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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2006

Ultra reliability at NASA

Ultra reliable systems are critical to NASA particularly as consideration is being given to extended lunar missions and manned missions to Mars. NASA has formulated a program designed to improve the reliability of NASA systems. The long term goal for the NASA ultra reliability is to ultimately improve NASA systems by an order of magnitude. The approach outlined in this presentation involves the steps used in developing a strategic plan to achieve the long term objective of ultra reliability. Consideration is given to: complex systems, hardware (including aircraft, aerospace craft and launch vehicles), software, human interactions, long life missions, infrastructure development, and cross cutting technologies. Several NASA-wide workshops have been held, identifying issues for reliability improvement and providing mitigation strategies for these issues. In addition to representation from all of the NASA centers, experts from government (NASA and non-NASA), universities and industry participated. Highlights of a strategic plan, which is being developed using the results from these workshops, will be presented.

risk↗
NASA NTRS1984

Reliability analysis of an ultra-reliable fault tolerant control system

This report analyzes the reliability of NASA's Ultra-reliable Fault Tolerant Control System (UFTCS) architecture as it is currently envisioned for helicopter control. The analysis is extended to air transport and spacecraft control using the same computational and voter modules applied within the UFTCS architecture. The system reliability is calculated for several points in the helicopter, air transport, and space flight missions when there are initially 4, 5, and 6 operating channels. Sensitivity analyses are used to explore the effects of sensor failure rates and different system configurations at the 10 hour point of the helicopter mission. These analyses show that the primary limitation to system reliability is the number of flux windings on each flux summer (4 are assumed for the baseline case). Tables of system reliability at the 10 hour point are provided to allow designers to choose a configuration to meet specified reliability goals.

Curry, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Methods and Costs to Achieve Ultra Reliable Life Support

A published Mars mission is used to explore the methods and costs to achieve ultra reliable life support. The Mars mission and its recycling life support design are described. The life support systems were made triply redundant, implying that each individual system will have fairly good reliability. Ultra reliable life support is needed for Mars and other long, distant missions. Current systems apparently have insufficient reliability. The life cycle cost of the Mars life support system is estimated. Reliability can be increased by improving the intrinsic system reliability, adding spare parts, or by providing technically diverse redundant systems. The costs of these approaches are estimated. Adding spares is least costly but may be defeated by common cause failures. Using two technically diverse systems is effective but doubles the life cycle cost. Achieving ultra reliability is worth its high cost because the penalty for failure is very high.

deep space life support↗
NASA NTRS2010

Ultra Reliable Closed Loop Life Support for Long Space Missions

Spacecraft human life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by providing sufficient spares to replace all failed components. The additional mass of spares for ultra reliability is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided that the original system reliability is not too low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the Space Shuttle and Space Station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units. However, on-demand maintenance and repair requires a logistics supply chain in place to provide the needed spares. In contrast, a Mars or other long space mission must take along all the needed spares, since resupply is not possible. Long missions must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since they will take years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, distant missions have a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than near-Earth missions. Achieving ultra reliable spacecraft life support systems with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must determine the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Ultra reliability requires reducing the intrinsic failure causes, providing spares to replace failed components and having "graceful" failure modes. Technologies, components, and materials must be selected and designed for high reliability. Long duration testing is needed to confirm very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The system must be designed, developed, integrated, and tested with system reliability in mind. Maintenance and reparability of failed units must not add to the probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass should start soon since it must be a long term effort.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Developing Ultra Reliable Life Support for the Moon and Mars

Recycling life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by using spares to replace failed components. The added mass for spares is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided the original system reliability is not very low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the space shuttle and space station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units, However, this maintenance and repair depends on a logistics supply chain that provides the needed spares. The Mars mission must take all the needed spares at launch. The Mars mission also must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since it requires years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, the Mars mission has a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than shuttle or station. Achieving ultra reliable space life support with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must define the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Technologies, components, and materials must be designed and selected for high reliability. Extensive testing is needed to ascertain very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The systems must be designed, produced, integrated, and tested without impairing system reliability. Maintenance and failed unit replacement should not introduce any additional probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass must start soon if it is to produce timely results for the moon and Mars.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Ultra Reliability

This viewgraph presentation gives a general overview of NASA's ultra reliability areas. The contents include: 1) Objectives; 2) Approach; 3) Ultra Reliability Areas; 4) Plan Overview; 5) Work Flows; and 6) Customers.

long life↗
NASA NTRS2006

Ultra Reliability Workshop Introduction

This plan is the accumulation of substantial work by a large number of individuals. The Ultra-Reliability team consists of representatives from each center who have agreed to champion the program and be the focal point for their center. A number of individuals from NASA, government agencies (including the military), universities, industry and non-governmental organizations also contributed significantly to this effort. Most of their names may be found on the Ultra-Reliability PBMA website.

ultra reliability↗
NASA NTRS2005

An Ultra Reliability for Project for NASA

NASA has embarked on a new program designed to improve the reliability of NASA systems. In this context, the goal for ultra reliability is to ultimately improve the systems by an order of magnitude. The approach outlined in this presentation involves five steps: 1. Divide NASA systems into seven sectors; 2. Establish sector champions and representatives from each NASA center; 3. Develop a challenge list for each sector using a team of NASA experts in each area with the sector champion facilitating the effort; 4. Develop mitigation strategies for each of the sectors' challenge lists and rank their importance by holding a workshop with area experts from government (NASA and non-NASA), universities and industry; 5. Develop a set of tasks for each sector in order of importance for improving the reliability of NASA systems. Several NASA-wide workshops have been held, identifying issues for reliability improvement and providing mitigation strategies for these issues.

ultra-reliability↗
NASA NTRS1975

Technical description of space ultra reliable modular computer (SUMC), model 2 B

The design features of the SUMC-2B computer, also called the IBM-HTC are described. It is general purpose digital computer implemented with flexible hardware elements and microprograming to enable low cost customizing to a wide range of applications. It executes the S/360 standard instruction set to maintain problem state compability. Memory technology, extended instruction sets, and I/O channel variations are among the available options.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1983

Specifying and Verifying Ultra-reliability and Fault-tolerance Properties

A methodology to rigorously verify ultrareliability and fault tolerance system properties is described. The methodology utilizes a hierarchy of formal mathematical specifications of system design and incremental design proof to prove the system has the desired properties. A small example of the approach is given, and the application of the methodology to the large scale proof of SIFT, a fault tolerant flight control operating system, is discussed.

Schwartz, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability

A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.

reliability↗
NASA NTRS2012

Designing Fault-Injection Experiments for the Reliability of Embedded Systems

This paper considers the long-standing problem of conducting fault-injections experiments to establish the ultra-reliability of embedded systems. There have been extensive efforts in fault injection, and this paper offers a partial summary of the efforts, but these previous efforts have focused on realism and efficiency. Fault injections have been used to examine diagnostics and to test algorithms, but the literature does not contain any framework that says how to conduct fault-injection experiments to establish ultra-reliability. A solution to this problem integrates field-data, arguments-from-design, and fault-injection into a seamless whole. The solution in this paper is to derive a model reduction theorem for a class of semi-Markov models suitable for describing ultra-reliable embedded systems. The derivation shows that a tight upper bound on the probability of system failure can be obtained using only the means of system-recovery times, thus reducing the experimental effort to estimating a reasonable number of easily-observed parameters. The paper includes an example of a system subject to both permanent and transient faults. There is a discussion of integrating fault-injection with field-data and arguments-from-design.

White, Allan L.↗
NASA NTRS1990

High level design proof of a reliable computing platform

The main objectives are: to establish hardware/software platform for ultra-reliable computing; to use fault tolerant computer architecture; to use formal methods to prevent design and implementation errors; and to construct reliability model to quantify reliability estimate. The results show that: ultra-reliable control systems are hard to achieve; simple fault tolerant design is postulated; formal specification of design is constructed; and preliminary correctness proofs are obtained.

Divito, Ben L.↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Conceptual Design for a Reliable Optical Bus (ROBUS)

The Scalable Processor-Independent Design for Electromagnetic Resilience (SPIDER) is a new family of fault-tolerant architectures under development at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC). The SPIDER is a general-purpose computational platform suitable for use in ultra-reliable embedded control applications. The design scales from a small configuration supporting a single aircraft function to a large distributed configuration capable of supporting several functions simultaneously. SPIDER consists of a collection of simplex processing elements communicating via a Reliable Optical Bus (ROBUS). The ROBUS is an ultra-reliable, time-division multiple access broadcast bus with strictly enforced write access (no babbling idiots) providing basic fault-tolerant services using formally verified fault-tolerance protocols including Interactive Consistency (Byzantine Agreement), Internal Clock Synchronization, and Distributed Diagnosis. The conceptual design of the ROBUS is presented in this paper including requirements, topology, protocols, and the block-level design. Verification activities, including the use of formal methods, are also discussed.

Miner, Paul S.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Design for validation, based on formal methods

Validation of ultra-reliable systems decomposes into two subproblems: (1) quantification of probability of system failure due to physical failure; (2) establishing that Design Errors are not present. Methods of design, testing, and analysis of ultra-reliable software are discussed. It is concluded that a design-for-validation based on formal methods is needed for the digital flight control systems problem, and also that formal methods will play a major role in the development of future high reliability digital systems.

Butler, Ricky W.↗