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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1980

SPS technical issues

The technical issues which would either seriously impact or potentially negate the integrity of a solar power satellite program are enumerated. Issues are identified not only relating to the question of engineering feasibility, but also to the equally important areas of environmental and social acceptability and, especially, economic viability. Specific information required for resolution of the issues was developed and a planned overall approach for resolution was identified. Results of these analyses show that 60% of the technical issues can be resolved with analysis only; 10% require only ground testing for resolution; and the remaining 30% require space experiments or demonstrations for resolution. The results also show that 85% resolution of the issues may be accomplished prior to development of a protoype.

Guttman, C. H.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Long Term Dry Storage Technical Issues Action Plan - Technical and Engineering Activities

The DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group (SNFWG)’s report on technical considerations and challenges for extended dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) entitled, Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Technical Consideration and Challenges for Extended (>50 Years) Dry Storage, DOE/ID RPT-1575, June 2017 identified five knowledge gaps and technical data needs. This DOE SNFWG report also made several recommendations including one to develop an action plan to identify needed technical and engineering activities and analyses to address the identified knowledge gaps and technical data needs. A team composed of twenty SNF management experts and appropriate subject matter experts from the Idaho National Laboratory and Savannah River National Laboratory was assembled to develop this action plan. The action plan identifies and recommends six technical and engineering tasks and estimated cost and schedule for task completion. It is estimated that $5M and 18 months will be required to execute the recommended tasks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Resolution of Technical Issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Pretreatment Facility - 17281

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have required additional expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. In 2006, an External Flowsheet Review Team identified 28 technical vulnerabilities with the plant design or future operability. Over a period of three months starting in September 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review of the major technical issues associated with the design and operability of the WTP. These experts also provided independent advice on some of the broader challenges associated with completing the Hanford tank waste mission - highlighting the linkage between the physical and chemical properties of the tank waste and the PT Facility technical issues. In 2012 and early 2013, DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) directed the WTP contractor to suspend production work on the PT Facility until the outstanding technical issues could be resolved and the nuclear safety basis could be updated and brought into alignment with any updates to the facility design and/or process flowsheet. By late 2016, DOE and the WTP contractor resolved three of the eight outstanding technical issues: - (T1) Hydrogen Gas in Vessels; - (T2) Criticality in PT Facility Vessels; - (T3) Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV). Resolving all three of these issues required a combination of engineering studies and updates to foundational PT Facility safety basis documents to ensure both the design features and safety control strategies were adequately developed and fully supportable. The five remaining unresolved technical issues are Pulse-Jet Mixing (PJM) of Vessels (T4), Erosion and Corrosion in WTP Vessels and Piping (T5), PT Facility Optimization (T6), Black Cell Vessel Structural Integrity (T7), and Facility Ventilation (T8). Specific plans for resolving each of the five remaining technical issues have been developed by the WTP contractor. This paper provides a synopsis of the status of PT Facility technical issue resolution, and how resolution of the issues will enable DOE to make an informed decision to establish a new performance baseline for the PT Facility at a future date. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Progress on Resolution of Technical Issues at the Hanford Waste Treatment And Immobilization Plant Project - 16285

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Pretreatment (PT) Facility has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have required additional expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. In 2006 an External Flowsheet Review Team identified 28 technical vulnerabilities with the plant design or future operability. Over a period of three months starting in September 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review of the major technical issues associated with the design and operability of the WTP. These experts also provided independent advice on some of the broader challenges associated with completing the Hanford tank waste mission - highlighting the linkage between the physical and chemical properties of the tank waste and the PT Facility technical issues. In 2012 and early 2013 DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) directed the WTP contractor to suspend production work on the Pretreatment Facility until the outstanding technical issues could be resolved and the nuclear safety basis could be updated and brought into alignment with any updates to the facility design and/or process flowsheet. Specific plans for resolving each the technical issues have been developed and significant progress has been made over the past year in identifying solution sets for each of the issues. The eight remaining technical issues (referred to as T1 to T8) are as follows: (T1) Hydrogen Gas Release from Vessel Solids; (T2) Potential Criticality in Pretreatment Facility Vessels; (T3) Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels; (T4) Pulse-Jet Mixing and Control; (T5) Erosion and Localized Corrosion in WTP Vessels and Piping; (T6) Design Redundancy in Black Cells/In-Service Inspection; (T7) Black Cell Vessel Structural Integrity; (T8) Facility Ventilation. This paper provides a synopsis of the progress that has been made on resolving the Pretreatment technical issues over the past year, and how resolution of the issues will enable DOE to make an informed decision to resume design and production engineering for the Pretreatment Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2011

Investigating Some Technical Issues on Cohesive Zone Modeling of Fracture

This study investigates some technical issues related to the use of cohesive zone models (CZMs) in modeling fracture processes. These issues include: why cohesive laws of different shapes can produce similar fracture predictions; under what conditions CZM predictions have a high degree of agreement with linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) analysis results; when the shape of cohesive laws becomes important in the fracture predictions; and why the opening profile along the cohesive zone length needs to be accurately predicted. Two cohesive models were used in this study to address these technical issues. They are the linear softening cohesive model and the Dugdale perfectly plastic cohesive model. Each cohesive model constitutes five cohesive laws of different maximum tractions. All cohesive laws have the same cohesive work rate (CWR) which is defined by the area under the traction-separation curve. The effects of the maximum traction on the cohesive zone length and the critical remote applied stress are investigated for both models. For a CZM to predict a fracture load similar to that obtained by an LEFM analysis, the cohesive zone length needs to be much smaller than the crack length, which reflects the small scale yielding condition requirement for LEFM analysis to be valid. For large-scale cohesive zone cases, the predicted critical remote applied stresses depend on the shape of cohesive models used and can significantly deviate from LEFM results. Furthermore, this study also reveals the importance of accurately predicting the cohesive zone profile in determining the critical remote applied load.

Wang, John T.↗
DOE OSTI2015

Plan for resolution of technical issues at the Hanford waste treatment and immobilization plant project - 15596

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Project has a number of first-of-a-kind technical challenges that have necessitated expert analysis and testing activities to resolve. Since 2006, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) chartered two major WTP technical reviews. Most recently, in 2012, a number of top scientists and engineers conducted a review focused on the design and operability of WTP black cell and hard-to-reach areas. To provide leadership and oversight for resolution of the technical issues, DOE assembled a Design Completion Team composed of personnel from the DOE Office of River Protection (ORP), DOE contractors, and the national laboratories. The Design Completion Team established five technical sub-teams to address specific focus areas. The work of these sub-teams has evolved such that the project is now focused on eight technical issues referred to as T1 to T8. The WTP contractor has developed, and DOE has approved, plans for resolution of these issues. These plans form the basis for the Pretreatment (PT) Facility engineering work that will be performed over the coming years. This work, along with a corresponding update to the PT Facility safety basis, will result in an authorization to resume the engineering work necessary to complete the PT Facility design. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1979

The critical satellite technical issues of future pervasive broadband low-cost communication networks

The critical technical issues of signal waveform design, projected spacecraft technology, satellite launch options, and satellite cost are discussed for future pervasive broadband communication networks. With DPCM video signal encoding, 32 Mb/s user-to-user data rate per channel, 10% overhead, two orthogonal polarizations, and crosstalk loss limited to 1 dB, TFM permits about 75 channels/GHz of frequency allocation. The BOM (beginning of mission) weight and power of a baseline 400-channel multibeam satellite is about 1800 kg and 5000 W. Each 35 Mb/s channel can support 1 to 10 video channels. The weight and power estimates assume hardened digital logic, composite materials for a multibeam antenna structure, high-efficiency solar cells, batteries, and amplifiers. Based on a cost model for large communication satellites, the total space segment cost of two active satellites and one spare would be about $485 M.

Harvey, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Technical Issues in Implementing DTN in a Flight Software Architecture

This slide presentation reviews some of the technical issues in implementing Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) in a enviornments that lack continuous network connectivity, such as spacecraft in deepspace or submarines. In a DTN, asynchronous variable-length messages (called bundles) are routed in a store and forward manner between participating nodes over a heterogeneous network. The review examines the enabling technologies, the porting steps and issues, operational scenarios for DTN. There is a review of the Licklider Transmission Protocol (LTP) aka Long-haul Transmission Protocol. Also included is a brief review of the current uses of DTN.

Licklider Transmission Protocol (LTP)↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues that Need to Be Addressed in Preparing a Large Program to Transport SNF and HLW - 20093

The U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) has been interested for many years in the Department of Energy (DOE) activities related to transporting spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The Board has conducted several public meetings and issued associated reports on this topic. In September 2019, the Board issued a report entitled Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation-Technical Issues that Need to Be Addressed in Preparing for a Nationwide Effort to Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste [1] that focuses on the issues DOE will need to address to plan and implement an integrated transportation program. In its report, the Board describes 30 broad technical issues that DOE needs to address and offers three sets of findings and recommendations to DOE. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Key Technical Issues for Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC) Waste Disposal - 20164

Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste is low-level waste (LLW) that exceeds the Class C concentrations tabulated in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61. Disposal of GTCC waste in the near surface (i.e. upper 30 m of the earth's surface) is prohibited in the United States. Though GTCC waste disposal is generally prohibited, the Commission can approve disposal according to 10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)(iv) on a case-by-case basis. The waste classification tables, developed in the early 1980's, were based on model projections of dose to an inadvertent intruder in agricultural, construction, and discovery exposure scenarios. The assumptions and parameters used were documented in a series of public reports. Though different disposal facility designs and site conditions were considered, the waste classification tables were based on a disposal facility design located in a specific environment. The tables were based on shallow (i.e., top few meters) trench facility designs and did not consider deeper facilities. To determine the suitability of GTCC waste disposal in the near-surface, site-specific analyses must account for differences between GTCC waste and Class A, B, and C LLW (hereafter, traditional LLW). GTCC waste can have concentrations of radionuclides that are much higher than traditional LLW. Because of these higher concentrations, processes that are typically not significant for traditional LLW may be significant with respect to disposal of GTCC waste. These processes include, but are not limited to, heat generation, criticality, and radiolysis. The form of the waste as well as the barriers to release of the waste (e.g. waste package) could be substantially different than they are for traditional LLW. These barriers need to be considered when assessing the impacts of accidents during receipt and placement and in evaluating long-term performance. Some GTCC radioactivity is either embedded in stainless steel or contained in stainless steel barriers. Stainless steel can have very low corrosion rates under a variety of environmental conditions. Finally, and possibly most importantly, GTCC waste would likely need to be disposed deeper than traditional LLW to reduce the probability of disturbance. The waste classification table values of traditional LLW are based on an inadvertent intruder excavating into the waste and bringing some of the material to the land surface. If waste is deeper than approximately 5 m, the excavation scenario becomes very unlikely. Therefore, other intruder scenarios, such as drilling exposure scenarios, need to be evaluated. This paper summarizes key technical issues for the disposal of GTCC waste. Our previous study shows that certain GTCC waste may be suitable for near surface disposal whereas others may not. This study may support ongoing technical analyses assessing potential disposal of GTCC in a near surface disposal facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2002

Regulatory and Technical Issues Concerning the Detection and Treatment of NDMA-Contaminated Groundwater at NASA WSTF

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was established in 1963 primarily to provide rocket engine testing services for several NASA programs. The groundwater underlying the site has been contaminated as a result of historical operations. Groundwater contaminants include several volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and two semi-volatile compounds: N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) and N-nitrodimethylamine (DMN). This paper discusses some of the technical, analytical, regulatory, and health risk issues associated with the contaminant plume. The plume has moved approximately 2.5 miles downgradient of the facility industrial boundary, with evidence of continued migration. As a result, NASA has proposed a pump and treat system using air strippers and ultraviolet (UV) oxidation to stabilize future movement of the contaminant plume. The system has been designed to treat 1,076 gallons (4,073 liters) per minute, with provisions for future expansion. The UV oxidation process was selected to treat NDMA-contaminated groundwater based on successes at other NDMA-contaminated sites. Bench- and pilot-scale testing of WSTF groundwater confirmed the ability of UV oxidation to destroy NDMA and generated sufficient data to design the proposed full-scale treatment system. NDMA is acutely toxic and is a probable human carcinogen. EPA-recommended health risk criteria for the residential consumption of NDMA/DMN-contaminated groundwater was used to determine that a 1.0 x 10(exp -6) excess cancer risk corresponds to 1.7 parts per trillion (ppt). EPA analytical methods are unable to detect NDMA and DMN in the low ppt range. EPA's current Appendix IX analytical method used to screen for NDMA, Method 8270, can detect NDMA only at levels that are orders of magnitude greater than the recommended health risk level. Additionally, EPA Method 607, the most sensitive EPA approved method, has a detection limit of 150 ppt. This corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 9.0 x 10(exp -5), which exceeds the State of New Mexico's water quality standard of a cancer risk less than 1 x 10(exp -5). The treatment system has been engineered to treat contaminated groundwater to levels significantly below the New Mexico standard. However, the inability of EPA-approved analytical methods to detect NDMA and DMN at low ppt levels, and to provide verification of compliance with the 1 x 10(exp -5) cancer risk, introduces a notable risk to the long-term operation of the system. WSTF has been working with Southwest Research Institute to develop a non-EPA analytical method that can achieve a reporting limit of 1 ppt, which corresponds to an excess cancer risk of 7.6 x 10(exp -7). WSTF is currently developing a proposal to obtain approval from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) of this non-EPA method.

Wiebe, D. T.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Policy and Technical Issues Facing a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Chapter 14

We report the largest obstacle to creating nuclear weapons, starting with the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has been to make sufficient quantities of fissile materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium – to sustain an explosive fission chain reaction.1 Recognition of this fact has, for more than fifty years, underpinned both the support for and the opposition to adoption of an international treaty banning at a minimum the production of more fissile materials for nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1981

Technical issues in focal plane development for terrestrial resource observations

Performance goals for solid-state detector arrays operating in the pushbroom scan mode for the high-resolution, high-accuracy remote sensing of earth resources from space are discussed and some of the focal plane and system trades involved are identified. Issues in the development of solid-state pushbroom arrays with radiometric calibration to 0.5% precision detector-to-detector over a dynamic range of 1000:1 are considered, with calibration, temporal stability and spectral response conditions noted. Factors influencing the geometric precision of satellite-borne pushbroom scan mode sensors are then examined, including satellite orbit track and attitude errors, and geometric and radiometric correlation between information in the various spectral bands. Approaches to the alignment of linear arrays of thousands of detectors are then discussed that take into account tradeoffs between fabrication and test complexity and ground processing requirements. Continuing science experiments are indicated as necessary to establish tolerances on performance goals.

Thompson, L. L.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Technical issues in dynamics and control of large space structures

Examples of large space systems currently being considered by NASA include a large communications antenna system (the Land Mobile Satellite System), a precision antenna system (the Large Deployable Reflector System), and a preliminary concept for NASA's space station. Each system has low natural vibration frequencies, stringent pointing requirements, and, for the antennas, demanding surface accuracy requirements. A review is provided of the progress being made in structural ground tests with respect to surface accuracy, deployment, and erection of large structures. Attention is given to the dynamic loads on large space structures, on-orbit testing, space vibration control devices, and the characteristics of distributed control.

Card, M. F.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Technical issues in the conduct of large space platform experiments in plasma physics and geoplasma sciences

Large, permanently-manned space platforms can provide exciting opportunities for discoveries in basic plasma and geoplasma sciences. The potential for these discoveries will depend very critically on the properties of the platform, its subsystems, and their abilities to fulfill a spectrum of scientific requirements. With this in mind, the planning of space station research initiatives and the development of attendant platform engineering should allow for the identification of critical science and technology issues that must be clarified far in advance of space station program implementation. An attempt is made to contribute to that process, with a perspective that looks to the development of the space station as a permanently-manned Spaceborne Ionospheric Weather Station. The development of this concept requires a synergism of science and technology which leads to several critical design issues. To explore the identification of these issues, the development of the concept of an Ionospheric Weather Station will necessarily touch upon a number of diverse areas. These areas are discussed.

Szuszczewicz, Edward P.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Summary of the AIAA/NASA/DOD Orbital Debris Conference - Technical issues and future directions

An international conference on orbital debris was held on April 16-19, 1990, in Baltimore, Maryland. Topics of the conference included the implications of orbital debris for space flight, orbital debris measurements, modeling of the orbital debris environment, and methods to reduce the growth of the orbital debris population. Significant results from this meeting are summarized.

Potter, A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Orbital debris: Technical issues and future directions

An international conference on orbital debris sponsored jointly by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, NASA, and the Department of Defense, was held in Baltimore, Maryland, 16-19 Apr. 1990. Thirty-three papers were presented. The papers were grouped into the areas of measurements, modeling, and implications of orbital debris for space flight. New radar and optical measurements of orbital debris were presented that showed the existence of a large population of small debris. Modeling of potential future environments showed that runaway growth of the debris population from random collisions was a real possibility. New techniques for shielding against orbital debris and methods for removal of satellites from orbit were discussed.

Potter, Andrew↗