Results for “Costs” — Page 11

NASA NTRS2005

The Effect of Infrastructure Sharing in Estimating Operations Cost of Future Space Transportation Systems

NASA and the aerospace industry are extremely serious about reducing the cost and improving the performance of launch vehicles both manned or unmanned. In the aerospace industry, sharing infrastructure for manufacturing more than one type spacecraft is becoming a trend to achieve economy of scale. An example is the Boeing Decatur facility where both Delta II and Delta IV launch vehicles are made. The author is not sure how Boeing estimates the costs of each spacecraft made in the same facility. Regardless of how a contractor estimates the cost, NASA in its popular cost estimating tool, NASA Air force Cost Modeling (NAFCOM) has to have a method built in to account for the effect of infrastructure sharing. Since there is no provision in the most recent version of NAFCOM2002 to take care of this, it has been found by the Engineering Cost Community at MSFC that the tool overestimates the manufacturing cost by as much as 30%. Therefore, the objective of this study is to develop a methodology to assess the impact of infrastructure sharing so that better operations cost estimates may be made.

Sundaram, Meenakshi↗

NASA NTRS2011

Cost Modeling for Space Optical Telescope Assemblies

Parametric cost models are used to plan missions, compare concepts and justify technology investments. This paper reviews an on-going effort to develop cost modes for space telescopes. This paper summarizes the methodology used to develop cost models and documents how changes to the database have changed previously published preliminary cost models. While the cost models are evolving, the previously published findings remain valid: it costs less per square meter of collecting aperture to build a large telescope than a small telescope; technology development as a function of time reduces cost; and lower areal density telescopes cost more than more massive telescopes.

Stahl, H. Philip↗

NASA NTRS2016

Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Advanced Near Net Shape Technology (ANNST) Method for Fabricating Stiffened Cylinders

Low Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and high levels of uncertainty make it challenging to develop cost estimates of new technologies in the R&D phase. It is however essential for NASA to understand the costs and benefits associated with novel concepts, in order to prioritize research investments and evaluate the potential for technology transfer and commercialization. This paper proposes a framework to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a technology in the R&D phase. This framework was developed and used to assess the Advanced Near Net Shape Technology (ANNST) manufacturing process for fabricating integrally stiffened cylinders. The ANNST method was compared with the conventional multi-piece metallic construction and composite processes for fabricating integrally stiffened cylinders. Following the definition of a case study for a cryogenic tank cylinder of specified geometry, data was gathered through interviews with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), with particular focus placed on production costs and process complexity. This data served as the basis to produce process flowcharts and timelines, mass estimates, and rough order-of-magnitude cost and schedule estimates. The scalability of the results was subsequently investigated to understand the variability of the results based on tank size. Lastly, once costs and benefits were identified, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to assess the relative value of these achieved benefits for potential stakeholders. These preliminary, rough order-of-magnitude results predict a 46 to 58 percent reduction in production costs and a 7-percent reduction in weight over the conventional metallic manufacturing technique used in this study for comparison. Compared to the composite manufacturing technique, these results predict cost savings of 35 to 58 percent; however, the ANNST concept was heavier. In this study, the predicted return on investment of equipment required for the ANNST method was ten cryogenic tank barrels when compared with conventional metallic manufacturing. The AHP study results revealed that decreased final cylinder mass and improved quality assurance were the most valued benefits of cylinder manufacturing methods, therefore emphasizing the relevance of the benefits achieved with the ANNST process for future projects.

Ivanco, Marie L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Optical Telescope Assembly Cost Estimating Model

Parametric cost models can be used by designers and project managers to compare cost between major architectural cost drivers and allow high-level design trades; enable cost-benefit analysis for technology development investment; and, provide a basis for estimating total project cost between related concepts. The NASA Marshall Space Flight Center has developed a 5- parameter cost model that explains 93% (Adjusted R2) of the cost variation in a database of 46 total ground and space telescope assemblies. This model can be used to estimate the most probably cost for the Habitable Exoplanet Telescope Assembly.

Stahl, H Philip↗

NASA NTRS2016

Humans to Mars Will Cost About "Half a Trillion Dollars" and Life Support Roughly Two Billion Dollars

A recent estimate of the cost of the first human mission to Mars suggests that it could cost half a trillion dollars. This estimate is consistent with most past estimates. A similar cost number can easily be derived using mass-cost estimating factors based on the International Space Station (ISS) and other experience. Using the same cost factors and life cycle cost estimating approach, the cost of the life support for the Mars mission could be two billion dollars or more. The cost to go to Mars is expected to be two or three times that of either Apollo, space shuttle, or ISS and could be as much as all three together.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Parametric Cost Modeling of a Mid-Lift-to-Drag Ratio Vehicle for Human Mars Entry, Descent, and Landing

Cost is one of the biggest obstacles to sending humans to Mars. However, spacecraft costs are typically estimated after the preliminary vehicle and mission concepts have been designed. By automating the cost estimation process, the effect of any change in vehicle or mission design on the mission cost can be determined more rapidly. This paper uses the tool SAPE-C (Systems Analysis for Planetary Entry, Descent, and Landing-Cost). SAPE-C integrates the cost modeling software SEER-H (System Estimation and Evaluation of Resources-Hardware) with a number of systems analysis tools and enables large design tradespace exploration early in the design process. SAPE-C is used to analyze several tradespaces of the Mid-Lift-to-Drag ratio rigid entry vehicle for human Mars missions. Key findings include quantifying the impacts of payload, vehicle length, and main engine specific impulse on the overall cost of the vehicle, and how the payload per lander and number of landers affects the cost of a campaign to Mars.

Paul D Friz↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Parametric Cost Modeling of a Mid-Lift-to-Drag Ratio Vehicle for Human Mars Entry, Descent, and Landing

Cost is one of the biggest obstacles to sending humans to Mars. However, spacecraft costs are typically estimated after the preliminary vehicle and mission concepts have been designed. By automating the cost estimation process, the effect of any change in vehicle or mission design on the mission cost can be determined more rapidly. This paper uses the tool SAPE-C (Systems Analysis for Planetary Entry, Descent, and Landing-Cost). SAPE-C integrates the cost modeling software SEER-H (System Estimation and Evaluation of Resources-Hardware) with a number of systems analysis tools and enables large design tradespace exploration early in the design process. SAPE-C is used to analyze several tradespaces of the Mid-Lift-to-Drag ratio rigid entry vehicle for human Mars missions. Key findings include quantifying the impacts of payload, vehicle length, and main engine specific impulse on the overall cost of the vehicle, and how the payload per lander and number of landers affects the cost of a campaign to Mars.

Paul D Friz↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The optimum cost-effective test time for redundant systems with specified reliability and confidence

This paper investigates the optimum test time to determine the number of redundant units needed to achieve high reliability with high confidence. Newly designed systems often have high initial failure rates which can be reduced by testing to find failure modes and remove them by redesign. To accurately estimate the required number of redundant units, the test time must be extended to accurately determine the failure rate. If the measured failure rate is used, there is a 50% chance that the actual hardware failure rate is higher. Using the measured failure rate gives only a 50% confidence that the failure rate and number of spares are not too low. After the test, given the measured failure rate and the desired reliability, the number of spares can be determined and the confidence in the reliability computed. Instead of accepting the reliability results of a fixed duration test, it is possible to set the requirements for both the redundant reliability and the confidence level and then compute the test time needed to minimize the total cost required to achieve these requirements. The confidence that the redundant reliability is not too low is increased by using a higher than measured failure rate to increase the number of spares. The higher number of spares increases cost. Longer test time reduces the variance in the failure rate and the increase in the number of spares, so that test cost increases and spares cost decreases. The total cost is the sum of the cost of the test time and the spares. The optimum test time produces the minimum total cost for the system failure rate, mission length, and required reliability and confidence level. Longer testing is justified by reduced cost. Some examples are given.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRS2022

Bayesian Rules of Thumb: Robust Uncertainty Quantification in Early Project Cost Estimation

Systems engineers often make use of cost Rules ofThumb in order to estimate cost during early phases of projectformulation. These Rules of Thumb typically take the form ofa sequence of percentages over which a total cost is allocatedacross NASA WBS elements. Rules of Thumb can then be usedto extrapolate cost from one or more known WBS elements tothe remaining unknown WBS elements, assisting early projectformulation architecture studies (such as those in JPL’s Team Xand A Team).A number of issues can arise when generating and using costRules of Thumb. For example, many records of project costsconsist of incomplete data. Typical methods of dealing withincomplete cost allocation data include (a) ignoring missionswith incomplete data, or (b) taking averages of the non-zero percentagesacross missions, but both of these methods can result inbiased estimates if the existence of incomplete data correlateswith total mission cost or any particular WBS element. Anothercommon example is cost reported in one or more incorrect WBSelements. This is especially prevalent in smaller missions whereit is more common for engineers to perform tasks that fall underthe purview of multiple WBS elements.Furthermore, a Rule of Thumb estimate is typically reported asa point estimate; there is no reported uncertainty around thepercentages used to generate an allocation. Even in the rarecase in which confidence intervals around mean percentages areprovided, there may be positive or negative correlations betweenWBS elements which can skew estimates.Here we attempt to address these problems by formulatingprobabilistic Rules of Thumb in which a distribution of allocationschemes, rather than a single allocation scheme, is generated.We use a bootstrap imputation method to simultaneouslyaccount for uncertainty in the missing data while using allavailable information contained in the dataset. The imputeddatasets are then input into a multivariate Bayesian modelwhich accounts for correlations between WBS elements andproperly accounts for uncertainty in the final Rule of Thumbpercentages and predictions. We describe the mathematicalmodel and provides snippets of R code utilizing the brms(Bayesian Regression Models using Stan) package. To illustratethis model, we generate a Bayesian Level 2 WBS Cost Rule ofThumb for MIDEX (Medium-Class Explorers) missions withdata extracted from NASA’s CADRe. We then compare thismethod’s performance with the classical Rule of Thumb method.

Hooke, Melissa A↗

NASA NTRS2013

Evaluation of Contrail Reduction Strategies Based on Environmental and Operational Costs

This paper evaluates a set of contrail reduction strategies based on environmental and operational costs. A linear climate model was first used to convert climate effects of carbon dioxide emissions and aircraft contrails to changes in Absolute Global Temperature Potential, a metric that measures the mean surface temperature change due to aircraft emissions and persistent contrail formations. The concept of social cost of carbon and the carbon auction price from recent California's cap-and-trade system were then used to relate the carbon dioxide emissions and contrail formations to an environmental cost index. The strategy for contrail reduction is based on minimizing contrail formations by altering the aircraft's cruising altitude. The strategy uses a user-defined factor to trade off between contrail reduction and additional fuel burn and carbon dioxide emissions. A higher value of tradeoff factor results in more contrail reduction but also more fuel burn and carbon emissions. The strategy is considered favorable when the net environmental cost benefit exceeds the operational cost. The results show how the net environmental benefit varies with different decision-making time-horizon and different carbon cost. The cost models provide a guidance to select the trade-off factor that will result in the most net environmental benefit.

social cost of carbon↗

NASA NTRS2014

Evaluating Tradeoffs Between Environmental Impact and Operational Costs for Enroute Air Traffic

The rapid growth of air traffic has drawn attention to aircraft-induced environmental impact. Aviation operations affect the environment mainly through the release of emissions and by the formation of contrails. Recent research has shown that altering aircraft cruise altitudes can reduce aviation environmental impact by reducing Absolute Global Temperature Change Potential, a climate assessment metric that adapts a linear system for modeling the global temperature response to aviation emissions and contrails. However, these methods will increase fuel consumption that leads to higher operational costs imposed on airlines resulting in reluctance to adopt a new routing strategy. This paper evaluates the tradeoff between environmental impact reduction and the corresponding added operational costs for enroute air traffic. The concept of social cost of carbon and the carbon auction price from California's recent cap-and-trade system were used to provide estimates and a methodology to evaluate environmental costs for carbon dioxide emissions and contrail formations. Depending on the specific environmental policy, the strategy is considered favorable when the reduction in environmental costs exceeds the increase in operational costs. The results show how the net environmental bene t varies with different decision-making time horizons, different carbon and fuel costs, and different days. The study provides guidance towards the development of the environmental reduction strategies.

environmental impact↗

NASA NTRS2019

Blind Validation Study of Parametric Cost Estimation Tool SEER-H for NASA Space Missions

One of the primary parametric cost modeling tools used by NASA and the aerospace industry to estimate the development and production cost of future spacecraft hardware is SEER-H by Galorath. To date, no independent validation of this tool for cost estimation of space missions has been reported in the literature. In the present validation study, cost estimators used SEER-H to estimate the cost of twelve different past NASA science missions. The estimators were prevented from knowing the actual cost of the missions in an effort to minimize cognitive biases. The point estimates of SEER-H had an average error of 23%, median error of -0.3%, and a standard deviation of 43%. Nine of the twelve mission's actual costs fell within the 80% confidence interval of SEER's probabilistic estimates. Several factors independent of SEER that may have affected the accuracy of the results have been identified and are discussed; these include: uncertainty in the technical data used for the estimates, the methods used to estimate uncertainty in spacecraft component mass and numbers of prototypes, and the experience of the estimators.

SEER-H↗

NASA NTRS2004

The scaling relationship between telescope cost and aperture size for very large telescopes

Cost data for ground-based telescopes of the last century are analyzed for trends in the relationship between aperture size and cost. We find that for apertures built prior to 1980, costs scaled as aperture size to the 2.8 power, which is consistent with the precious finding of Meinel (1978). After 1980, 'traditional' monolithic mirror telescope costs have scaled as aperture to the 2.5 power. The large multiple mirror telescopes built or in construction during this time period (Keck, LBT, GTC) appear to deviate from this relationship with significant cost savings as a result, although it is unclear what power law such structures follow. We discuss the implications of the current cost-aperture size data on the proposed large telescope projects of the next ten to twenty years. Structures that naturally tend towards the 2.0 power in the cost-aperture relationship will be the favorable choice for future extremely large apertures; out expectation is that space-based structures will ultimately gain economic advantage over ground-based ones.

telescope costs↗

NASA NTRS2016

Schedule Matters: Understanding the Relationship between Schedule Delays and Costs on Overruns

This paper examines the relationship between schedule delays and cost overruns on complex projects. It is generally accepted by many project practitioners that cost overruns are directly related to schedule delays. But what does "directly related to" actually mean? Some reasons or root causes for schedule delays and associated cost overruns are obvious, if only in hindsight. For example, unrealistic estimates, supply chain difficulties, insufficient schedule margin, technical problems, scope changes, or the occurrence of risk events can negatively impact schedule performance. Other factors driving schedule delays and cost overruns may be less obvious and more difficult to quantify. Examples of these less obvious factors include project complexity, flawed estimating assumptions, over-optimism, political factors, "black swan" events, or even poor leadership and communication. Indeed, is it even possible the schedule itself could be a source of delay and subsequent cost overrun? Through literature review, surveys of project practitioners, and the authors' own experience on NASA programs and projects, the authors will categorize and examine the various factors affecting the relationship between project schedule delays and cost growth. The authors will also propose some ideas for organizations to consider to help create an awareness of the factors which could cause or influence schedule delays and associated cost growth on complex projects.

Overruns↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Recent Developments of Thermal Protection Materials to Enable Lower Cost Space Missions

Introduction: Starting with the Commercial Crew Program, a new paradigm has emerged at NASA. Rather than designing rockets and spacecrafts for every mission optimized to achieve science, NASA has begun to use a service-based model and utilizing public-private partnership in developing the vehicles that can bring broader benefits as well as lower the cost for NASA missions. Commercial companies own and operate those vehicles. This allows NASA to not design missions from the bottom up, and has cost, risk, and schedule savings implications. On the other side, the constraints require meeting the requirements in terms of mass, volume, power, etc. By leveraging NASA developed technologies, commercial companies can quickly demonstrate the commercial mission concept, and, through technology transfer, adopt needed technology to address supply chain problems. A downside is that the technology has to be sufficiently mature to be transferred by NASA, which means that it requires significant investment, expertise, and time to develop. Space entities are focused on rapid development with an emphasis on manufacturing and integration innovation with reduced cost and schedule and quick entrance into the market. Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) are mission critical, but their development takes years, and involve access to arc jets or unique test facilities. Therefore, their development is both risky and investment heavy. NASA ARC developed several new TPS materials over the last decade (C-PICA, HEEET, 3MDCP, 3DMAT, ADEPT woven TPS) and brought them to high TPS maturity, making them enablers for commercials space missions from LEO, Lunar Sample Return, Mars, and Venus missions. LEO missions are relevant to future Mars missions due to the comparable entry conditions. External Partners' Missions: C-PICA is a recent improvement on NASA’s heritage PICA lightweight TPS ablator. C-PICA is now considered an enabling technology for New Frontiers and other NASA missions. C-PICA was infused into several missions from external partners. Varda Space Industries’ Winnebago-1 spacecraft successfully returned to Earth from LEO on Feb. 21st, 2024, using a C-PICA heatshield. Inversion Space’s Ray vehicle will test both ARC’s C-PICA and SIRCA TPS materials on a LEO return mission later in 2024. The Kentucky Re-Entry Probe Experiment (KREPE) is another example of a low-cost flight experiment to demonstrate the use of small entry capsules to gather data with three instrumented Kentucky Re-entry and Universal Payload System (KRUPS) capsules. NASA Arc provided C-PICA and Soft-PICA for two of the next KRUPS capsules scheduled to re-enter Earth from the ISS later in 2024. Finally, Rocket Lab’s low-cost mission to Venus, scheduled to launch in December 2024, will search for habitable conditions in Venus’ cloud layer, making use of NASA ARC provided HEEET insulation layer heat shield, and SIRCA backshell TPS materials. Future NASA Missions: NASA’s ability to help commercial missions can lead to future low-cost missions for several reasons: Competition encourages lower cost; technology maturation is now done at an integrated system level; and a common design architecture between commercial and scientific applications requires no specialized engineering design. From an engineering perspective, both of these commercial LEO capsules aforementioned are capable of a Mars entry; the commercial payload mut be replaced with as science payload. Finally, several NASA mission concepts, that could be candidates for future SIMPLEx program calls, such as VATMOS-SR and Nephele, both proposing to target the Venusian atmosphere, would make use of the HEEET insulation layer TPS for part of their heat shield.

TPS materials↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Recent Developments of Thermal Protection Materials to Enable Lower Cost Space Missions

Introduction: Starting with the Commercial Crew Program, a new paradigm has emerged at NASA. Rather than designing rockets and spacecrafts for every mission optimized to achieve science, NASA has begun to use a service-based model and utilizing public-private partnership in developing the vehicles that can bring broader benefits as well as lower the cost for NASA missions. Commercial companies own and operate those vehicles. This allows NASA to not design missions from the bottom up, and has cost, risk, and schedule savings implications. On the other side, the constraints require meeting the requirements in terms of mass, volume, power, etc. By leveraging NASA developed technologies, commercial companies can quickly demonstrate the commercial mission concept, and, through technology transfer, adopt needed technology to address supply chain problems. A downside is that the technology has to be sufficiently mature to be transferred by NASA, which means that it requires significant investment, expertise, and time to develop. Space entities are focused on rapid development with an emphasis on manufacturing and integration innovation with reduced cost and schedule and quick entrance into the market. Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) are mission critical, but their development takes years, and involve access to arc jets or unique test facilities. Therefore, their development is both risky and investment heavy. NASA ARC developed several new TPS materials over the last decade (C-PICA, HEEET, 3MDCP, 3DMAT, ADEPT woven TPS) and brought them to high TPS maturity, making them enablers for commercials space missions from LEO, Lunar Sample Return, Mars, and Venus missions. LEO missions are relevant to future Mars missions due to the comparable entry conditions. External Partners' Missions: C-PICA is a recent improvement on NASA’s heritage PICA lightweight TPS ablator. C-PICA is now considered an enabling technology for New Frontiers and other NASA missions. C-PICA was infused into several missions from external partners. Varda Space Industries’ Winnebago-1 spacecraft successfully returned to Earth from LEO on Feb. 21st, 2024, using a C-PICA heatshield. Inversion Space’s Ray vehicle will test both ARC’s C-PICA and SIRCA TPS materials on a LEO return mission later in 2024. The Kentucky Re-Entry Probe Experiment (KREPE) is another example of a low-cost flight experiment to demonstrate the use of small entry capsules to gather data with three instrumented Kentucky Re-entry and Universal Payload System (KRUPS) capsules. NASA Arc provided C-PICA and Soft-PICA for two of the next KRUPS capsules scheduled to re-enter Earth from the ISS later in 2024. Finally, Rocket Lab’s low-cost mission to Venus, scheduled to launch in December 2024, will search for habitable conditions in Venus’ cloud layer, making use of NASA ARC provided HEEET insulation layer heat shield, and SIRCA backshell TPS materials. Future NASA Missions: NASA’s ability to help commercial missions can lead to future low-cost missions for several reasons: Competition encourages lower cost; technology maturation is now done at an integrated system level; and a common design architecture between commercial and scientific applications requires no specialized engineering design. From an engineering perspective, both of these commercial LEO capsules aforementioned are capable of a Mars entry; the commercial payload mut be replaced with as science payload. Finally, several NASA mission concepts, that could be candidates for future SIMPLEx program calls, such as VATMOS-SR and Nephele, both proposing to target the Venusian atmosphere, would make use of the HEEET insulation layer TPS for part of their heat shield.

TPS materials↗

NASA NTRS2015

Underestimation of Project Costs

Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.

Cost estimation↗

NASA NTRS1973

Cost estimation for unmanned lunar and planetary programs

A basic model is presented for estimating the cost of unmanned lunar and planetary programs. Cost data were collected and analyzed for eight lunar and planetary programs. Total cost was separated into the following components: labor, overhead, materials, and technical support. The study determined that direct labor cost of unmanned lunar and planetary programs comprises 30 percent of the total program cost. Twelve program categories were defined for modeling: six spacecraft subsystem categories (science, structure, propulsion, electrical power, communications, and guidance and integration, test and quality assurance, launch and flight operations, ground equipment, systems analysis and engineering, and program management). An analysis showed that on a percentage basis, direct labor cost and direct labor manhours compare on a one-to-one ratio. Therefore, direct labor hours is used as the parameter for predicting cost, with the advantage of eliminating the effect of inflation on the analysis.

Dunkin, J. H.↗