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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

A Flexible and Generic Functional Mock-up Unit Based Threat Injection Framework for Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings: A Case Study in Modelica

Grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) have been considered as an important asset to support the power grid reliability by utilizing the demand flexibility offered by GEBs. GEBs are enabled by advances in sensors and controls, and the communication between building equipment, whole buildings, and the grid. The integration of different building technologies and network-based communication system makes GEBs vulnerable to passive threats such as equipment failure and active threats such as cyber-attacks. Modeling and simulation is an effective way to evaluate the impact of threats on the system performance. This paper proposes a generic and flexible threat injection framework for commonly-used building energy simulators such as EnergyPlus and Modelica to support threat modeling and evaluation. This framework leverages functional mock-up unit (FMU) to develop a general modeling interface for threat injection and simulation. A numerical case study using Modelica as a building energy simulator is conducted to demonstrate the capability of the framework for supporting single/multiple-order threat modeling and simulation of a GEB. Four threats and their combinations are injected on a Modelica-based threat-free building energy and control system, including operating supply fan at its full speed, remotely cycling the chiller on and off, blocking the chiller from receiving the chilled water supply temperature setpoints, and hijacking the global zone air temperature setpoint. Simulation results show that the cyber-attack that leads to short-term signal blocking has small effects on the system operation due to the "self-healing" feature of the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) interactive control system. The threat that takes control of resetting the global zone air temperature setpoints has the most adverse impact on the system energy use, peak power demand, thermal comfort and the provision of demand flexibility. The combination of four threats have aggregative effects on the system but the effects are less than the additive effects of the individual threat.

Fu, Yanyang↗
DOE OSTI2025

Performance Evaluation of Vertical Federated Machine Learning Against Adversarial Threats on Wide-Area Control System: Preprint

Federated machine learning (FL) is gaining significant popularity to develop cybersecurity solutions in power grids because of its advanced capability to support decentralized data handing at local devices, its privacy preservation, and its low-bandwidth requirement. However, the evolving adversarial machine learning (AML) threats raise significant concerns for the cybersecurity of FL architectures. The FL-based split neural network (SplitNN) achieves high performance through the decentralized training of local neural network models while preserving data privacy across multiple entities. In this paper, we propose a methodology for evaluating the performance of a vertical FLbased anomaly detector against different types of AML attacks, including denial-of-service attacks, adversarial data injection attacks, and replay attacks on the trained local models deployed in the grid network. For a case study, we consider the modified IEEE 13-bus system, and we develop SplitNN-based binary and multiclass classification models to detect, locate, and identify different types of data integrity attacks on the volt-watt control with two pooling layers: maximum pooling and AvgPool. Our experimental results, computed through performance metrics, reveal that the severity of these AML attacks varies with the integrated pooling mechanism, the type of classification model, and the nature of the cyberattack. Further, the AML attacks negatively impacted the prediction time per sample for the pretrained SplitNN during the online testing.

adversarial threats↗
DOE OSTI2026

NASA analysis of space mission options for the 2025 planetary defense conference hypothetical asteroid impact threat scenario

The 2025 Planetary Defense Conference (PDC) hypothetical asteroid impact threat exercise is being conducted in coordination with the United Nations-endorsed Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG), exercising SMPAG's processes for assessing space mission options and communicating to decision makers. Here, in this paper, we describe the work performed by our NASA-led team and present the results we contributed to the SMPAG effort for the exercise. Our NASA-led team assessed mission options for asteroid reconnaissance (flyby and rendezvous), deflection, and robust disruption using several viable techniques: kinetic impactors, ion beam deflection, and nuclear explosive devices. Our simulations and analyses considered how much change-in-velocity an asteroid can tolerate before fragmentation onset, and we worked towards establishing requirements for robustly disrupting an asteroid. Heuristics informed by the simulation results are incorporated into optimization of deflection and disruption mission campaign options. Finally, we make some observations about useful generalizations from these results with potential applicability to any planetary defense scenario.

Asteroid deflection↗
NASA NTRS2007

Users Guide for the Anvil Threat Corridor Forecast Tool V1.7.0 for AWIPS

The Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) originally developed the Anvil Threat Sector Tool for the Meteorological Interactive Data Display System (MIDDS) and delivered the capability in three phases beginning with a feasibility study in 2000 and delivering the operational final product in December 2003. This tool is currently used operationally by the 45th Weather Squadron (45 WS) Launch Weather Officers (LWO) and Spaceflight Meteorology Group (SMG) forecasters. Phase I of the task established the technical feasibility of developing an objective, observations-based tool for short-range anvil forecasting. The AMU was subsequently tasked to develop short-term anvil forecasting tools to improve predictions of the threat of triggered lightning to space launch and landing vehicles. Under the Phase II effort, the AMU developed a nowcasting anvil threat sector tool, which provided the user with a threat sector based on the most current radiosonde upper wind data from a co-located or upstream station. The Phase II Anvil Threat Sector Tool computes the average wind speed and direction in the layer between 300 and 150 mb from the latest radiosonde for a user-designated station. The following threat sector properties are consistent with the propagation and lifetime characteristics of thunderstorm anvil clouds observed over Florida and its coastal waters (Short et al. 2002): a) 20 n mi standoff circle, b) 30 degree sector width, c) Orientation given by 300 to 150 mb average wind direction, d) 1-, 2-, and 3- hour arcs in upwind direction, and e) Arc distances given by 300 to 150 mb average wind speed. Figure 1 is an example of the MIDDS Anvil Threat Sector tool overlaid on a visible satellite image at 2132 UTC 13 May 2001. Space Launch Complex 39A was selected as the center point and the Anvil Threat Sector was determined from upper-level wind data at 1500 UTC in the preconvective environment. Narrow thunderstorm anvil clouds extend from central Florida to the space launch and landing facilities at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and beyond. The anvil clouds were generated around 1930 UTC (1430 EDT) by thunderstorm activity over central Florida and transported 90 n mi east-northeastward within 2 hours, as diagnosed by the anvil forecast tool. Phase III, delivered in February 2003, built upon the results of Phase II by enhancing the Anvil Threat Sector Tool with the capability to use national model forecast winds for depiction of potential anvil lengths and orientations over the KSC/CCAFS area with lead times from 3 through 168 hours (7 days). In September 2003, AMU customers requested the capability to use data from the KSC 50 MHz Doppler Radar Wind Profiler (DRWP) in the Anvil Threat Sector Tool and this capability was delivered by the AMU in December 2003. In March 2005, the AMU was tasked to migrate the MIDDS Anvil Threat Sector Tool capabilities onto the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS) as the Anvil Threat Corridor Forecast Tool.

Bauman, William H., III↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
NASA NTRS2024

Computing Proximity to Threat Along Uncertain Trajectory to Support Urban Air Mobility

Many airspace threats affect the selection of a flight route, such as terrain, physical obstacles, adverse weather, and special-use airspace, among others. Threat avoidance during Urban Air Mobility (UAM) and Low Altitude Mobility (LAM) flights is especially challenging due to their lower cruising altitudes. These operations may be exposed to buildings, towers, trees, terrain undulations, etc., along much of their flight route. Moreover, these low-altitude flights in urban environments are expected to encounter very busy airspace, increasing the workload associated with threat avoidance. The Proximity to Threat (PtT) function aims to support onboard or remote pilots by computing the risk from geospatial threats in the airspace along an aircraft’s flight path. The threats are both static entities and dynamic airspace restrictions that have been modeled and stored in geo-referenced mapping databases. The flight path may be specified by waypoints, airways, or similar discrete route elements or by a time series of closely spaced position and altitude points. Flight path uncertainty can also be taken into account by assuming both the position and altitude to be sampled from two normal distributions, each being specified by a mean and variance. PtT uses this additional information to verify that the flight path remains clear of threats along a wider path or if a position is reached earlier or later than anticipated, assuring the pilot or operator that there will be an available safety margin even if the aircraft deviates due to one or more occurrences of unexpected wind gusts, mechanical failures, airspeed changes, collision avoidance maneuvers, etc. The client can specify an uncertainty confidence level to bound the set of trajectories evaluated for threats so that the confidence level corresponds to the client’s risk tolerance under the expected conditions. PtT can be used as a pre-flight planning tool to determine a safe route through known threats and in-flight to avoid emerging or changing threats. In this report, we present the PtT function, discuss how the trajectory uncertainty is incorporated into the PtT function, and describe the use of this PtT function in a representative scenario.

urban air mobility↗
NASA NTRS2005

Using Cloud-to-Ground Lightning Climatologies to Initialize Gridded Lightning Threat Forecasts for East Central Florida

Each morning, the forecasters at the National Weather Service in Melbourn, FL (NWS MLB) produce an experimental cloud-to-ground (CG) lightning threat index map for their county warning area (CWA) that is posted to their web site (http://www.srh.weather.gov/mlb/ghwo/lightning.shtml) . Given the hazardous nature of lightning in central Florida, especially during the warm season months of May-September, these maps help users factor the threat of lightning, relative to their location, into their daily plans. The maps are color-coded in five levels from Very Low to Extreme, with threat level definitions based on the probability of lightning occurrence and the expected amount of CG activity. On a day in which thunderstorms are expected, there are typically two or more threat levels depicted spatially across the CWA. The locations of relative lightning threat maxima and minima often depend on the position and orientation of the low-level ridge axis, forecast propagation and interaction of sea/lake/outflow boundaries, expected evolution of moisture and stability fields, and other factors that can influence the spatial distribution of thunderstorms over the CWA. The lightning threat index maps are issued for the 24-hour period beginning at 1200 UTC (0700 AM EST) each day with a grid resolution of 5 km x 5 km. Product preparation is performed on the AWIPS Graphical Forecast Editor (GFE), which is the standard NWS platform for graphical editing. Currently, the forecasters create each map manually, starting with a blank map. To improve efficiency of the forecast process, NWS MLB requested that the Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) create gridded warm season lightning climatologies that could be used as first-guess inputs to initialize lightning threat index maps. The gridded values requested included CG strike densities and frequency of occurrence stratified by synoptic-scale flow regime. The intent is to increase consistency between forecasters while enabling them to focus on the mesoscale detail of the forecast, ultimately benefiting the end-users of the product. Several studies took place at the Florida State University (FSU) and NWS Tallahassee (TAE) for which they created daily flow regimes using Florida 1200 UTC synoptic soundings and CG strike densities from National Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) data. The densities were created on a 2.5 km x 2.5 km grid for every hour of every day during the warm seasons in the years 1989-2004. The grids encompass an area that includes the entire state of Florida and adjacent Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico waters. Personnel at the two organizations provided this data and supporting software for the work performed by the AMU. The densities were first stratified by flow regime, then by time in 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, and 24-hour increments while maintaining the 2.5 km x 2.5 km grid resolution. A CG frequency of occurrence was calculated for each stratification and grid box by counting the number of days with lightning and dividing by the total number of days in the data set. New CG strike densities were calculated for each stratification and grid box by summing the strike number values over all warm seasons, then normalized by dividing the summed values by the number of lightning days. This makes the densities conditional on whether lightning occurred. The frequency climatology values will be used by forecasters as proxy inputs for lightning prObability, while the density climatology values will be used for CG amount. In addition to the benefits outlined above, these climatologies will provide improved temporal and spatial resolution, expansion of the lightning threat area to include adjacent coastal waters, and potential to extend the forecast to include the day-2 period. This presentation will describe the lightning threat index map, discuss the work done to create the maps initialized with climatological guidance, and show examples of the climatological CG lightning densities and frequencies of occurren based on flow regime.

Lambert, Winnie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Estimating Tropical Cyclone Threats to Floating Rigs in the Gulf of Mexico

Offshore drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico are particularly vulnerable during hurricane season. When a weather threat arises, a decision to evacuate the rig and/or move to a safe location may need to be made. Depending on the activities in progress at the time of the threat, securing the well, evacuating, and/or moving to a safe location can take a considerable amount of time. This transition time is called T-time. T-time is not only rig dependent, but also depends on the activity being performed at the time of the threat. For these reasons it is important to assess tropical cyclone threats and the time it takes for them to reach the rig location. The objective of this study is to use the available 50 years of past cyclone history to estimate cyclone threats at any location in the Gulf of Mexico. The cyclone threat is estimated based on the rig location as well as the start date and duration of the offshore activity. By threat, it is meant the likelihood that a specific location with an associated offshore activity would be exposed to an upcoming cyclone whose forecasted track cone and storm size lies within that location. Three representative rig locations in the Gulf of Mexico were selected as assessment sites to evaluate the threat of incoming cyclones for different T-times. To conduct this tropical cyclone study, an Excel spreadsheet tool was developed to automate the analysis of the tropical cyclone data from the Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) Version 4. The spreadsheet tool allows the user to input any location (i.e., longitude and latitude) in the Gulf of Mexico and displays a list of historical cyclones that have passed within 150 nautical miles of that location during the activity period selected by the user. Also, the tool allows the user to input a T-time to assess the threat of cyclones that would not provide adequate time to secure the well, evacuate, and/or move to a safe location.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2021

The spatial distribution of ionospheric threats to WAAS integrity, 2000 – 2019: a systematic analysis

The United States’ Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) broadcasts data to facilitate aircraft navigation. This paper examines the spatial dependence of ionospheric disturbances that have threatened the accuracy and reliability of position estimates derived from these data over the period 2000 – 2019. We address two distinct aspects of this spatial dependence: (1) the geographic distribution of these threats, in particular, in relation to geomagnetic latitude, and (2) the geometric dependence of threats relative to the locations of the receiver sites that comprise the WAAS network. We analyze threat distributions in terms of the various means that WAAS employs to mitigate these threats, including the Extreme Storm Detector, the Moderate Storm Detector, local irregularity detectors, and the ionospheric threat model. Distinct distributions are presented for threats occurring in Solar Cycle 23 and those of Solar Cycle 24. To study the geometric dependence of threats on receiver locations, we use as a metric the distance separating a threat from the centroid of the nearest Ncentroid receivers. Large values of this metric identify threats at or beyond the edge of coverage. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for WAAS operations.

Altshuler, Eric↗
NASA NTRS2022

Estimating Tropical Cyclone Threats to Floating Rigs in the Gulf of Mexico

Offshore drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico are particularly vulnerable during hurricane season. When a weather threat arises, a decision to evacuate the rig and/or move to a safe location may need to be made. Securing the well, evacuating, and/or moving to a safe location can take a considerable amount of time. This transition time is called T-time. T-time is not only rig dependent, but also depends on the activity being performed at the time of the threat. For these reasons, it is important to assess tropical cyclone threats and the estimated time it will take the storm to reach the rig location from the time it is first detected. The objective of this study is to use 50 years of cyclone history from a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) database, the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) to estimate cyclone threats at any location in the Gulf of Mexico. The cyclone threat is estimated based on the rig location as well as the start date and duration of the offshore activity. By threat, it is meant the likelihood that a specific location with an associated offshore activity lies within the forecasted track cone and storm size of the upcoming cyclone. Three representative rig locations in the Gulf of Mexico were selected as assessment sites to evaluate the threat of incoming cyclones for different T-times. To conduct this tropical cyclone study, an Excel spreadsheet tool was developed to automate the analysis of the tropical cyclone data. The spreadsheet tool allows the user to input any location (i.e., longitude and latitude) in the Gulf of Mexico and displays a list of historical cyclones that have passed within 150 nautical miles of that location during the activity period selected by the user. In addition, the tool allows the user to input any T-time to assess the threat of cyclones that would not provide adequate time to secure the well, evacuate, and/or move to a safe location.

Offshore Oil Drilling↗
DOE OSTI2024

GraphCH: A Deep Framework for Assessing Cyber-Human Aspects in Insider Threat Detection

Insider threat is one of the most damaging cyber attacks that could cause the loss of intellectual property and enterprise data security breaches. Action sequence data such as host logs are used to investigate such threats and develop anomaly-based AI detectors. However, insider threat actions are similar to legitimate user activities, causing AI detectors to fail and suffer from high false alarm rates. Therefore, user cyber activity logs are inadequate to fully unfold insider threats. In this study, we adopt human psychological principles of risk-taking and impulsiveness along with host data to assess the influence and usefulness of human behavioral aspects in insider threat detection. Here, we hypothesize that individuals' impulsive and risk-taking behavior correlates with cyberspace activities. To validate our hypothesis, we conducted an IRB-approved study recruiting 35 participants who work in a large U.S. university and collected their cyber and psychological data for 90 days. Host and human-behavioral data analysis and mapping indicate that impulsive and risk-taking users trigger more system errors causing (un)intentional insider threats and are susceptible to attackers' social engineering and cognitive hacking. Utilizing cyber-human aspects, we introduce a Cyber-Human Graph Neural Network (GNN) based framework GraphCH to identify abnormal user behaviors and detect insider threats.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Domestic Extremism: Countering the Threat Posed to Critical Assets

Domestic extremism has been a growing concern in the United States in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the threat of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered in the Office of Radiological Security’s radiological source security mission. In this effort, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions and next steps. Twenty-two subject matter experts participated in a series of five focus group sessions. Questions focused on definitions of domestic extremism, potential changes in the threat, best practices in securing facilities, assets, and personnel, and any perceived gaps. Upon completion of the focus groups, notes were analyzed thematically to identify any recurring patterns in the results. In addition, a review of academic, industry, and government literature was conducted to understand the threat, describe the process of radicalization to extremism, and to identify empirically informed practices in prevention and response. Results of this project demonstrated that further work is needed to define domestic extremism in law, regulation, and policy, to help the U.S. develop a consistent response to the threat within organizations. This is especially important, as SMEs emphasized the need for early intervention in prevention efforts, noting that organizations need clear guidance on when and how to intervene. In addition, the need for social media monitoring was discussed, although challenges remain to do so with appropriate respect for privacy and civil liberties concerns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation

Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

MetaPoL: Immersive VR based Indoor Patterns of Life (PoL) and Anomalies Data Generation for Insider Threat Modeling in Nuclear Security

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear and radiological security systems face. Insiders pose such a great threat due to their access, authority, and knowledge, granting them opportunities to bypass dedicated nuclear and radiological security elements. For example, in one of the latest major insider threat incidents to nuclear security, the Doel-4 nuclear powerplant in Belgium suffered a shutdown, the threat of nuclear materials diversion, and long-term loss of tens of millions of dollars. Seven years of investigation concluded that it was an inside job and attempted sabotage. In this regard, there is an immediate need for R&D and technology integration in the domain of modeling indoor Patterns-of-Life (PoL) and anomaly detection. This can be achieved by using datasets of facility users’ mobility and activity, which can support the design of algorithms for insider threat modeling and detection. However, due to classification, privacy, sensitivity, and safety protocols, such datasets from real physical nuclear reactor facilities are not only hard to share, but also not always feasible to deploy and collect. Aiming to find an alternate solution, our proposed demonstration work - MetaPoL, is the first-ever (for the application space) immersive VR (virtual reality) environment of a real-world secure facility and allows users to move-and-stay through the designed indoor physical layout and also encounter NPCs (non-player characters) that emulate other facility users. In the MetaPoL an interactive user performs realistic spatio-temporal movement, dwelling and activities using a Meta Quest Pro VR headset, and that generates high-frequency (in time) high-resolution (in space) indoor spatial-temporal datasets that are valuable for PoL modeling and anomaly detection research specifically for insider threat modeling and detection mission. Such generated realistic, rich in context, and mission specific datasets can boost AI/Machine Learning based research for modeling and detecting insider threats in nuclear security and nonproliferation.

Gunaratne, Chathika↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗