Combined radiation environment modeling using the Scorpius linear induction accelerator
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73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
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An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.
12-201800↗
Carbamoylation as an Effective Tool in the Analysis of the Soman Nerve Agent Marker Pinacolyl Alcohol in Soil Matrices by EI-GC-MS and LC-HRMS
Pinacolyl alcohol (PA) is a Schedule 2 chemical commonly featured in most proficiency tests (PTs) administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) due to its direct as well as forensic link to the nerve agent Soman. Therefore, its detection by Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) inspection teams during on-site investigations is a strong indicator of the past or latent presence of Soman in the environment. Its small molecular weight (102), early elution time, and poor ionization profile make PA a challenging analyte to detect particularly at low concentrations (∼1–10 μg/g). In this work, 1,1′-carbonyldimidazole (CDI) has been used to effectively modify PA for the first time in two different soil matrices (Virginia type A soil and silt sediment) at two separate concentrations (1 and 10 μg/g) for its subsequent detection by EI-GC-MS and LC-HRMS methods. For the EI-GC-MS analysis, the PA carbamate derivative (PIC) exhibits improved chromatography relative to PA such as improved peak shape, increased molecular weight (196 for PIC and 102 for PA) and increased retention time (16.9 min for PIC and ∼4.1 min for PA). In addition, the derivatization also improves the detection of PA by LC-HRMS as the PIC product possesses protonation sites (i.e., imidazole ring) relative to none exhibited by PA. More importantly, the carbamoylation proceeds under mild conditions (55 °C, no base) and rapidly (3 h), characteristics that make it an appealing protocol for the analysis of PA during OPCW PTs or real case scenarios particularly in instances where it is present at low concentrations. It is anticipated that the protocol can be applied to the forensic analysis of this important Soman marker in various environmental matrices.
Chemistry↗
MCNP® Code Version 6.3.1 Release Notes
The Monte Carlo N-Particle® (MCNP® ) code is a general-purpose, continuous-energy, generalized-geometry, time-dependent, radiation transport code developed by the MCNP development team. MCNP calculations provide predictive capabilities that can replace expensive or impossible-to-perform experiments. Specific application problems include simulations of experimental diagnostics, intrinsic radiation, radiation detection and measurement, criticality safety, nuclear threat reduction and response, radiation health protection, nuclear weapons effects, and nuclear forensics. This MCNP code, version 6.3.1, follows the MCNP6.3.0 version. Since the release of MCNP6.3.0, a variety of bug fixes and code enhancements have been completed for MCNP6.3.1. A few new features have also been added to this release to support both ongoing research and the release of the latest ENDF/B-VIII.1 nuclear data library. The MCNP code, version 6.3.1, theory and user input information is documented in MCNP® Code Version 6.3.1 Theory & User Manual, the build guidance for various platforms is documented in MCNP® Code Version 6.3.1 Build Guide, and the verification and validation testing for various application benchmark test suites is documented in MCNP® Code Version 6.3.1 Verification & Validation Testing.
73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
OB200-DV-1 Treatability Testing: Final Results
The Hanford Site in Washington state previously generated plutonium for nuclear weapons. During operations, radionuclide byproducts and chemical process fluids were intentionally and/or unintentionally released to the subsurface, resulting in more than 800 contaminated waste sites across the Central Plateau, where historical chemical separations and waste management activities took place. As the Hanford Site mission transitioned from operations to site cleanup, remediation of the vadose zone and groundwater became a priority. However, given the depth of the unsaturated zone contamination above the groundwater, the unique nature of the waste, and the continuing impacts on groundwater quality, technologies needed to be identified and evaluated for in situ remediation in the deep vadose zone (DVZ). A laboratory treatability study has been completed to evaluate site-relevant effectiveness for nine in situ technologies that may be used to treat continuing sources of contaminants in specific areas of the Central Plateau waste sites that are grouped into the 200-DV-1 Operable Unit (OU). The 200-DV-1 OU was established in 2010 to address 43 Central Plateau waste sites with complex DVZ remediation challenges. Eight of these technologies were identified through a prescreening effort that evaluated remedial technologies potentially applicable to DVZ contamination in the Central Plateau . These eight technologies were selected for further study based on site specific knowledge gaps about their effectiveness. A ninth technology was added to the treatability study based on new information from separate laboratory investigations (conducted following the prescreening effort) demonstrating the technology’s potential effectiveness (see Section 1.2 for more information) and value for inclusion in the treatability study.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment
Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Scoping Analysis of Pebble-Bed Reactors for the Destruction of the Transuranic Inventory of LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel
With the forecasted increase in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, there will be a corresponding increase in the quantity of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that requires long-term storage. In SNF, transuranic isotopes contribute the most to the long-term radiotoxicity of the fuel and pose a proliferation risk. One option that has been explored to address these issues is the removal of the transuranic isotopes from SNF and the conversion of these isotopes into transuranic fuel (TRU fuel). Here, this work sought to determine how effective a micro-modular Pebble-Bed High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (PB-HTGR); the 10-MW High Temperature Gas-cooled Test Reactor (HTR-10); and a salt-cooled small-modular pebble-bed reactor (PBR), i.e. the generic Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Reactor (gFHR), are at reducing the inventory of transuranic isotopes while still maintaining the intrinsic safety features of the PBR designs, such as negative temperature coefficients of reactivity. Optimized pebble designs utilizing TRU fuel were found for both reactors through the adjustment for the packing fraction of fuel in each pebble. The Axial Zone Equilibrium Modeling (A-ZEM) method was used in this work to help select the optimized pebble design. Once an optimized pebble design was selected and an equilibrium model was produced, the results from the deep burn (DB) HTR-10 and gFHR designs were compared to the results of two models from the literature. While both the DB gFHR and the DB HTR-10 were able to reduce the weapons-usable transuranic inventory, the performance of these reactors did not match that of the small-modular PB-HTGRs in the literature. Therefore, a need was identified for further refinement of the gFHR design using TRU fuel, as the results for this model were more promising than those of the DB HTR-10, which was strongly limited by the high leakage intrinsic to micro-modular PB-HTGRs.
Transuranic fuel↗
Development of a Robust Reference Electrode in Aggressive Chemical and Radiation Environments in the Hanford Waste Tanks
The Hanford site stores more than 200 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous wastes from the production of weapons materials. The wastes are stored in 177 underground carbon-steel storage tanks, separated between 149 single shell tanks (SSTs) and 28 double shell tanks (DSTs). The DSTs provide critical retrieval and interim storage before the waste is vitrified in the Waste Treatment and Isolation Plant (WTP). The tanks will need to remain in-service far beyond the initial 40-year design life, and effective corrosion control practices must remain in force to extend the tanks’ lifespans. This effort includes direct measurements of corrosion rate (e.g., ultrasonic measurements and corrosion coupons) and electrochemical processes (e.g., linear polarization measurements and open circuit potential measurements). The Hanford site began monitoring the corrosion potential in select DSTs in 2008. Of the 45 reference electrodes that have been installed, 29 have failed and 6 others provided unreliable results. DOE-EM is supporting a 3-year program to develop a chemical and radiation resistant reference electrode for application in the Hanford tanks. The first year of the program focused on understanding the failure mechanism for the reference electrodes and identification of candidate construction materials that would mitigate degradation of the electrodes in the waste environment. During the second year of the program, the objectives were to: 1) test candidate materials under simulated waste conditions, 2) design components that will extend the service life of the electrode, 3) fabricate materials for prototype reference electrodes, and 4) assemble prototype reference electrodes for accelerated testing. The reference electrode is constructed of four principal parts: 1) junction, 2) casing, 3) inner chamber backfill materials, and 4) the sensing wire. Principally, improvements of the junction, casing, and inner chamber backfill materials are being pursued. The junction material at the interface between the waste and the inner chamber of the reference electrode was identified as a critical component in the failure of the reference electrodes. Nine candidate replacement junction materials were tested under simulated waste conditions to evaluate permeation rate. These materials included a variety of polymeric and ceramic materials, some of which were 3-D printed. Thus far, porous polyvinylidene fluoride materials have performed satisfactorily and are being considered for prototype development. The commercial electrode casing materials in general have performed well. Additionally, 3-D printing of chemically and mechanically stable materials is being investigated as a means for further improvement in fabrication consistency. SRNL has also investigated altering the reference electrode design to extend the service life. The new design of the interior of the reference electrode casing creates a longer, more tortuous path between the junction material and the electrode sensing wire. A finite element model was used to optimize the design without adversely impacting the circuit resistance of the electrode during the measurements, thus preserving the measurement accuracy while enhancing the service life. The inner chamber back fill materials are also critical to the performance of the reference electrode. Materials that are resistant to intruding tank waste and provide a conductive path to the sensing wire were investigated. Gel and powder materials that are interspersed with a conductive chloride bearing material were tested for their influence on diffusion and electrode resistance. All the investigated materials and components will be assembled, with collaboration from commercial vendors, to fabricate the initial prototypes. Accelerated testing of the prototypes will be initiated in Year 2 of the program and will be completed in Year 3. A recommendation on the materials of construction and the design of the new robust reference electrode will be presented to the Hanford tank farm facility.
Sykes, Kiana [Savannah River National Laboratory (↗
Cathodic Protection Modeling for Hanford Underground Double-Shell Tank Farms
Hanford stores millions of gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste from the production of weapon materials in tank farms consisting of underground carbon-steel storage tanks surrounded by reinforced concrete. Six of these Hanford tank farms use double-shell storage tanks (DSTs). The DST farms were constructed from 1968 to 1986 with a planned 40–50 year design life, so some are already operating beyond their initial life expectancy. Ultrasonic testing (UT) has indicated significant thinning on the bottom of the secondary (outer) liner of these tanks, believed to arise from groundwater intrusion driving concrete side corrosion. There is no direct access to the steel/concrete interface between the tank and the concrete pad, making it difficult to apply a chemical-based mitigation strategy or to conduct repairs, but cathodic protection (CP) is a possible method to inhibit further concrete-side corrosion. Hanford already uses CP to protect below grade steel piping within the tank farms and connected to the tanks, but this system was not designed to protect the tank bottoms. CP design must account for the structures surrounding the DSTs, including the steel reinforcing bars (rebar) within the concrete pad and vault, various process lines, and the existing CP system. In this study, finite element analysis (FEA) modeling was carried out to simulate CP protection of 1) a single tank and CP anode to develop options for modeling the rebar and to compare to a simpler circuit model and 2) the entire Hanford AN tank farm as a representative example consisting of seven tanks, associated piping, and both existing and new CP anodes. Both circuit and FEA models predict that significant protective current could be delivered to the bottoms of the tanks with the addition of tank-protection anodes below the depth of the tanks. Simulations with only the existing pipe-protection anodes active confirmed that only a very small current to the tank bottoms is predicted under present conditions. Multiple simplified representations of the dome and wall rebar were tested to reduce the computational complexity of the tank-farm simulations, resulting in modeling the rebar as edge elements with a prescribed effective circumference that matches the real rebar surface area. The geometry of the rebar is also simplified into horizontal hoops around the tank walls and radial rebar over the dome with increased effective circumference to retain the target surface area. This simplification was found to greatly reduce the complexity and solution time of the models without large changes in current distributions, especially to the tank bottom. A range of values were tested for model parameters such as soil and concrete resistivities and polarization resistance to investigate their impact on the current and electric potential distributions. Depending on the parameters used, FEA simulations predict some risk of overprotection, particularly on the piping system; since overprotection can also lead to surface damage associated with hydrogen gas generation at the interface (e.g. hydrogen embrittlement or damage to coatings), this needs to be considered when refining the design of the new CP system. Comparison between the FEA models and the circuit model representation demonstrated that the circuit model could not match the predicted FEA current distribution, even when using the exact same surface areas. This discrepancy appeared to be at least partly attributable to the impact of the relative positions of the tank components and anodes to each other and to the ground surface. The FEA model accounts for the relative positions since it solves the governing equations in three dimensions, but the circuit model cannot account for the positioning. In particular, the circuit model underpredicts the current to the tank bottom and overpredicts the current to the dome compared to FEA for the baseline geometry. The FEA models omitted the electrically isolated rebar in the bottom concrete slab. However, a circuit based stray current model estimated that only 2.1% of the total current through the slab would stray into the rebar, corresponding to ~0.21 A for a target current density of 2 mA/ft2 to the tank bottom. The estimated corrosion driven by this amount of stray current is predicted to yield a lifetime of >400 years for the minimum rebar diameter, assuming an acceptable cross-section area loss of 10%.
d'Entremont, Anna [Savannah River National Laborat↗