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NASA NTRS2016

Model Based Mission Assurance: Emerging Opportunities for Robotic Systems

The emergence of Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) in a Model Based Engineering framework has created new opportunities to improve effectiveness and efficiencies across the assurance functions. The MBSE environment supports not only system architecture development, but provides for support of Systems Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis concurrently in the same framework. Linking to detailed design will further improve assurance capabilities to support failures avoidance and mitigation in flight systems. This also is leading new assurance functions including model assurance and management of uncertainty in the modeling environment. Further, the assurance cases, a structured hierarchal argument or model, are emerging as a basis for supporting a comprehensive viewpoint in which to support Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA).

Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2018

USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Research Updates

Space Missions in 2017 Earth Satellite Population Collision Avoidance Maneuvers Post mission Disposal of U.S.A. Spacecraft Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) A total of 86 space launches placed more than 400 spacecraft into Earth orbits during 2017, following the trend of increase over the past decade NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 The 2014-15 NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) assessment for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) provided the following findings - Millimeter-sized orbital debris pose the highest penetration risk to most operational spacecraft in LEO - The most effective means to collect direct measurement data on millimetersized debris above 600 km altitude is to conduct in situ measurements - There is currently no in situ data on such small debris above 600 km altitude Since the orbital debris population follows a power-law size distribution, there are many more millimeter-sized debris than the large tracked objects - Current conjunction assessments and collision avoidance maneuvers against the tracked objects (which are typically 10 cm and larger) only address a small fraction (<1%) of the mission-ending risk from orbital debris To address the millimeter-sized debris data gap above 600 km, NASA has recently developed an innovative in situ measurement instrument - the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS

Liou, J.-C.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Reuse International Space Station (ISS) Modules as Lunar Habitat

NASA currently projects ending the ISS mission in approximately 2016, due primarily to the expense of re-boost and re-supply. Lunar outposts are expected to be in place in the same timeframe. In support of these mission goals, a scheme to reuse ISS modules on the moon has been identified. These modules could function as pressurized volumes for human habitation in a lunar vacuum as they have done in low-earth orbit. The ISS hull is structurally capable of withstanding a lunar landing because there is no atmospheric turbulence or friction. A compelling reason to send ISS modules to the moon is their large mass; a large portion of the ISS would survive re-entry if allowed to de-orbit to Earth. ISS debris could pose a serious risk to people or structures on Earth unless a controlled re-entry is performed. If a propulsive unit is devised to be attached to the ISS and control re-entry, a propulsion system could be used to propel the modules to the moon and land them there. ISS modules on the lunar surface would not require re-boost. Radiation protection can be attained by burying the module in lunar regolith. Power and a heat removal system would be required for the lunar modules which would need little support structure other than the lunar surface. With planetary mass surrounding the module, heat flux may be controlled by conductance. The remaining requirement is the re-supply of life-support expendables. There are raw materials on the moon to supplement these vital resources. The lunar maria is known to contain approximately 40% oxygen by mass in inorganic mineral compounds. Chemical conversion of moon rocks to release gaseous oxygen is known science. Recycling and cleaning of air and water are currently planned to be accomplished with ISS Environmental Control & Life Support Systems (ECLSS). By developing a Propulsion and Landing Module (PLM) to dock to the Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM), several identical PLMs could be produced to rescue and transfer the ISS modules to the lunar surface, one by one. The propulsion does not need to be as swift as Apollo, nor would the modules need to be manned during transportation to the moon. The trajectory from low-Earth to lunar orbit would avoid or quickly pass through the Van Allen belts to minimize radiation exposure to electronics onboard. A landing technology similar to Apollo's could be utilized to land an ISS module on the moon. Since the mission will be unmanned, system redundancy could be minimized to keep the cost down. If the mission failed and a module crashed landed on the moon, the risk of debris landing on Earth would be avoided and the raw materials could be used in future lunar missions.

Miernik, Janie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lagrange-Based Options for Relay Satellites to Eliminate Earth-Mars Communications Outages During Solar Superior Conjunctions

Recent conjunction class Mars human mission plans have generally assumed that there will inevitably be periods of communications outages between Earth and Mars. This has significant cost and risk implications for not only Mars missions, but also precursor missions in the lunar environment. But are there ways to avoid these outages? The potential exists for communications to be interrupted by Solar Superior Conjunctions (SSCs). Depending on the communications system, used, there can be communications outages up to as many as 78 days. The higher bandwidth systems experience the greatest outage. If these communications channels are interrupted due to an SSC, there are of course resulting challenges to mission operations. An outage of a few days to a few weeks could allow minor disturbances to become major concerns or even trigger subsystems failures. An inability to consult with the ground at the wrong time could result in loss of mission, loss of an element, or loss of life. Each planet in the solar system has a set of five Lagrange points associated with it and the Sun. At any given point in time, a planet or either its L4 or L5 point is visible to any other planet in the solar system, regardless of the position of the sun relative to the two. Thus, L4 and L5 have high value as relay systems to prevent communications outages. There are four sets of solar Lagrange points that may be of potential use in this study: Mars-Sun L4 and L5 points, Earth-Sun L4 and L5, Venus-Sun L4 and L5, and Mercury-Sun L4 and L5. A candidate relay satellite system will be identified, with consideration of both new technology developments and existing telecommunications satellites. This system may have implications for not only the Mars human mission architectures, but also Gateway and human lunar surface architectures as these other studies are tasked with paving the way to human Mars missions. If Mars communications outages can be eliminated, then the degree of autonomy necessary in Mars and precursor systems may be reduced.

Relay Satellite↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Oxidative Stress and the Neuroconsequences of Spaceflight Environment - Immune Dysregulation and Antioxidant Dietary Countermeasure Efficacy

In this project, we will test the hypothesis that Ionizing Radiation (IR), microgravity and social isolation combine synergistically to trigger an oxidative stress response that alters immune homeostasis, brain structure and function, and neurobehavioral and cognitive performance. Specific Aims for this project are: (1) Determine dose-response curves for acute ‘Five-Ion GCR Simulation’ exposure for immune, brain and performance responses in crew age-matched adult male and female mice; (2) Determine effects of acute ‘Five-Ion GCR Simulation’ exposure singly and in combination with simulated microgravity and social isolation, on immune, brain and performance responses in crew age-matched male and female mice mimicking deep space missions; and (3) Determine efficacy of the dietary antioxidant, Nicotinamide Mononucleotide (NMN), a key intermediate in nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD+) biosynthesis. The project relies on established and highly translatable ground-based mouse models and assays with IR exposures to be performed at the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL). The experimental approach will provide definitive data on the timing and mechanisms involved in the oxidative stress response, immune and brain changes, and ensuing functional (behavioral/cognitive) impairments expected during human transit to Mars. This project will identify potential biomarkers for, and mechanisms underlying, structural and functional changes in the immune and nervous systems leading to behavioral/cognitive performance deficits, and its potential application to develop effective countermeasures to mitigate negative health effects of long duration space habitation. The project will address NASA’s efforts to rapidly advance the characterization of risks and identify appropriate countermeasures in anticipation of future deep space missions. Ensuring crew health and performance during extended transits necessitates that sensorimotor and cognitive abilities remain strong to avoid potentially catastrophic health and safety outcomes. Further, despite historically low numbers of female astronauts, the two most recent NASA Astronaut Corps class selections, comprised of ~50% women as compared to men, signal the need to understand how sex differences affect physiological adaptation and health in the space environment. Here, we will determine how key features of the deep space environment may interact to increase risk to crewmembers by negatively impacting health and performance, and identify and develop strategies to characterize and mitigate the potential risks via countermeasures. Supported by the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) Human Factors Behavioral Performance Element Grant 18-18FLAG_2-0028.

radiation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2000

Software IV and V Research Priorities and Applied Program Accomplishments Within NASA

The mission of this research is to be world-class creators and facilitators of innovative, intelligent, high performance, reliable information technologies that enable NASA missions to (1) increase software safety and quality through error avoidance, early detection and resolution of errors, by utilizing and applying empirically based software engineering best practices; (2) ensure customer software risks are identified and/or that requirements are met and/or exceeded; (3) research, develop, apply, verify, and publish software technologies for competitive advantage and the advancement of science; and (4) facilitate the transfer of science and engineering data, methods, and practices to NASA, educational institutions, state agencies, and commercial organizations. The goals are to become a national Center Of Excellence (COE) in software and system independent verification and validation, and to become an international leading force in the field of software engineering for improving the safety, quality, reliability, and cost performance of software systems. This project addresses the following problems: Ensure safety of NASA missions, ensure requirements are met, minimize programmatic and technological risks of software development and operations, improve software quality, reduce costs and time to delivery, and improve the science of software engineering

Blazy, Louis J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Program Promotion Can Distort Space Systems Engineering and Deny Risk

NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings was achieved against the odds by an obsessive dedication to reducing the great risk. But risk analysis predicted so many astronaut fatalities that it was thought to be unreasonably pessimistic and potentially damaging to the Apollo program. Risk analysis was discontinued, risk was neglected in space shuttle engineering, and so the space shuttle design was unnecessarily dangerous. Since the Apollo era it has been understood that long human space missions would recycle oxygen and water to avoid the very high launch cost of directly supplying them. The development of recycling systems was justified by the need to increase material closure and reduce launch mass. When it was recognized that increasing closure leads to rapidly diminishing returns, the program goal was changed to reducing launch mass and reliability, cost, and risk were considered irrelevant. Systems engineering and especially the discouraging problems of risk and cost have been deliberately ignored because they detract from program promotion, with unfortunate results. Current human launch system design does account for risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Current life support design continues to assume recycling, even though the recent great reduction in launch cost now allows direct supply of oxygen and water with significantly better quality, reliability, cost, and risk.

Advocacy↗
NASA NTRS2010

Overview of Graphical User Interface for ARRBOD (Acute Radiation Risk and BRYNTRN Organ Dose Projection)

Solar particle events (SPEs) pose the risk of acute radiation sickness (ARS) to astronauts, because organ doses from large SPEs may reach critical levels during extra vehicular activities (EVAs) or lightly shielded spacecraft. NASA has developed an organ dose projection model of Baryon transport code (BRYNTRN) with an output data processing module of SUMDOSE, and a probabilistic model of acute radiation risk (ARR). BRYNTRN code operation requires extensive input preparation, and the risk projection models of organ doses and ARR take the output from BRYNTRN as an input to their calculations. With a graphical user interface (GUI) to handle input and output for BRYNTRN, these response models can be connected easily and correctly to BRYNTRN in a user friendly way. The GUI for the Acute Radiation Risk and BRYNTRN Organ Dose (ARRBOD) projection code provides seamless integration of input and output manipulations required for operations of the ARRBOD modules: BRYNTRN, SUMDOSE, and the ARR probabilistic response model. The ARRBOD GUI is intended for mission planners, radiation shield designers, space operations in the mission operations directorate (MOD), and space biophysics researchers. Assessment of astronauts organ doses and ARS from the exposure to historically large SPEs is in support of mission design and operation planning to avoid ARS and stay within the current NASA short-term dose limits. The ARRBOD GUI will serve as a proof-of-concept for future integration of other risk projection models for human space applications. We present an overview of the ARRBOD GUI product, which is a new self-contained product, for the major components of the overall system, subsystem interconnections, and external interfaces.

Kim, Myung-Hee Y.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Collision Avoidance "Short Course" Part III: CA in Changing Space Flight Environment

Satellite conjunction assessment is perhaps the fastest-growing area in space situational awareness and protection, with military, civil, and commercial satellite owner/operators embracing more and more sophisticated processes to "avoid the avoidable"—namely collisions between high-value space assets and orbital debris. NASA and CNES have collaborated to offer an introductory short course on all the major aspects of the conjunction assessment problem. This half-day course will cover satellite conjunction dynamics and theory, JSpOC conjunction data products, major risk assessment parameters and plots, conjunction remediation decision support, and present and future challenges. This briefing represents the NASA portion of the course.

avoidance↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Decision Aid for Conjunction Risk Mitigation by Differential Drag

In the previous five years, the rate of conjunctions that the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team processed and analyzed has more than tripled. (NASA CARA, 2024) New missions in the early development phases are now required to plan for dealing with conjunctions under the present space environment, and also projecting forward into a future likely with even further increased utilization of the space environment. Some missions are investigating the possibility of using differential drag to remediate conjunctions without expending limited fuel or for missions without propulsive capabilities. The NASA CARA team studied the historical record of conjunctions to evaluate the circumstances under which differential drag may be successfully applied and have developed a series of tables to use as a decision aid for missions considering differential drag. Currently, if a CARA-protected mission with maneuvering capabilities is predicted to have a conjunction with probability of collision (Pc) greater than 7E-5 (the default value of the ‘yellow threshold’, which may have some other value agreed by CARA and the mission during the Orbital Collison Avoidance Planning (OCAP) process), CARA will use its Maneuver Trade Space (MTS) tool to evaluate and recommend options for the timing and magnitude of a risk mitigation maneuver (RMM), based on the mission’s capabilities. If the conjunction’s Pc is greater than 1E-4, the ‘red threshold’, then an RMM must be executed per NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8079.1 (NASA, 2023), although missions may execute an RMM even if the Pc is lower. The magnitude of the maneuver is typically a few cm/s, and CARA estimates how many will be required for the mission’s nominal lifetime – typically a few per year – during the OCAP process, to inform the mission’s delta-V requirement. For traditional satellites, this is usually smaller than other requirements for orbit insertion, maintenance, and disposal, but for CubeSats or other small satellite missions, a propulsion system may not provide much more than a few cm/s of delta-V or may not fit at all within the available budget of money, time, size, weight, and/or power (SWaP). Conversely, CubeSats often have deployable solar panels, which offer the capacity to have much higher areas facing some directions than others. Such a mission can instead use ‘differential drag’ to remediate a conjunction -- in other words, change its drag area (usually increasing) to deviate from the predicted collision course. This is how Planet’s Dove spacecraft maintain their formations and remediate conjunction risks without having on-board propulsion (Foster, et al., 2017) (Griffith, et al., 2021). CARA has been developing improvements to MTS to support differential-drag for NASA's missions -- where it is effective. CARA records all conjunctions of their protected payloads, with historical records starting in 2005 (with significant conjunction events starting to occur on or after 2013). From this record, approximately 7,300 had a Pc greater than 1E-4 at 3 days prior to the time of closest approach, the time analyzed for differential drag efficacy. Of those, approximately 4,300 had fully-defined covariance matrices stored for both the primary and secondary objects; this set of conjunctions is the basis for the analysis of this work. CARA’s MTS tool was used to propagate the primary satellite forward from that decision point with varying degrees of increase to ballistic coefficient (BC). Because these conjunctions came from multiple missions, the nondimensional ‘delta-BC’ factor was used to quantify and normalize the increase in ballistic coefficient, defined as follows: Delta-BC = BC_new / BC_old - 1 Positive delta-BC factors represent an increase in drag compared to the nominal attitude, while negative delta-BC factors (to a minimum of -1) represent a decrease in drag. At the conclusion of the differential-drag ‘maneuver’, the Pc was recalculated to evaluate whether or not the conjunction was mitigated (Pc < 3E-6). These results were then binned and sorted along several axes, including altitude, amount of delta-BC, and (pre-maneuver) rate of energy dissipation (EDR), to identify underlying patterns. The altitude plot is shown in Figure 1. To validate this analysis, we consulted the record of a NASA mission which uses differential drag to maintain its orbit and remediate conjunction risk. CARA’s empirical record of the mission’s orbit history suggests it achieves a delta-BC of 2.2. Of the twenty-one RMM plans that were submitted by this mission, eighteen were matched with conjunctions in the historical record; of those, twelve were successfully remediated (final measured Pc < 3E-6), and six were not. This is consistent with the expected efficacy for missions orbiting at that altitude. We are presently simulating this mission’s RMMs with MTS; this work is ongoing, but so far, the MTS results are qualitatively in agreement with the empirical results -- correctly predicting that a maneuver would or would not remediate a conjunction, if not exactly matching the final post-remediation Pc value. We found that differential drag was most successful for satellites with perigees below 560 km, and which could adopt an average delta-BC of 2 or greater (that is, increasing their ballistic coefficient by a factor of 3). However, this is a difficult threshold for a mission to clear; very few spacecraft are capable of adopting a high-drag configuration for 72 hours continuously. Planet’s Dove spacecraft use differential drag to remediate conjunctions (Griffith, et al., 2021), and they have a maximum delta-BC factor of 9, but in practice (with mission and charging constraints) they achieve a time-averaged delta-BC that is closer to 2 (Foster, et al., 2017). A mission’s differential drag utility strongly depends on the operational constraints that has the capacity to limit the time-averaged delta-BC. A mission with a high maximum delta-BC of 5 or more can have an effective delta-BC of less than 1 due to operational constraints such as instrument and solar panel pointing, especially if this constraint results in holding an intermediate drag value for most of its orbit. CARA has developed tables that can be used as decision aids to advise missions-in-development about the best way to utilize their differential drag capabilities. For missions below 560 km with the operational flexibility to devote multiple days to holding a high-drag configuration (or a sufficiently high drag ratio to compensate for limitations on that time), they are -- more likely than not -- able to successfully remediate high-risk conjunctions. Conversely, missions that do not meet these exacting criteria -- most missions -- can instead be advised to use on-board propulsion systems to perform RMMs, or to turn their minimum-area face towards the approach vector, thereby reducing Pc at the moment of conjunction due to the decreased Hard-Body Radius (HBR), that is a strongly correlated variable in the Pc calculations. (NASA, 2023)

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRS1999

NASA Lewis Launch Collision Probability Model Developed and Analyzed

There are nearly 10,000 tracked objects orbiting the earth. These objects encompass manned objects, active and decommissioned satellites, spent rocket bodies, and debris. They range from a few centimeters across to the size of the MIR space station. Anytime a new satellite is launched, the launch vehicle with its payload attached passes through an area of space in which these objects orbit. Although the population density of these objects is low, there always is a small but finite probability of collision between the launch vehicle and one or more of these space objects. Even though the probability of collision is very low, for some payloads even this small risk is unacceptable. To mitigate the small risk of collision associated with launching at an arbitrary time within the daily launch window, NASA performs a prelaunch mission assurance Collision Avoidance Analysis (or COLA). For the COLA of the Cassini spacecraft, the NASA Lewis Research Center conducted an in-house development and analysis of a model for launch collision probability. The model allows a minimum clearance criteria to be used with the COLA analysis to ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. If, for any given liftoff time, the nominal launch vehicle trajectory would pass a space object with less than the minimum required clearance, launch would not be attempted at that time. The model assumes that the nominal positions of the orbiting objects and of the launch vehicle can be predicted as a function of time, and therefore, that any tracked object that comes within close proximity of the launch vehicle can be identified. For any such pair, these nominal positions can be used to calculate a nominal miss distance. The actual miss distances may differ substantially from the nominal miss distance, due, in part, to the statistical uncertainty of the knowledge of the objects positions. The model further assumes that these position uncertainties can be described with position covariance matrices. With these, and some additional simplifying assumptions, a closed-form solution for the probability of collision is obtained. This solution provides clear insights into how each of the independent parameters affects the probability of collision. It shows that for a given maximum probability of collision and prior knowledge of the objects position uncertainties and sizes, only knowledge of the nominal closest approach distance is required to make the launch/no launch decision. The model was completed and used for the mission assurance COLA analysis for the Cassini spacecraft, which was launched on a Titan IV/Centaur rocket on October 15, 1997. Although the model was specifically developed for the Cassini mission, it is clearly applicable for other launches as well. The effect of COLA closures on the launch window is shown. The bar represents the entire 140-min launch window on October 15, 1997; the blackened areas represent the loss of launch opportunities due to the potential for a collision with an orbiting object.

Bollenbacher, Gary↗
NASA NTRS2004

Teleoperation from Mars Orbit: A proposal for Human Exploration

For a human expedition to Mars, a case can be made that the best strategy for initial exploration is not to actually land the humans on Mars, but to put the humans into Mars orbit and operate on the surface by the technology of teleoperation. This will provide the results of human exploration, but at greatly reduced risk and cost. Teleoperation of Mars surface robots from a Mars-orbital habitat will operation near real time operation with minimum time delay, giving a virtual presence on the surface. By use of teleoperation, it is possible to vastly simplify the surface exploration mission. We now have no need to develop a human-rated Mars Lander and Mars Ascent Vehicle, and we can send geologists & biologists on the mission; not VTOL pilots. It is a cheaper, simpler, and safer way to explore, and hence it will be a faster way to explore. It has the excitement of being there, at a fraction of the price. Tele-exploration from Mars orbit also allows human (virtual) presence at a wide variety of locations. With an orbital base controlling surface telerobotics, human explorers are not stuck with one base location, but can explore all over Mars. They can explore the polar caps and also near-equatorial canyon regions, from the same orbiting base. This frees the mission from landing site constraints. With no need to select a "grab bag" site that contains a large number of geologically diverse features at or near a single location; it is now possible go to all the best sites-- paleolake sites, river beds, volcanic calderas, lava tube sites, layered terrain, canyons, possible shoreline features, the North and South poles. A near-polar inclination 24-hr 39-minute period Mars orbit, for example, will put the orbital station in line-of-sight of a given region for about 8 hours per day-- one teleoperation shift. Since present day life could exist on Mars, planetary protection is also needed to preserve the (possible) fragile Mars biosphere from competition from ferocious Earth life. Isolated biospheres on Earth have been devastated when they have been exposed to alien life forms introduced-accidentally or deliberately-- from another continent. If there is life on Mars, we will wish to protect it from having to compete with introduced Earth biota. Reverse planetary protection-protecting the Earth biosphere from exposure to Mars microorganisms-is also an important consideration. Exploring from orbit will reduce biological risk by keeping humans from exposure to possible Mars microbes. A telerobotic mission will need no quarantine on return to Earth, and avoids the difficult human question of how to isolate Mars mission astronauts infected by Martian microorganisms.

Landis, Geoffrey A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Pulmonary Inflammatory Responses To Acute Meteorite Dust Exposures - Implications For Human Space Exploration

The previous manned missions to the Moon represent milestones of human ingenuity, perseverance, and intellectual curiosity. However, one of the major ongoing concerns is the array of hazards associated with lunar surface dust. Not only did the dust cause mechanical and structural integrity issues with the suits, the dust 'storm' generated upon reentrance into the crew cabin caused "lunar hay fever" and "almost blindness" (Figure 1). It was further reported that the allergic response to the dust worsened with each exposure. The lack of gravity exacerbated the exposure, requiring the astronauts to wear their helmet within the module in order to avoid breathing the irritating particles. Due to the prevalence of these high exposures, the Human Research Roadmap developed by NASA identifies the Risk of Adverse Health and Performance Effects of Celestial Dust Exposure as an area of concern. Extended human exploration will further increase the probability of inadvertent and repeated exposures to celestial dusts. Going forward, hazard assessments of celestial dusts will be determined through sample return efforts prior to astronaut deployment. Studies on the lunar highland regolith indicate that the dust is not only respirable but also reactive, and previous studies concluded that it is moderately toxic; generating a greater response than titanium oxide but a lower response than quartz. The presence of reactive oxygen species (ROS) on the surface of the dust has been implicated. However, there is actually little data related to physicochemical characteristics of particulates and pulmonary toxicity, especially as it relates to celestial dust exposure. As a direct response to this deficit, the present study evaluates the role of a particulate's innate geochemical features (e.g., bulk chemistry, internal composition, morphology, size, and reactivity) in generating adverse toxicological responses in vitro and in vivo. This highly interdisciplinary study evaluates the relative toxicity of six meteorite samples representing either basalt or regolith breccia on the surfaces of the Moon, Mars, and Asteroid 4Vesta; three potential candidates for future human exploration or colonization. Terrestrial mid-ocean ridge basalt (MORB) is also used for comparison as a control sample.

Harrington, A. D.↗
NASA NTRS2018

The Need for Medical Geology in Space Exploration: Implications for the Journey to Mars and Beyond

The previous manned missions to the Moon represent milestones in human ingenuity, perseverance, and intellectual curiosity. They also highlight a major hazard for future human exploration of the Moon and beyond: surface dust. Not only did the dust cause mechanical and structural integrity issues with the suits, the dust "storm" generated upon reentrance into the crew cabin caused "lunar hay fever" and "almost blindness". It was further reported that the allergic response to the dust worsened with each exposure. The lower gravity environment exacerbated the exposure, requiring the astronauts to wear their helmet within the module in order to avoid breathing the irritating particles. Due to the prevalence of these high exposures, the Human Research Roadmap developed by NASA identifies the Risk of Adverse Health and Performance Effects of Celestial Dust Exposure as an area of concern. Extended human exploration will further increase the probability of inadvertent and repeated exposures to celestial dusts. Going forward, hazard assessments of celestial dusts will be determined through sample return efforts prior to astronaut deployment. However, even then the returned samples could also put the Curators, technicians, and scientists at risk during processing and examination.

Harrington, A. D.↗
NASA NTRS2018

NASA SPLICE Project: Development and Testing of Precision Landing GN&C Technologies

NASA's technology advancement needs for entry, descent and landing call for high-precision, high-rate sensors that can improve navigation accuracy and vehicle control performance. Higher landing accuracy is required for any future human lander missions, and likely, for most robotic missions 1,2. Sensors and algorithms that significantly reduce navigation errors and can image the local terrain will enable landing at locations of high scientific interest that would otherwise pose significant risk to the vehicle. The Safe and Precise Landing-Integrated Capabilities Evolution project, or SPLICE, is developing precision landing and hazard avoidance (PL&HA) technologies for NASA and for potential commercial space flight missions. SPLICE technologies include sensors, algorithms, advanced space flight computing capabilities, and simulation tools used to integrate and study guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) system performance. SPLICE efforts include hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) simulation testing, ground testing, and flight testing, including reuse of hardware from the CoOperative Blending of Autonomous Landing Technologies (COBALT) suborbital flight-test payload3,4. Two of the precise navigation sensors that are being developed and matured within SPLICE are LiDARs. Since 2006, NASA Langley has been developing a Navigation Doppler LiDAR (NDL) for precise velocity measurements, and SPLICE is building an NDL engineering test unit (ETU) that will be brought up to TRL 6 following environmental and high-speed1,2 testing. NASA Goddard is developing a Hazard Detection LiDAR (HD LiDAR) engineering development unit (EDU) for SPLICE that has relevance to future human and robotic lander missions. The HD LiDAR will be flight test and matured to TRL 5.

Restrepo, Carolina I.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Differential Drag Efficacy for Close Approach Remediation

Differential drag has become a viable alternative to propulsion for satellites to avoid collisions, but there is little guidance in the literature to aid mission designers in developing a differential drag capability that verifiably meets collision avoidance efficacy standards or requirements, if such requirements were to exist. This paper proposes a differential drag efficacy determination approach based on empirical conjunctions from the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis historical database, focusing on energy dissipation rate and change in ballistic coefficient as the key satellite parameters correlated to efficacy. The data analysis informs the discussion toward adoption of recommended differential drag requirements. A case study is presented to walk through the process to determine efficacy of a proposed mission assuming several potential requirements.

conjunction remediation↗