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Vinson, D

Publications and source records attributed to Vinson, D.

CONTAINMENT EVALUATION OF PU-METAL TRANSPORT USING MULTIPLE BARRIERS

A methodology was developed previously by SRNL to show that Al-SNF with cladding breaches can be directly transported in standard casks and maintained within the allowable release rates. This novel approach may be extended to other nuclear material systems. Utilizing an adaptation to the methodology, a containment analysis has been performed for the scenario of non-routine transfer of a damaged 9975 package containing plutonium metal from K-area monitored storage to F-area on the Savannah River Site. A multiple barrier system with each barrier having a defined leakage rate of less than 1 x 10{sup -3} cm{sup 3}/sec of air at Standard Temperature and Pressure was analyzed to determine the number of barriers needed to transport the package under normal transportation conditions to meet transportation requirements for containment. The barrier system was analyzed parametrically to achieve a composite system that met the federal requirements for the maximum permissible release rate. The multiple barrier system acts to retard the release of radioactivity. That is, a build-up in the radioactivity release rate occurs with time. For example, a system with three barriers (e.g., sealed plastic barrier) with a total free volume of 4,500 cm{sup 3} could be transported for a total time of up to approximately 10 days with a release rate within the permissible rate. Additional number of barriers, or volume of the barriers, or both, would extend to this period of time. For example, a system with seven barriers with a total free volume of 4,500 cm{sup 3} could be transported for up to 100 days. Plastic bags are one type of barrier used in movement of radioactive materials and capable of achieving a leak rate of 1 x 10{sup -3} cm{sup 3}/sec of air at STP. Low-density polyethylene bags can withstand high temperature (up to 180 C); a barrier thickness of 10 mils should be suitable for the barrier system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

INVENTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF COMMERCIAL REACTOR FUELS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

There are currently 104 nuclear reactors in 31 states, operated by 51 different utilities. Operation of these reactors generates used fuel assemblies that require storage prior to final disposition. The regulatory framework within the United States (U.S.) allows for the licensing of used nuclear fuel storage facilities for an initial licensing period of up to 40 years with potential for license extensions in 40 years increments. Extended storage, for periods of up to 300 years, is being considered within the U.S. Therefore, there is an emerging need to develop the technical bases to support the licensing for long-term storage. In support of the Research and Development (R&D) activities required to support the technical bases, a comprehensive assessment of the current inventory of used nuclear fuel based upon publicly available resources has been completed that includes the most current projections of used fuel discharges from operating reactors. Negotiations with the nuclear power industry are ongoing concerning the willingness of individual utilities to provide information and material needed to complete the R&D activities required to develop the technical bases for used fuel storage for up to 300 years. This report includes a status of negotiations between DOE and industry in these regards. These negotiations are expected to result in a framework for cooperation between the Department and industry in which industry will provide and specific information on used fuel inventory and the Department will compensate industry for the material required for Research and Development and Testing and Evaluation Facility activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

US PRACTICE FOR INTERIM WET STORAGE OF RRSNF

Aluminum research reactor spent nuclear fuel is currently being stored or is anticipated to be returned to the United States and stored at Department of Energy storage facilities at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center. This paper summarizes the current practices to provide for continued safe interim wet storage in the U.S. Aluminum fuel stored in poor quality water is subject to aggressive corrosion attack and therefore water chemistry control systems are essential to maintain water quality. Fuel with minor breaches are safely stored directly in the basin. Fuel pieces and heavily damaged fuel is safely stored in isolation canisters.

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CONTAINMENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR TRANSPORT OF BREACHED CLAD ALUMINUM SPENT FUEL

Aluminum-clad, aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al-SNF) from foreign and domestic research reactors (FRR/DRR) is being shipped to the Savannah River Site and placed in interim storage in a water basin. To enter the United States, a cask with loaded fuel must be certified to comply with the requirements in the Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71. The requirements include demonstration of containment of the cask with its contents under normal and accident conditions. Many Al-SNF assemblies have suffered corrosion degradation in storage in poor quality water, and many of the fuel assemblies are 'failed' or have through-clad damage. A methodology was developed to evaluate containment of Al-SNF even with severe cladding breaches for transport in standard casks. The containment analysis methodology for Al-SNF is in accordance with the methodology provided in ANSI N14.5 and adopted by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in NUREG/CR-6487 to meet the requirements of 10CFR71. The technical bases for the inputs and assumptions are specific to the attributes and characteristics of Al-SNF received from basin and dry storage systems and its subsequent performance under normal and postulated accident shipping conditions. The results of the calculations for a specific case of a cask loaded with breached fuel show that the fuel can be transported in standard shipping casks and maintained within the allowable release rates under normal and accident conditions. A sensitivity analysis has been conducted to evaluate the effects of modifying assumptions and to assess options for fuel at conditions that are not bounded by the present analysis. These options would include one or more of the following: reduce the fuel loading; increase fuel cooling time; reduce the degree of conservatism in the bounding assumptions; or measure the actual leak rate of the cask system. That is, containment analysis for alternative inputs at fuel-specific conditions and at cask-loading-specific conditions could be performed to demonstrate that release is within the allowable leak rates of the cask.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR ALUMINUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL - A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The Department of Energy's Environmental Management (DOE-EM) Program is responsible for the receipt and storage of aluminum research reactor spent nuclear fuel or used fuel until ultimate disposition. Aluminum research reactor used fuel is currently being stored or is anticipated to be returned to the U.S. and stored at DOE-EM storage facilities at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center. This paper assesses the technologies and the options for safe transportation/receipt and interim storage of aluminum research reactor spent fuel and reviews the comprehensive strategy for its management. The U.S. Department of Energy uses the Appendix A, Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Criteria, to identify the physical, chemical, and isotopic characteristics of spent nuclear fuel to be returned to the United States under the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program. The fuel is further evaluated for acceptance through assessments of the fuel at the foreign sites that include corrosion damage and handleability. Transport involves use of commercial shipping casks with defined leakage rates that can provide containment of the fuel, some of which are breached. Options for safe storage include wet storage and dry storage. Both options must fully address potential degradation of the aluminum during the storage period. This paper focuses on the various options for safe transport and storage with respect to technology maturity and application.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NDA SYSTEM RESPONSE MODELING AND ITS APPLICATION

The Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plant (PORTS) is a uranium enrichment facility that was historically used to enrich uranium to levels that range from 2% to greater than 97%. The feed material for PORTS was obtained from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) that produced uranium in the form of UF6 that was enriched to about 1 to 2%. The enrichment process involves a multistage process by which gaseous UF{sub 6} passed through a diffusion barrier in each stage. The porous diffusion barrier in each stage retards the rate of the diffusion of the heavier {sup 238}U atoms relative to the diffusion of the lighter {sup 235}U atoms. By this process the product stream is slightly enriched by each stage of the process. Each stage consists of a compressor, converter and a motor. There are more than 4000 stages that are linked together with piping of various diameters to form the PORTS cascade. The cascade spans three interconnected buildings and comprises miles of piping, thousands of seals, converters, valves, motors, and compressors. During operation, PORTS process equipment contained UF{sub 6} gas with uranium enrichment that increased in the process stream from the first to the last stage in a known manner. Gaseous UF{sub 6} moving through the PORTS process equipment had potential to form deposits within the process equipment by several mechanisms, including solidification due to incorrect temperature and pressure conditions during the process, inleakage of atmospheric moisture that chemically reacts with UF{sub 6} to form hydrated uranyl fluoride solids, reduction reactions of UF{sub 6} with cascade metals, and UF{sub 6} condensation on the internal equipment surfaces. As a result, the process equipment of the PORTS contains a variable and unknown quantity of uranium with variable enrichment that has been deposited within the equipment during plant operations. The exact chemical form of this uranium is variable, although it is expected that the bulk of the material is of the form of uranyl fluoride that will become hydrated on exposure to moisture in air when the systems are no longer buffered. The deposit geometry and thickness is uncertain and variable. However, a reasonable assessment of the level of material holdup in this equipment is necessary to support decommissioning efforts. The assessment of nuclear material holdup in process equipment is a complex process that requires integration of process knowledge, nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements, and computer modeling to maximize capabilities and minimize uncertainty. The current report is focused on the use of computer modeling and simulation of NDA measurements.

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