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Gomera, Jose

Publications and source records attributed to Gomera, Jose.

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 significant quantities (SQ), using typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5 gamma spectrometer. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Evaluating Safeguards Statistical Assumptions via Stochastic Simulation

Herein, the authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 SQ, using typical IAEA inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The goal of this project is to develop statistical methods and tools that can be used to rigorously calculate achieved DPs on individual material strata and then aggregate these to the facility and state levels. In particular, this project is evaluating the utility of stochastic ("Monte Carlo") methods as a potentially more powerful and flexible option to the analytical solutions traditionally employed by IAEA statisticians.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Evaluation of Repurposing Archetypal Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detectors to the Consequence Management Mission

In the first hours or days after an unplanned release of radioactive material to the environment, the radiation detection instruments most widely available to local first responders may be those currently fielded for interdiction missions. This study investigated how such preventative radiological / nuclear detection instruments could perform if repurposed to consequence management missions. A representative sample of three archetypes (body-worn, human carried, and other/large detection volume) encompassed six categories: personal radiation detector, extended range personal radiation detector, personal emergency radiation detector, radio-isotope identification device, human portable detector/backpack, and vehicle mounted large detection volume. Overall 19 models of equipment were included in the study. Laboratory evaluations were designed to assess the capabilities of the instruments in four consequence management missions: exposure rate, integrated exposure, radiation survey, and contamination screening. As applicable, the evaluations included measurement of exposure rate, integrated exposure, overrange response, and angular response. The results were compared to benchmarks from the American National Standards Institute ANSI N42.49A. The performance of the instruments for initial screening for contamination was assessed by an automated radioactive source moving past the detectors at various speeds and distances. The results demonstrate that if the equipment is used in accordance with the mission analysis and categories, and within the original equipment manufacturer specifications, it is possible to achieve sufficient accuracy to estimate and document doses to responders, plan entries into contaminated areas, detect contamination, and protect the public, until such time as outside resources arrive with sufficient numbers of standard health physics instruments and personnel dosimetry to replace the preventative radiological / nuclear detection instruments. Finally, this evaluation campaign was conducted to complement the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report-179 on Guidance for Emergency Response Dosimetry.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Evaluation of Preventative Radiological/Nuclear Detector Archetypes to Validate Repurpose to the Consequence Management Mission

In the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency involving a large-scale release of radioactive material, local responders would be the primary means to perform radiation measurements to assess impacts and issue protective action recommendations for the responders and the public. Over the first 24-36 hours, Federal responders and resources will deploy to augment the local efforts, and if necessary, provide extensive radiation monitoring and assessment capabilities coordinated by the Department of Energy-led Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center and Federal Emergency Management Agency-led Multiagency Coordination Group. Unless Federal resources happen to be deployed at the moment an incident occurs, such as a preventative radiological/nuclear detection mission for a scheduled special event, the local response to an incident will commence and persist for many hours with no on-scene Federal support. For a catastrophic incident, such as a nuclear detonation or severe reactor accident, the local jurisdictions may not have a full range of adequate supplies of health physics instruments and personnel dosimetry. Therefore early in a crisis, the local responders will inevitably conduct their operations with the radiation detection and dosimetry capabilities that they have available until additional resources and support are requested and arrive. Most of the radiation detection instruments currently fielded at the local level are carried by law enforcement personnel and are designed for interdiction missions - referred to here as preventative radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) instruments. This study investigated how this PRND equipment can be repurposed in consequence management (CM) missions.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗