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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Blueprint: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Adoption for Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)-Like Groups

The electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) industry is an incredibly diverse set of participants (EVSE manufacturers, charge network operators (CNOs), original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), etc.), and with the potential for an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) or ISAC-like group, it requires a series of guidance for doing a multiparty coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) such that a group like this could be successful. This blueprint provides a template and guidance to stakeholders in the EVSE industry for conducting a multiparty CVD. It also formalizes what multiparty CVD could look like in an ISAC-like group with multiple entities as well as vulnerability coordinators by specifically calling out who in the ISAC-like group may be involved, and which industry members it may apply to. This blueprint leverages tools such as Vultron, VINCE, etc. along with open resources such as the Software Engineering Institutes guide for coordinated vulnerability disclosure, for the stakeholder in the EVSE industry to start up a CVD program of their own.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Blueprint: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Adaption and Adoption Guide for Industry To Create Their Own CVD Program

This guide provides a series of steps and guidance for electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) industry members to set up their own coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) program by utilizing the Software Engineering Institute/Computer Emergency Response Team (SEI/CERT)’s CVD how-to guide. Due to the complexity of CVD, and with the existing resources out there, this guide is intended that this portion of the blueprint is an extension of the CVD how-to guide, not meant as a replacement. This guide is meant to outline a process for what to do when you discover a vulnerability on EVSE equipment. It is written for developers, vendors and security researchers as well as management. This is not a technical document. It is meant to be accessible for both technical and non-technical roles.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Vulnerability Management for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment

Vulnerability management for EVSE is a challenging undertaking with all the necessary stakeholders and devices that are interconnected, this presentation reviews the challenges and opportunities for conducting CVD for EVSE.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Blueprint: Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization Guidance

Vulnerability management is a process of discovering, analyzing, and handling new or reported security vulnerabilities in systems to prevent the systems from being exploited, to reduce risk, and to protect assets. For vulnerability analysis, handling, and response, the prioritization of organizational and analyst resources must precede. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a standard prioritization method that is used to rate the severity of security vulnerabilities in systems by assigning numerical severity scores, but it does not provide clear guidelines of how the numerical severity scores might inform decisions. The Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) provides a method for prioritizing vulnerabilities based on the needs of the stakeholders involved in the vulnerability management process. Instead of the numerical scoring used in the CVSS, the SSVC focuses on contextual decision-making to determine how quickly and effectively an organization should respond to vulnerabilities. The main functionality of the SSVC accommodates the diversity of the stakeholders in the vulnerability management process, including finders, vendors, coordinators, deployers, and others. So, the SSVC should be designed to be used by any of these stakeholders, and it should be customizable to enable specific stakeholder decision models and risk appetites.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Energy Sector Threat Brief: 2024 Round Up

What major and minor cybersecurity events affected the energy sector in the last year? What trends were observed in the events, disclosure of vulnerabilities, and other headline news? This talk will focus on real-world events put in the context of an evolving geo-political landscape. We will discuss events that had operational impact as well as events affecting third-parties with exploration of how the impact of incidents is changing as more stakeholders are involved in new projects and the complexity of the modern grid. We will focus on lessons learned from the 2024 trends that operators and their partners can apply to stay ahead of the threats in 2025.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trust-Based Detection and Mitigation of Cyber Attacks in Distributed Cooperative Control of Islanded AC Microgrids

In this study, we address the challenge of detecting and mitigating cyber attacks in the distributed cooperative control of islanded AC microgrids, with a particular focus on detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), a significant threat to the Smart Grid (SG). The SG integrates traditional power systems with communication networks, creating a complex system with numerous vulnerable links, making it a prime target for cyber attacks. These attacks can lead to the disclosure of private data, control network failures, and even blackouts. Unlike machine learning-based approaches that require extensive datasets and mathematical models dependent on accurate system modeling, our method is free from such dependencies. To enhance the microgrid’s resilience against these threats, we propose a resilient control algorithm by introducing a novel trustworthiness parameter into the traditional cooperative control algorithm. Our method evaluates the trustworthiness of distributed energy resources (DERs) based on their voltage measurements and exchanged information, using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to dynamically adjust control actions. We validated our approach through simulations on both the IEEE-34 bus feeder system with eight DERs and a larger microgrid with twenty-two DERs. The results demonstrated a detection accuracy of around 100%, with millisecond range mitigation time, ensuring rapid system recovery. Additionally, our method improved system stability by up to almost 100% under attack scenarios, showcasing its effectiveness in promptly detecting attacks and maintaining system resilience. These findings highlight the potential of our approach to enhance the security and stability of microgrid systems in the face of cyber threats.

Computer Science↗
DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗