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Helinski, Ryan

Publications and source records attributed to Helinski, Ryan.

At least 19 records

Integrated circuit authentication from a die material measurement

The various technologies presented herein relate to measuring a signal generated by a die-based test circuit incorporated into an IC and utilizing the measured signal to authenticate the IC. The signal can be based upon a sensor response generated by the test circuit fabricated into the die, wherein the sensor response is based upon a property of the die material. The signal can be compared with a reference value obtained from one or more test circuit(s) respectively located on one or more reference dies, wherein the reference dies are respectively cut from different wafers, and the location at which the reference dies were cut is known. If the measured signal matches the reference value, the die is deemed to be from the same cut location as the dies from which the reference value was obtained. If the measured signal does not match the reference value, the die is not authenticated.

Zortman, William A.↗

Integrated circuit authentication from a die material measurement

The various technologies presented herein relate to measuring a signal generated by a die-based test circuit incorporated into an IC, and utilizing the measured signal to authenticate the IC. The signal can be based upon a sensor response generated by the test circuit fabricated into the die, wherein the sensor response is based upon a property of the die material. The signal can be compared with a reference value obtained from one or more test circuit(s) respectively located on one or more reference dies, wherein the reference dies are respectively cut from different wafers, and the location at which the reference dies were cut is known. If the measured signal matches the reference value, the die is deemed to be from the same cut location as the dies from which the reference value was obtained. If the measured signal does not match the reference value, the die is not authenticated.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Test circuits for integrated circuit counterfeit detection

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to identifying counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) by way of allowing the origin of fabrication to be verified. An IC comprises a main circuit and a test circuit that is independent of the main circuit. The test circuit comprises at least one ring oscillator (RO) signal that, when energized, is configured to output a signal that is indicative of a semiconductor fabrication facility where the IC was manufactured.

Helinski, Ryan↗

Repeatable masking of sensitive data

The various technologies presented herein relate to enabling a value generated based upon a physical unclonable function (PUF) response to be available as needed, while also preventing exposure of the PUF to a malicious entity. A masked PUF response can be generated based upon applying a function to a combination of the PUF response and a data file (e.g., a bitstream), and the masked PUF response is forwarded to a requesting entity, rather than the PUF response. Hence, the PUF is masked from any entity requiring access to the PUF. The PUF can be located in a FPGA, wherein the data file is a bitstream pertinent to one or more configurable logic blocks included in the FPGA. A first masked PUF response generated with a first data file can have a different value to a second masked PUF response generated with a second data file.

Hamlet, Jason↗

Integrated circuit physically unclonable function

An integrated circuit (IC) based physically unclonable function (PUF) that comprises a common source amplifier for generating PUF output voltages, a unity gain, negative feedback operational amplifier for generating bias voltages, a voltage regulator and a bit exclusion circuit that excludes unstable PUF bits. Compensation circuitry built into the IC-PUF provides a high power supply rejection ratio and enables highly reliable operation of the IC-PUF across varying input voltages and operating temperatures. The IC-PUF generates a uniformly random output bit stream by taking advantage of process variations that are inherent to the fabrication of (metal-oxide semiconductor) MOS transistors.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Test circuits for integrated circuit counterfeit detection

Described herein are various technologies pertaining to identifying counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) by way of allowing the origin of fabrication to be verified. An IC comprises a main circuit and a test circuit that is independent of the main circuit. The test circuit comprises at least one ring oscillator (RO) signal that, when energized, is configured to output a signal that is indicative of a semiconductor fabrication facility where the IC was manufactured.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Framework and methodology for supply chain lifecycle analytics

The various technologies presented herein relate to pertaining to identifying and mitigating risks and attacks on a supply chain. A computer-implemented representation of a supply chain is generated comprising nodes (locations) and edges (objects, information). Risk to attack and different attack vectors can be defined for the various nodes and edges, and further, based upon the risks and attacks, (difficulty, consequence) pairs can be determined. One or more mitigations can be generated to increase a difficulty of attack and/or reduce consequence of an attack. The one or more mitigations can be constrained, e.g., by cost, time, etc., to facilitate determination of how feasible a respective mitigation is to implement with regard to finances available, duration to implement, etc. A context-free grammar can be utilized to identify one or more attacks in the supply chain. Further, the risks can undergo a ranking to enable mitigation priority to be determined.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

BiEntropy for Python v. 1.0

This Python package provides high-performance implementations of the functions and examples presented in "BiEntropy - The Approximate Entropy of a Finite Binary String" by Grenville J. Croll, presented at ANPA 34 in 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.0954 According to the paper, BiEntropy is "a simple algorithm which computes the approximate entropy of a finite binary string of arbitrary length" using "a weighted average of the Shannon Entropies of the string and all but the last binary derivative of the string."

Helinski, Ryan↗

Increasing security in inter-chip communication

An apparatus for increasing security in inter-chip communication includes a sending control module, a communication bus, and a receiving control module. The communication bus is coupled between the sending control module and the receiving control module. The sending control module operates to send data on the communication bus, disable the communication bus when threats are detected, or both.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Fast frequency divider circuit using combinational logic

The various technologies presented herein relate to performing on-chip frequency division of an operating frequency of a ring oscillator (RO). Per the various embodiments herein, a conflict between RO size versus operational frequency can be addressed by dividing the output frequency of the RO to a frequency that can be measured on-chip. A frequency divider circuit (comprising NOR gates and latches, for example) can be utilized in conjunction with the RO on the chip. In an embodiment, the frequency divider circuit can include a pair of latches coupled to the RO to facilitate dividing the oscillating frequency of the RO by 2. In another embodiment, the frequency divider circuit can include four latches (operating in pairs) coupled to the RO to facilitate dividing the oscillating frequency of the RO by 4. A plurality of ROs can be MUXed to the plurality of ROs by a single oscillation-counting circuit.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Macro Supply Chain Lifecycle Decision Analytics

This report summarizes a two-year LDRD project that investigated the problem of representing complex supply chains, identifying the worst risks and evaluating mitigation options. Our team developed a framework that includes a representation for business processes, risk assessment questions, risk indicators and methods for analyzing and summarizing the data. In our approach, the Process Matrix represents an overall supply chain for an end product in a high-level, tabular form. It connects the various touch-points of a business process including people, external vendors, tools, storage locations and transportation services while capturing the flow of both physical and intellectual artifacts. We believe these direct connections are exactly the things that a process owner can typically control. These material flows (both physical and intellectual) are also represented in a graph. This enables us to use graph-oriented analysis such as fault tree analysis and attack graph generation. Our approach is top-down, which helps users to get a more holistic understanding for a given amount of resources. Understanding the provenance of materials is difficult and it is easy to exhaust the analysts' resources. Rather than a tool to do vendor analysis or product comparison, our framework enables an enterprise-level analysis. The risk assessment questionnaires have a varying levels of detail and cover various aspects of the supply chain such as process steps, artifacts, suppliers, etc. and connections between these aspects such as artifact-storage, artifact-supplier, etc. Each question is further associated with one of seven risk indicators which can be used to summarize the risk. These risk indicators can also be weighted to reflect a user's concerns. We have successfully applied our framework to several use cases in various stages of its development and provided valuable insights to our partners, but it can also be applied to other complex systems outside of the supply chain security problem.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗