Challenges in Implementing Methodologies for Nonproliferation Assessments

Abstract

A handful of models for explaining and predicting States’ development of nuclear weapons programs have been proposed since the 1970s. Despite the array of techno-social variables and computational concepts employed in these models, no model has yet been established as an agreed-upon standard. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—one of the main institutions evaluating social, political, and technological information for assessments of States’ current nuclear capabilities—uses only a qualitative framework by which to evaluate such information to assess the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration. In this paper, analysts familiar with both the development of techno-social modelling and the IAEA’s implementation of a safeguards system that is information driven discuss the challenges faced in the development, implementation, and evaluation of models and methodologies for nonproliferation assessments, based on experiences at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the IAEA.