SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site.
The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameters. Examples are as follows: (1) the alpha trailers of ID 322A and ID 322D differentiate waste packaging configurations; (2) the alpha trailers of OR 321F and OR 321G differentiate shipping periods for the same waste (i.e., 60 days versus 10 days); and (3) the alpha trailers of OR 321D and OR 321H differentiate generating sources and time periods from the same waste stream, resulting in different isotopic content. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.
The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC).1 The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site.
The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.
This document provides instructions for performing (1) Inner containment vessel (IV) and outer containment vessel (OC) maintenance leakage rate test on packaging seals and corresponding seal surfaces using a nondestructive helium (He) leak test; (2) IV and OC periodic leakage rate test using nondestructive He leak test; and (3) IV and OC structural pressure tests.
In times of continuing fiscal constraints, a management and operation tool that is straightforward to implement, works as advertised, and virtually ensures compliant waste packaging should be carefully considered and employed wherever practicable. In the near future, the Department of Energy (DOE) will issue the first major update to DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. This update will contain a requirement for sites that do not have a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste certification program to use two newly developed technical standards: Contact-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions and Remote-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions. The technical standards are being developed from the DOE O 435.1 Notice, Contact-Handled and Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Packaging, approved August 2011. The packaging instructions will provide detailed information and instruction for packaging almost every conceivable type of transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal at WIPP. While providing specificity, the packaging instructions leave to each site's own discretion the actual mechanics of how those Instructions will be functionally implemented at the floor level. While the Technical Standards are designed to provide precise information for compliant packaging, the density of the information in the packaging instructions necessitates a type of Rosetta Stone that translates the requirements into concise, clear, easy to use and operationally practical recipes that are waste stream and facility specific for use by both first line management and hands-on operations personnel. The Waste Generator Instructions provide the operator with step-by-step instructions that will integrate the sites' various operational requirements (e.g., health and safety limits, radiological limits or dose limits) and result in a WIPP certifiable waste and package that can be transported to and emplaced at WIPP. These little known but widely productive Waste Generator Instructions (WGIs) have been used occasionally in the past at large sites for treatment and packaging of TRU waste. The WGIs have resulted in highly efficient waste treatment, packaging and certification for disposal of TRU waste at WIPP. For example, a single WGI at LANL, combined with an increase in gram loading, resulted in a mind boggling 6,400% increase in waste loading for {sup 238}Pu heat source waste. In fact, the WGI combined with a new Contact Handled (CH) TRU Waste Content (TRUCON) Code provided a massive increase in shippable wattage per Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) over the previously used and more restrictive TRUCON Code that have been used previously for the heat source waste. In fact, the use of the WGI process at LANL's TA-55 facility reduced non-compliant drums for WIPP certification and disposal from a 13% failure rate down to a 0.5% failure rate and is expected to further reduce the failure rate to zero drums per year. The inherent value of the WGI is that it can be implemented in a site's current procedure issuance process and it provides documented proof of what actions were taken for each waste stream packaged. The WGI protocol provides a key floor-level operational component to achieve goal alignment between actual site operations, the WIPP TRU waste packaging instructions, and DOE O 435.1. (authors)
The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented in Table 1. The CH-TRAMPAC describes "shipping categories" that are assigned to each payload container. Multiple shipping categories may be assigned to a single content code. A summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories is provided in Table 2, which consists of Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Table 2A provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for the "General Case," which reflects the assumption of a 60-day shipping period as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.4 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to be completed within an approximately 1,000-mile radius, a shorter shipping period of 20 days is applicable as described in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.5 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices. For shipments to WIPP from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Nevada Test Site, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, a 20-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2B provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Close-Proximity Shipments" (20-day shipping period). For shipments implementing the controls specified in the CH-TRAMPAC and Appendix 3.6 of the CH-TRU Payload Appendices, a 10-day shipping period is applicable. Table 2C provides a summary of approved content codes and corresponding shipping categories for "Controlled Shipments" (10-day shipping period).
The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) CH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC. A summary of currently approved content codes by site is presented.
The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC.
The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC.
The CH-TRU Waste Content Codes (CH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC). The CH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT packagings. This document is a catalog of TRUPACT-II and HalfPACT authorized contents and a description of the methods utilized to demonstrate compliance with the CH-TRAMPAC.
The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository for the permanent disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste. Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 194.43, Passive institutional controls, requires that measures be employed, '...to preserve knowledge about the location, design, and contents of the [WIPP] disposal system'. These measures include the, 'Placement of records in the archives and land record systems of local, State, and Federal governments, as well as international archives, that would likely be consulted by individuals in search of unexploited resources'. One possibility for allowing individuals to quickly and easily access information on the location, design, and contents of a disposal system and its relation to unexploited resources is the development of an electronic geographic information system (GIS) that would be used to interpret spatial data. In 2016, R. Patterson proposed such a system, known as the 'World Information Library (WIL)'. Information in this database system would be designed to be publicly accessible through a simple web-based user interface that would focus on spatial databases with categories such as; waste repositories, resources, historical sites, wildlife, infrastructure, medicine, agriculture, and technology. The conceptual WIL would be a compilation of searchable libraries and databases. A category in the WIL would consist of spatial databases created for the purpose of preserving knowledge and providing a means of communicating location information in a GIS-based Land Use Information System (LUIS) user interface. The successful implementation of the WIL would require the robust use of project controls, an effective Quality Assurance program, and the development of international standards in collaboration with industry experts. The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss known practices and industry standards that could be utilized for the implementation of a WIL as was introduced by Patterson et al. in 'A Conceptual World Information Library (WIL) and Land Use Information System (LUIS)'. (authors)
The use of plutonium in Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in traditional Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) assemblies leads to greater americium production which is not addressed in MOX recycling. The transuranic nuclides (TRU) contribute the most to the radiotoxicity of nuclear waste and a reduction of the TRU stockpile would greatly reduce the overall radiotoxicity of what must be managed. Am-241 is a TRU of particular concern because it is the dominant contributor of total radiotoxicity for the first 1000 years in a repository. This research explored the feasibility of transmuting Am-241 by using varying amounts in MOX rods being used in place of burnable absorbers and evaluated with respect to the impact on incineration and transmutation of transuranics in MOX fuel as well as the impact on safety. This research concludes that the addition of americium to a non-uniform fuel assembly is a viable method of transmuting Am-241, holding down excess reactivity in the core while serving as a burnable poison, as well as reducing the radiotoxicity of high level waste that must be managed. The use of Am/MOX hybrid fuel assemblies to transmute americium was researched using multiple computer codes. Am-241 was shown in this study to be able to hold down excess reactivity at the beginning of cycle and shape the power distribution in the core with assemblies of varying americium content loaded in a pattern similar to the traditional use of assemblies with varying amounts of burnable absorbers. The feasibility, safety, and utility of using americium to create an Am/MOX hybrid non-uniform core were also evaluated. The core remained critical to a burnup of 22,000 MWD/MTM. The power coefficient of reactivity as well as the temperature and power defects were sufficiently negative to provide a prompt feedback mechanism in case of a transient and prevent a power excursion, thus ensuring inherent safety and protection of the core. As shown here as well as many other studies, this non-uniform assembly type successfully addresses the concerns of reduced control rod worth within advanced MOX assemblies because the Am/MOX hybrid fuel rods are on the periphery of the assembly. The radiotoxicity of the high level waste that must be managed from a single use of an Am/MOX hybrid batch is reduced for the first 1000 years in comparison to a regular UO{sub 2} batch. However, there is no heat-load advantage without multi-recycling the Am/MOX hybrid assemblies. As shown through numerous studies, the heterogeneous assembly model used as the basis for this research is capable of multiple recycles while still maintaining negative temperature and power coefficients of reactivity. Multi-recycling would provide an even greater reduction to the radiotoxicity of the high level waste as well as provide a heat-load advantage compared to a once through UO{sub 2} fuel cycle. (authors)
This report compiles information to support the evaluation of alternatives and analysis of regulatory paths forward for the 33 shafts. The historical information includes a form completed by waste generators for each waste package (Reference 6) that included a waste description, estimates of Pu-239 and uranium-235 (U-235) based on an accounting technique, and calculations of mixed fission products (MFP) based on radiation measurements. A 1979 letter and questionnaire (Reference 7) provides information on waste packaging of hot cell waste and the configuration of disposal shafts as storage in the 33 Shafts was initiated. Tables of data by waste package were developed during a review of historical documents that was performed in 2005 (Reference 8). Radiological data was coupled with material-type data to estimate the initial isotopic content of each waste package and an Oak Ridge National Laboratory computer code was used to calculate 2009 decay levels. Other sources of information include a waste disposal logbook for the 33 shafts (Reference 9), reports that summarize remote-handled waste generated at the CMR facility (Reference 10) and placement of waste in the 33 shafts (Reference 11), a report on decommissioning of the LAMPRE reactor (Reference 12), interviews with an employee and manager involved in placing waste in the 33 shafts (References 13 and 14), an interview with a long-time LANL employee involved in waste operations (Reference 15), a 2002 plan for disposition of remote-handled TRU waste (Reference 16), and photographs obtained during field surveys of several shafts in 2007. The WIPP Central Characterization Project (CCP) completed an Acceptable Knowledge (AK) summary report for 16 canisters of remote-handled waste from the CMR Facility that contains information relevant to the 33 Shafts on hot-cell operations and timeline (Reference 17).
This report documents the modeling and simulation of a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) as part of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–sponsored project to assess the modeling and simulation capabilities for accident progression, source term, and consequence analysis for advanced reactor technologies with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory code SCALE and the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) code MELCOR. Based on publicly available benchmark specifications, a fully heterogeneous 3D SCALE model of the 250 MWth Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) was developed to demonstrate SCALE’s capabilities for full-core reactivity analysis, fuel inventory prediction, and decay heat analysis of an SFR. The benchmark specifications contain modeling details for the ABTR core at the beginning of equilibrium cycle (BOEC) at operating conditions; they were derived from a 2006 preconceptual design report produced by Argonne National Laboratory. The ABTR was designed to demonstrate reactor-based transmutation of transuranics, that is, to “burn” transuranics recovered from light-water reactor (LWR) spent fuel. The ABTR’s fuel is designed to operate in 4 month cycles using uranium/transuranic (U/TRU) metallic fuel, with a TRU content of approximately 20%, at a conversion ratio of approximately 0.6. Various reactivity calculations were performed with SCALE for the ABTR and, where possible, compared with results available in the open literature. Additionally, SCALE was used to perform a full-core depletion calculation over the 4 month cycle to obtain the nuclide inventory at the end of equilibrium cycle (EOEC). These nuclide inventories, decay heat, power profiles, and reactivity feedback coefficients at EOEC represent the initial conditions for analyzing severe accident scenarios with MELCOR.
This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection provides facility information on the design, processes, and security features associated with the Cell 18 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU) at the Nevada National Security Site, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Onsite and offsite containerized low-level mixed waste (LLMW) that has an approved DOE nexus, DOE non-radioactive classified hazardous waste, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agency non-radioactive classified hazardous waste (hereafter called waste) are disposed in the unit. Classified waste is the only non-radioactive waste accepted for disposal and is required to meet waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste. The MWDU is located in the southeast portion of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The RWMC includes transuranic waste storage units, breaching and re-packaging facilities, and the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The RWMS is an active disposal site for waste. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and friable and non-friable asbestos are accepted for disposal. The MWDU has been compliantly operating since January 26, 2011, and approximately 60 percent of its capacity has been used for disposal. In addition to the requirements of the RCRA, the MWDU is also subject to DOE orders, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (for receipt of offsite waste), and State of Nevada requirements. General information and hazardous waste codes identified for disposal at the MWDU are described. State-only designated hazardous waste may also be received at the NNSS as hazardous waste. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.
An approach new to the H-Canyon facility criticality safety analysis has been performed using highly detailed models of the H-Modified (HM) process mixer settlers. The HM process uses tributyl phosphate (TBP) in organic n-paraffin to extract and purify uranium from used nuclear fuel. This occurs in two cycles of counter-current solvent extraction. The aqueous stream is a weak to moderate nitric acid and the feed stock is an aqueous stream. The first Cycle, consisting of two 16-stage banks (A and B-Banks) and one 12-stage bank (C-Bank), is a three step process that separates uranium from the fuel matrix, fission products, and most of the transuranic actinide content. The first Cycle aqueous product is concentrated, adjusted for acidity and fed to the second Cycle. The second Cycle, consisting of one 16-stage bank (D-Bank) and one 12-stage bank (E-Bank), is a two-step process that further purifies the uranium and removes to a great extent remaining actinides and fission products Each stage of the mixer settler banks is modeled as three unique compositions: the mixer as a combined composition of aqueous and organic components and the settler one aqueous and one organic component. This work addresses what is believed to be normal, credible abnormal, and beyond credible abnormal conditions for a particular postulated series of process parameter upsets. The level of detail and the source for the stage-wise compositions are both new and unique to criticality safety analyses of the HM process. Initial work was presented in Ref. 1 and has since been refined. A predictive chemistry model for flowsheet development has been used to solve the solvent extraction equations for the prescribed conditions and the output of that model was then transformed into compositions for each mixture in each stage. The remaining question upon which to achieve consensus is if the approach was appropriately conservative by concluding the chemistry is appropriately bounded. Computational modeling for criticality calculations was performed using KENO-VI in the SCALE 6.1 code package. Computational modeling of the chemistry was performed using the SEPHIS Modification 4 code.
This report documents the Transmutation Library that is used in Fuel Cycle System Analyses. This version replaces the 2008 version.[Piet2008] The Transmutation Library has the following objectives: • Assemble past and future transmutation cases for system analyses. • For each case, assemble descriptive information such as where the case was documented, the purpose of the calculation, the codes used, source of feed material, transmutation parameters, and the name of files that contain raw or source data. • Group chemical elements so that masses in separation and waste processes as calculated in dynamic simulations or spreadsheets reflect current thinking of those processes. For example, the CsSr waste form option actually includes all Group 1A and 2A elements. • Provide mass fractions at input (charge) and output (discharge) for each case. • Eliminate the need for either “fission product other” or “actinide other” while conserving mass. Assessments of waste and separation cannot use “fission product other” or “actinide other” as their chemical behavior is undefined. • Catalog other isotope-specific information in one place, e.g., heat and dose conversion factors for individual isotopes. • Describe the correlations for how input and output compositions change as a function of UOX burnup (for LWR UOX fuel) or fast reactor (FR) transuranic (TRU) conversion ratio (CR) for either FR-metal or FR-oxide. This document therefore includes the following sections: • Explanation of the data set information, i.e., the data that describes each case. In no case are all of the data presented in the Library included in previous documents. In assembling the Library, we return to raw data files to extract the case and isotopic data, into the specified format. • Explanation of which isotopes and elements are tracked. For example, the transition metals are tracked via the following: two Zr isotopes, Zr-other, Tc99, Tc-other, two Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd isotopes, Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd-other, four other specific TM isotopes, and TM-other. Mo-Ru-Rh-Pd are separated because their content constrains the loading of waste in glass, so we have to know the mass of those elements independent of others. • Rules for collapsing long lists of isotopes (~1000) to the 81 items in the library. For each tracked isotope, we define which short-lived isotopes’ mass (at t=0) is included with the mass of the tracked isotope at t=0, which short-lived radioactive progeny must be accounted for when the tracked isotope decays, and to which of the other 80 items the mass of the tracked isotope goes when it decays. • Explanation of where raw data files can be found on the fuel cycle data portal. • Explanation of generic cross section sets • Explanation of isotope-specific parameters such as heat and dose conversion factors • Explanation of the LWR UOX burnup and FR TRU CR correlations.