Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Fault Tree”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 181 records · Page 10

Reconfigurable tree architectures using subtree oriented fault tolerance

An approach to the design of reconfigurable tree architectures is presented in which spare processors are allocated at the leaves. The approach is unique in that spares are associated with subtrees, and sharing of spares between these subtrees can occur. The subtree-oriented fault-tolerance approach is more reliable than previous approaches capable of tolerating link and switch failures for both single-chip and multichip tree implementations while reducing redundancy in terms of both spare processors and links. VLSI layout is O(n) for binary trees and is directly extensible to N-ary trees and fault tolerance through performance degradation.

Lowrie, Matthew B.↗

Chemical hazards database and detection system for Microgravity and Materials Processing Facility (MMPF)

The ability to identify contaminants associated with experiments and facilities is directly related to the safety of the Space Station. A means of identifying these contaminants has been developed through this contracting effort. The delivered system provides a listing of the materials and/or chemicals associated with each facility, information as to the contaminant's physical state, a list of the quantity and/or volume of each suspected contaminant, a database of the toxicological hazards associated with each contaminant, a recommended means of rapid identification of the contaminants under operational conditions, a method of identifying possible failure modes and effects analysis associated with each facility, and a fault tree-type analysis that will provide a means of identifying potential hazardous conditions related to future planned missions.

Steele, Jimmy↗

Overcoming obstacles to the exchange of information between risk tools

Our work to date in connecting risk tools hs had successes, but also has revealed there to be significant impediments to information exchange between them. These impediments stem from the well-known phenomenon of 'semantic dissonance' - mismatch between conceptual assumptions made by the separately developed tools. This issue represents a fundamental challenge that arises regardless of the mechanism of information exchange. This paper explains the issue and illustrates it with reference to our experiences to date connecting several risk tools. We motivate this work, present and discuss the solutions we have adopted to surmount these impediments, and the implications this work has for future efforts to integrate risk tools.

semantic dissonance↗

Modeling uncertainty in requirements engineering decision support

One inherent characteristic of requrements engineering is a lack of certainty during this early phase of a project. Nevertheless, decisions about requirements must be made in spite of this uncertainty. Here we describe the context in which we are exploring this, and some initial work to support elicitation of uncertain requirements, and to deal with the combination of such information from multiple stakeholders.

risk analysis↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Decision Making During Spacecraft Operations

Decisions made during the operational phase of a space mission often have significant and immediate consequences. Without the explicit consideration of the risks involved and their representation in a solid model, it is very likely that these risks are not considered systematically in trade studies. Wrong decisions during the operational phase of a space mission can lead to immediate system failure whereas correct decisions can help recover the system even from faulty conditions. A problem of special interest is the determination of the system fault protection strategies upon the occurrence of faults within the system. Decisions regarding the fault protection strategy also heavily rely on a correct understanding of the state of the system and an integrated risk model that represents the various possible scenarios and their respective likelihoods. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling is applicable to the full lifecycle of a space mission project, from concept development to preliminary design, detailed design, development and operations. The benefits and utilities of the model, however, depend on the phase of the mission for which it is used. This is because of the difference in the key strategic decisions that support each mission phase. The focus of this paper is on describing the particular methods used for PRA modeling during the operational phase of a spacecraft by gleaning insight from recently conducted case studies on two operational Mars orbiters. During operations, the key decisions relate to the commands sent to the spacecraft for any kind of diagnostics, anomaly resolution, trajectory changes, or planning. Often, faults and failures occur in the parts of the spacecraft but are contained or mitigated before they can cause serious damage. The failure behavior of the system during operations provides valuable data for updating and adjusting the related PRA models that are built primarily based on historical failure data. The PRA models, in turn, provide insight into the effect of various faults or failures on the risk and failure drivers of the system and the likelihood of possible end case scenarios, thereby facilitating the decision making process during operations. This paper describes the process of adjusting PRA models based on observed spacecraft data, on one hand, and utilizing the models for insight into the future system behavior on the other hand. While PRA models are typically used as a decision aid during the design phase of a space mission, we advocate adjusting them based on the observed behavior of the spacecraft and utilizing them for decision support during the operations phase.

dynamic fault trees↗

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle. In this report we describe an extension to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) that supports modeling of system behavior under failure conditions. This Safety Annex enables the independent modeling of component failures and allows safety engineers to weave various types of fault behavior into the nominal system model. The accompanying tool support uses model checking to propagate errors from their source to their effect on safety properties without the need to add separate propagation specifications. The tool also captures all minimal set of fault combinations that can cause violation of the safety properties, that can be compared to qualitative and quantitative objectives as part of the safety assessment process. We describe the Safety Annex, illustrate its use with a representative example, and discuss and demonstrate the tool support enabling an analyst to investigate the system behavior under failure conditions.

FTA↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

This paper describes a new representation that enables rigorous definition and decomposition of both nominal and off-nominal system goals and functions: the Goal-Function Tree (GFT). GFTs extend the concept and process of functional decomposition, utilizing state variables as a key mechanism to ensure physical and logical consistency and completeness of the decomposition of goals (requirements) and functions, and enabling full and complete traceabilitiy to the design. The GFT also provides for means to define and represent off-nominal goals and functions that are activated when the system's nominal goals are not met. The physical accuracy of the GFT, and its ability to represent both nominal and off-nominal goals enable the GFT to be used for various analyses of the system, including assessments of the completeness and traceability of system goals and functions, the coverage of fault management failure detections, and definition of system failure scenarios.

Johnson, Stephen B.↗

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM). This methodology and corresponding model, known as a Goal-Function Tree (GFT), provides a means to represent, decompose, and elaborate system goals and functions in a rigorous manner that connects directly to design through use of state variables that translate natural language requirements and goals into logical-physical state language. The state variable-based approach also provides the means to directly connect FM to the design, by specifying the range in which state variables must be controlled to achieve goals, and conversely, the failures that exist if system behavior go out-of-range. This in turn allows for the systems engineers and SHM/FM engineers to determine which state variables to monitor, and what action(s) to take should the system fail to achieve that goal. In sum, the GFT representation provides a unified approach to early-phase SE and FM development. This representation and methodology has been successfully developed and implemented using Systems Modeling Language (SysML) on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) Program. It enabled early design trade studies of failure detection coverage to ensure complete detection coverage of all crew-threatening failures. The representation maps directly both to FM algorithm designs, and to failure scenario definitions needed for design analysis and testing. The GFT representation provided the basis for mapping of abort triggers into scenarios, both needed for initial, and successful quantitative analyses of abort effectiveness (detection and response to crew-threatening events).

Patterson, Jonathan D.↗

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM).

Johnson, Stephen B.↗

Sequential Testing Algorithms for Multiple Fault Diagnosis

In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing optimal and near-optimal test sequencing algorithms for multiple fault diagnosis. The computational complexity of solving the optimal multiple-fault isolation problem is super-exponential, that is, it is much more difficult than the single-fault isolation problem, which, by itself, is NP-hard. By employing concepts from information theory and AND/OR graph search, we present several test sequencing algorithms for the multiple fault isolation problem. These algorithms provide a trade-off between the degree of suboptimality and computational complexity. Furthermore, we present novel diagnostic strategies that generate a diagnostic directed graph (digraph), instead of a diagnostic tree, for multiple fault diagnosis. Using this approach, the storage complexity of the overall diagnostic strategy reduces substantially. The algorithms developed herein have been successfully applied to several real-world systems. Computational results indicate that the size of a multiple fault strategy is strictly related to the structure of the system.

Shakeri, Mojdeh↗

Sequential Test Strategies for Multiple Fault Isolation

In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing near optimal test sequencing algorithms for diagnosing multiple faults in redundant (fault-tolerant) systems. The computational complexity of solving the optimal multiple-fault isolation problem is super-exponential, that is, it is much more difficult than the single-fault isolation problem, which, by itself, is NP-hard. By employing concepts from information theory and Lagrangian relaxation, we present several static and dynamic (on-line or interactive) test sequencing algorithms for the multiple fault isolation problem that provide a trade-off between the degree of suboptimality and computational complexity. Furthermore, we present novel diagnostic strategies that generate a static diagnostic directed graph (digraph), instead of a static diagnostic tree, for multiple fault diagnosis. Using this approach, the storage complexity of the overall diagnostic strategy reduces substantially. Computational results based on real-world systems indicate that the size of a static multiple fault strategy is strictly related to the structure of the system, and that the use of an on-line multiple fault strategy can diagnose faults in systems with as many as 10,000 failure sources.

Shakeri, M.↗

Implementing Falut Tolerance in the COTS-Based X2000 Architecture: A Case Study on IEEE 1394

Among other challenges from NASA's X2000 Technology Development Program, affordability and miniaturizaton are prominent criteria, which 1) preclude the traditional solutions for mission reliability that rely on customer-built hardware and extensive component/subsystem replication, and 2) call for commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) based approaches incorporating novel, practical fault tolerance techniques.

IEEE 1394 bus interface commercial-off-th-shelf sp↗

Coseismic fault slip associated with the 1992 M(sub w) 6.1 Joshua Tree, California, earthquake: Implications for the Joshua Tree-Landers earthquake sequence

Coseismic surface deformation associated with the M(sub w) 6.1, April 23, 1992, Joshua Tree earthquake is well represented by estimates of geodetic monument displacements at 20 locations independently derived from Global Positioning System and trilateration measurements. The rms signal to noise ratio for these inferred displacements is 1.8 with near-fault displacement estimates exceeding 40 mm. In order to determine the long-wavelength distribution of slip over the plane of rupture, a Tikhonov regularization operator is applied to these estimates which minimizes stress variability subject to purely right-lateral slip and zero surface slip constraints. The resulting slip distribution yields a geodetic moment estimate of 1.7 x 10(exp 18) N m with corresponding maximum slip around 0.8 m and compares well with independent and complementary information including seismic moment and source time function estimates and main shock and aftershock locations. From empirical Green's functions analyses, a rupture duration of 5 s is obtained which implies a rupture radius of 6-8 km. Most of the inferred slip lies to the north of the hypocenter, consistent with northward rupture propagation. Stress drop estimates are in the range of 2-4 MPa. In addition, predicted Coulomb stress increases correlate remarkably well with the distribution of aftershock hypocenters; most of the aftershocks occur in areas for which the mainshock rupture produced stress increases larger than about 0.1 MPa. In contrast, predicted stress changes are near zero at the hypocenter of the M(sub w) 7.3, June 28, 1992, Landers earthquake which nucleated about 20 km beyond the northernmost edge of the Joshua Tree rupture. Based on aftershock migrations and the predicted static stress field, we speculate that redistribution of Joshua Tree-induced stress perturbations played a role in the spatio-temporal development of the earth sequence culminating in the Landers event.

Bennett, Richard A.↗

Implementation of a Goal-Based Systems Engineering Process Using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML)

Building upon the purpose, theoretical approach, and use of a Goal-Function Tree (GFT) being presented by Dr. Stephen B. Johnson, described in a related Infotech 2013 ISHM abstract titled "Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management", this paper will describe the core framework used to implement the GFTbased systems engineering process using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). These two papers are ideally accepted and presented together in the same Infotech session. Statement of problem: SysML, as a tool, is currently not capable of implementing the theoretical approach described within the "Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management" paper cited above. More generally, SysML's current capabilities to model functional decompositions in the rigorous manner required in the GFT approach are limited. The GFT is a new Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to the development of goals and requirements, functions, and its linkage to design. As a growing standard for systems engineering, it is important to develop methods to implement GFT in SysML. Proposed Method of Solution: Many of the central concepts of the SysML language are needed to implement a GFT for large complex systems. In the implementation of those central concepts, the following will be described in detail: changes to the nominal SysML process, model view definitions and examples, diagram definitions and examples, and detailed SysML construct and stereotype definitions.

Patterson, Jonathan D.↗

Implementation of a Goal-Based Systems Engineering Process Using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML)

Building upon the purpose, theoretical approach, and use of a Goal-Function Tree (GFT) being presented by Dr. Stephen B. Johnson, described in a related Infotech 2013 ISHM abstract titled "Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management", this paper will describe the core framework used to implement the GFTbased systems engineering process using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). These two papers are ideally accepted and presented together in the same Infotech session. Statement of problem: SysML, as a tool, is currently not capable of implementing the theoretical approach described within the "Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management" paper cited above. More generally, SysML's current capabilities to model functional decompositions in the rigorous manner required in the GFT approach are limited. The GFT is a new Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to the development of goals and requirements, functions, and its linkage to design. As a growing standard for systems engineering, it is important to develop methods to implement GFT in SysML. Proposed Method of Solution: Many of the central concepts of the SysML language are needed to implement a GFT for large complex systems. In the implementation of those central concepts, the following will be described in detail: changes to the nominal SysML process, model view definitions and examples, diagram definitions and examples, and detailed SysML construct and stereotype definitions.

Breckenridge, Jonathan T.↗