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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Impact of Cyber Threat Awareness on Driver Response to an Unexpected Vehicle Cyberattack

Here, the integration of advanced cyber-physical systems in heavy vehicles introduces new vulnerabilities by expanding the possibility of cyberattacks. The objective of this study is to evaluate (1) how threat awareness influences driver response to an unexpected cyberattack, (2) how the provision of a basic cyberattack response protocol influences driver performance, and (3) how professionally trained versus standard drivers compare in their responses to a cyberattack. An on-road driving study (N = 50) was conducted using a medium heavy-duty vehicle. Participants were divided into three groups: Control, which remained unaware of any potential cyberattack; Aware, which was informed about the potential cyberattack; and Aware + Protocol, which received the same warning as the Aware group with the addition of a basic cyberattack response protocol. An instrument cluster cyberattack was executed at the same location for all participants. The findings highlight the essential role of awareness and response protocol in enhancing driver response to an unexpected vehicle cyberattack. The Aware + Protocol group had the highest stop rate (100%) and the shortest stopping distances (224 m for standard drivers and 254 m for professionals), compared to the Control group (828 and 520 m, respectively). Aware + Protocol also had the fastest reaction time, averaging 7.53 s, versus 16.12 s (Aware) and 30.29 s (Control). These results emphasize that awareness alone is insufficient. Providing drivers with clear, actionable protocols significantly improves their ability to react quickly and safely to cyberattacks, enhancing overall road safety.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Principles Slide Presentation [Slides]

This document describes the concept and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), a methodology that integrates cyber threat awareness into all stages of the systems engineering life cycle. It delineates how CIE enhances the security posture of critical infrastructure systems, which are increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber threats. The exposition proceeds to methodically walk through the twelve foundational principles of CIE, each serving as a strategic guidepost for embedding cybersecurity into the fabric of system design, development, operation, and maintenance. The principles highlight the importance of proactive and comprehensive security measures that span from risk assessment to continuous improvement, ensuring that systems are not only designed with security in mind but are also resilient in the face of evolving cyber threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1987

The hack attack - Increasing computer system awareness of vulnerability threats

The paper discusses the issue of electronic vulnerability of computer based systems supporting NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) by unauthorized users. To test the security of the system and increase security awareness, NYMA, Inc. employed computer 'hackers' to attempt to infiltrate the system(s) under controlled conditions. Penetration procedures, methods, and descriptions are detailed in the paper. The procedure increased the security consciousness of GSFC management to the electronic vulnerability of the system(s).

Quann, John↗
NASA NTRS1987

Threat expert system technology advisor

A prototype expert system was developed to determine the feasibility of using expert system technology to enhance the performance and survivability of helicopter pilots in a combat threat environment while flying NOE (Nap of the Earth) missions. The basis for the concept is the potential of using an Expert System Advisor to reduce the extreme overloading of the pilot who flies NOE mission below treetop level at approximately 40 knots while performing several other functions. The ultimate goal is to develop a Threat Expert System Advisor which provides threat information and advice that are better than even a highly experienced copilot. The results clearly show that the NOE pilot needs all the help in decision aiding and threat situation awareness that he can get. It clearly shows that heuristics are important and that an expert system for combat NOE helicopter missions can be of great help to the pilot in complex threat situations and in making decisions.

Kurrasch, E. R.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Managing Cyber Supply Chain Risk for Renewable Energy Technologies

On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) hosted a virtual workshop facilitated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Cybersecurity supply chain experts, researchers, and leaders in government and industry came together to share information on current and future challenges in securing emerging technologies and technical architecture. From a cybersecurity perspective, we need to move from a cybersecurity approach that focuses principally on legacy asset owners to one that incorporates more emphasis on end-point device manufacturers and third-party integrators. Cybersecurity for the global digital supply chain for manufacturers of consumer end-point devices—such as smart solar inverters and smart electric vehicle (EV) chargers—will be critical to the future cyber health of the grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEB) through Cyber Defense and Resilient System (CYDRES)

The DOE CYDRES project is driven by the urgent need to address critical research gaps in the domain of cyber-physical security of smart buildings, including Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEBs). CYDRES, a real-time advanced building resilient platform, aims to enhance the cyber-attack-immune capabilities of buildings through multi-layered prevention, detection, and adaptation mechanisms. CYDRES consists of five key modules: a multi-layer network analyzer, an Automatic Fault Detection, Diagnosis, and Prognosis (AFDDP) framework, an intelligent mode selector, a cyber-resilient control framework, and a situation awareness platform. The Network Analyzer employs a data-driven framework that includes a protocol state learning tool and a CRF (Conditional Random Field) command validator. In Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) testbeds, it achieved 100% detection accuracy with a false alarm rate of 3%, validating its efficacy in identifying selected cyber-attacks. The AFDDP framework leverages pattern matching, PCA (Principal Component Analysis)-based strategies, and a DBN (Dynamic Bayesian Network)-based fault diagnosis approach to pinpoint the causes of physical system abnormalities using Building Automation System (BAS) data. In HIL experiments, the AFDDP module attained a detection accuracy of over 95% with a false alarm rate below 7%. Additionally, the fault detector utilized machine learning (Random Forest) and deep learning (Multi-Layer Perceptron) methods with acoustic sensor data to achieve a 100% fault detection accuracy in Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The Mode Selector offered real-time impact analysis, allowing immediate actions to protect BASs in the face of emerging threats. The cyber-resilient control framework included an adaptive Model Predictive Control (MPC) and a measurement compensator, reducing temperature violations by up to 94% and improving the total demand flexibility by up to 70% in HIL experiments. Such HIL experiments covered a cyber-attack case and a physical fault case, showcasing CYDRES’ efficiency in maintaining operational continuity during threats. The situation awareness platform in Grafana enhanced real-time threat detection and response visualization, augmenting the operational awareness for building operators. CYDRES demonstrated high technical effectiveness in various test scenarios, particularly in HIL environments. The project's phased development approach ensured efficient use of resources, highlighting its practical feasibility and readiness for commercialization. By enhancing the security and resilience of building operations, CYDRES represents a significant advance in mitigating risks associated with cyber-physical systems, thereby enhancing public confidence in the safety of modern building infrastructure. Future directions for the project include expanding testing protocols, refining AFDDP methodologies, exploring more comprehensive resilient control strategies, and testing in real commercial buildings.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Impact of Cultural Values and Organizational Processes on Nuclear Security Operations

Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2022

IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Grid Operational Technology Edge-Level Threat Detection

This report presents a deployable solution to improve the cybersecurity situational awareness of the legacy SCADA system infrastructure in power grids. The main goal of this project is to provide system owners and operators a highly trusted, intelligent alarm system and comprehensive situational awareness of ongoing or potential cybersecurity threats on the grid network. The key contributions of this project include: (1) the development of software, the Intrusion Detection Visualizer for the Operational Technology Network (IViz-OT), to visualize and locate intrusions on the grid network; (2) testing the signature-based Hybrid Intrusion Detection for Energy Systems (HIDES) for different types of intrusions; (3) the integration of HIDES and IViz-OT into the visualization dashboard; and (4) real-time testing using a hardware-in-the-loop test bed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

New York Ecological Forecasting: Utilizing NASA Earth Observations to Map Ash Distribution and Inform Emerald Ash Borer Control

Since their first sightings in the U.S. in 2002, emerald ash borer beetles (Agrilus planipennis; EAB) have killed millions of native ash (Fraxinus spp.) trees across 35 states. Infected ash stands frequently exhibit complete mortality, with the predicted result being the functional extinction of native ash in U.S. forests. In August of 2020, EAB was discovered in the 6.1-million-acre Adirondack Park. The team’s partners at the Adirondack Park Invasive Plant Program (APIPP) desired ash tree distribution and EAB susceptibility information to help improve EAB bio-control efficiency and apply the methodology to future invasive programs. To assist, the team mapped ash tree distribution using NASA Earth observations from Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) and Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), along with hyperspectral imagery from the Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS). Field data from the Monitoring and Managing Ash (MaMA) project, iMapInvasives and iNaturalist databases, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) provided ground truthing for mapping and modeling. Results indicate that for ash detection, the team’s Spectral Angle Mapping (SAM) hyperspectral classification is slightly more sensitive but less accurate than multispectral Random Forest (RF) classification, though neither method was above a ~20% detection rate. End products include maps of ash extent derived from both imagery types, a model forecasting future spread scenarios based on current EAB presence, and outreach materials. These products inform APIPP’s management decisions and facilitate public awareness of EAB’s threat to communities within the region.

Liam Megraw↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and Implementation: Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Physical Protection Systems at Fixed Sites and During Transportation

Physical protection systems, and response forces in particular, are designed to prevent an adversary from successfully completing a malevolent act against a facility or transport operations. Timely detection and assessment of any potential adversary action against a target is an essential element of materials security. The timely detection and assessment must then be followed-up by a capable and timely response that might be enhanced with the additional situational awareness provided by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration Office of International Nuclear Security has been exploring capabilities provided by UAS to support response force operations within the physical protection system. UAS have the potential to provide response force commanders and operators with situational awareness in assessing adversary locations and actions as well as the locations of responders. UAS may be utilized for area searches ahead of responder pathways to identify potential threats and to provide situational awareness of areas not normally covered by cameras (such as areas outside the fence line outside at fixed facilities). In addition, UAS can provide real-time information to transportation convoy teams that pass through constantly changing public access environments. This paper will provide operational recommendations to be addressed when integrating UAS into existing physical protection systems at fixed sites and during transport. Recommendations will include aspects of the following: needs analysis; tactics and techniques to support detection and assessment as well as response force deployment; remote pilot selection, qualifications, training, and currency; UAS selection criteria; UAS laws and regulations; possible cost sharing with other facility operations; and on-scene emergency management.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2021

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗
NASA NTRS2005

Research Needs in Electrostatics for Lunar and Mars Space Missions

The new space exploratory vision announced by President Bush on January 14, 2004, initiated new activities at the National Science and Space Administration (NASA) for human space missions to further explore our solar system. NASA is undertaking Lunar exploration to support sustained human and robotic exploration of Mars and beyond. A series of robotic missions to the Moon by 2008 to prepare for human exploration as early as 2015 but no later than 2020 are anticipated. In a similar way, missions to the Moon and Mars are being planned in Europe, Japan and Russia. These space missions will require international participation to solve problems in a number of important technological areas where research is needed, including biomedical risk mitigation as well as life support and habitability on the surface of Mars. Mitigation of dust hazards is one of the most important problems to be resolved for both Lunar and Mars missions. Both Lunar and Martian regolith are unique materials and completely different from the terrestrial soils that we are exposed to on earth. The total absence of water and an atmosphere on the moon and the formation of soil and fine dust by micrometeorite impacts over billions of years resulted in a layer of soil with unique properties. The soil is primarily basaltic in composition with a high glass concentration. The depth of the soil layer varies from a few meters in the mare areas (dark areas on the Lunar near side) to tens of meters in the highland areas (the lighter mountainous areas) and the particle size distribution of this dust layer varies widely with a major mass fraction less than 10 micrometer in diameter. The hard soil from the moon which has been extensively studied by several researchers showed clearly unique properties of Lunar soil. Apollo astronauts became aware of the potentially serious threat to crew health and mission hardware that can be caused by the lunar dust. As reported by McKay and Carrier the mass fraction of the lunar dust with particle diameter smaller than 20p.m probably represents up to 30% of the total mass of regolith. Apollo astronaut Dr. Harrison Schmidt reported that these fine dust particles were clinging to the Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) suits and to the visors and were limiting the activity on the surface of the moon. The dust particles that were transported with the EVA suits into the lunar module floated throughout the cabin. Crews inhaled the dust particles and noted that they smelled like gun smoke, caused a chocking sensation in the throat and eye irritation. In addition,, some of the mechanical systems were not functioning well because of the dust deposition. It appeared that the dust particles are highly charged electrostatically and Dr. Schmidt noted that future successful Lunar missions will require appropriate dust mitigation technology for protecting astronauts from inhaling toxic particles and mission's life supporting equipment from contamination with the dust particles.

Calle, Carlos I.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Maintaining Situation Awareness with Autonomous Airborne Observation Platforms

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) offer tremendous potential as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms for early detection of security threats and for acquisition and maintenance of situation awareness in crisis conditions. However, using their capabilities effectively requires addressing a range of practical and theoretical problems. The paper will describe progress by the "Autonomous Rotorcraft Project," a collaborative effort between NASA and the U.S. Army to develop a practical, flexible capability for UAV-based ISR. Important facets of the project include optimization methods for allocating scarce aircraft resources to observe numerous, distinct sites of interest; intelligent flight automation software than integrates high-level plan generation capabilities with executive control, failure response and flight control functions; a system architecture supporting reconfiguration of onboard sensors to address different kinds of threats; and an advanced prototype vehicle designed to allow large-scale production at low cost. The paper will also address human interaction issues including an empirical method for determining how to allocate roles and responsibilities between flight automation and human operations.

Freed, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Landscape for BESS and IBR

The cyber risk landscape for BESS and IBR can be broken up by threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for these systems. This presentation walks through the cyber risk landscape for BESS through the lens of consequence-informed awareness and mitigation for each risk factor. Threats with varying capabilities have been demonstrated in real-world events. Though threat actors can rarely be directly influenced by organizations, exposure of systems to adversaries can be limited (a known issue with IBR systems) to reduce likelihood of adversaries accessing systems with disruptive consequences. Common trends in disclosed IBR vulnerabilities include weak password generation or managements for various devices or services and web portal vulnerabilities that provide unauthorized access to data or capabilities or elevated user privileges. Understanding these common vulnerabilities and considering the consequences if these types of vulnerabilities were to occur can help mitigate risk. Consequences range from loss-of-view events that have no reliability impact to asset damage or grid stability impacts. Five case studies are briefly shared to highlight trends in real-world events affecting IBR.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Design and Implementation of Full-Scale Industrial Control System Test Bed for Assessing Cyber-Security Defenses

In response to the increasing awareness of the Ethernet-based threat surface of industrial control systems (ICS), both the research and commercial communities are responding with ICS-specific security solutions. Unfortunately, many of the properties of ICS environments that contribute to the extent of this threat surface (e.g. age of devices, inability or unwillingness to patch, criticality of the system) similarly prevent the proper testing and evaluation of these security solutions. Production environments are often too fragile to introduce unvetted technology and most organizations lack test environments that are sufficiently consistent with production to yield actionable results. Cost and space requirements prevent the creation of mirrored physical environments leading many to look towards simulation or virtualization. Examples in literature provide various approaches to building ICS test beds, though most of these suffer from a lack of realism due to contrived scenarios, synthetic data and other compromises. In this paper, we provide a design methodology for building highly realistic ICS test beds for validating cybersecurity defenses. We then apply that methodology to the design and building of a specific test bed and describe the results and experimental use cases.

Gillen, Rob↗
NASA NTRS1988

Atmospheric sciences program at NASA Kennedy Space Center

A very keen awareness of the impact of lightning threat on ground operations exists at NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) because of the high frequency of thunderstorm occurrences in Florida. The majority of thunder events occur in the summertime, initiated by solar heating of the land. Merritt Island, where KSC is located, produces its own thunderstorms under light flow conditions; because some are small, their importance might be unappreciated at first glance. The impress of these facts, and others of pertinence, on the KSC atmospheric sciences development program will be discussed, priorities enumerated, and a review of development projects presented.

Nicholson, James R.↗