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Huan, Junjun

Publications and source records attributed to Huan, Junjun.

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

On-Chip Batteries as Distributed Energy Sources in Heterogeneous 2.5D/3D Integrated Circuits

Energy efficiency in digital systems faces challenges due to the constraints imposed by small-scale transistors. Moreover, the growing demand for portable consumer electronics necessitates the use of compact energy sources. To address these challenges, heterogeneous 3D IC technology has emerged as a promising solution for the former. Regarding the latter, we propose the concept of distributed batteries within a heterogeneous 3D IC. This approach involves utilizing multiple smaller batteries with different specifications among different modules of 3D ICs. This approach optimizes performance and overcomes limitations associated with both 3D ICs and conventional power delivery methods. Distributed batteries play a vital role in effectively managing the heat generated by energy sources and modules within a 3D IC. Furthermore, they contribute to achieving a uniform distribution of heat throughout the entire structure, which ultimately ensures the optimal performance of the batteries and modules. The simulation results indicate a 40 percent enhancement in achieving a more even distribution of generated heat. Additionally, the proposed distributed battery techniques improve power delivery, enhance reliability, and enable optimized voltage regulation while improving efficiency. In addition to the primary benefits, alternative configurations of the proposed approach can offer extra energy storage capacity and act as efficient electromagnetic shields, resulting in an impressive reduction of external electromagnetic noises by 60 dB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Contact-Less Integrity Verification of Microelectronics Using Near-Field EM Analysis

Modern microelectronics life-cycle and supply chain ecosystem bring multiple untrusted entities, which can compromise their integrity. A major integrity issue of microelectronics stems from piracy of intellectual properties (IP) and counterfeiting, which causes significant revenue loss to the semiconductor manufacturers. Further, these components often lead to compromised functionality, reliability, security, and safety of an electronic system. This paper presents secure information transmission and probing methods for verifying the integrity of digital integrated circuit (ICs) based on their electromagnetic (EM) near-field emissions and thereby protecting systems against counterfeit components. The proposed method has been tested on both high-level instructions executed by microprocessors or Systems-on-Chip (serving as examples of software), and also logic circuits within FPGA fabrics and ASICs (serving as examples of hardware). The authentication information required by each digital system is generated using a pseudo-random number generator circuit and securely transmitted via near-field magnetic emissions. The authorized party can probe these emissions using a near-field probe, process the acquired signals to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and then recover the secure information through matched filtering. Experimental results from commercial SoCs are used to demonstrate the proposed technique. Methods for reducing EM interference during integrity verification of both FPGAs and ASICs are also described.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗