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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Third international challenge to model the medium- to long-range transport of radioxenon to four Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations

In 2015 and 2016, atmospheric transport modeling challenges were conducted in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, however, with a more limited scope with respect to emission inventories, simulation period and number of relevant samples (i.e., those above the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)) involved. Therefore, a more comprehensive atmospheric transport modeling challenge was organized in 2019. Stack release data of Xe-133 were provided by the Institut National des Radioéléments/IRE (Belgium) and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories/CNL (Canada) and accounted for in the simulations over a three (mandatory) or six (optional) months period. Best estimate emissions of additional facilities (radiopharmaceutical production and nuclear research facilities, commercial reactors or relevant research reactors) of the Northern Hemisphere were included as well. Model results were compared with observed atmospheric activity concentrations at four International Monitoring System (IMS) stations located in Europe and North America with overall considerable influence of IRE and/or CNL emissions for evaluation of the participants’ runs. Participants were prompted to work with controlled and harmonized model set-ups to make runs more comparable, but also to increase diversity. It was found that using the stack emissions of IRE and CNL with daily resolution does not lead to better results than disaggregating annual emissions of these two facilities taken from the literature if an overall score for all stations covering all valid observed samples is considered. A moderate benefit of roughly 10% is visible in statistical scores for samples influenced by IRE and/or CNL to at least 50% and there can be considerable benefit for individual samples. Effects of transport errors, not properly characterized remaining emitters and long IMS sampling times (12–24 h) undoubtedly are in contrast to and reduce the benefit of high-quality IRE and CNL stack data. Complementary best estimates for remaining emitters push the scores up by 18% compared to just considering IRE and CNL emissions alone. Despite the efforts undertaken the full multi-model ensemble built is highly redundant. An ensemble based on a few arbitrary runs is sufficient to model the Xe-133 background at the stations investigated. The effective ensemble size is below five. An optimized ensemble at each station has on average slightly higher skill compared to the full ensemble. However, the improvement (maximum of 20% and minimum of 3% in RMSE) in skill is likely being too small for being exploited for an independent period.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Computational Optimization of 133m Xe Production via Neutron Irradiation in a TRIGA Reactor

Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests worldwide. As part of treaty compliance, the concentration of radioactive nuclides in the atmosphere is monitored to detect nuclear weapons tests. Radioactive noble gas fission products, specifically radioxenon, can vent into the atmosphere after a nuclear weapons test, even if the test is well contained underground or underwater. Radioxenon thus serves as a signal for nuclear weapons tests. All atmospheric monitoring systems require samples of radioxenon isotopes for detector calibration, quality control, and certification. Here, we present a novel, improved method for creating samples of 133m Xe via neutron irradiation of 132 Xe in the Washington State University TRIGA reactor. 132 Xe neutron absorption results in either 133 Xe or 133m Xe—thermal neutron absorption results in 133m Xe 12% of the time, while fast neutron absorption (above ~1 MeV) results in 133m Xe ~50% of the time. To optimize the production of 133m Xe via neutron absorption in 132 Xe in the thermal TRIGA reactor, spectral tuning using an irradiation chamber is required to maximize the fraction of fast neutrons being absorbed and minimize the number of thermal neutrons interacting with the 132 Xe. We used MCNP to tally 132 Xe absorptions with the isotopic tally function, flux tallies and neutron attenuation to estimate the number of neutrons reaching the 132 Xe through the irradiation chamber, and the adjoint importance function to improve the source strength estimate. Additionally, we performed a heat transfer analysis for safety considerations. It was determined that the use of a 96% enriched 10 B boron carbide chamber, placed next to the fuel elements in reactor position D8, increases the 133m Xe/ 133 Xe activity ratio from a baseline value of 0.3 to 1.0, a 233% increase. Additionally, it was determined that the alpha heating produced in the boron does not become an unmanageable problem in the Washington State University reactor.

37 - INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL C↗
DOE OSTI2022

Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

Radioxenon Detection for Monitoring Subsurface Nuclear Explosion

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere on the earth (atmospheric, surface, underwater and subsurface). Identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, surface, and underwater is relatively straightforward considering a wide range of signatures resulting from such an event. However, for a subsurface explosion, most of the signatures traditionally associated with a nuclear explosion are not readily available. Therefore, the international community has increasingly relied on the atmospheric measurement of noble gases to identify subsurface nuclear weapon explosions. This chapter initially covers the basic principles of subsurface nuclear explosion identification and the importance of detecting radioxenon. This is followed by reviewing some of the early radioxenon detection systems that were developed by research groups around the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The detection media employed, results from laboratory and field testing, and some challenges/drawbacks for these systems are detailed. The next section of the chapter is dedicated to innovative detector concepts that have emerged in the past ten to fifteen years using novel detection material, algorithms, and signal readout techniques. The advances achieved in terms of energy resolution, coincidence detection efficiencies, system performance, and the minimum detectable concentration are covered. The final section goes over some of the potential improvements that can be incorporated in the design to enhance detector sensitivity and new detection material that can be explored in the field of radioxenon detection.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗
DOE OSTI2021

Guidelines for Broadband Seismometer Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mandates the four verification technologies to be used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor compliance to the Treaty. These technologies are seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Operational manuals for each of these technologies specify the requirements that equipment installed at IMS stations must meet for data from said stations to be accepted by the International Data Center. Following a model in which a revised set of infrasound sensor specifications and accompanying test procedures were developed in an international collaboration overseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the same process was recently followed for seismometers potentially of use by the IMS. This document, a product of that collaboration, defines key concepts and recommends test procedures to be followed to characterize broadband seismometers in a consistent and standardized way. Results from these test procedures can be used to verify that a seismometer meets the manufacturers stated specifications and IMS requirements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writers of this document would like to acknowledge Charles R. Hutt, John R. Evans, Fred Followill, Robert L. Nigbor, and Erhard Wielandt, the authors of the 2009 Guidelines for Standardized Testing of Broadband Seismometers and Accelerometers funded by the U.S. Department of Interior, on which this document is based. Although this document is limited in scope to seismometers and much of the document has been updated, the structure remains essentially the same.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Novel Photonuclear Methods to Produce an Argon-37 Standard

The mission of this research is to explore novel photonuclear-based pathways into the production of 37Ar. Above-background detection levels of 37Ar uniquely indicates the occurrence of an underground nuclear explosion, produced from fission neutrons interacting in the surrounding environment through the 40Ca(n,a)37Ar reaction. The half-life of 35 days allows on-site inspectors (OSI) adequate time following the nuclear event to detect 37Ar and verify compliance or defiance of non-proliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). An 37Ar standard would give OSI the ability to calibrate their detectors and measure detector efficiency allowing for the quantification of detected activity, give OSI authentic samples to test detectors in field exercises, and improve models predicting diffusion pathways of 37Ar through the underground environment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its Role in Trust Building

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development and validation of a software for simulating γ-γ coincidence emission and detection probabilities

Gamma-gamma coincidence spectrometers have the potential to significantly enhance detection sensitivity for ultra-trace radionuclide measurements. The implementation of these spectrometers, however, is limited by the complexity of acquisition hardware, data processing and quantification. This work reports development of a novel radionuclide quantification software for γ-γ coincidence measurements. For any radionuclide, the software parses the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) database, recursively simulating all possible γ-γ coincidence signatures and their respective emission and detection probabilities. Implemented using Python programming language, the software employs several strategies to boost overall computational performance. Since coincidence-based spectrometers are of notable interest in monitoring compliance for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the software’s execution was tested for 84 CTBT-relevant radionuclides. To date, the software has been experimentally validated for 15 radionuclides using the Advanced Radionuclide Gamma spectrOmeter (ARGO) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA (PNNL). Notably, the software can be operated in convergence mode, whereby coincidence detection efficiency’s convergence behavior can help avoid unreliable radionuclide activity estimates. With growing number of coincidence spectrometers worldwide, this paper aims to assist the radiation metrology community in developing similar software for their system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Seismic moment tensor classification using elliptical distribution functions on the hypersphere

Discrimination of underground explosions from naturally occurring earthquakes and other anthropogenic sources is one of the fundamental challenges of nuclear explosion monitoring. In an operational setting, the number of events that can be thoroughly investigated by analysts is limited by available resources. The capability to rapidly screen out events that can be robustly identified as not being explosions is, therefore, of great potential benefit. Nevertheless, possible mis-classification of explosions as earthquakes currently limits the use of screening methods for verification of test-ban treaties. Moment tensors provide a physics-based classification tool for the characterization of different seismic sources and have enabled the advent of new techniques for discriminating between earthquakes and explosions. Following normalization and projection of their six-degree vectors onto the hypersphere, existing screening approaches use spherically symmetric metrics to determine whether any new moment tensor may have been an explosion. Here, we show that populations of moment tensors for both earthquakes and explosions are anisotropically distributed on the hypersphere. Distributions possessing elliptical symmetry, such as the scaled von Mises–Fisher distribution, therefore provide a better description of these populations than the existing spherically symmetric models. We describe a method that uses these elliptical distributions in combination with a Bayesian classifier to achieve successful classification rates of 99 per cent for explosions and 98 per cent for earthquakes using existing catalogues of events from the western United States. The 1983 May 5 Crowdie underground nuclear test and 2018 July 20 DAG-1 deep-borehole chemical explosion are the only two explosions out of 140 that are incorrectly classified. Application of the method to the 2006–2017 nuclear tests in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea yields 100 per cent identification rates and we provide a simple routine MTid for general usage. The approach provides a means to rapidly assess the likelihood of an event being an explosion and can be built into monitoring workflows that rely on simultaneously assessing multiple different discrimination metrics.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Annual Assessment Reporting Process

On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Characterization of PIPS detectors for measurement of radioxenon

The International Monitoring System arm of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization utilizes sampling of atmospheric radioxenon to scan the world for nuclear testing events. Current designs utilized in the field involve plastic scintillator cells run in coincidence with Sodium Iodide (NaI) or High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors. The use of plastic scintillators as electron detectors exhibit some issues in comparison to other materials. Silicon detectors are analyzed as an alternative to plastic scintillators for beta detection based on their higher energy resolution and lowered memory effect. A radioxenon detection setup was created with the intent of measuring radioxenon samples using coincidence counting between silicon and NaI detectors as well as silicon and HPGe. Finally, the absolute efficiency of both setups is calculated and compared.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

The 2022 Hunga eruption exercises the nuclear explosion monitoring community

The 2022 Hunga eruption was a global event recorded by all three Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Monitoring System (IMS) geophysical waveform sensor technologies: seismic, infrasound, and hydroacoustic. Large volcanic eruptions are rare and additionally present an opportunity to test seismoacoustic detection, location, and identification methods for nuclear explosion monitoring.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Global Nuclear Explosion Discrimination Using a Convolutional Neural Network

Using P-wave seismograms, we trained a seismic source classifier using a Convolutional Neural Network. We trained for three classes: earthquake P-wave, underground nuclear explosion (UNE) P-wave, and noise. With the current absence of nuclear testing by countries that have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, high quality seismic data from UNEs is limited. Even with limited training data, our model can accurately characterize most events recorded at regional and teleseismic distances, finding over 95% signals in the validation set. We applied the model on holdout datasets of the North Korean test explosions to evaluate the performance on unique region and station-source pairs, with promising results. Additionally, we tested on the Source Physics Experiment events to investigate the potential for chemical explosions to act as a surrogate for nuclear explosions. We anticipate that machine-learning models like our classifier system can have broad application for other seismic signals including volcanic and non-volcanic tremor, anomalous earthquakes, ice-quakes or landslide-quakes.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Photonuclear Production of Radioxenon for Air Samples

Radioxenon plays an important role in ensuring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty due to its ability to be transported through the atmosphere, as well as the fact that the half-lives of its isotopes provide a window long enough to be detected but not long enough that it could become background radiation. This allows it to be correlated with specific events that indicate the testing of nuclear weapons. Idaho National Laboratory supports this mission by providing spiked air samples for monitoring stations to enable instrument calibration and ensure measurement accuracy. We tested a photonuclear method of producing one of the main isotopes of radioxenon, Xe-135. We also tested the separation of Xe-135 from the parent isotope Xe-136 using the method of kinematic recoil. Aluminum coils were placed in quartz ampoules filled with enriched Xe-136 and were irradiated by a bremsstrahlung beam with an endpoint energy of 21 MeV. The results showed that we were not only successful in producing Xe-135 but also that the Xe-135 was deposited into the coil allowing it to be removed from the Xe-136 gas. The coil and the Xe-135 can then be chemically separated. At the time of counting the coil, it was calculated that there was about 18 Bq of activity from Xe-135 remaining in the coil. Future work includes determining the optimal material and geometry of the catcher to maximize the amount of Xe-135 captured.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗