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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Requirement Metrics for Risk Identification

The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is part of the Office of Mission Assurance of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The SATC's mission is to assist National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects to improve the quality of software which they acquire or develop. The SATC's efforts are currently focused on the development and use of metric methodologies and tools that identify and assess risks associated with software performance and scheduled delivery. This starts at the requirements phase, where the SATC, in conjunction with software projects at GSFC and other NASA centers is working to identify tools and metric methodologies to assist project managers in identifying and mitigating risks. This paper discusses requirement metrics currently being used at NASA in a collaborative effort between the SATC and the Quality Assurance Office at GSFC to utilize the information available through the application of requirements management tools.

Hammer, Theodore↗
NASA NTRS1998

Statistical Treatment of Earth Observing System Pyroshock Separation Test Data

The Earth Observing System (EOS) AM-1 spacecraft for NASA's Mission to Planet Earth is scheduled to be launched on an Atlas IIAS vehicle in June of 1998. One concern is that the instruments on the EOS spacecraft are sensitive to the shock-induced vibration produced when the spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle. By employing unique statistical analysis to the available ground test shock data, the NASA Lewis Research Center found that shock-induced vibrations would not be as great as the previously specified levels of Lockheed Martin. The EOS pyroshock separation testing, which was completed in 1997, produced a large quantity of accelerometer data to characterize the shock response levels at the launch vehicle/spacecraft interface. Thirteen pyroshock separation firings of the EOS and payload adapter configuration yielded 78 total measurements at the interface. The multiple firings were necessary to qualify the newly developed Lockheed Martin six-hardpoint separation system. Because of the unusually large amount of data acquired, Lewis developed a statistical methodology to predict the maximum expected shock levels at the interface between the EOS spacecraft and the launch vehicle. Then, this methodology, which is based on six shear plate accelerometer measurements per test firing at the spacecraft/launch vehicle interface, was used to determine the shock endurance specification for EOS. Each pyroshock separation test of the EOS spacecraft simulator produced its own set of interface accelerometer data. Probability distributions, histograms, the median, and higher order moments (skew and kurtosis) were analyzed. The data were found to be lognormally distributed, which is consistent with NASA pyroshock standards. Each set of lognormally transformed test data produced was analyzed to determine if the data should be combined statistically. Statistical testing of the data's standard deviations and means (F and t testing, respectively) determined if data sets were significantly different at a 95-percent confidence level. If two data sets were found to be significantly different, these families of data were not combined for statistical purposes. This methodology produced three separate statistical data families of shear plate data. For each population, a P99.1/50 (probability/confidence) per-separation-nut firing level was calculated. By using the binomial distribution, Lewis researchers determined that this pernut firing level was equivalent to a P95/50 per-flight confidence level. The overall envelope of the per-flight P95/50 levels led to Lewis' recommended EOS interface shock endurance specification. A similar methodology was used to develop Lewis' recommended EOS mission assurance levels. The available test data for the EOS mission are significantly larger than for a normal mission, thus increasing the confidence level in the calculated expected shock environment. Lewis significantly affected the EOS mission by properly employing statistical analysis to the data. This analysis prevented a costly requalification of the spacecraft's instruments, which otherwise would have been exposed to significantly higher test levels.

McNelis, Anne M.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS1995

Product Assurance for Spaceflight Hardware

This report contains information about the tasks I have completed and the valuable experience I have gained at NASA. The report is divided into two different sections followed by a program summary sheet. The first section describes the two reports I have completed for the Office of Mission Assurance (OMA). I describe the approach and the resources and facilities used to complete each report. The second section describes my experience working in the Receipt Inspection/Quality Assurance Lab (RI/QA). The first report described is a Product Assurance Plan for the Gas Permeable Polymer Materials (GPPM) mission. The purpose of the Product Assurance Plan is to define the various requirements which are to be met through completion of the GPPM mission. The GPPM experiment is a space payload which will be flown in the shuttle's SPACEHAB module. The experiment will use microgravity to enable production of complex polymeric gas permeable materials. The second report described in the first section is a Fracture Analysis for the Mir Environmental Effects Payload (MEEP). The Fracture Analysis report is a summary of the fracture control classifications for all structural elements of the MEEP. The MEEP hardware consists of four experiment carriers, each of which contains an experiment container holding a passive experiment. The MEEP hardware will be attached to the cargo bay of the space shuttle. It will be transferred by Extravehicular Activity and mounted on the Mir space station. The second section of this report describes my experiences in the RVQA lab. I listed the different equipment I used at the lab and their functions. I described the extensive inspection process that must be completed for spaceflight hardware. Included, at the end of this section, are pictures of most of the equipment used in the lab. There is a summary sheet located at the end of this report. It briefly describes the valuable experience I have gained at NASA this summer and what I will be able to take with me as I return to college. I briefly discuss the experiences I mentioned in the previous three paragraphs along with training classes I attended and courses I completed at the Learning Lab.

Monroe, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2016

Ensuring Payload Safety in Missions with Special Partnerships

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload space flight missions involve cooperative work between NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, Range Safety organization, Agency launch service organizations, and launch vehicle contractors. The role of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically fairly straightforward, but when a mission's partnerships become more complex, to realize cost and science benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative international missions), the task of ensuring payload safety becomes much more challenging. This paper discusses lessons learned from NASA safety professionals working multiple-agency missions and offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals working multiple-agency missions.

Agency launch service organizations↗
NASA NTRS2017

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed: (1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, (2) A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance (MBMA) concepts. center dot Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Software Assurance's Roles in Research and Technology

This slide presentation reviews the interactions between the scientist and engineers doing research and technology and the software developers and others who are doing software assurance. There is a discussion of the role of the Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in developing software to be used for research and technology, and the importance of this role as the technology moves to the higher levels of the technology readiness levels (TRLs). There is also a call to change the way the development of software is developed.

Wetherholt, Martha↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Role of PHM in Autonomous Decision-Making: Aerospace applications

There is an increased need for onboard decision-making capabilities in cyber-physical systems be it in energy, automotive, aviation, space, or other industries as they aim for increased efficiency, resiliency, and mission assurance capabilities. Emerging next-gen technologies such as multi-rover planetary missions, distributed satellites, unmanned ground and aerial vehicle operations and smart grid systems rely on in-time risk assessment and autonomous decision-making. One critical piece of the autonomy puzzle is reliable prediction of system behavior under time-varying and potentially uncertain environmental conditions. Further, if agent states change during operation such as initiation of faults or degradation, reliable diagnostic tools need to be investigated. In this tutorial, we will revise approaches that integrates existing physics-based and data-driven models of agents interacting with probability models of the environment and component operation state. Role of existing PHM methodologies as they feed into decision-making under uncertainty will be studied. Balancing critical trade-offs between high-fidelity prognostic models, prediction time-horizons and the computational requirements for in-time cost-effective decision-making will be discussed through the implementation of surrogate models. Finally, the audience will be introduced to a real-time application of in-time trajectory planning of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) based on its PHM assessments under uncertain and varying wind conditions.

decision-making↗
NASA NTRS2007

Organization, Management and Function of International Space Station (ISS) Multilateral Medical Operations

Long duration crews have inhabited the ISS since November of 2000. The favorable medical outcomes of its missions can be largely attributed to sustained collective efforts of all ISS Partners medical organizations. In-flight medical monitoring and support, although crucial, is just a component of the ISS system of Joint Medical Operations. The goal of this work is to review the principles, design, and function of the multilateral medical support of the ISS Program. The governing documents, which describe the relationships among all ISS partner medical organizations, were evaluated, followed by analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and decision-making processes of the ISS medical boards, panels, and working groups. The degree of integration of the medical support system was evaluated by reviewing the multiple levels of the status reviews and mission assurance activities carried out throughout the last six years. The Integrated Medical Group, consisting of physicians and other essential personnel in the mission control centers represents the front-line medical support of the ISS. Data from their day-to-day activities are presented weekly at the Space Medicine Operations Team (SMOT), where known or potential concerns are addressed by an international group of physicians. A broader status review is conducted monthly to project the state of crew health and medical support for the following month, and to determine measures to return to nominal state. Finally, a comprehensive readiness review is conducted during preparations for each ISS mission. The Multilateral Medical Policy Board (MMPB) issues medical policy decisions and oversees all health and medical matters. The Multilateral Space Medicine Board (MSMB) certifies crewmembers and visitors for training and space flight to the Station, and physicians to practice space medicine for the ISS. The Multilateral Medical Operations Panel (MMOP) develops medical requirements, defines and supervises implementation of operational countermeasures, environmental monitoring, medical care, and emergency medical services. MMOP assures the medical readiness of the Station for each subsequent mission or critical event. All boards and panels have functioned effectively and without interruptions even in various challenging circumstances. Based on the experience of the authors, consensus has prevailed as the primary nature of decisions made by all ISS medical groups, at all levels. The six first years of piloted operation have demonstrated the ability of the ISS medical authority groups and the medical infrastructure to implement medical policies and requirements, effectively interface with non-medical groups, and maintain the health and productivity of the crew in an integrated, multilaterally coordinated fashion. The medical support system appears to be mature and ready for further expansion of all Partners roles, and for the anticipated increase in the size of ISS crews.

Duncan, James M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Propulsion Health Management System Development for Affordable and Reliable Operation of Space Exploration Systems

The constraints of future Exploration Missions will require unique integrated system health management capabilities throughout the mission. An ambitious launch schedule, human-rating requirements, long quiescent periods, limited human access for repair or replacement, and long communication delays, all require an integrated approach to health management that can span distinct, yet interdependent vehicle subsystems, anticipate failure states, provide autonomous remediation and support the Exploration Mission from beginning to end. Propulsion is a critical part of any space exploration mission, and monitoring the health of the propulsion system is an integral part of assuring mission safety and success. Health management is a somewhat ubiquitous technology that encompasses a large spectrum of physical components and logical processes. For this reason, it is essential to develop a systematic plan for propulsion health management system development. This paper provides a high-level perspective of propulsion health management systems, and describes a logical approach for the future planning and early development that are crucial to planned space exploration programs. It also presents an overall approach, or roadmap, for propulsion health management system development and a discussion of the associated roadblocks and challenges.

Melcher, Kevin J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Space Shuttle Program Legacy Report

Share lessons learned on Space Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) culture, processes, and products that can guide future enterprises to improve mission success and minimize the risk of catastrophic failures. Present the chronology of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) S&MA organization over the 40-year history of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and identify key factors and environments which contributed to positive and negative performance.

Johnson, Scott↗
NASA NTRS1996

Risk/Requirements Trade-Off Guidelines for Faster, Better, Cheaper Missions

From Preface: This document is a compendium of Risk/Requirements Tradeoff Guidelines for Faster, Better, Cheaper missions. It summarizes the reduced-cost approach for the design, verification, and validation of flight equipment for assuring mission success of microspacecraft.

risk risk management faster better cheaper product↗
NASA NTRS1992

A six-degree-of-freedom guidance and control analysis of Mars aerocapture

A six-degree-of-freedom (6DOF) simulation is developed to investigate the control and guidance issues of a Mars aerobraking vehicle. The guidance algorithm used is a predictor-corrector guidance formulation designed to control the exit orbital apoapsis and wedge angle using bank-angle modulation. Major features of this predictor-corrector guidance algorithm include: (1) integration of the 3DOF equations of motion within an inner-loop simulation; (2) load-relief logic; (3) finite roll rates; and (4) an aerodynamic feedback multiplier. The algorithm is capable of successfully guiding the vehicle through combinations of atmospheric density dispersions, aerodynamic mispredictions, and off-nominal atmospheric interface conditions. This study demonstrated that the addition of vehicle dynamics to the Mars aerobraking simulation does not significantly impact mission feasibility. That is, a robust control system design coupled with an adaptive guidance algorithm can assure mission success in the presence of numerous off-nominal conditions.

Powell, Richard W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Responsible Exploration Preserving the Cosmos for Tomorrow

This submittal encompasses NASA presentations to be shared at the forthcoming Trilateral S&MA Summit at ESRIN in Frascati, Italy. This event is an annual meeting comprised of SMA leadership and supporting staff from NASA, ESA, and JAXA. The Trilateral Parties discuss current and future areas of cooperation in areas of Safety & Mission Assurance.

trilateral↗
NASA NTRS1996

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: Fiscal Year 1996 Activities

Topics considered include: (1) Space launch activities: space shuttle missions; expendable launch vehicles. (2) Space science: astronomy and space physics; solar system exploration. (3) Space flight and technology: life and microgravity sciences; space shuttle technology; reuseable launch vehicles; international space station; energy; safety and mission assurance; commercial development and regulation of space; surveillance. (4) Space communications: communications satellites; space network; ground networks; mission control and data systems. (5) Aeronautical activities: technology developments; air traffic control and navigation; weather-related aeronautical activities; flight safety and security; aviation medicine and human factors. (6) Studies of the planet earth: terrestrial studies and applications: atmospheric studies: oceanographic studies; international aeronautical and space activities; and appendices.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Robust and Mass Efficient Thermal Protection Systems for Future Venus Missions

Several international Venus missions, both orbiter, and in-situ probe are in the works after a prolonged absence. Future missions are expected to be long-duration lander missions and balloon missions to investigate the cloud layer. The entry mass for these in-situ missions will be significantly higher, and the aeroshell will be larger, than previous missions. Two cardinal requirements govern the selection and use of thermal protection systems (TPS), namely, robustness to assure mission safety during entry and mass efficiency so that the useful mass for science is maximized. One cannot trade mission safety for mass when it comes to TPS. The robustness of the TPS is a paramount requirement as it is a single point of system failure. At the same time, TPS mass is carried for the entire mission duration prior to entry, and any excess TPS mass is at the cost of science payload. Future missions will benefit enormously from TPS options with mass and performance benefits far beyond advanced carbon-carbon (ACC) that is currently proposed for the DAVINCI mission. NASA STMD, and SMD jointly invested in the development of 3-D woven thermal protection systems in the last decade, and as a result, the Heat-shield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) TPS has been matured to TRL 6. It is ready for future mission use including Venus. The HEEET project focused on developing a broad technology base, applicable for missions not only to Venus, but also to Saturn, the Ice Giants, and higher speed sample return missions such as Mars Sample Return requiring extreme robustness due to bio-hazards. The dual-layer HEEET (DL-HEEET) is proven to be extremely robust. DL-HEEET performed well in arc jet and laser testing conditions where heritage carbon-phenolic failed. HEEET also proved to be more mass efficient compared to Carbon-Phenolic. Recently, the principal author was invited to present his perspectives to the 2023-2032 Planetary Sciences Decadal Venus subcommittee on the current state of TPS for future Venus missions [1]. In addition to pointing out successful TPS and other developments in the last decade in support of entry systems, the principal author made two findings: 1) importance of and need to sustain TPS capabilities that took nearly a decade to develop and 2) the opportunity to further optimize TPS mass without sacrificing robustness to further enable future in-situ missions. This talk will focus on the above two recommendations and provide the rationale for them. The intent of the talk is to seek advocacy from the VEXAG community for the criticality of TPS sustainment and the benefits of 3D woven TPS optimization. TPS Capability Sustainment: HEEET development was necessitated by the atrophy of heritage carbon-phenolic. Atrophy has impacted other TPS materials as well. Avcoat, the TPS that successfully allowed astronauts to explore the Moon in the 1960s and 70s, took nearly a decade and $10’sM to recover in support of Orion/Artemis. One of the most used TPS materials, SLA 561V, had to be recovered prior to its use on Mars Pathfinder. Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA), the TPS that replaced SLA 561V on MSL, has undergone multiple replacements and recovery due to constituent rayon changes. Recently, NASA invested in a domestic rayon replacement program and also invested in FMI to consolidate PICA capability for NASA missions, as a result of FMI’s decision to discontinue commercial FiberForm, which is needed for PICA. TPS used for planetary missions are unique and have no other commercial or defense use. In addition, low mission cadence is also a driver for TPS atrophy. Hence, NASA, as the steward, must take steps to ensure and sustain TPS capabilities. In this talk, we outline steps NASA can take to keep abreast of emerging risks and target risk mitigation steps to ensure TPS capability sustainment for Venus and other extreme environment missions. Next Generation of Mass efficient and Robust TPS: NASA invested in an alternate TPS to PICA based on felt-technology called Conformal-PICA which has the potential to save 30% - 50% mass over PICA. The development was discontinued at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of ~ 5. 3D Mid-Density Carbon Phenolic (3MDCP) is a single layer variant of HEEET, based on the insulating layer only (SL-HEEET) and currently baselined for the Mars Sample Return Mission Earth Entry System due to its mass efficiency (30% more mass efficient than DL- HEEET). Currently, SL-HEEET is limited to aeroshell diameters of < 1.3m. The SL-HEEET was compared to DL-HEEET in the recent ADVENT flag-ship class mission study in support of the Planetary Science Decadal. SL HEEET was the recommended TPS based on 30% mass savings for both the balloon and lander missions. Given C-PICA and SL-HEEET have superior reliability and mass efficiency, advocacy from VEXAG is sought for completing their further development to TRL 5/6 in this decade so as to enable TPS readiness for future missions.

Thermal Protection Systems↗
NASA NTRS1996

Risk/Requirements Trade-Off Guidelines for Faster, Better, Cheaper Missions

From preface: This document is a compendium of Risk/Requirements Tradeoff Guidelines for Faster, Better, Cheaper Missions. It summarizes the reduced-cost approach for the design, verification, and validation of flight equipment for assuring mission success of microspacecraft.

faster better cheaper risk risk tradeoffs↗