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NASA's software subsystems undergo extensive modification and updates over the operational lifetimes. It is imperative that modified software should satisfy safety goals. This report discusses the difficulties encountered in doing so and discusses a solution based on integrated modelling of software, use of automatic information extraction tools, web technology and databases.
NASA's software subsystems undergo extensive modification and updates over the operational lifetimes. It is imperative that modified software should satisfy safety goals. This report discusses the difficulties encountered in doing so and discusses a solution based on integrated modelling of software, use of automatic information extraction tools, web technology and databases. To appear in an article of Journal of Database Management.
This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.
We describe a system for the automated certification of safety properties of NASA software. The system uses Hoare-style program verification technology to generate proof obligations which are then processed by an automated first-order theorem prover (ATP). We discuss the unique requirements this application places on the ATPs, focusing on automation, proof checking, and usability. For full automation, however, the obligations must be aggressively preprocessed and simplified, and we demonstrate how the individual simplification stages, which are implemented by rewriting, influence the ability of the ATPs to solve the proof tasks. Our results are based on 13 certification experiments that lead to more than 25,000 proof tasks which have each been attempted by Vampire, Spass, e-setheo, and Otter. The proofs found by Otter have been proof-checked by IVY.
To identify best practices for the improvement of software engineering on projects, NASA's Offices of Chief Engineer (OCE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) formed a team led by Heather Rarick and Sally Godfrey to conduct this benchmarking study. The primary goals of the study are to identify best practices that: Improve the management and technical development of software intensive systems; Have a track record of successful deployment by aerospace industries, universities [including research and development (R&D) laboratories], and defense services, as well as NASA's own component Centers; and Identify candidate solutions for NASA's software issues. Beginning in the late fall of 2010, focus topics were chosen and interview questions were developed, based on the NASA top software challenges. Between February 2011 and November 2011, the Benchmark Team interviewed a total of 18 organizations, consisting of five NASA Centers, five industry organizations, four defense services organizations, and four university or university R and D laboratory organizations. A software assurance representative also participated in each of the interviews to focus on assurance and software safety best practices. Interviewees provided a wealth of information on each topic area that included: software policy, software acquisition, software assurance, testing, training, maintaining rigor in small projects, metrics, and use of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, as well as a number of special topics that came up in the discussions. NASA's software engineering practices compared favorably with the external organizations in most benchmark areas, but in every topic, there were ways in which NASA could improve its practices. Compared to defense services organizations and some of the industry organizations, one of NASA's notable weaknesses involved communication with contractors regarding its policies and requirements for acquired software. One of NASA's strengths was its software assurance practices, which seemed to rate well in comparison to the other organizational groups and also seemed to include a larger scope of activities. An unexpected benefit of the software benchmarking study was the identification of many opportunities for collaboration in areas including metrics, training, sharing of CMMI experiences and resources such as instructors and CMMI Lead Appraisers, and even sharing of assets such as documented processes. A further unexpected benefit of the study was the feedback on NASA practices that was received from some of the organizations interviewed. From that feedback, other potential areas where NASA could improve were highlighted, such as accuracy of software cost estimation and budgetary practices. The detailed report contains discussion of the practices noted in each of the topic areas, as well as a summary of observations and recommendations from each of the topic areas. The resulting 24 recommendations from the topic areas were then consolidated to eliminate duplication and culled into a set of 14 suggested actionable recommendations. This final set of actionable recommendations, listed below, are items that can be implemented to improve NASA's software engineering practices and to help address many of the items that were listed in the NASA top software engineering issues. 1. Develop and implement standard contract language for software procurements. 2. Advance accurate and trusted software cost estimates for both procured and in-house software and improve the capture of actual cost data to facilitate further improvements. 3. Establish a consistent set of objectives and expectations, specifically types of metrics at the Agency level, so key trends and models can be identified and used to continuously improve software processes and each software development effort. 4. Maintain the CMMI Maturity Level requirement for critical NASA projects and use CMMI to measure organizations developing software for NASA. 5.onsolidate, collect and, if needed, develop common processes principles and other assets across the Agency in order to provide more consistency in software development and acquisition practices and to reduce the overall cost of maintaining or increasing current NASA CMMI maturity levels. 6. Provide additional support for small projects that includes: (a) guidance for appropriate tailoring of requirements for small projects, (b) availability of suitable tools, including support tool set-up and training, and (c) training for small project personnel, assurance personnel and technical authorities on the acceptable options for tailoring requirements and performing assurance on small projects. 7. Develop software training classes for the more experienced software engineers using on-line training, videos, or small separate modules of training that can be accommodated as needed throughout a project. 8. Create guidelines to structure non-classroom training opportunities such as mentoring, peer reviews, lessons learned sessions, and on-the-job training. 9. Develop a set of predictive software defect data and a process for assessing software testing metric data against it. 10. Assess Agency-wide licenses for commonly used software tools. 11. Fill the knowledge gap in common software engineering practices for new hires and co-ops.12. Work through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) program with universities in strengthening education in the use of common software engineering practices and standards. 13. Follow up this benchmark study with a deeper look into what both internal and external organizations perceive as the scope of software assurance, the value they expect to obtain from it, and the shortcomings they experience in the current practice. 14. Continue interactions with external software engineering environment through collaborations, knowledge sharing, and benchmarking.
An external review of the Integrated Technology Plan for the Civil Space Program is presented. This review is specifically concerned with the Software Engineering Program. The goals of the Software Engineering Program are as follows: (1) improve NASA's ability to manage development, operation, and maintenance of complex software systems; (2) decrease NASA's cost and risk in engineering complex software systems; and (3) provide technology to assure safety and reliability of software in mission critical applications.
The era of the shuttle program has come to an end, but only to give rise to newer and more exciting projects. Now is the time of the Orion spacecraft, a work of art designed to exceed all previous endeavors of man. NASA is exiting the time of exploration and is entering a new period, a period of pioneering. With this new mission, many of NASAs organizations must undergo a great deal of change and development to support the Orion missions. The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) is the new system that will provide NASA the ability to launch rockets into orbit and thus control Orion and other spacecraft as the goal of populating Mars becomes ever increasingly tangible. Since the previous control system, Launch Processing System (LPS), was primarily designed to launch the shuttles, SCCS was needed as Kennedy Space Center (KSC) reorganized to a multiuser spaceport for commercial flights, providing a more versatile control over rockets. Within SCCS, is the Launch Control System (LCS), which is the remote software behind the command and monitoring of flight and ground system hardware. This internship at KSC has involved two main components in LCS, including Remote Software Application and Display development. The display environment provides a graphical user interface for an operator to view and see if any cautions are raised, while the remote applications are the backbone that communicate with hardware, and then relay the data back to the displays. These elements go hand in hand as they provide monitoring and control over hardware and software alike from the safety of the Launch Control Center. The remote software applications are written in Application Control Language (ACL), which must undergo unit testing to ensure data integrity. This paper describes both the implementation and writing of unit tests in ACL code for remote software applications, as well as the building of remote displays to be used in the Launch Control Center (LCC).
NASA Gateway program has named cFS as the software architecture for the vehicle. The core CFS team (GSFC+JSC) is tasked to develop a certifiable release of the cFS bundle, by components, as class A, safety-critical flight software. It is to be available to all Gateway software developers, including our element vendors and international partners. Its availability & usage will be as stated by the Gateway User Agreement license. In this presentation, we will describe our general certification process, and more importantly, our certification artifacts that can be re-run to certify cFS on different platforms. Our goal is to also make available these certifiable packages to the open source community, specifically for cFE, OSAL and certain cFS applications and libraries that are currently hosted on NASA github (https://github.com/nasa).
NASA Gateway program has named cFS as the software architecture for the vehicle. The core CFS team (GSFC+JSC) is tasked to develop a certifiable release of the cFS bundle, by components, as class A, safety-critical flight software. It is to be available to all Gateway software developers, including our element vendors and international partners. Its availability & usage will be as stated by the Gateway User Agreement license. In this presentation, we will describe our general certification process, and more importantly, our certification artifacts that can be re-run to certify cFS on different platforms. Our goal is to also make available these certifiable packages to the open source community, specifically for cFE, OSAL and certain cFS applications and libraries that are currently hosted on NASA github (https://github.com/nasa).
Verification and Validation (V&V) is used to increase the level of assurance of critical software, particularly that of safety-critical and mission-critical software. V&V is a systems engineering discipline that evaluates the software in a systems context, and is currently applied during the development of a specific application system. In order to bring the effectiveness of V&V to bear within reuse-based software engineering, V&V must be incorporated within the domain engineering process.
Mission or safety-critical spaceflight systems should be developed to both reduce the likelihood of software faults pre-flight and to detect/mitigate the effects of software errors should they occur in-flight. New data is available that categorizes software errors from significant historic spaceflight software incidents with implications and considerations to better develop and design software to both minimize and tolerate these most likely software failures.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed an on-orbit, adaptable, Software Defined Radio (SDR)Space Telecommunications Radio System (STRS)-based testbed facility to conduct a suite of experiments to advance technologies, reduce risk, and enable future mission capabilities on the International Space Station (ISS). The SCAN Testbed Project will provide NASA, industry, other Government agencies, and academic partners the opportunity to develop and field communications, navigation, and networking technologies in the laboratory and space environment based on reconfigurable, SDR platforms and the STRS Architecture.The SDRs are a new technology for NASA, and the support infrastructure they require is different from legacy, fixed function radios. SDRs offer the ability to reconfigure on-orbit communications by changing software for new waveforms and operating systems to enable new capabilities or fix any anomalies, which was not a previous option. They are not stand alone devices, but required a new approach to effectively control them and flow data. This requires extensive software to be developed to utilize the full potential of these reconfigurable platforms. The paper focuses on development, integration and testing as related to the avionics processor system, and the software required to command, control, monitor, and interact with the SDRs, as well as the other communication payload elements. An extensive effort was required to develop the flight software and meet the NASA requirements for software quality and safety. The flight avionics must be radiation tolerant, and these processors have limited capability in comparison to terrestrial counterparts. A big challenge was that there are three SDRs onboard, and interfacing with multiple SDRs simultaneously complicatesd the effort. The effort also includes ground software, which is a key element for both the command of the payload, and displaying data created by the payload. The verification of the software was an extensive effort. The challenges of specifying a suitable test matrix with reconfigurable systems that offer numerous configurations is highlighted. Since the flight system testing requires methodical, controlled testing that limits risk, a nearly identical ground system to the on-orbit flight system was required to develop the software and write verification procedures before it was installed and tested on the flight system. The development of the SCAN testbed was an accelerated effort to meet launch constraints, and this paper discusses tradeoffs made to balance needed software functionality and still maintain the schedule. Future upgrades are discussed that optimize the avionics and allow experimenters to utilize the SCAN testbed potential.
The reliability of the propulsion system of an aircraft is paramount for the aircraft safety and hence the aircraft health must be monitored continuously. In contrast to fuel- operated aircraft, electric battery-operated propulsion system poses specific problems, such as, the remaining battery power does not linearly decrease and cannot be measured directly. In this paper, we describe a combined monitoring and prognostics architecture that can continuously monitor all components of the electric propulsion system with respect to safety and performance properties as well as state of charge and rest of useful life for the battery. Our system combines a detailed electrochemical battery model for Li-ion batteries with a powerful prognostics engine based upon an Unscented Kalman Filter with the R2U2 monitoring device, which provides efficient observers for metric temporal logic and Bayesian reasoning. R2U2 is a real-time, realizable, responsive, unobtrusive unit, which continuously monitors sensor readings, outputs of the prognostics engine, as well as the ight software status for safety, performance, and security properties. We illustrate our architecture with two case studies, one reporting actual ight tests with an X8+ octocopter and the other a software-in-the-loop simulation with an unmanned Edge 540 electric aircraft model.
The Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design team is responsible for defining a launch to orbit trajectory profile that satisfies all programmatic mission objectives and defines the ground and onboard reconfiguration requirements for this high-speed and demanding flight phase. This design, verification and reconfiguration process ensures that all applicable mission scenarios are enveloped within integrated vehicle and spacecraft certification constraints and criteria, and includes the design of the nominal ascent profile and trajectory profiles for both uphill and ground-to-ground aborts. The team also develops a wide array of associated training, avionics flight software verification, onboard crew and operations facility products. These key ground and onboard products provide the ultimate users and operators the necessary insight and situational awareness for trajectory dynamics, performance and event sequences, abort mode boundaries and moding, flight performance and impact predictions for launch vehicle stages for use in range safety, and flight software performance. These products also provide the necessary insight to or reconfiguration of communications and tracking systems, launch collision avoidance requirements, and day of launch crew targeting and onboard guidance, navigation and flight control updates that incorporate the final vehicle configuration and environment conditions for the mission. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, ascent trajectory design and mission planning has evolved in order to improve program flexibility and reduce cost, while maintaining outstanding data quality. Along the way, the team has implemented innovative solutions and technologies in order to overcome significant challenges. A number of these solutions may have applicability to future human spaceflight programs.
This paper will provide a description of some of the challenges NASA is facing in providing software assurance within the new commercial space services paradigm, namely with the Commercial Crew Program (CCP). The CCP will establish safe, reliable, and affordable access to the International Space Station (ISS) by purchasing a ride from commercial companies. The CCP providers have varying experience with software development in safety-critical space systems. NASA's role in providing effective software assurance support to the CCP providers is critical to the success of CCP. These challenges include funding multiple vehicles that execute in parallel and have different rules of engagement, multiple providers with unique proprietary concerns, providing equivalent guidance to all providers, permitting alternates to NASA standards, and a large number of diverse stakeholders. It is expected that these challenges will exist in future programs, especially if the CCP paradigm proves successful. The proposed CCP approach to address these challenges includes a risk-based assessment with varying degrees of engagement and a distributed assurance model. This presentation will describe NASA IV&V Program's software assurance support and responses to these challenges.
Software Health Management (SWHM) must make sure that the software always remains in safe and healthy regions of the state space. Boundaries between healthy and unhealthy regions are important for the detection of violations and health management.In this position paper, we present a framework, which employs techniques from Bayesian statistical modeling and active learning to efficiently characterize health boundaries in high-dimensional spaces. We will discuss, how this framework supports SWHM during design time and during operation of learning/adapting software systems
System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.
This report documents the verification and validation (V&V) efforts of the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code (MCNP) version 6.2 on the Sawtooth supercomputer for the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor required for the preliminary documented safety analysis. This document records V&V for a safety, hazards, analysis, and design software used for design and analysis of safety class structures, system and components (SSC)s.