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Kelly, Elizabeth J.

Publications and source records attributed to Kelly, Elizabeth J..

At least 19 records

Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Destructive Examination Protocol for 3013-Container-Package Storing Plutonium-Bearing Materials

The 3013-container-package consists of a convenience, inner and outer container and is used for long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials. A destructive examination (DE) protocol has been developed to examine the container package visually and with microscopic aid to find any corrosion conditions that could result in the loss of the integrity of the container package over its lifetime. The DE protocol contains three main steps: initial container examination, helium (He) leak testing, and detailed imaging and analysis of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). The ICCWR has been determined to be bounding, defined as exhibiting worst case conditions for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the inner container. To assess SCC in the ICCWR, the inner container lid is cut into quarters and the weld and He-leak testing gasket are removed. Then a citric acid wash is performed to remove adherent chlorides from the ICCWR. The wash is then sent for analysis to determine the concentration of chlorides in the ICCWR. While the analysis for chloride concentration is being performed, the quarter sections are further sectioned into 1/8th subsections by cutting each section in half. These subsections are washed using nitric acid to remove corrosion products. Then each subsection is imaged using a Wide Angle 3-D Measurement System (WAMS). After analysis of microscope images for potential SCC, additional imaging can be performed, including subsurface imaging. After review, a determination is made of whether the container integrity may potentially affect the safe storage of the material.

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Tools for Water Ingress Testing

The Safety Storage and Engineering Team, as part of the Production Support Services division (PSS-2), is tasked with ensuring the safety of containers used for handling and storage of nuclear materials. As part of this work, water ingress tests are conducted to evaluate the water-tightness of containers intended for in-glovebox use. In collaboration, the statistics group of the Computer and Computational Sciences Division (CCS-6) provided support in developing a statistically defensible approach for determining appropriate sample sizes for water ingress testing. Water ingress testing involves multiple measurements on multiple containers. Our approach uses a simple random effects model to analyze a pilot data set, implementing prediction limits to evaluate the efficacy of collecting additional data. Although this study capitalizes on available data, our approach can be used with estimates of the ratio of between and within variability and average values, often available from past testing or expert knowledge. An interactive Shiny tool was developed as a final user-friendly product for future testing. The Shiny interface is an open-source package providing a framework for building web applications. Raw data exploration and prediction interval-based sample size assessments can quickly be conducted by the engineering team without needing to interact with the underlying code.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Historic Source Inspection Metadata

Although this data dictionary describes the raw data format, it is relevant only for data entered in 2017 and later. Entries in this date range represent formatted, standardized data that have been verified against original, raw data files by the database manager. She took ownership of the database in September 2022 and was able to standardize entries by comparing against raw data files back to 2017. Furthermore, for comparison of historic pre-source inspection data to new pre-source data supplied by the vendor and intended for action limit analysis purposes, this time period is of sufficient length.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Historic Source Inspection Records

To create true counts of number of containers, each container can be identified by a combination of the purchase order, unique part number and type of inspection. The column TestEventName and any columns derived from TestEventName should not be used in the instance of presource inspection because the vendor may mete out testing over multiple months, meaning that a container would be counted twice if a single test was completed in one month and another test in a different month. By counting on this combination of values, we are able to drop row entries that signify multiple tests completed on a single container. Inspection type must be used because each container will be tested by the vendor and re-tested by the LANL container engineering team. Recall that the vendor will complete action limit tests for the full set of containers during pre-source inspection but during source inspection, action limit tests are completed for only a random subset. However, LANL SMEs will complete a manual inspection for the full set of containers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The 65 Elevated Risk Container Status Relative Humidity Measurements RFID RH/T Sensors in Containers [Slides]

In March of 2023, a memo was issued, drafted by the Container Management, Safety, and Engineering Team, identifying 65 elevated risk legacy containers for priority disposition at TA-55. These 65 were identified separately from the “typical” prioritization decision-making method used at TA-55 to disposition legacy items. This new technique gave important feedback and revealed improvement opportunities for the selection process of legacy containers for disposition. The DOE complex and TA-55 have a long history of nuclear operations and therefore the disposition of these legacy materials is vital.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pit depth analysis using automated software for three containers with complete imaging

The 3013 surveillance program is tasked with ensuring the long term safety of plutonium storage in 3013-compliant containers. One component of this task is to understand corrosion features found on the interior sidewall of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). To this end, three containers were selected to have laser confocal microscope (LCM) 20X imaging of the entire ICCWR. This report describes the analysis of the LCM pit depth data using the automated corrosion analysis software. The analysis included determining maximum pit depths and distributions of pit depths, volumes, and diameters for all pit features identified on the three containers. Results provided insight into possible corrosion mechanisms and were consistent with previous pit growth model predictions.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Selection of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance (FY 2021 Update)

This Update is the ninth in a series of reports that document the binning and sample selection of 3013 containers for the Field Surveillance program as part of the Integrated Surveillance Program. The last Update was in 2016. This Update documents changes to the binning and changes to the random and engineering judgment samples since 2016. This Update also documents field surveillance activities since 2016 and describes plans to complete random sampling in 2025. In addition, this Update describes a new effort to collect surveillance data as part of down blending operations and updates assumptions about Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) 3013 containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Prompt Gamma Analysis of ARIES Materials and Updates to the 2015 Calibration Equations

Prompt gamma (PG) analysis is a nondestructive, nuclear, elemental analysis technique that uses charged particle reactions to interrogate a sample, and elements present in the sample matrix are identified through the characteristic gamma-rays emitted from the product nuclei in alpha-p and alpha-n nuclear reactions. This technique has been applied to plutonium oxide packaged in over 4,000 individual 3013 containers, and the concentrations of certain light elements were determined from the integrated peak areas based on a calibration that was published previously. This report provides the results for a new population of 3013 containers packaged with oxide materials produced by the conversion of metal by Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) project using the direct metal oxidation (DMO) process and muffle furnaces. New PG and analytical chemistry data collected since 2015 were added to the existing calibration data sets to refine the calibration parameters. Calibration equations were also developed for determining beryllium and fluorine at low concentrations in high-purity ARIES product oxides. The new fluorine calibration provides an order of magnitude greater sensitivity and results in an additional 1,408 containers in the original population identified as having fluorine as an impurity. Additionally, equations for calculating the lower limits of detection (LLDs) as a function of the actual counting time (live time) were obtained using WLS regression technique for samples in the calibration data set. This resulted in changes to the LLDs published previously.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan (Update for 2021)

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Six surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018 one in 2019 and one in 2020. This 2021 update documents what was actually done in 2020 and what is planned for 2021. Deviations from the 2020 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2021 Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

Prior to 2021, Hagan containers were examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors identified the need for Hagan-specific surveillance (Kelly, et al., 2020) and have developed this surveillance plan to meet that need.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗