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Morgan, Paula S.

Publications and source records attributed to Morgan, Paula S..

Cassini Spacecraft Strategy for Recovering from a Complete Loss-Of-Signal Condition

Unlike other faults where the space craft’s automated Fault Protection (FP) routines can be relied upon to provide a carrier signal and telemetered data to the ground-based Spacecraft Operations Flight Support (SOFS) team to facilitate vehicle acquisition, diagnosis, and fault recovery, a complete Loss-of-Spacecraft-Signal (LOS) condition will yield no information at all to help re-acquire the vehicle and resolve the fault. For any FP response activation, the spacecraft’s downlink signal must be acquired via the Deep Space Network (DSN) on the expected (post-fault) Radio Frequency Subsystem (RFS) device configuration commanded by the FP; data that will not be attainable in the case of a complete LOS condition since there is no signal available for the ground station to lock onto. In the case of the Cassini Mission-to-Saturn spacecraft, numerous fault possibilities exist that can cause a LOS condition. Activations of the onboard RFS-related FP can reconfigure the post-fault RFS states, impeding the ground team’s ability to acquire the spacecraft’s downlink signal

Morgan, Paula S.↗

Enhancing the Cassini Mission Through FP Applications After Launch

Although rigorous pre-emptive measures are taken to preclude failures and anomalous conditions from occurring in JPL spacecraft missions prior to launch, unforeseeable problems can still surface after liftoff. In the case of the Cassini/Huygens Mission-to-Saturn spacecraft, several problems were observed post-launch: 1) immediately after takeoff, the collected engineering/science data stored on the Solid State Recorders (SSR) contained a significantly higher number of corrupted bits than was expected (considerably over spec) due to human error in the memory mapping of these devices, 2) numerous Solid State Power Switches (SSPS) sporadically tripped off throughout the mission due to cosmic ray bombardment from the unique space environment, and 3) false assumptions in the pressure regulator design in combination with missing heritage test data led to inaccurate design conclusions, causing the issuance of two waivers for the regulator to close properly (a potentially mission catastrophic single-point failure which occurred 24 days after launch) - amongst other problems. For Cassini, some of these anomalies led to arduous work-arounds or required continuous monitoring of telemetry variables by the ground-based Spacecraft Operations Flight Support (SOFS) team in order to detect and fix fault occurrences as they happened. Fortunately, sufficient funding and schedule margin allowed several Fault Protection (FP) solutions to be implemented into post-launch Flight Software (FSW) uploads to help resolve these issues autonomously, reducing SOFS ground support efforts while improving anomaly recovery time in order to preserve maximum science capture. This paper details the FP applications used to resolve the above issues as well as to optimize solutions for several other problems experienced by the Cassini spacecraft during its fight, in order to enhance the spacecraft's overall mission success throughout the 18 years of its 20 year expedition to and within the Saturnian system.

fault protection↗

Fault protection techniques in JPL Spacecraft

While every JPL spacecraft requires some unique mission specific fault protection, there are many requirements which are common to all spacecraft configurations. These consist of protecting command and data processing & attitude control computers, protection against communication loss with the spacecraft, ensuring that safe external and internal temperature levels are maintained, and recovery from power overloads. Additionally, most JPL spacecraft are equipped with a general-purpose 'Safe Mode' response algorithm which configures the spacecraft to a lower power state which is safe and predictable so that diagnosis of more complex faults can be addressed by the Operations Team. This paper details the generic application of fault protection techniques which are implemented into most JPL spacecraft designs.

fault protection↗