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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2011

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

Non-Invertible Transforms for Image-Based Verification

Imaging may play a unique role in verifying the presence and distribution of warhead components in warhead counting and dismantlement settings where image information content can distinguish among shapes, forms, and material composition of items. However, a major issue with imaging is the high level of intrusiveness, and in particular, the possible need to store sensitive comparison images in the inspection system that would violate information barrier (IB) principles. Reducing images via transformations or feature extraction can produce image features (e.g. attributes) for verification, but with enough prior information about structure the reduced information itself may be sufficient to deduce sensitive details of the original image. Further reducing resolution of the transformed image information is an option, but too much reduction destroys the quality of the attribute. We study the possibility of a one-way transform that allows storage of non-sensitive reference information and analysis to enable comparison of transformed images within IB constraints. In particular, we consider the degree to which images can be reconstructed from image intensity histograms depending on the number of pixel intensity bins and the degree of frequency data quantization, as well as assumed knowledge of configuration of objects in the images. We also explore the concept of a 'perceptual hash' as a class of transforms that may enable verification with provable non-invertibility, leading to an effective one-way transform that preserves the nature of the image feature data without revealing sufficient information to reconstruct the original image.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems

Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. By confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components we show the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Our paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Applications and Deployment of Neutron Scatter Cameras in Nuclear Safeguards Scenarios

Neutron scatter cameras (NSCs) are a type of directionally sensitive neutron detector that rely on two consecutive neutron scattering events to localize a source of neutrons. NSCs can be used to locate, image, and identify unknown neutron sources or verify the geometry and identity of known sources. Much technical progress has been made in improving NSC designs, but little literature exists exploring the full range of practical application of neutron scatter cameras. This paper seeks to identify scenarios related to nuclear security and non-proliferation where deployment of NSCs may be useful. These situations could include: limited searches for sources during cargo screening, counting nuclear warheads for treaty verification, verification of special nuclear material during inspections, imaging nuclear contamination, imaging nuclear reactor cores, searching for lost sources, and matching neutron images in shipper/receiver or inventory management scenarios. These scenarios are examined with respect to existing NSC designs and proposed designs in terms of usefulness and practicality of deployment when compared to currently used detection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

A new method of passive counting of nuclear missile warheads -a white paper for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Cosmic ray muon imaging has been studied for the past several years as a possible technique for nuclear warhead inspection and verification as part of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Los Alamos team has studied two different muon imaging methods for this application, using detectors on two sides and one side of the object of interest. In this report we present results obtained on single sided imaging of configurations aimed at demonstrating the potential of this technique for counting nuclear warheads in place with detectors above the closed hatch of a ballistic missile submarine.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Nuclear disarmament verification via resonant phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. In this work, we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Investigation into Practical Implementations of a Zero Knowledge Protocol.

In recent years, the concept of Zero Knowledge Protocols (ZKP) as a useful approach to nuclear warhead verification has become increasingly popular. Several implementations of ZKP have been proposed, driving technology development toward proof of concept demonstrations. Whereas proposed implementations seem to fall within the general class of template-based techniques, all physical implementations of ZKPs proposed to date have a complication: once the instrumentation is prepared, it is no longer authenticatable; the instrument physically contains sensitive information. In this work we explore three different concepts that may offer more authenticatable and practical ZKP implementations and evaluate the sensitive information that may be at risk when doing so: sharing a subset of detector counts in a preloaded image (with spatial information removed), real-time image subtraction, and a new concept, CONfirmation using a Fast-neutron Imaging Detector with Anti-image NULL-positive Time Encoding (CONFIDANTE). CONFIDANTE promises to offer an almost ideal implementation of ZKP: a positive result is indicated by a constant rate at all times enabling the monitoring party the possibility of full access to the instrument before, during, and after confirmation. A prototype of CONFIDANTE was designed, built, and its performance evaluated in a series of measurements of several objects including a set of plutonium dioxide Hemispheres. Very encouraging results proving feasibility are presented. 1 Rebecca is currently a graduate student in Nuclear Engineering at UC Berkeley

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept

Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisit the so - called Buddy Tag concept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item itself. Verification of the pairings between tags and limited items would take place during a short-notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the last 24-48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single-site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discovery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In this project, we developed a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper summarizes the performance requirements for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗