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NASA NTRS · 20060044316

Fault protection techniques in JPL Spacecraft

Morgan, Paula S.
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Abstract

While every JPL spacecraft requires some unique mission specific fault protection, there are many requirements which are common to all spacecraft configurations. These consist of protecting command and data processing & attitude control computers, protection against communication loss with the spacecraft, ensuring that safe external and internal temperature levels are maintained, and recovery from power overloads. Additionally, most JPL spacecraft are equipped with a general-purpose 'Safe Mode' response algorithm which configures the spacecraft to a lower power state which is safe and predictable so that diagnosis of more complex faults can be addressed by the Operations Team. This paper details the generic application of fault protection techniques which are implemented into most JPL spacecraft designs.

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Morgan, Paula S.. 2005-11-07. Fault protection techniques in JPL Spacecraft. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20060044316

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