Solution Concepts for Distributed Decision-Making without Coordination

Abstract

Consider a single-stage problem in which we have a group N agents who are attempting to minimize the expected cost of their joint actions, without the benefit of communication or a pre-established protocol but with complete knowledge of the expected cost of any joint set of actions for the group. We call this situation a static coordination problem. The central issue in defining an appropriate solution concept for static coordination problems is considering how to deal with the fact that if the agents axe faced with a set of multiple (mixed) strategies that are equally attractive in terms of cost, a failure of coordination may lead to an expected cost value that is worse than that of any of the strategies in the set. In this proposal, we describe the notion of a general coordination problem, describe initial efforts at developing a solution concept for static coordination problems, and then outline a research agenda that centers on activities that will be basis for obtaining a complete understanding of solutions to static coordination problems.