tested configurations, and conservation is maintained near machine precision for a translating droplet. Conservation and accurate phase change rates are preserved at the low numerical resolutions commonly encountered in engineering calculations. Following verification, the method is validated by comparison to an empirical correlation for evaporating droplets in high temperature crossflow, and the presentation concludes with the simulation of an iso-octane spray at conditions representative of gasoline direct injection. In conclusion, successful verification, validation, and demonstrated practical utility suggest the method to be an accurate, efficient, and robust approach for the study of phase change in engineering systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Use of Grid-Forming Medium-Voltage Power Electronics Hub in a Microgrid Setting: Preprint

This paper presents the application of a new design of a multiport, modular, medium-voltage power electronics hub (M3PE-HUB) in a microgrid setting. The M3PE-HUB system was modeled in a digital real-time simulator (DRTS) and integrated into the Banshee microgrid test system. This paper presents the preliminary DRTS simulation-based results of the M3PE- HUB system connected in a test microgrid system. Verification and validation of the M3PE-HUB architecture and controls in the test microgrid setting are the primary contributions of this work. The results of the operation during the islanding and resynchronization process indicate the feasibility of the proposed architecture in a microgrid setting. This paper also presents results for a system reconfiguration use case where the M3PE- HUB was used to reconfigure the system under a fault condition.

grid forming↗
DOE OSTI2024

The First Tri-Lab Workshop on Formal Verification: Capabilities, Challenges, Research Opportunities, and Exemplars

The First Tri-Lab Workshop on Formal Verification was held in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on December 5th, 2023. This workshop gathered staff from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This report summarizes and expands on the presentations given and discussion had at this workshop. In this report, we describe the current capabilities and research needs related to formal methods at the NNSA labs. In particular, we identify medium-term and long-term research gaps in programming languages, formalization efforts of complex systems, embedded systems verification, hardware verification, cybersecurity, formal methods usability, workflows, numerical methods, the use of formal methods for artificial intelligence (and its converse, artificial intelligence for formal methods), and collaboration opportunities and considerations on these topics. We conclude with a small number of exemplar research problems related to these topics.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗