CAN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY POINT TO A TREATY IN OUTER SPACE
Possibility of the antarctic treaty serving as a model for an outer space treaty
SPACE LAW↗
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Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective
Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers, Isomer Enumeration, Ring Strain and Stereochemistry: What Does Any of This Have to do with an International Chemical Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaty?
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty that mandates a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This treaty entered-into-force in 1997 and has a nearly universal membership of world states. The CWC provides definitions for what constitutes a chemical weapon and describes chemicals for which verification measures and regulatory oversight are required. These chemicals, which must be declared to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for verification purposes, appear in three Schedules within the CWC. The schedules list specific chemical substances and families of chemicals defined by molecular structure descriptions that allow a range of specified variable groups. The text of an international treaty provides a basis for laws and regulatory requirements at international and national levels that must be enacted to comply with treaty obligations. These laws and regulations must account for the “chemistry” that is described in the treaty text, which has been negotiated and agreed upon by world governments. In this paper, we look at some of the chemicals described within the CWC and discuss how atoms and molecules, nomenclature and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain and stereochemistry influence the obligations of States to an international treaty. The material draws upon the authors’ experiences from an interactive “Science for Diplomats” initiative that has provided a forum for engaging with chemical disarmament decision makers to aid in their understanding of fundamental concepts in chemistry that have impact on treaty implementation. We hope this article will spark interest from chemistry students and educators in the provision of science advice for policymakers and provide policymakers with an appreciation of the complexity and importance of understanding the language of chemistry in support of a world free of chemical weapons.
Organic Chemistry, Alkanes/Cycloalkanes, Applicati↗
The Role of Satellite Earth Observation Data in Monitoring and Verifying International Environmental Treaties
The term verification implies compliance verification in the language of treaty negotiation and implementation, particularly in the fields of disarmament and arms control. The term monitoring on the other hand, in both environmental and arms control treaties, has a much broader interpretation which allows for use of supporting data sources that are not necessarily acceptable or adequate for direct verification. There are many ways that satellite Earth observation (EO) data can support international environmental agreements, from national forest inventories to use in geographic information system (GIs) tools. Though only a few references to satellite EO data and their use exist in the treaties themselves, an expanding list of applications can be considered in support of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This paper explores the current uses of satellite Earth observation data which support monitoring activities of major environmental treaties and draws conclusions about future missions and their data use. The scope of the study includes all phases of environmental treaty fulfillment - development, monitoring, and enforcement - and includes a multinational perspective on the use of satellite Earth observation data for treaty support.
Johnston, Shaida↗
History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Explaining patterns in the ratification of global environmental treaties
A study was made of the ratification behavior of 160 countries with respect to 38 global environmental treaties. The study identifies and explains patterns in the ratification of treaties, providing two means of assessing the likelihood that any given country will support global environmental treaties. National ratification totals reveal a pattern of high ratification by countries in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A country's standing within the range of high to low ratification rates can be explained by the statistical model developed in the study. This research allows one to identify countries likely to support global environmental treaties.
Cook, David W.↗
Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena
Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Treaties and Arms Control [Slides]
This presentations provides an overview of arms control including aims and methods of arms control, the treaty process, treaties, new START inspections, and future treaty considerations: strategic vs. nonstrategic.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications
Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification
Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Five reasons why the US should not withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty
In October 2019, reports emerged that the Trump administration was considering a withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. According to media sources, President Trump has already signed a memorandum to leave the treaty, but the United States has not yet officially initiated the six-month withdrawal process. This article discusses 5 reasons why the U.S. should not withdraw.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Third international challenge to model the medium- to long-range transport of radioxenon to four Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring stations
In 2015 and 2016, atmospheric transport modeling challenges were conducted in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, however, with a more limited scope with respect to emission inventories, simulation period and number of relevant samples (i.e., those above the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)) involved. Therefore, a more comprehensive atmospheric transport modeling challenge was organized in 2019. Stack release data of Xe-133 were provided by the Institut National des Radioéléments/IRE (Belgium) and the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories/CNL (Canada) and accounted for in the simulations over a three (mandatory) or six (optional) months period. Best estimate emissions of additional facilities (radiopharmaceutical production and nuclear research facilities, commercial reactors or relevant research reactors) of the Northern Hemisphere were included as well. Model results were compared with observed atmospheric activity concentrations at four International Monitoring System (IMS) stations located in Europe and North America with overall considerable influence of IRE and/or CNL emissions for evaluation of the participants’ runs. Participants were prompted to work with controlled and harmonized model set-ups to make runs more comparable, but also to increase diversity. It was found that using the stack emissions of IRE and CNL with daily resolution does not lead to better results than disaggregating annual emissions of these two facilities taken from the literature if an overall score for all stations covering all valid observed samples is considered. A moderate benefit of roughly 10% is visible in statistical scores for samples influenced by IRE and/or CNL to at least 50% and there can be considerable benefit for individual samples. Effects of transport errors, not properly characterized remaining emitters and long IMS sampling times (12–24 h) undoubtedly are in contrast to and reduce the benefit of high-quality IRE and CNL stack data. Complementary best estimates for remaining emitters push the scores up by 18% compared to just considering IRE and CNL emissions alone. Despite the efforts undertaken the full multi-model ensemble built is highly redundant. An ensemble based on a few arbitrary runs is sufficient to model the Xe-133 background at the stations investigated. The effective ensemble size is below five. An optimized ensemble at each station has on average slightly higher skill compared to the full ensemble. However, the improvement (maximum of 20% and minimum of 3% in RMSE) in skill is likely being too small for being exploited for an independent period.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Reply to “Comment on ‘Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain, and stereochemistry: What does any of this have to do with an international chemical disarmament and nonproliferation treaty?’”
A letter to the Journal of Chemical Education provided comments and accurate enumerations of isomers for sets of organic compounds discussed in the paper “Nomenclature, Chemical Abstracts Service numbers, isomer enumeration, ring strain, and stereochemistry: What does any of this have to do with an international chemical disarmament and nonproliferation treaty?”. This is a reply to that letter to address the comments and propose updates to the original paper in order to incorporate the accurate enumeration values.
Alkanes/Cycloalkanes, Chemical Weapons Convention ↗
A BASIS FOR A SEPARATE TREATY FOR BANNING WEAPONS IN SPACE
Proposed treaty for banning weapons in space
NASA PROGRAM↗
Evolution toward a space treaty - An historical analysis
Historical analysis of space treaty development
Kemp, J. M.↗
Experimental demonstration and modeling of a robotic neutron detector with spectral and directional sensitivity for treaty verification
International safeguards and arms control agreements often require labor-intensive, intrusive onsite inspections to perform verification tasks. The ability to localize a neutron source and/or characterize a neutron field may be imperative for identifying anomalies. We are interested in the role of autonomous mobile robots, which, if designed properly, may be more effective and efficient and less intrusive than their human counterparts. Toward developing such a capability, we, for this study, have constructed the N-SpecDir Bot, comprised of three boron-coated straw detectors azimuthally-distributed within a cylinder of high-density polyethylene, which is mounted on an omni-directional robotic platform. Our N-SpecDir Bot is specifically designed to provide spectral and directional sensitivity, in addition to gross counts, by utilizing the signals from the three detectors. The detection system has been extensively characterized by MCNP modeling, which has been benchmarked to experiments conducted at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. We demonstrate the spectral and directional sensitivity experimentally and in simulation, and provide a simple yet robust method for directional measurements.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Multi-Layered Video Authentication for Treaty Inspection Regimes (1 minute summary).
Abstract not provided.
Weber, Thomas↗
The Vela Hotel Program: The AEC's Space-Based Nuclear Detection and Treaty Verification Program [Slides]
Early Interest in "Detection": "I would suggest that the best way to get reliable information in a short time would be to send from the States a man qualified to do the testing of the samples on the spot. This man should be officially a representative of the State Department, and his detecting devices, such as small portable Geiger Counters, could then go into Switzerland in the diplomatic pouch via air from Southern Italy. This man could then contact, through the Embassy, suitable people who could collect the water samples without arousing too much curiosity. A fishing trip in a boat would probably give the best disguise, as the fisherman could carry a water bottle in his lunch basket, and fill it after drinking the original contents. The water should be collected from the center of the river, to get the swiftest flowing water, so that the holdup could be minimized. In the lake, the water should be collected as near to the suspected site as possible, or as near to each of the inlet rivers as can be done. Speed in getting from the collection point to the counting room is of great importance, as you are, no doubt, aware." - Luis Alvarez to Major Furman, May 1944.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗