Self-Security for Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters
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Smart Inverters, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, ↗
Engineering topics
Gursoy, Mehmetcan
Publications and source records attributed to Gursoy, Mehmetcan.
Direct vs. Indirect Control Schemes for Grid-Forming Inverters–Unveiling a Performance Comparison in a Microgrid
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24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Dynamic Load Inrush Current Mitigation in Islanded Microgrids Powered by Grid-Forming Inverters
Grid-forming inverters in a microgrid may trip due to high inrush current caused by a switched connection of an inductive load, e.g., a relatively large induction motor. The control scheme presented in this article includes virtual inertia control method superimposed on the cascaded controller. This article studies the impact of cascaded control scheme used for grid-forming inverter to mitigate the inrush current effects and enhance the inverter’s robustness for the safe connection of inductive and dynamic loads. Experimental tests are performed using the virtual inertia method for generating the reference angle for synchronous frame conversion. The experimental performance and sensitivity of the controller to different controller gain settings for a switched connection of an induction motor are discussed. The cascaded operation significantly mitigates the inrush currents while the inverters can perform a normal operation. The performance of the control method is tested in a laboratory-scale hardware setup of a 208V microgrid fed by 5kVA and 10kVA inverters, and the results are presented.
Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
Inrush Current Mitigation for Grid-Forming Inverters in Islanded Microgrids
Virtual-inertia and droop control methods are commonly used for grid-forming inverters. While the virtual inertia is used to emulate the equation of motion/frequency, if the inverter output voltage is emulated as in synchronous generators, then the method is known as the virtual synchronous generator. An inductive pulse-load, e.g., a relatively large induction motor, connection to a microgrid fed only by grid-forming inverters may lead to blackout due to high inrush currents. This article presents virtual reactance techniques to mitigate the inrush current effects and enhance the inverter’s robustness for the safe connection of inductive and dynamic loads. This article also compares the virtual inertia and droop control methods under switching inductive-dynamic loads while the proposed techniques are implemented. Experimental tests are performed considering the linear and nonlinear virtual reactance techniques, and the findings are discussed. The mitigation significantly suppresses the inrush currents while the inverters can perform a normal operation. Furthermore, the frequency and power response of the virtual inertia control with different inertia settings to a sudden change in the load is analyzed. The virtual reactance technique is tested in a laboratory-scale hardware setup of a 208V microgrid fed by 5kVA and 10kVA inverters, and the results are presented in this article.
Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
Self-Protective Inverters Against Malicious Setpoints Using Analytical Reference Models
This paper presents the concept of self-protective inverters using reference models. In the proposed method, incoming setpoints from the utility operator or third-party aggregators are inspected using analytical reference models before engaging the setpoints to the inverter’s local controller. When a malicious setpoint passes the existing security layers, a smart inverter can examine the integrity of an incoming setpoint in real-time. The efficacy of the developed method has been tested using a laboratory setup, including a three-phase 3kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12kW NHR 9410 regenerative grid emulator. Furthermore, the results verify that the developed analytical models can provide device-level protection for grid-interactive inverters by inspecting and preventing harmful setpoints from getting engaged to the local controller.
42 ENGINEERING↗
Self-Security for Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters Using Steady-State Reference Model
Smart inverters exchange information with other devices through a shared communication link, making the inverters more prone to receive harmful commands from external parties. This erroneous data can be received due to an anomaly in the system, such as a device fault, unintentional utility operator action, or a cyber-attack. In this paper, a device-level self-security strategy is implemented using reference models for a grid-interactive inverter to examine the incoming power setpoints, detect the anomalies, and protect the system accordingly. The PQ setpoints received from the utility supervisory controller are autonomously examined using the inverter’s normal and stable operating regions before engaging the setpoints to the inverter’s local controller. Grid parameters are estimated in real-time during the examination process. The efficacy of the self-security algorithm is tested using a three-phase 3-kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12-kW NHR 9410 regenerative grid emulator. The results verify that the proposed method can detect harmful PQ setpoints that can cause abnormal or unstable inverter operation.
Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
A Model-Reference Adaptive Direct-Power Control Scheme for Grid-Interactive Inverters
This paper develops an adaptive direct power control scheme for grid-interactive inverters while the control parameters are adaptively adjusted as the grid and filter parameters vary under different conditions. To demonstrate the efficacy and robustness of the adaptive operation, the performance of the adaptive controller is compared with a typical direct power controller by estimating the filter and grid impedances using a model reference parameter estimation technique with small signal injection. The simulation results verify that the developed methodology can track the reference power setpoints under output circuit parameter uncertainties while the typical design leads to instability. To improve the performance of the adaptive technique and eliminate the need for filter parameter estimation, a Lyapunov stability criterion-based model-reference adaptive direct power controller is designed to track the filter impedance. The developed method was tested using MATLAB/Simulink software to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results verify that adaptively tuning the control parameter can still maintain stable operation if the control gains are poorly selected while applying the classical method leads to abnormal operation or instability.
Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
Digital Twin for Self-Security of Smart Inverters
Smart inverters connected to a communication network are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, a self-security approach is implemented using the digital twin concept for smart inverters. The digital twin is formed using the inverter’s normal operating region and the inverter’s dynamic model. Then, the incoming setpoints are autonomously examined using the digital twin, and only the safe setpoints are engaged to the inverter’s local controller. This paper demonstrates how the inverter’s normal operating region and dynamic model are formed. In particular, the normal operation region is experimentally verified by changing the P and Q setpoints engaged to the local controller, using a laboratory setup including a three-phase 3-kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12-kW NHR 9410 regenerative power grid emulator. The results demonstrate that the self-security technique can potentially protect inverters from man-in-the-middle attacks by examining the incoming commands (new setpoints) using the inverter’s digital twin before engaging the setpoints to the local controller.
Hossen, Tareq↗
On Self-Security of Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters
The capability to exchange information with utility operators, aggregators, and nearby smart devices can make a grid-interactive inverter an intelligent cyber-physical device. However, the capability of exchanging information can also put the inverters at the risk of insecure operation. In this paper, possible software manipulations into the inverters are studied to understand their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Moreover, the state-of-the-art system-level and device-level cyber-defense measures are discussed, and advantages and drawbacks of each technique are provided. Studies show that a reference model can be implemented in device-level security to effectively examine incoming setpoints for detecting and preventing malicious or harmful actions. This paper particularly underlines the significance of device-level self-security and its advantages for grid-interactive inverters. Finally, recommendations for future studies are provided.
Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
Self-Secure Inverters Against Malicious Setpoints
The next generation of grid-interactive inverters brings a communication feature that allows data sharing from utility supervisory controllers and smart devices that are connected to the same network. This feature enhances the control capabilities of grid-interactive inverters to provide services beyond active power injection. However, communication networks entail more vulnerable surfaces to malicious attacks that may result in modifying active and reactive power setpoints and causing weak-grid conditions or abnormal inverter operation. In this paper, steady-state and the dynamic behavior of the inverter for the incoming setpoints are analyzed to detect false data injection attacks and provide device-level security. The steady-state behavior of the inverter in the operating region is determined from the grid parameters such as the grid voltage and the grid impedance. These estimations are accomplished by the proposed self-security technique through a low-frequency signal injection-based approach combined with the recursive least square method. Moreover, a reduced fourth-order inverter model is used as the dynamic reference model, and grid parameters as well as the incoming setpoints are implemented to the reference model to verify whether the dynamic behavior of the inverter is inside the permissible region of operation. The validity and performance of the proposed method are verified experimentally through Allen-Bradley Powerflex 755 three-phase inverter and a 12 kW NHR 9410 regenerative power grid emulator. The results show that the self-secure smart-inverter is able to accept or reject the incoming commands and thus is protected from malicious cyber-physical attacks.
Hossen, Tareq↗