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Results for “verification validation avionics”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Model-Based Verification and Validation of Spacecraft Avionics

Verification and Validation (V&V) at JPL is traditionally performed on flight or flight-like hardware running flight software. For some time, the complexity of avionics has increased exponentially while the time allocated for system integration and associated V&V testing has remained fixed. There is an increasing need to perform comprehensive system level V&V using modeling and simulation, and to use scarce hardware testing time to validate models; the norm for thermal and structural V&V for some time. Our approach extends model-based V&V to electronics and software through functional and structural models implemented in SysML. We develop component models of electronics and software that are validated by comparison with test results from actual equipment. The models are then simulated enabling a more complete set of test cases than possible on flight hardware. SysML simulations provide access and control of internal nodes that may not be available in physical systems. This is particularly helpful in testing fault protection behaviors when injecting faults is either not possible or potentially damaging to the hardware. We can also model both hardware and software behaviors in SysML, which allows us to simulate hardware and software interactions. With an integrated model and simulation capability we can evaluate the hardware and software interactions and identify problems sooner. The primary missing piece is validating SysML model correctness against hardware; this experiment demonstrated such an approach is possible.

MBV&V↗
NASA NTRS2013

Managing Complexity in the MSL/Curiosity Entry, Descent, and Landing Flight Software and Avionics Verification and Validation Campaign

The complexity of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission presented the Entry, Descent, and Landing systems engineering team with many challenges in its Verification and Validation (V&V) campaign. This paper describes some of the logistical hurdles related to managing a complex set of requirements, test venues, test objectives, and analysis products in the implementation of a specific portion of the overall V&V program to test the interaction of flight software with the MSL avionics suite. Application-specific solutions to these problems are presented herein, which can be generalized to other space missions and to similar formidable systems engineering problems.

Stehura, Aaron↗
NASA NTRS2022

Europa Clipper Payload Verification and Validation: Avionics-Instrument Interface Test Campaign

NASA's Europa Clipper mission will investigate Jupiter's icy moon Europa using a payload suite consisting of nine instruments to address a range of scientific objectives concerning Europa's habitability. As the project proceeds past its Critical Design Review, confidence is being built in the system's ability to achieve mission objectives through the implementation of a rigorous payload verification and validation (V&V) program. As part of this payload V&V program, instrument box-level testing was performed by the payload team to verify select instrument-avionics interface requirements. This testing was performed at JPL using the avionics testbed's Bulk Data Storage Emulator (BDSEM) with visiting instrument Test Models. This paper summarizes the Data Link test campaign involving roughly four days of functional testing per instrument, including planning, testing methods, types of issues found, and the requirement closure process. Detail is also provided on the development, deployment, and validation of a standardized analysis tool used in data reviews. This testing verified requirements related to commanding rates, loss of link, packet format, clock counters, loopback test capability, and SpaceWire jitter and skew margins. Additional risk reduction testing of basic commanding, counter behavior, science data collection and transfer, and interface swapping was also performed. Because the BDSEM venue was not originally designed to be a run for record venue, the process of characterizing venue fidelity and establishing suitability for requirement closure using data collected in this venue will also be addressed.In order to close requirements, an extensible tool was developed to post-process instrument command and telemetry data from their original binary to a human-readable format and give visibility to errors detected within the data, such as packets with Cyclic Redundancy Check errors. This tool, called payload-packet-parser, is a Python 3.9 command line tool built using a variety of open-source Python libraries. Payload-packet-parser was designed to support parsing command and telemetry packets for all Europa Clipper instruments and additional analysis tools were developed for verification of specific information interface requirements. This test campaign, including post-processing using a single parsing and verification toolset, allowed for early interface testing, alleviating testing burdens on instrument teams and buying down risk on the instrument-avionics interface by finding hardware and software issues and idiosyncrasies prior to integration with system test venues. Over twenty issues were discovered across the payload, resulting in software updates and instrument rework well in advance of any system impacts. This paper concludes with an assessment of benefits and costs of this type of testing and lessons learned.

Montanez, Leticia↗
NASA NTRS2012

Model-Based Verification and Validation of Spacecraft Avionics

Our simulation was able to mimic the results of 30 tests on the actual hardware. This shows that simulations have the potential to enable early design validation - well before actual hardware exists. Although simulations focused around data processing procedures at subsystem and device level, they can also be applied to system level analysis to simulate mission scenarios and consumable tracking (e.g. power, propellant, etc.). Simulation engine plug-in developments are continually improving the product, but handling time for time-sensitive operations (like those of the remote engineering unit and bus controller) can be cumbersome.

Systems Modeling Language (SysML↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning vane control system (TVCS) are discussed and the problems and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated system.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning valve control system (TVCS) are discussed, and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated systems.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS1990

Application of industry-standard guidelines for the validation of avionics software

The application of industry standards to the development of avionics software is discussed, focusing on verification and validation activities. It is pointed out that the procedures that guide the avionics software development and testing process are under increased scrutiny. The DO-178A guidelines, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, are used by the FAA for certifying avionics software. To investigate the effectiveness of the DO-178A guidelines for improving the quality of avionics software, guidance and control software (GCS) is being developed according to the DO-178A development method. It is noted that, due to the extent of the data collection and configuration management procedures, any phase in the life cycle of a GCS implementation can be reconstructed. Hence, a fundamental development and testing platform has been established that is suitable for investigating the adequacy of various software development processes. In particular, the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the development method recommended by the DO-178A guidelines are being closely examined.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS2013

State Machine Modeling of the Space Launch System Solid Rocket Boosters

The Space Launch System is a Shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle currently in development to serve as NASA's premiere launch vehicle for space exploration. The Space Launch System is a multistage rocket with two Solid Rocket Boosters and multiple payloads, including the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. Planned Space Launch System destinations include near-Earth asteroids, the Moon, Mars, and Lagrange points. The Space Launch System is a complex system with many subsystems, requiring considerable systems engineering and integration. To this end, state machine analysis offers a method to support engineering and operational e orts, identify and avert undesirable or potentially hazardous system states, and evaluate system requirements. Finite State Machines model a system as a finite number of states, with transitions between states controlled by state-based and event-based logic. State machines are a useful tool for understanding complex system behaviors and evaluating "what-if" scenarios. This work contributes to a state machine model of the Space Launch System developed at NASA Ames Research Center. The Space Launch System Solid Rocket Booster avionics and ignition subsystems are modeled using MATLAB/Stateflow software. This model is integrated into a larger model of Space Launch System avionics used for verification and validation of Space Launch System operating procedures and design requirements. This includes testing both nominal and o -nominal system states and command sequences.

model-based systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2021

Toward Certification of Machine-Learning Systems for Low Criticality Airborne Applications

The exceptional progress in the field of machine learning (ML) in recent years has attracted a lot of interest in using this technology in aviation. Possible airborne applications of ML include safety-critical functions, which must be developed in compliance with rigorous certification standards of the aviation industry. Current certification standards for the aviation industry were developed prior to the ML renaissance without taking specifics of ML technology into account. There are some fundamental incompatibilities between traditional design assurance approaches and certain aspects of ML-based systems. In this paper, we analyze the current airborne certification standards and show that all objectives of the standards can be achieved for a low-criticality ML-based system if certain assumptions about ML development workflow are applied.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Toward Design Assurance of Machine-Learning Airborne Systems

In recent years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, enabled by Machine Learning (ML)technology, have demonstrated impressive progress and provides historic opportunities for the aviation industry. However, several key aspects of ML technology are not compatible with existing design assurance standards and make certification problematic. In this paper, we present a case study of a visual system with a Deep Neural Network (DNN) intended to detect and identify airport runway signs. Different use cases and variants of this system exhibit different levels of criticality ranging from design assurance level (DAL) D to B. We use the case study to illustrate the challenges of certification according to the current standards, such asDO-178C. We present the system design, data generation, training, and verification in detail and describe how the design assurance objectives can be met for a DAL D variant of the system. We also discuss gaps and potential approaches for the higher design assurance levels.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS1987

Aircraft electromagnetic compatibility

Illustrated are aircraft architecture, electromagnetic interference environments, electromagnetic compatibility protection techniques, program specifications, tasks, and verification and validation procedures. The environment of 400 Hz power, electrical transients, and radio frequency fields are portrayed and related to thresholds of avionics electronics. Five layers of protection for avionics are defined. Recognition is given to some present day electromagnetic compatibility weaknesses and issues which serve to reemphasize the importance of EMC verification of equipment and parts, and their ultimate EMC validation on the aircraft. Proven standards of grounding, bonding, shielding, wiring, and packaging are laid out to help provide a foundation for a comprehensive approach to successful future aircraft design and an understanding of cost effective EMC in an aircraft setting.

Clarke, Clifton A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Safeguard: Progress and Test Results for a Reliable Independent On-Board Safety Net for UAS

As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate them without compromising safety or disrupting traditional airspace operations. For small UAS, several operational rules have been established; e.g., do not operate beyond visual line-of-sight, do not fly within five miles of a commercial airport, do not fly above 400 feet above ground level. Enforcing these rules is challenging for UAS, as evidenced by the number of incident reports received by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This paper reviews the development of an onboard system - Safeguard - designed to monitor and enforce conformance to a set of operational rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, and altitude constraints). Unlike typical geofencing or geo-limitation functions, Safeguard operates independently of the off-the-shelf UAS autopilot and is designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions to simplify compliance with existing standards for safety-critical systems (e.g. for spacecraft and manned commercial transportation aircraft systems). A framework is described that decouples the system from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability beyond what can be provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS). This paper summarizes the progress and test results for Safeguard research and development since presentation of the design concept at the 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC '16). Significant accomplishments include completion of software verification and validation in accordance with NASA standards for spacecraft systems (to Class B), development of improved hardware prototypes, development of a simulation platform that allows for hardware-in-the-loop testing and fast-time Monte Carlo evaluations, and flight testing on multiple air vehicles. Integration testing with NASA's UAS Traffic Management (UTM) service-oriented architecture was also demonstrated.

Young, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Assessing Requirements Quality through Requirements Coverage

In model-based development, the development effort is centered around a formal description of the proposed software system the model. This model is derived from some high-level requirements describing the expected behavior of the software. For validation and verification purposes, this model can then be subjected to various types of analysis, for example, completeness and consistency analysis [6], model checking [3], theorem proving [1], and test-case generation [4, 7]. This development paradigm is making rapid inroads in certain industries, e.g., automotive, avionics, space applications, and medical technology. This shift towards model-based development naturally leads to changes in the verification and validation (V&V) process. The model validation problem determining that the model accurately captures the customer's high-level requirements has received little attention and the sufficiency of the validation activities has been largely determined through ad-hoc methods. Since the model serves as the central artifact, its correctness with respect to the users needs is absolutely crucial. In our investigation, we attempt to answer the following two questions with respect to validation (1) Are the requirements sufficiently defined for the system? and (2) How well does the model implement the behaviors specified by the requirements? The second question can be addressed using formal verification. Nevertheless, the size and complexity of many industrial systems make formal verification infeasible even if we have a formal model and formalized requirements. Thus, presently, there is no objective way of answering these two questions. To this end, we propose an approach based on testing that, when given a set of formal requirements, explores the relationship between requirements-based structural test-adequacy coverage and model-based structural test-adequacy coverage. The proposed technique uses requirements coverage metrics defined in [9] on formal high-level software requirements and existing model coverage metrics such as the Modified Condition and Decision Coverage (MC/DC) used when testing highly critical software in the avionics industry [8]. Our work is related to Chockler et al. [2], but we base our work on traditional testing techniques as opposed to verification techniques.

Rajan, Ajitha↗
NASA NTRS1994

Automated Test Environment for a Real-Time Control System

An automated environment with hardware-in-the-loop has been developed by Rocketdyne Huntsville for test of a real-time control system. The target system of application is the man-rated real-time system which controls the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). The primary use of the environment is software verification and validation, but it is also useful for evaluation and analysis of SSME avionics hardware and mathematical engine models. It provides a test bed for the integration of software and hardware. The principles and skills upon which it operates may be applied to other target systems, such as those requiring hardware-in-the-loop simulation and control system development. Potential applications are in problem domains demanding highly reliable software systems requiring testing to formal requirements and verifying successful transition to/from off-nominal system states.

Hall, Ronald O.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Command and Data Handling Network Implementation and Validation

As initial Lunar Gateway modules approach design maturity, the Artemis Network Validation and Integration Lab (ANVIL) has begun demonstrations to validate avionics network dataflows. The flight architecture design includes utilizing Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE) and layer-3 switching capabilities to enable greater automation and flexibility of critical and best effort traffic. Critical traffic is considered as Time-Triggered (TT), Rate Constrained (RC) and prioritized Best Effort (BE) traffic classes. End systems, such as mission computers, power control, and robotics, use three planes and all traffic classes while other devices interface via Best Effort. Typical best effort devices include video, laptops, wireless access points, and payloads. Other devices have a various hybrid approach of interfaces including alarms, telemetry/logging, and communication units. In the paper, we will present an update of the Gateway network architecture and how the system will operate nominally and during a stack topology reconfiguration. We will also discuss the network risks, and trade-offs of performance, flexibility, and redundancy. Finally, we will show the process for validation, demonstration, and verification approaches to the vehicle network.

Gateway↗
NASA NTRS1995

The AAMP5/AAMP-FV project

This presentation describes a project, formal verification of the microcode in the AAMP5 microprocessor, conducted to explore how formal techniques for specification and verification could be introduced into an industrial process. Sponsored by the Systems Validation Branch of NASA Langley and by Collins Commercial Avionics, a division of Rockwell International, it was conducted by Collins and the SRI International Computer Science Laboratory. The project consisted of specifying in the PVS language developed by SRI a portion of a Rockwell proprietary microprocessor, the AAMP5, at both the instruction set and register-transfer levels and using the PVS theorem prover to prove the microcode correct for a representative subset of instructions. While this presentation includes a brief technical overview, its emphasis is on the lessons learned in using PVS for an example of this size and the implications for using formal methods in an industrial setting. The central result of this project was to demonstrate the feasibility of formally specifying a commercial microprocessor and the use of mechanical proofs of correctness to verify microcode. This is particularly significant since the AAMP5 was not designed for formal verification, but to provide a more than three fold performance improvement, by pipelining instruction execution, while remaining object code compatible with the earlier AAMP2. As a consequence, the AAMP5 is one of the most complex microprocessors to which formal methods have been applied. Another key result was the discovery of both actual and seeded errors. Two actual microcode errors were discovered and corrected during development of the formal specification, illustrating the value of simply creating a precise specification. Two seeded errors were systematically uncovered while doing correctness proofs. One of these was an actual error that had been discovered after first fabrication but left in the microcode provided to SRI. The other error was designed to be unlikely to be detected by walkthroughs, testing, or simulation. Several other results emerged during the project, including the ease with which practicing engineers became comfortable with PVS, the need for libraries of general purpose theories, the usefulness of formal specification in revealing errors, the natural fit between formal specification and inspections, the difficulty of selecting the best style of specification for a new problem domain, the high level of assurance provided by proofs of correctness, and the need to engineer proof strategies for reuse.

Miller, Steven P.↗