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Veirs, Douglas Kirk

Publications and source records attributed to Veirs, Douglas Kirk.

At least 19 records

Summary of Gas Generation Behavior Observed in 3013 Surveillance and Monitoring Program Shelf-Life Experiments

Gas generation experiments have been conducted in small- and full-scale test containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory on samples of plutonium oxide material collected from plutonium processes across the DOE complex and tested at the bounding conditions for the Department of Energy 3013 Standard. The gas composition and pressures in the sealed experimental containers were measured over periods of months to years. These experiments have provided results for the formation and consumption of hydrogen and other gases. The conditions supporting the formation of flammable gas mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen in flammable gas mixtures were also determined. Different behaviors were observed between the materials tested based on their compositions, the stabilization performed on the material, and the post stabilization handling of the material. Many of the experiments are still ongoing. This report summarizes the results obtained for the gas generation behavior for high-purity plutonium oxides and salt-bearing impure plutonium oxides in sealed containers.

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3013 Fire Test 2020: Post-Test Measurements and Analysis

Sandia National Laboratory conducted fire tests on ten 3013 containers with varying amounts of water. The containers with attached manifolds were sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory for post-test measurements of the plastic deformation, the amount of water remaining on the material post-test and the mass loss. The measurements of the plastic deformation were used to determine the free gas volume in each container and manifold post-test. The disassembly of each container was documented by photographs. The amount of pre-test gas constituents is also reported using data in the Sandia Final Report.

3013 fire test↗

3013 Fire Test 2020: Post-Test Volumes

Sandia National Laboratory conducted fire tests on ten 3013 containers with varying amounts of water. The containers plastically deformed during the fire tests. The plastic deformation increased the free-gas volume within the containers. The amount of plastic deformation is measured and post-test free gas volumes at 25°C is reported.

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Technical Basis for Extending Storage Life of DOE-STD-3013 Containers

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard for Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013 [USDOE 2018], provides requirements for packaging stabilized metals, alloys, and oxides containing at least 30 weight percent (wt%) plutonium (Pu) plus uranium for storage for up to 50 years. This document provides the technical basis for extending that storage duration to up to 100 years for metals and alloys, and oxides that do not present a corrosion risk to the integrity of the container.

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Relative humidity threshold for oxygen generation by high-purity plutonium dioxides in 3013 containers

High-purity plutonium dioxide with adsorbed water in a sealed container can generate oxygen, but oxygen will not be generated in low water loading conditions. A threshold for oxygen generation has been observed in the hydrogen generation rate normalized by the specific power for high-purity plutonium dioxide. Normalized hydrogen generation rates above this threshold generate oxygen and below the threshold consume oxygen. The threshold rate is determined by the amount of water adsorbed onto the surface of the oxide. The relative humidity of the atmosphere that the oxide is in equilibrium with determines the amount of physisorbed water adsorbed on the surface. We calculate the relative humidity corresponding to the threshold rate as a function of mass and specific surface area of material stored in 3013 containers. Exceeding the calculated relative humidity may result in flammable gas mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen at some time during storage.

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The 65 Elevated Risk Container Status Relative Humidity Measurements RFID RH/T Sensors in Containers [Slides]

In March of 2023, a memo was issued, drafted by the Container Management, Safety, and Engineering Team, identifying 65 elevated risk legacy containers for priority disposition at TA-55. These 65 were identified separately from the “typical” prioritization decision-making method used at TA-55 to disposition legacy items. This new technique gave important feedback and revealed improvement opportunities for the selection process of legacy containers for disposition. The DOE complex and TA-55 have a long history of nuclear operations and therefore the disposition of these legacy materials is vital.

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Potential safety impacts associated with production of gaseous PuF 6 due to reactions between 3013-compliant PuO 2 with Novec TM 1230 at temperature

A part of the NNSA/SRNS Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is a planned expansion of an existing facility with capabilities to handle, process, package, and characterize large amounts of plutonium oxide materials for permanent disposition at WIPP. The facility design for this future processing capability will include glovebox operations, HEPA filters, and exhaust/ventilation systems. An NNSA review of the facility support systems included comments on the potential residual reactivity of previously-stabilized PuO 2 , and on the possibility of chemical interactions between stabilized PuO 2 and a new fire suppressant (Novec TM 1230), a replacement for chlorinated/brominated compounds such as HALON TM , to be employed in the event of a room/glovebox fire where PuO 2 will be processed.

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MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item CAN92 (SSR147) from Rocky Flats Analytical Laboratory Operations

A plutonium/uranium oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample CAN92 represents plutonium/uranium oxides stored in 3013 containers. The material originated in the analytical laboratory at Rocky Flats. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over 5 ½ years. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 117 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 77.5 kPa was largely due to the generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide with minor amounts of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. The internal components of SSR147 were inspected 6.5 years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 1,937 days had an etched appearance and general corrosion. No pitting was observed on the inner bucket that held the sample.

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MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

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Comparing elemental measurements at packaging and after storage for signatures of chloride salt radiolysis

Radiolysis of hydrated alkaline earth chloride salts by alpha radiation from plutonium produces the chloride containing gases HCl and Cl 2 . These gases are known to diffuse out of the plutonium-containing material and contribute to corrosion outside of the convenience container. The alkaline earth elements remain with the plutonium-containing material as oxides or hydroxides. The amount of chlorine within the material after storage will be reduced compared to the amount at packaging. The fraction of the alkaline earth elements that are soluble after storage will be reduced compared to the amount at packaging. These signatures may be observable by comparing the chemical analysis measurements made at packaging and after storage. Comparison of measurements on a single Hanford container shows that the chloride does decrease and the alkaline earth elements have reduced solubility in water. Differences seen with other elements make conclusions difficult.

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Evaluation of the 2018 Version of the Integrated Surveillance Program Database Pressure Equation

The Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Database Pressure Equation was developed to determine with reasonable certainty the total maximum pressure of hydrogen and other gases in packaged 3013 containers stored at Savannah River Site (SRS) in support of the destructive evaluation (DE) process. The pressure equation in the Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard, “Standard for Stabilization, Packaging and Storage of Plutonium- Bearing Materials” (DOE-STD-3013-2004) used a bounding assumption that all the water is decomposed to form hydrogen. However, the results of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) shelf-life experiments showed that hydrogen is consumed, and that the maximum pressures would not approach the design pressure of the 3013 container. Therefore, the ISP Database Pressure Equation was revised in 2008 to include terms for the generation of helium and hydrogen as a function of time, as well as the consumption of water and destruction of hydrogen based on shelf-life results. The 2008 ISP Database Pressure Equation provided a more reasonable estimate of the total maximum pressure in packaged 3013 containers than the pressure equation in versions of the 3013 Standard issued prior to 2018.

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MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Oxalate Precipitation/Calcination Product PBO-47-09-012-023 (Final Report)

A high-purity fuel-grade plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample PBO-47-09-012-023 originated from the Hanford continuous oxalate precipitation and calcination process and represents plutonium oxides from multiple processes currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 87.5% plutonium/americium with no major impurities. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400 th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a three year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 96 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure was primarily due to generation of hydrogen (5.7 kPa) and nitrogen (2 kPa) gas. Oxygen was a minor component of the initial headspace gas and was depleted. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container did not show significant signs of corrosion.

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MIS High-Purity Plutonium/Uranium Oxide Hydride Product 5501407 (SSR129): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from high purity mixed oxides and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Hanford, hydride oxide from Rocky Flats, and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation and scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure of two samples of this material with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. The first experiment studied a mixture of 60% as-received material (AR) and 40% material that had been calcined at 950 °C. The mixture contained 66% weapons grade plutonium and 11% uranium, with approximately 7.3% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. A second experiment studied material calcined at 950 °C which contained approximately 4.3% impurities and similar uranium and plutonium content. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 3.5 years in the first container and 20 months for the second container, which was terminated early due to an inadvertent container pumpdown. The maximum observed gas pressures were 152 kPa and 161 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressures of 82 kPa and 88 kPa, respectively, was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. In the container with the AR/calcined mixture, a small amount of hydrogen and oxygen was generated and was consumed. In the container with calcined material only, hydrogen partial pressure of 18.9 kPa was measured. A small amount of oxygen was generated and was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of both sealed containers showed signs of corrosion

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MIS High Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product MT1490 (SSR125): Final Report

A high purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample MT1490 represents process plutonium oxides from several metal oxidation operations that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 weight percent water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500 th of the volume of a 3013 container. The sample was a mixture of as-received material, material calcined at 800°C and material calcined at 950°C. This material contained 87% plutonium with no major impurities. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a nine year period. The maximum observed gas pressure of 118 kPa was reached during the ninth year. The increase over the initial pressure of 95 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and hydrogen gas. Oxygen was a minor component of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the inner bucket showed signs of corrosion, including pitting, in the container material contact region.

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3013 Inner Can Lid Leak Test System Development

Contained in this report is a description of the 3013 inner container lid leak detection system, a listing of the data collected to validate the system and a statistical analysis of collected data. The 3013 Container Surveillance Program provides assessment criteria and evaluates 3013 containers selected from the storage inventory for potential degradation mechanisms. The 3013 outer container is the boundary credited to prevent release of material to the environment. The integrity of the outer container is only at risk if the inner container loses its seal and allows corrosive gases to diffuse into the outer container. To date, the determination of potential outer container exposure to corrosive gases has been through comparison of the gas analysis of the annular space and the inner container. If the two volumes have the same gas composition and pressure, then the inner container may have leaked. The leak detection system described in this report will provide a direct measurement of the integrity of the inner container, and if approved, will provide for the elimination of gas analysis. The inner container lid leak testing system consists of two basic parts: the Agilent leak testing instrument and the leak test fixture. The test fixture base provides the connection between the leak test instrument and the test sample. This connection allows helium to flow into the leak detector when a leak path exists in the test sample allowing leak measurement to be performed. The tests reported here were conducted in a cold lab using a configuration very similar, but not identical to, the configuration anticipated when installed in a glove box. A total of sixty-five leak rate measurements were made on 10 containers and the data is included in the report. The data analysis shows that the leak detection system can identify leaks in the lid, including the weld and heat affected zone of 3013 inner containers, during destructive examination. The measurements taken support that a 3013 IC lid with a leak rate value greater than 2.0 x 10 -7 atm cc/sec will be identified using the leak test system prior to introduction into a glove box. These results from the baseline for future tests of the leak test system after it is installed in the glove box for use as part of surveillance DE.

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