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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the 1984 martial arts drama film, The Karate Kid, a young Daniel LaRusso is unexpectedly placed in an adversarial environment unable to eYectively adapt to a series of new threats and limitations. Fortunately for the main character, once placed under the tutelage of a Mr. Miyagi, he finds resiliency not through the adoption of new tools, but a re-focused set of fundamentals. Much in the same way that Daniel learns waxing on and buYing oY car wax by hand has rewards for Karate, LANL is choosing the harder path of self-hosting Large Language Models (LLMs) for enterprise use instead of only relying on buying access to a hosted AI service like Azure’s OpenAI Application Programming Interface (API). We also are not willing to wait for software-as-a-service (SAAS) AI services to meet us where we need to be from a FedRAMP accreditation standpoint. Our operations regularly depend on access at CUI, UCNI, ITAR and other FIPS-199 moderate-impact data levels and hosting our own services gives us the right security and compliance posture to be useful across the broad range of our work at LANL. With the rise in threats to critical infrastructure, cloud service providers (CSPs), and supply chain attacks from both state and non-state actors, we are not placing the bet that SAAS hosted AI services will be available when we need them. Should a major event occur, we do not want our staY and operations left without a pathway for us to fix the problem and resume the use of AI tools.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Blockchain Research and Development Activities Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and Utility Sector

This article provides an in-depth analysis of blockchain research in the energy sector, focusing on projects funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and comparing them with industry-funded initiatives. A total of 110 funded activities within the U.S. power industry were successfully tracked and mapped into a newly developed categorization framework. This framework is designed to help research agencies to systematically understand their funded portfolio. Such characterization is expected to help them make effective investments, identify research gaps, measure impact, and advance technological progress to meet national goals. In line with this need, the proposed framework proposes a 2-D categorization matrix to systematically classify blockchain efforts within the energy sector.Under the proposed framework, the Energy System Domain serves as the primary classification dimension, categorizing use cases into 30 distinct applications. The second dimension, Blockchain Properties, captures the specific needs and functionalities provided by Blockchain technology. The aim was to capture blockchain’s applicability and functionality: where and why blockchain? Principles behind the selection of the viewpoint dimensions were carefully defined based on consensus obtained through the Blockchain for Optimized Security and Energy Management (BLOSEM) project. The mapped results show that activities within the Grid Automation, Coordination, and Control (31.8%), Marketplaces and Trading (25.5%), Foundational Blockchain Research (19.1%), and Supply Chain Management (17.3%) domains have been actively pursued to date. The three leading specific use case applications were identified as Transactive Energy Management for Marketplaces and Trading, Asset Management for Supply Chain Management, and Fundamental Blockchain for Foundational Blockchain Research. The Marketplaces and Trading and Retail Services Enablement domains stood out as being favored by industry by a factor greater than 2 (2.3 and 2.6, respectively), yet there seemed to be little to zero investment from DOE. Approximately 76% of the total projects prioritized Immutability, Identity Management, and Decentralization and/or Disintermediation compared to Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization, Automation, and Privacy and/or Anonymity. The greatest discrepancies between DOE and industry were in Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization and Automation. The industry efforts (36% in Asset Digitization/Tokenization and 22% in Automation) was 14 times and 2.4 times, respectively, more intensive than the DOE-sponsored efforts, indicating a significant discrepancy in industry versus government priorities. Overall, quantifying DOE-sponsored projects and industry activities through mapping provides clarity on portfolio investments and opportunities for future research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Hydropower Supply Chain Gap Analysis

In 2022, DOE conducted supply chain "deep dives" for renewable energy technologies, including hydropower (Uria-Martinez, Hydropower Industry Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment 2022). The deep dive identified several challenges in the current hydropower supply chain. In addition, Nguyen et. al (2022) conducted an analogous deep-dive assessment on large (> 100-MW) power transformers (LPTs), a critical component of hydropower installations, and concluded that the LPTs as well as several upstream components and materials also have domestic supply chain challenges. These deep dives were the initial high-level assessments of these supply chains and were focused on identifying the biggest issues. Both recommended further investigation. In the two years since the deep dives were published, the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) has focused on improving our understanding of the hydropower supply chain and developing strategies for addressing these challenges. Because the challenges outlined above are most acute for large hydropower systems, most of the report and specifically, this report concentrates on the larger > 100-MW hydropower systems. Early in 2023, DOE's Secretary of Energy asked the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) to engage the hydropower community and seek input on strategies to secure and encourage domestic manufacturing. WPTO has established three focus areas for engagement: 1) Define the market for planned rehabilitations and new construction of the domestic fleet, 2) Provide insights for policies, incentives, loan programs, and technology investments to encourage domestic content, and 3) Define the existing and required domestic hydropower manufacturing capabilities and workforce. This report summarizes these efforts and complements the earlier work by further exploring the identified challenges and identifying potential actions to address these challenges. Furthermore, we conducted a detailed gap analysis of the domestic hydropower supply chain, down to the component level. From this analysis, we then make specific, actionable recommendations for closing these gaps. Section 2 of the report summarizes recent (i.e., since 2021) legislation impacting hydropower deployment and/or its supply chain. It then describes the efforts of WPTO to assess and improve the hydropower supply chain since the publication of the deep-dive assessments. In Section 3, the report updates the earlier supply chain and market studies, identifying specific capabilities by company and location. Section 4 outlines the hydropower demand signal for both new builds due to clean energy goals as well as refurbishments and upgrading of the current domestic fleet. Section 5 is a detailed gap analysis while Section 6 provides actionable recommendations for closing the gaps. Section 7 concludes the report by linking the recommendations to the identified gaps and discusses future efforts.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Electric Grid Operations

The future of the grid will be powered by AI—or undermined by it. Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping grid operations, improving fault detection, forecasting accuracy, and real-time optimization. As AI systems move closer to operational decision loops, however, they introduce new consequence pathways: expanded attack surfaces, model integrity risks, regulatory exposure, and human-automation challenges. This talk presents a consequence-driven framework for deploying AI responsibly in the electric grid. Attendees will gain practical strategies to strengthen resilience, boost reliability, and deploy AI securely — ensuring the grid of the future is not only smarter but safer.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Reactor Supply Chain Assessment (GAIN Report)

Several net-zero scenario evaluations predict a rapid ramp up of nuclear energy in the coming decades. If this materializes, it will most likely strain the supply chains associated with the potential advanced reactor concepts awaiting deployment. To help assess the current and potential capacities of the various advanced reactor supply chains, the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) conducted a survey of companies able to produce components for advanced reactors in the near future (namely for sodium, gas-cooled, and molten salt reactors). Using an aggressive nuclear deployment scenario, the objective was to assess the ability of the various supply chains to meet the considerable demand projections for certain key components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors) and identify potential challenges. While individual companies were unable to meet the most optimistic nuclear deployment rate projections, it was found that on aggregate, a United States-based supply chain projected that expansion could be ramped up to meet a larger future demand of these components. However, meeting projected demand for several more complex items (namely gas or salt heat exchangers) was found to be more challenging. Deploying new reactors at scale necessitates the production of more and more supply chain components, requiring a ramp up in production. Supply chain companies were surveyed, and respondents appeared less able to meet short term demand (next year) versus longer-term demand projections (5 and 10 years). This reflects the need to obtain orders with adequate lead times (can range from 3 to 30 months). Future demand will need to be met by expanding existing capacity. These expansions will require suppliers to raise capital or secure other types of support (federal loans or grants) to invest in facilities, equipment, and workforce. Individual suppliers indicated financial investments could be in the range of $\$ $100 million to $\$ $1 billion for their own facilities (depending on the type of facility). The biggest risk, according to respondents, related to general uncertainties surrounding the future nuclear industry and whether the potential demand projections will materialize into real demand that is actionable from a business perspective. Businesses do not seem willing to take investments risks without clear orders. If businesses are not able to invest to expand the supply, it will either delay the deployment of advanced nuclear technology, or the supply chain will be met by suppliers outside of the United States. This report only focuses on the domestic supply chain’s ability to meet the various projections stipulated here for the specific assessed components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors). The report does not cover all reactor designs or all components that may ultimately be needed for any one reactor design. It also does not address whether any specific aspect of the supply chain will be cost competitive in the global market, nor how potential state-backed entities could affect the expansion of a United States-based supply chain. The largest challenges in ramping up capacity among respondents appear to be workforce related. This includes workforce availability, experience, training, and turnover. In addition to facility investment, suppliers will also need to invest heavily in long-term workforce training to meet production goals. This issue is not nuclear-specific, and the expansion of any supply chain will likely face similar challenges. While suppliers evaluated expected normal business demand from other markets outside of nuclear, it is possible that other market segments could expand more than predicted and compete for the same suppliers. One potential market that may compete for the same supplier resources is the United States military, as many of these suppliers support both the commercial nuclear sector as well as the Navy with reactors and components. In summary, suppliers in the United States believe that there is a way to increase production in order to begin meeting the demand which will exist for advanced reactors—as long as appropriate investments can be made in the supply chain in an appropriate timeframe. Based on the capacity projections and lead times, investment will be needed to meet the 5-year and 10-year production targets. Therefore, if significant nuclear deployment is to occur in the 2030s, investment and ramp up of the advanced nuclear supply chain will need to begin in the near future for the United States to successfully deploy these advanced reactors with domestic supply chains.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Data Center Cybersecurity, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Cohort Summary: Takeaways and Action Plans

This report summarizes the outcomes of the Data Center Cohort under the Department of Energy’s Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, aimed at enhancing grid resilience through cybersecurity, supply chain risk management (SCRM), and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). The cohort engaged 17 organizations across utilities, data center operators, vendors, and technology providers in three sessions combining presentations, discussions, and exercises. Key topics included AI-driven load behavior, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in UPS/BESS and cooling systems, governance gaps at utility–data center boundaries, and supply chain integrity. Five cross-cutting themes emerged: interconnection architecture vulnerabilities, fragmented governance, AI-driven stability risks, lack of regulatory frameworks, and long-term supply chain concerns. Actionable recommendations were developed, including implementing DMZ segmentation, formalizing vendor access agreements, designing AI workload limits, and advancing standards through NERC and state-level programs. These strategies aim to strengthen resilience, clarify responsibilities, and ensure secure integration of data centers into the grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Achieving American Leadership in the Electric Grid Supply Chain Factsheet

The U.S. electric grid consists of more than 22,000 generators; 55,000 substations; 642,000 miles of high-voltage lines; and 6.3 million miles of distribution lines that serve 153 million customers. To date, much of the smart grid transformation has focused on applying advanced digital information and communication technologies to the power grid to improve the system’s efficiency, flexibility, and security. To achieve the full value of grid modernization, we also need advances in grid hardware. Many critical components supporting the power grid have limited to no domestic manufacturing capacity and face complex challenges in supporting a rapid expansion of the grid to meet multiple objectives, including decarbonization goals.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Engineering-In Cybersecurity

Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Contact-Less Integrity Verification of Microelectronics Using Near-Field EM Analysis

Modern microelectronics life-cycle and supply chain ecosystem bring multiple untrusted entities, which can compromise their integrity. A major integrity issue of microelectronics stems from piracy of intellectual properties (IP) and counterfeiting, which causes significant revenue loss to the semiconductor manufacturers. Further, these components often lead to compromised functionality, reliability, security, and safety of an electronic system. This paper presents secure information transmission and probing methods for verifying the integrity of digital integrated circuit (ICs) based on their electromagnetic (EM) near-field emissions and thereby protecting systems against counterfeit components. The proposed method has been tested on both high-level instructions executed by microprocessors or Systems-on-Chip (serving as examples of software), and also logic circuits within FPGA fabrics and ASICs (serving as examples of hardware). The authentication information required by each digital system is generated using a pseudo-random number generator circuit and securely transmitted via near-field magnetic emissions. The authorized party can probe these emissions using a near-field probe, process the acquired signals to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and then recover the secure information through matched filtering. Experimental results from commercial SoCs are used to demonstrate the proposed technique. Methods for reducing EM interference during integrity verification of both FPGAs and ASICs are also described.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Ameliorating Global Challenges: Globalization, Geopolitics, Basic & Applied Research, and Research Security

We are confronted with a myriad of global challenges, from extreme weather events, occurring at higher frequencies than at any point in history, to pollution, food insecurity, clean water shortages, and fundamentally limited natural resources and materials. The largest number of people inhabit our planet today and enjoy the highest standard of living - though not equally distributed across the world - compared to any prior moment in history. To sustain this quality of life, we are largely reliant on fossil fuel sources, which are responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions by weight each day than the collective weight of all humans that inhabit the planet. Ameliorating these global challenges will require elements of solutions that include advances in basic and applied research, innovative global engineering, materials discovery, new technologies, manufacturing at scale, resilient and adaptable infrastructure, carbon-free energy sources and storage technologies, and new supply chain networks and markets. Success will require constructive collaborative efforts between researchers in countries located in every continent of this planet. For any of these goals to be realized in a timely fashion, geopolitical leaders must become better educated about this existential challenge and incentivized to act.

applied research↗
DOE OSTI2025

Feasibility and Compatibility of Alternative Fuels in the U.S. Rail Sector: Technoeconomic, Lifecycle, and Supply Chain Analysis

The U.S. rail sector is a cornerstone of the United States’ freight transportation system, responsible for moving approximately 40% of long-distance freight ton-miles each year (AAR, 2025). Freight demand is projected to grow over time (BTS, 2017) thereby necessitating the investigation of alternative fuels that can sustain operational efficiency while reducing emissions and cost impacts. At the same time, it is important to explore alternative fuels as new sources of energy that can increase energy security and resilience for this sector. This report investigates the feasibility and compatibility of seven alternative fuels in the U.S. rail sector, focusing on biofuels and fuels from other renewable energy sources. The study evaluates alternative fuel pathways, considering their technical, economic, and environmental aspects to provide stakeholders with a comprehensive understanding of potential solutions.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2021

COVID 19 vaccine distribution solution to the last mile challenge: Experimental and simulation studies of ultra-low temperature refrigeration system

Most COVID-19 vaccines require ambient temperature control for transportation and storage. Both Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are based on mRNA and lipid nanoparticles requiring low temperature storage. The Pfizer vaccine requires ultra-low temperature storage (between -80 °C and -60 °C), while the Moderna vaccine requires -30 °C storage. Pfizer has designed a reusable package for transportation and storage that can keep the vaccine at the target temperature for 10 days. However, the last stage of distribution is quite challenging, especially for rural or suburban areas, where local towns, pharmacy chains and hospitals may not have the infrastructure required to store the vaccine. Also, the need for a large amount of ultra-low temperature refrigeration equipment in a short time period creates tremendous pressure on the equipment suppliers. In addition, there is limited data available to address ancillary challenges of the distribution framework for both transportation and storage stages. As such, there is a need for a quick, effective, secure, and safe solution to mitigate the challenges faced by vaccine distribution logistics. The study proposes an effective, secure, and safe ultra-low temperature refrigeration solution to resolve the vaccine distribution last mile challenge. Furthermore, the approach is to utilize commercially available products, such as refrigeration container units, and retrofit them to meet the vaccine storage temperature requirement. Both experimental and simulation studies are conducted to evaluate the technical merits of this solution with the ability to control temperature at -30 °C or -70 °C as part of the last mile supply chain for vaccine candidates.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗