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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

The distinct conditions of atmospheric and underground nuclear tests revealed by Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples

We analyzed the Zn isotopic compositions of nuclear debris samples from atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. Samples from the site of atmospheric tests exhibit a range of Zn isotopic fractionation (δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon = 0.23–0.86 ‰) while samples from underground tests exhibit Zn isotopic compositions with minimal variation among samples and from terrestrial igneous rock standards (δ 66 ZnJMC-Lyon = 0.28–0.39 ‰). In conclusion, the larger range of δ 66 Zn JMC-Lyon observed in atmospheric test samples relative to underground test samples is likely the result of the open system characteristics of atmospheric nuclear tests and the closed system characteristics of underground nuclear tests.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of Cavity Radius and Chimney Height Information for Underground Nuclear Tests at Nevada National Security Site

Underground nuclear explosions release an immense amount of thermal and mechanical energy that alter the geologic materials surrounding the “working point” (WP = underground location) of the detonation. Explosion effects produce mechanically and thermally altered zones such as the “cavity,” “chimney,” and “melt glass puddle,”as well as concentric zones of crushed, compressed, and fractured rock extending away from the cavity wall.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Recovery and Calibration of Legacy Underground Nuclear Test Seismic Data from the Leo Brady Seismic Network

The Leo Brady Seismic Network (LBSN, originally the Sandia Seismic Network) was established in 1960 by Sandia National Laboratories to monitor underground nuclear tests (UGTs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly named the Nevada Test Site). The LBSN has been in various configurations throughout its existence, but it has generally been comprised of four to six stations at regional distances (~150–400 km) from the NNSS with approximately evenly spaced azimuthal coverage. Between 1962 and the end of nuclear testing in 1992, the LBSN—and a sister network operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories—was the most comprehensive United States source of regional seismic data of UGTs. Approximately 75% of all UGTs performed by the United States occurred in the predigital era. At that time, LBSN data were transmitted as frequency-modulated (FM) audio over telephone lines to a central location and recorded as analog waveforms on high-fidelity magnetic audio tapes. These tapes have been in dry temperature-stable storage for decades and contain the sole record of this irreplaceable data; full waveforms of LBSN-recorded UGTs from this era were not routinely digitized or otherwise published. We have developed a process to recover and calibrate data from these tapes. First, we play back and digitize the tapes as audio. Next, we demodulate the FM “audio” into individual waveforms. We then estimate the various instrument constants through careful measurement of “weight-lift” tests performed prior to each UGT on each instrument. Finally, these coefficients allow us to scale and shape the derived instrument response of the seismographs and compute poles and zeros. Finally, the result of this process is a digital record of the recorded seismic ground motion in a modern data format, stored in a searchable database. To date, we have digitized tapes from 592 UGTs.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Full Moment Tensor Solutions of U.S. Underground Nuclear Tests for Event Screening and Yield Estimation

Moment tensor (MT) solutions are proving increasingly valuable in explosion monitoring, especially now that they are more routinely calculated for the unconstrained, full (six component) MT. In this study, we have calculated MTs for U.S. underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada National Security Site using seismic recordings primarily from the Livermore Nevada Network. We are able to determine them for 130 nuclear explosions from 1970 to 1996 for a range of yields and under a variety of material conditions, which we have supplemented with 10 additional chemical explosions at the test site. The result is an extensive database of MTs that can be used to assess the performance of important monitoring tasks such as event identification and yield determination. We test the explosion event screening on the fundamental lune of the MT eigensphere and find MT screening to be a robust discriminant between earthquakes and explosions. We then explore the estimation of moment-derived yield, in which we find that material properties are the largest contributor to differences in the estimated moment-to-yield ratio. Additionally, further research conducted on this dataset can be used to develop, test, and improve various explosion monitoring methodologies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dense Seismic Array Study of a Legacy Underground Nuclear Test at the Nevada National Security Site

The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are difficult to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ~1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ~200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (~364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ~300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ~200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ~50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

On Magnitudes and Inferred Yields of the 39 Underground Nuclear Test Explosions at the Novaya Zemlya Test Site

ABSTRACT We review the previously compiled seismic magnitudes for underground nuclear explosions at the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Novaya Zemlya Test Site, and analyze these data in the context of published details about individual tests and official Russian reports of annual cumulative explosive energy release at the test site. We derive relationships between teleseismic body wave magnitude mb and explosive yield Y by predicting the yield of each test using mb and minimizing the difference between predicted and reported annual cumulative yield. A linear relationship between mb and logY with a slope of 0.82 provides a good fit to the annual total yield, with a root mean square (rms) misfit of 0.095 logY units. A spectral magnitude relationship based on the explosion source model of Mueller and Murphy (1971) with a single-free-parameter provides a slightly better fit. For the 10 tests for which individual yields can be directly deduced from the official reports, the rms misfit of reported yields is less than 0.1 logY units or about 25%. More complex relationships that differentiate between the northern and southern test areas, or take account of variations in the scaled depth of burial, do not provide substantially better fits to the reported yields.

Geochemistry & Geophysics↗
DOE OSTI2019

Evaluating the Importance of Barometric Pumping for Subsurface Gas Transport Near an Underground Nuclear Test Site

Core Ideas Gas transport modeling can estimate ground surface breakthrough after an underground nuclear explosion. Comparison tracer‐injection experimental and model results reveals parameter sensitivity. Barometric pumping may explain gas breakthrough following an underground nuclear explosion. Amplitude and period of barometric pressure signal are key in controlling breakthrough. An underground nuclear explosion (UNE) generates and distributes radioactive gases that can be transported to the ground surface though preexisting and explosion‐induced fractures over timescales of hours to months. If detected, the presence of short‐lived radionuclides in gas is evidence of a recent UNE. Numerical modeling can provide estimates of surface arrival times that can help inform gas monitoring strategies at suspected foreign test sites. Efforts are underway at historic US UNE sites to better understand subsurface gas‐transport processes following a UNE by geologic characterization of the near‐field damage structures, field‐scale tracer experiments, and subsurface air pressure monitoring. The development of numerical models using historical and experimental datasets from former UNE sites can improve predictions by testing conceptual models, highlighting key processes, and constraining parameter ranges. The models developed in this study represent the U20az site at the Nevada National Security Site where the Barnwell device was expended in December 1989. A two‐phase (water and air), dual‐permeability flow and transport model of the U20az site was built to investigate gas transport processes under recent experimental conditions and following the Barnwell nuclear event. Results indicate that the model can explain both the lack of arrival of radioactive gas tracers in a 2013 field experiment as well as the observed arrival of radioactive gases following the 1989 Barnwell event using barometric pressure records from the respective periods, even when additional advective processes associated with the Barnwell detonation are ignored. The results demonstrate that the character of the barometric records may be a key factor in explaining the differences in transport behavior.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

Underground Nuclear Testing [Slides]

Conducting a nuclear test was a major undertaking. It involves several hundred full time positions that have little to do with the actual test. In the 60’s Mercury was the second largest city in Nevada. On a average day in the 60’s, 70’s AND 80’s there were about 20,000 people on the site. One effects shot would require from 2 to 4 years to plan and execute. These were massive undertakings.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

Yield-Weighting Approaches for Calculating Radiologic Inventories for Individual Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

This memo supplements a set of notes developed in 2011 that outline two processes to identify and calculate unclassified radionuclide inventories for individual underground detonations conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The calculations are meant to be based upon unclassified yield information listed in U.S. Department of Energy (2015) and the unclassified total radionuclide inventory data summarized in either Bowen et al. (2001) or Finnegan et al. (2016).

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2019

Natural Gas Drilling near the Underground Nuclear Test Site of Rulison, Colorado - 19571

In 1969, the Project Rulison test was conducted in western Colorado using a nuclear device to stimulate natural gas production by fracturing low-permeability, gas-bearing rock. The presence of radionuclides (specifically tritium) in the produced gas persisted above acceptable levels, and the test was abandoned. Advances in hydrofracturing technology over the past 10-15 years have revolutionized the extraction of hydrocarbons from low-permeability formations, leading to a significant increase of drilling in the Rulison area. Drilling activity nearing the Rulison site has raised concerns that remnant radioactivity might be encountered. The site, now under the care of the US Department of Energy (DOE), is protected by a 16-hectare (40 acre) institutional control boundary (Lot 11) that prohibits drilling or extraction of materials below 1830 meters (6000 feet) within the lot boundary. Drilling within 0.8 kilometer (0.5 mile) of the site requires a hearing before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. DOE recommends that gas developers adopt a conservative, staged drilling approach, allowing gas reserves near the Rulison site to be recovered in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of encountering contamination. The staged approach calls for collecting data from wells away from the site before drilling closer. For instance, the wells 1.2 kilometer (0.75 mile) west of the site did not encounter any unexpected geologic conditions and now have 8 years of production without encountering any detonation-related radionuclides. The next set of wells would be 0.8 kilometer (0.5 mile) west of the site. This sequential method drills first at locations with a low probability of encountering contamination and then moves closer. This process protects public safety while allowing the collection of additional data to confirm that contamination has not migrated beyond the 16-hectare (40-acre) institutional control boundary. The staged drilling approach was simulated with a modeling effort that estimates the current extent of contamination and the potential for production-induced contaminant migration to nearby wells. The model incorporates geologic data from nearby wells and was calibrated to production data from both the reentry well production testing (1970-1971) and the wells 1.2 kilometer (0.75 mile) from the site that began producing in 2010. The geologic data include both sand/shale distribution statistics as well as the tendency of hydrofractures to preferentially propagate east and west due to the regional stress field. The model results indicate that it is unlikely that wells near the site would ever encounter site-related radionuclides. (authors)

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Hyperspectral vegetation identification at a legacy underground nuclear explosion test site

The detection, location, and identification of suspected underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) are global security priorities that rely on integrated analysis of multiple data modalities for uncertainty reduction in event analysis. Vegetation disturbances may provide complementary signatures that can confirm or build on the observables produced by prompt sensing techniques such as seismic or radionuclide monitoring networks. For instance, the emergence of non-native species in an area may be indicative of anthropogenic activity or changes in vegetation health may reflect changes in the site conditions resulting from an underground explosion. Previously, we collected high spatial resolution (10 cm) hyperspectral data from an unmanned aerial system at a legacy underground nuclear explosion test site and its surrounds. These data consist of visible and near-infrared wavebands over 4.3 km 2 of high desert terrain along with high spatial resolution (2.5 cm) RGB context imagery. In this work, we employ various spectral detection and classification algorithms to identify and map vegetation species in an area of interest containing the legacy test site. Here, we employed a frequentist framework for fusing multiple spectral detections across various reference spectra captured at different times and sampled from multiple locations. The spatial distribution of vegetation species is compared to the location of the underground nuclear explosion. We discover a difference in species abundance within a 130 m radius of the center of the test site.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Observed Surface Disturbances Associated with the DPRK’s 3 September 2017 Underground Nuclear Test

Satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, along with pre- and post-test optical commercial satellite imagery and a short official video (which was apparently recorded during the 3 September 2017 test), provide additional insights on the widespread surface disturbances around the peak of Mt. Mantap. These were generated by North Korea’s sixth and by far largest nuclear test (estimated to be roughly a quarter of a megaton; Zerbo, 2017). Although a number of visible landslides that are associated with this test had been previously reported, these additional data reveal more information about the widespread nature of the detected larger-scale movements that have been reported by other researchers, in addition to some smaller scale instances of localized slumping or compression within the top 200 m of the mountain; these took place in an area that was observed to contain stratified volcanic deposits not otherwise described to date. A closer look at two previously described zones of localized slippage, subsidence, or slumping (located within those identified volcanic layer deposits on the western side of Mt. Mantap) revealed useful information about the landscape of the area. Several healthy trees have been knocked down in one zone; in the other, a rock prominence had collapsed, and a 60-m-long crack or crevice appeared to have opened. It remains unclear whether these surface disturbances were associated with what had been allegedly reported by the news media as a “cave-in that was externally observable.” However, given the likely 800 m depth of the test in the lower hard-rock geology, we have been led to conclude that the notable observed localized surface disturbances cannot be interpreted as a “collapse crater” that was a result of a “cave-in” above any nuclear test created cavity and/or associated tunneling. Although the broadscale nature of the SAR and visually detected movements inhibits more precise geolocation of the test within the mountain, the radar imagery did show that the various surface ground movements were generated in opposing directions. The movements were directed away from the center on either side of the mountain; as such, they provided an empirical basis to confirm the previous seismological estimates that the detonation had occurred somewhere under the peak of Mt. Mantap. Moreover, a North Korean-sourced short video that was acquired with a ground-based camera focused directly on the peak shows a large dust cloud rising up from the mountain. In conclusion, this provides additional evidence that is consistent with that conclusion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗