A Reactive Force Field Study of Li/C Systems for Electrical Energy Storage
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided
Large angle gyro sensing system for body mount on unmanned Mars surface vehicle
Biochemical molecular model for metabolic energy transition from mammalian organs to central nervous system
Description of design reference model for space shuttle propulsion system onboard checkout and monitoring equipment to establish design criteria - Vol. 2
The performance, design, and quality assurance requirements for the Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) Observatory and Ground System program elements required to perform the Land Resources Management (LRM) A-type mission are presented. The requirements for the Observatory element with the exception of the instruments specifications are contained in the first part.
The Ground System requirements for the Land Resources Management (LRM) type-A and type-B missions of the Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) program are presented. Specifications for the Thematic Mapper data processing are provided (LRM A mission). The specifications also cover the R and D instruments (Thematic Mapper and High Resolution Pointable Imager) data processing for the LRM type-B mission.
Resource management missions to be performed by TERSSE are described. Mission and user requirements are defined along with information flows developed for each major resource management mission. Other topics discussed include: remote sensing platforms, remote sensor requirements, ground system architecture, and such related issues as cloud cover, resolution, orbit mechanics, and aircraft versus satellite.
The UAS-NAS Project hosted a Systems Integration Operationalization (SIO) Industry Day for the SIO Request for Information (RFI) on November 30, 2017 in San Diego, California. This presentation is being presented to the same group as a follow up regarding the progress that the UAS-NAS project has made on the SIO RFI. The presentation will be virtual with a teleconference
System identification is becoming a relevant research area for numerous applications in power grids due to the increasing complexity of the system. A paradigm shift in power system infrastructure driven by renewable energy resources, controllable loads, and new power electronics technologies have given rise to new challenges in power systems operation and control. This increased complexity of power systems and unavailability of physics-based models of most inverter-based resources requires that traditional modeling of power systems approaches be complemented by system identification-based black or grey box modeling techniques. In light of the importance of system identification and little attention paid to the applications of these techniques in transforming power systems, this paper provides a comprehensive review of active probing-based system identification methods in the context of power system applications. It reviews applications of both linear and nonlinear system identification with discussion on their potential and key takeaways. To motivate a further practical use in power systems, the paper provides an example of system identification, to develop a state space model of an unknown plant with step-by-step details. The paper highlights the advantages of using modern power electronics-based sources in the identification process and discusses the emerging research directions for future.
Spectrally selective materials show high technical potential for use as radiative cooling heat exchangers for buildings. Recent work by Stanford University has applied a photonic approach to tailor the optical properties of a coating material. In a prototype test, a radiative cooler based on that photonic material has demonstrated the ability to maintain radiator surfaces at below-ambient temperatures in the presence of intense, direct sunlight. This paper presents the simulation and parametric analysis of photonic radiative cooling system that integrates the use of the photonic radiative cooler and radiant floor cooling via the whole energy simulation program EnergyPlus. The simulation was made for a medium office building with three floors and a total floor area of 5,000 m2. Three key design parameters including the storage tank size, the radiator area, and the number of floors are expected to have a large impact on system performance were investigated in this paper. The results show that the percentage of cooling electricity savings from the photonic radiative cooling system relative to a reference variable-air-volume system has a linear relationship with the radiator area, and a quadratic correlation with both tank size and the number of floors. The findings from this parametric analysis are valuable to understand how component sizing affects system performance.
In Japan, ensuring the structural integrity of cask systems during seismic events is becoming increasingly important. Cask systems, which are free-standing cylindrical structures that contain spent fuel assemblies, are believed to exhibit rocking motions under strong seismic excitations. Thus far, analytical studies conducted by the authors have indicated that cask systems subjected to strong seismic motions, undergo large rocking motions, and, in the worst case, may overturn and collapse. Therefore, reducing the rocking motions of casks to avoid overturning and consequent contamination of radioactive substances is critical. To suppress rocking motions for heavy free-standing structures such as cask systems, we propose a rocking motion suppression system that employs a gyro system. This system is installed in the free-standing structure. A previous analytical study showed that this system largely mitigates rocking motion. In the present study, we fabricated a fundamental cask system model and a gyro system. By using the cask system model without a gyro system, free vibration tests and shaking table tests were conducted to understand the basic characteristics of rocking motion and responses under base excitations. Analyses were also conducted to confirm the validity of the analytical model for rocking motion comparing with the experimental data. Moreover, analyses for the cask system with the gyro system were conducted. From these results, we evaluated the ability of the gyro system to mitigate rocking motion. (authors)
At the end of his life, Stephen Jay Kline, longtime professor of mechanical engineering at Stanford University, completed a book on how to address complex systems. The title of the book is 'Conceptual Foundations of Multi-Disciplinary Thinking' (1995), but the topic of the book is systems. Kline first establishes certain limits that are characteristic of our conscious minds. Kline then establishes a complexity measure for systems and uses that complexity measure to develop a hierarchy of systems. Kline then argues that our minds, due to their characteristic limitations, are unable to model the complex systems in that hierarchy. Computers are of no help to us here. Our attempts at modeling these complex systems are based on the way we successfully model some simple systems, in particular, 'inert, naturally-occurring' objects and processes, such as what is the focus of physics. But complex systems overwhelm such attempts. As a result, the best we can do in working with these complex systems is to use a heuristic, what Kline calls the 'Guideline for Complex Systems.' Kline documents the problems that have developed due to 'oversimple' system models and from the inappropriate application of a system model from one domain to another. One prominent such problem is the Procrustean attempt to make the disciplines that deal with complex systems be 'physics-like.' Physics deals with simple systems, not complex ones, using Kline's complexity measure. The models that physics has developed are inappropriate for complex systems. Kline documents a number of the wasteful and dangerous fallacies of this type.
The Disposal Systems Evaluation Framework (DSEF) will use a logical process for developing one or more disposal system concepts (also referred to as repository system in this report) for any given waste form and geologic setting combination. In the Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) group of work packages, there are seven categories of waste forms and eight categories of geologic setting being studied. The DSEF will also establish a Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) knowledge management system to organize high-level information, data, and assumptions, thereby facilitating consistency in high-level system simulation and economic analyses. This system likely will be housed with the INL-based documentation system. Attention is given to lessons oearned from the systems used at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). Where reference material from other programs (e.g., international) is used or cited, the knowledge-management system imports the reference material directly or refer to it in bibliography form. Alternative data sets (e.g., from other programs) will also be utilized to evaluate their influence on DSEF analyses for given waste form and disposal-system combinations. The knowledge-management system can also be used to maintain the results of DSEF realizations, enabling the comparison and ranking of various waste-form/disposal-system-environment/disposal-system-design options. Finally, the UFDC knowledge-management system will be able to provide a compendium of 'templates' that can be utilized, in a labor-efficient fashion, to build parallel DSEF analyses (e.g., 'one offs'). The DSEF will not be a stand-alone, push-the-button and wait for the results, item of software. it will use osftware (probably EXCEL, initially), to guide the team members through a logical process of evaluating combinations of waste-form, disposal-syste-environment, and disposal-system design. In later stages, it will utilize software developed in the field of knowledge engineering and knowledge-management systems (Umeki et al. 2009). At certain points in the logical process, the DSEF software will point the evaluate to other software tools to do analyses needed to move the process forward. In the development of the DSEF, they will be mindful to make it no more complex than necessary to evaluate the system being considered. The DSEF will organize and document the work such that multiple realizations for different combinations can be compared and contrasted.
System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).
The topics discussed are the UAS-NAS project life-cycle and ARMD thrust flow down, as well as the UAS environments and how we operate in those environments. NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, CA, is leading a project designed to help integrate unmanned air vehicles into the world around us. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or UAS in the NAS, will contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The project falls under the Integrated Systems Research Program office managed at NASA Headquarters by the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. NASA's four aeronautics research centers - Armstrong, Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Glenn Research Center - are part of the technology development project. With the use and diversity of unmanned aircraft growing rapidly, new uses for these vehicles are constantly being considered. Unmanned aircraft promise new ways of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing safety and saving lives 460265main_ED10-0132-16_full.jpg Unmanned aircraft systems such as NASA's Global Hawks (above) and Predator B named Ikhana (below), along with numerous other unmanned aircraft systems large and small, are the prime focus of the UAS in the NAS effort to integrate them into the national airspace. Credits: NASA Photos 710580main_ED07-0243-37_full.jpg The UAS in the NAS project envisions performance-based routine access to all segments of the national airspace for all unmanned aircraft system classes, once all safety-related and technical barriers are overcome. The project will provide critical data to such key stakeholders and customers as the Federal Aviation Administration and RTCA Special Committee 203 (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) by conducting integrated, relevant system-level tests to adequately address safety and operational challenges of national airspace access by unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS. In the process, the project will work with other key stakeholders to define necessary deliverables and products to help enable such access. Within the project, NASA is focusing on five sub-projects. These five focus areas include assurance of safe separation of unmanned aircraft from manned aircraft when flying in the national airspace; safety-critical command and control systems and radio frequencies to enable safe operation of UAS; human factors issues for ground control stations; airworthiness certification standards for UAS avionics and integrated tests and evaluation designed to determine the viability of emerging UAS technology. Five Focus Areas of the UAS Integration in the NAS Project Separation Assurance Provide an assessment of how planned Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) separation assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed operations with manned aircraft Assess the applicability to UAS and the performance of NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and uncertain trajectories Assess functional allocations ranging from today's ground-based, controller-provided aircraft separation to fully autonomous airborne self-separation Communications Develop data and rationale to obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations to enable safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Develop and validate candidate secure safety-critical command and control system/subsystem test equipment for UAS that complies with UAS international/national frequency regulations, standards and recommended practices and minimum operational and aviation system performance standards for UAS Perform analysis to support recommendations for integration of safety-critical command and control systems and air traffic control communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Human Systems Integration Develop a research test bed and database to provide data and proof of concept for GCS - ground control station - operations in the NAS Coordinate with standards organizations to develop human-factors guidelines for GCS operation in the NAS Certification Define a UAS classification scheme and approach to determining Federal Aviation Regulation airworthiness requirements applicable to all UAS digital avionics Provide hazard and risk-related data to support development of type design criteria and best development practices Integrated Tests and Evaluation Integrate and test mature concepts from technical elements to demonstrate and test viability Evaluate the performance of technology development in a relevant environment (full-mission, human-in-the-loop simulations and flight tests)