SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The criteria are presented for preventing space shuttle structural failure associated with crack initiation or propagation during fabrication, test, handling, and the operational life of the vehicle. The criteria discussed include: engineering responsibilities, assurance management, production, operation and test, procurement, critical parts selection, design, and structural analysis.
The initial research effort was an in-depth analysis of the shuttle main engine plumes in an effort to improve the flowfield model and to enhance shuttle base heating equipment predictions during ascent. A prediction methodology code was developed incorporating the improved plume model into a predictive tool which could consider different trajectoreis and engine perfromance variables. Various plume flow model improvement studies were ongoing at the time of the 51-L accident. Since that time, base heating and plume methodology improvements have continued as part of the overall emphasis on Shuttle design assurance before resuming flight schedule.
Since the mid 1980s, much of the marine science research effort in the United Kingdom has been focused into large scale collaborative projects involving public sector laboratories and university departments, termed Community Research Projects. Two of these, the Biogeochemical Ocean Flux Study (BOFS) and the North Sea Project incorporated large scale data collection to underpin multidisciplinary modeling efforts. The challenge of providing project data sets to support the science was met by a small team within the British Oceanographic Data Centre (BODC) operating as a topical data center. The role of the data center was to both work up the data from the ship's sensors and to combine these data with sample measurements into online databases. The working up of the data was achieved by a unique symbiosis between data center staff and project scientists. The project management, programming and data processing skills of the data center were combined with the oceanographic experience of the project communities to develop a system which has produced quality controlled, calibrated data sets from 49 research cruises in 3.5 years of operation. The data center resources required to achieve this were modest and far outweighed by the time liberated in the scientific community by the removal of the data processing burden. Two online project databases have been assembled containing a very high proportion of the data collected. As these are under the control of BODC their long term availability as part of the UK national data archive is assured. The success of the topical data center model for UK Community Research Project data management has been founded upon the strong working relationships forged between the data center and project scientists. These can only be established by frequent personal contact and hence the relatively small size of the UK has been a critical factor. However, projects covering a larger, even international scale could be successfully supported by a network of topical data centers managing online databases which are interconnected by object oriented distributed data management systems over wide area networks.
The goal of this program was to evaluate the low cycle fatigue behavior of an SCS-6/Ti-6Al-4V sub-component under bi-axial loading conditions at 316 C(600 F). A simulated bladed TMC disk was designed having thirty four blades representing the number that would be used in Allied Signal's JTAGG II impeller. The outer diameter of the bladed ring was 254 mm (10.0 inch) and the inner diameter 114.3 mm (4.50 inch). The outer and inner diameter of the composite zone was 177.8 mm (7.00 inch) and 127.O mm(5.00 inch) respectively. Stress analysis showed that the fatigue life of the bladed composite ring would be about 12000 cycles for the test conditions applied. A modal analysis was conducted which showed that the blades would have sufficient life margin from dynamic excitation. The arbor design was the same as that employed in the spin-to burst test of NAS3-27027. A systematic stress analysis of each part making up the arbor was undertaken to assure the design would meet the low cycle fatigue requirements of the program. The Textron Systems grooved foil-fiber process was chosen to make the SCS-6/Ti-6Al-4V core ring based on the success they had in contract NAS3-27027. Fiber buckling, however, was observed at several locations in the first ring made which rendered it unsuitable for spin testing. The fiber buckling was attributed to cracking of the graphite tooling during the consolidation process. On this basis a second ring was made but it too contained fiber buckling defects. Analysis by Textron indicated that the fiber buckling was most likely due to poor placement of the SCS-6 fiber in the etched grooves of the Ti-6Al-4V foil. This was also a contributor to the defects in the first ring. Since there was little indication of control in the process to manufacture a quality ring a third attempt at making a ring was not undertaken.
A loss-of-separation (LOS) is said to occur when two aircraft are spatially too close to one another. A LOS is the fundamental unsafe event to be avoided in air traffic management and conflict detection (CD) is the function that attempts to predict these LOS events. In general, the effectiveness of conflict detection relates to the overall safety and performance of an air traffic management concept. An abstract, parametric analysis was conducted to investigate the impact of surveillance quality, level of intent information, and quality of intent information on conflict detection performance. The data collected in this analysis can be used to estimate the conflict detection performance under alternative future scenarios or alternative allocations of the conflict detection function, based on the quality of the surveillance and intent information under those conditions.Alternatively, this data could also be used to estimate the surveillance and intent information quality required to achieve some desired CD performance as part of the design of a new separation assurance system.
Adhesive bonding of composite materials requires reliable monitoring and detection of surface contaminants as part of a vigorous quality control process to assure robust and durable bonded structures. Surface treatment and effective monitoring prior to bonding are essential in order to obtain a surface which is free from contaminants that may lead to inferior bond quality. In this study, the focus is to advance the laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) technique by using pulse energies below 100 μJ (μLIBS) for the detection of low levels of silicone contaminants in carbon fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) composites. Various CFRP surface conditions were investigated by LIBS using ∼10 ps, 355 nm laser pulses with pulse energies below 30 μJ. Time-resolved analysis was conducted to optimize the gate delay and gate width for the detection of the C I emission line at 247.9 nm to monitor the epoxy resin matrix of CFRP composites and the Si I emission line at 288.2 nm for detection of silicone contaminants in CFRP. To study the surface sensitivity to silicone contamination, CFRP surfaces were coated with polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS), the active ingredient in many mold release agents. The presence of PDMS was studied by inspecting the Si I emission lines at 251.6 nm and 288.2 nm. The measured PDMS areal densities ranged from 0.15 to 2 μg/cm(sup 2). LIBS measurements were performed before and after laser surface ablation. The results demonstrate the successful detection of PDMS thin layers on CFRP using picosecond μLIBS.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The criteria are presented for preventing space shuttle structural failure associated with crack initiation or propagation during fabrication, test, handling, and the operational life of the vehicle. The criteria discussed include: engineering responsibilities, assurance management, production, operation and test, procurement, critical parts selection, design, and structural analysis.
The interactions that occur in human-teaming are inspiring novel aerospace designs aimed at improving how humans and machines, or multiple machines, work together. Unfortunately, current Systems Engineering processes are ill-equipped to handle these complex relationships and are unable to design and assure the safety for these systems. To close part of this gap, this paper introduces a novel system-theoretic analytical process to identify unsafe collaborative control actions. It is part of a broader set of techniques that extend the state-of-the-art in hazard analysis, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), to systematically address collaboration. The method rigorously expresses the different ways multiple commands may be unsafe together. Using Systems Theory, it employs abstraction to manage the combinatorial complexity in enumerating control contributions from multiple collaborating components. An algorithm integrates these concepts into an end-to-end process and is supported by automation to enumerate, refine, prune, and prioritize unsafe combinations of control actions. The output of the method feeds the specification of system requirements to implement safety-guided design starting early in concept development. The process is demonstrated on a manned-unmanned aircraft teaming case study and finds new causal factors that were not previously found in a past hazard analysis of the same system.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.
As part of the NASA Vehicle Systems Safety Technologies (VSST), Assuring Safe and Effective Aircraft Control Under Hazardous Conditions (Technical Challenge #3), an effort is underway within Boeing Research and Technology (BR&T) to address Advanced Modeling and Uncertainty Quantification for Flight Dynamics (VSST1-7). The scope of the effort is to develop and evaluate advanced multidisciplinary flight dynamics modeling techniques, including integrated uncertainties, to facilitate higher fidelity response characterization of current and future aircraft configurations approaching and during loss-of-control conditions. This approach is to incorporate multiple flight dynamics modeling methods for aerodynamics, structures, and propulsion, including experimental, computational, and analytical. Also to be included are techniques for data integration and uncertainty characterization and quantification. This research shall introduce new and updated multidisciplinary modeling and simulation technologies designed to improve the ability to characterize airplane response in off-nominal flight conditions. The research shall also introduce new techniques for uncertainty modeling that will provide a unified database model comprised of multiple sources, as well as an uncertainty bounds database for each data source such that a full vehicle uncertainty analysis is possible even when approaching or beyond Loss of Control boundaries. Methodologies developed as part of this research shall be instrumental in predicting and mitigating loss of control precursors and events directly linked to causal and contributing factors, such as stall, failures, damage, or icing. The tasks will include utilizing the BR&T Water Tunnel to collect static and dynamic data to be compared to the GTM extended WT database, characterizing flight dynamics in off-nominal conditions, developing tools for structural load estimation under dynamic conditions, devising methods for integrating various modeling elements into a real-time simulation capability, generating techniques for uncertainty modeling that draw data from multiple modeling sources, and providing a unified database model that includes nominal plus increments for each flight condition. This paper presents status of testing in the BR&T water tunnel and analysis of the resulting data and efforts to characterize these data using alternative modeling methods. Program challenges and issues are also presented.
CubeSats have become an attractive platform for universities, industry, and government space missions because they are cheaper and quicker to develop than full-scale satellites. One way CubeSats keep costs low is by using commercial off-the-shelf parts (COTS) instead of space-qualified parts. Space-qualified parts are often costlier, larger, and consume more power than their commercial counterparts precluding their use within the CubeSat form-factor. Given typical power budgets, monetary budgets, and timelines for CubeSat missions, conventional radiation hardness assurance, like the use of space-qualified parts and radiation testing campaigns of COTS parts, is not practical. Instead, a system-level approach to radiation effects mitigation is needed. In this paper an assurance case for a system-level approach to mitigate radiation effects of a CubeSat science experiment is expressed using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), a graphical argument standard. The case specifically looks at three main mitigation strategies for the radiation environment: total ionizing dose (TID) screening of parts, detection and recovery from single-event latch-ups (SEL) and single-event functional interrupts (SEFI). The graphical assurance case presented makes a qualitative argument for the radiation reliability of the CubeSat experiment using part and system-level mitigation strategies.
With the privatization of the space industry, NASA has entered a new era. To explore deeper parts of the solar system, NASA is developing a new spacecraft, the Space Launch System (SLS), capable of reaching these destinations, such as an asteroid or Mars. However, the test stand that is capable of testing the stage has been unused for many years. In addition to the updating/repair of the stand, more steel is being added to fully support the SLS. With all these modifications, the lightning protection system must be brought up to code to assure the protection of all personnel and assets. Structural bonding is a part of the lightning protection system. The focus of this project was to assure proper structural bonding. To begin, all relevant technical standards and the construction specifications were reviewed. This included both the specifications for the lightning protection and for general construction. The drawings were reviewed as well. From the drawings, bolted structural joints were reviewed to determine whether bonding was necessary. Several bolted joints were determined to need bonding according to the notes in the drawings. This exceeds the industry standards. The bolted joints are an electrically continuous joint. During tests, the stand experiences heavy vibration that may weaken the continuity of the bolted joint. Therefore, the secondary bonding is implemented to ensure that the structural joint has low resistance. If the structural joint has a high resistance because of corrosion, a potential gradient can occur that can cause a side flash. Damage, injury, or death can occur from a side flash so they are to be prevented. A list of the identified structural joints was compiled and sent to the contractor to be bonded. That covers the scope of this project.
Presently, there are three avenues by which Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations are authorized in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS): obtaining either (i) a certificate of authorization (COA), or (ii) a special airworthiness certificate (SAC) in either the experimental, or the restricted category, or (iii) an exemption from an airworthiness certificate together with a civil COA. The first is meant primarily for public entities, such as NASA; the remaining two are the only available means for civil UAS operations. Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also proposed a regulatory framework targeted for certain small UAS, specifically those weighing 55 pounds or less, although final rulemaking remains pending. We have previously shown how an assurance case can aggregate heterogeneous reasoning and safety evidence, with application to UAS safety. In this paper, we describe how assurance cases can serve as a common framework to justify overall system safety, unifying both operational aspects and airworthiness, in particular system design assurance. We also show how this approach can coexist with, and augment, existing safety analysis processes and best-practices, by transforming the artifacts they produce into structured assurance arguments. To illustrate the applicability and utility of our approach, we have been applying it for the design assurance of an unmanned rotorcraft system, intended for precision agriculture operations, as part of the NASA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project.
We develop methods for bounding part-to-part variation in TID data. When used in conjunction with statistical radiation environment models, these methods allow development of RHA that deliver estimated piece part reliability for any desired confidence level, moving beyond risk avoidance methodologies based on radiation design margin. Two methods are developed, and their results compared for realistic data.
We develop methods for bounding part-to-part variation in TID data. When used in conjunction with statistical radiation environment models, these methods allow development of RHA that deliver estimated piece part reliability for any desired confidence level, moving beyond risk avoidance methodologies based on radiation design margin. Two methods are developed, and their results compared for realistic data.
Electrical wiring systems are used extensively on NASA space systems for power management and distribution, control and command, and data transmission. The reliability of these systems when exposed to the harsh environments of space is very critical to mission success and crew safety. Failures have been reported both on the ground and in flight due to arc tracking in the wiring harnesses, made possible by insulation degradation. This report was written as part of a NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (Code Q) program to identify and characterize wiring systems in terms of their potential use in aerospace vehicles. The goal of the program is to provide the information and guidance needed to develop and qualify reliable, safe, lightweight wiring systems, which are resistant to arc tracking and suitable for use in space power applications. This report identifies the environments in which NASA spacecraft will operate, and determines the specific NASA testing requirements. A summary of related test programs is also given in this report. This data will be valuable to spacecraft designers in determining the best wiring constructions for the various NASA applications.