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Mathematical models represent single-event upset in bipolar memory chips. Physics of single-event upset in integrated circuits discussed in theoretical paper. Pair of companion reports present mathematical models to predict critical charges for producing single-event upset in bipolar randomaccess memory (RAM) chips.
Package of computer programs developed to predict cosmic-ray environment for spacecraft in orbit near Earth. Single cosmic-ray particle deposits enough electrical charge on sensitive area of individual circuit to change bit state. Single-event upsets may not cause permanent damage but upset functioning devices. Used to predict upset rate for space mission. Also calculates time-average cosmic-ray environment for multiple circular orbits, fragments of trajectories, and isolated points. Package written in HPL for interactive execution and implemented on HP 9825B desktop computer.
Single event upset (SEU) and latchup vulnerabilities were determined for a number of parts of interest to NASA space programs. In cases where a threshold linear energy transfer (LET) for SEU could be measured, an upset rate in a low inclination Space Shuttle orbit was computed. The predicted upset rates are extremely low, except for the devices with LET thresholds below the geomagnetic cutoff for altitude and inclination of the Space Shuttle orbit. While some of the devices do exhibit latchup, the cross sections and threshold LETs are such that the risk associated with flying these devices in low, near equatorial orbits is small if not negligible.
Modeling and test results are reported for 1 micron CMOS circuits. Analytical predictions are correlated with experimental data, and sensitivities to process and design variations are discussed. Unique features involved in predicting the SEU performance of these devices are described. The results show that the critical charge for upset exhibits a strong dependence on pulse width for very fast devices, and upset predictions must factor in the pulse shape. Acceptable SEU error rates can be achieved for a 1 micron bulk CMOS process. A thin retrograde well provides complete SEU immunity for N channel hits at normal incidence angle. Source interconnect resistance can be important parameter in determining upset rates, and Cf-252 testing can be a valuable tool for cost-effective SEU testing.
The accumulation of JPL data on Single Event Phenomena (SEP), from 1979 to August 1986, is presented in full report format. It is expected that every two years a supplement report will be issued for the follow-on period. This data for 135 devices expands on the abbreviated test data presented as part of Refs. (1) and (3) by including figures of Single Event Upset (SEU) cross sections as a function of beam Linear Energy Transfer (LET) when available. It also includes some of the data complied in the JPL computer in RADATA and the SPACERAD data bank. This volume encompasses bipolar and MOS (CMOS and MHNOS) device data as two broad categories for both upsets (bit-flips) and latchup. It also includes comments on less well known phenomena, such as transient upsets and permanent damage modes.
Control systems for advanced aircraft, especially those with relaxed static stability, will be critical to flight and will, therefore, have very high reliability specifications which must be met for adverse as well as nominal operating conditions. Adverse conditions can result from electromagnetic disturbances caused by lightning, high energy radio frequency transmitters, and nuclear electromagnetic pulses. Tools and techniques must be developed to verify the integrity of the control system in adverse operating conditions. The most difficult and illusive perturbations to computer based control systems caused by an electromagnetic environment (EME) are functional error modes that involve no component damage. These error modes are collectively known as upset, can occur simultaneously in all of the channels of a redundant control system, and are software dependent. A methodology is presented for performing upset tests on a multichannel control system and considerations are discussed for the design of upset tests to be conducted in the lab on fault tolerant control systems operating in a closed loop with a simulated plant.
An experimental analysis is described which studies the susceptibility of a microprocessor based jet engine controller to upsets caused by current and voltage transients. A design automation environment which allows the run time injection of transients and the tracing from their impact device to the pin level is described. The resulting error data are categorized by the charge levels of the injected transients by location and by their potential to cause logic upsets, latched errors, and pin errors. The results show a 3 picoCouloumb threshold, below which the transients have little impact. An Arithmetic and Logic Unit transient is most likely to result in logic upsets and pin errors (i.e., impact the external environment). The transients in the countdown unit are potentially serious since they can result in latched errors, thus causing latent faults. Suggestions to protect the processor against these errors, by incorporating internal error detection and transient suppression techniques, are also made.
An analysis of the expected space radiation effects on the single event upset (SEU) properties of CMOS/bulk memories onboard the Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) is presented. Dose-imprint data from ground test irradiations of identical devices are applied to the predictions of cosmic-ray-induced space upset rates in the memories onboard the spacecraft. The calculations take into account the effect of total dose on the SEU sensitivity of the devices as the dose accumulates in orbit. Estimates of error rates, which involved an arbitrary selection of a single pair of threshold linear energy transfer (LET) and asymptotic cross-section values, were compared to the results of an integration over the cross-section curves versus LET. The integration gave lower upset rates than the use of the selected values of the SEU parameters. Since the integration approach is more accurate and eliminates the need for an arbitrary definition of threshold LET and asymptotic cross section, it is recommended for all error rate predictions where experimental sigma-versus-LET curves are available.
Advanced aircraft will require flight critical computer systems for stability augmentation as well as guidance and control that must perform reliably in adverse, as well as nominal, operating environments. Digital system upset is a functional error mode that can occur in electromagnetically harsh environments, involves no component damage, can occur simultaneously in all channels of a redundant control computer, and is software dependent. A strategy is presented for dynamic upset detection to be used in the evaluation of critical digital controllers during the design and/or validation phases of development. Critical controllers must be able to be used in adverse environments that result from disturbances caused by an electromagnetic source such as lightning, high intensity radiated field (HIRF), and nuclear electromagnetic pulses (NEMP). The upset detection strategy presented provides dynamic monitoring of a given control computer for degraded functional integrity that can result from redundancy management errors and control command calculation error that could occur in an electromagnetically harsh operating environment. The use is discussed of Kalman filtering, data fusion, and decision theory in monitoring a given digital controller for control calculation errors, redundancy management errors, and control effectiveness.
This experiment investigated the integrity of static computer memory (floppy disk media) when exposed to the environment of low earth orbit. The experiment attempted to record soft-event upsets (bit-flips) in static computer memory. Typical conditions that exist in low earth orbit that may cause soft-event upsets include: cosmic rays, low level background radiation, charged fields, static charges, and the earth's magnetic field. Over the years several spacecraft have been affected by soft-event upsets (bit-flips), and these events have caused a loss of data or affected spacecraft guidance and control. This paper describes a commercial spin-off that is being developed from the experiment.
Highly integrated microelectronic devices are often used to increase the performance of satellite systems while reducing the system power dissipation, size, and weight. However, these devices are usually more susceptible to radiation than less integrated devices. In particular, the problem of sensitivity to single event upset and latchup is greatly increased as the integration level is increased. Therefore, a method for accurately evaluating the susceptibility of new devices to single event phenomena is critical to qualifying new components for use in space systems. This evaluation includes testing devices for upset or latchup and extrapolating the results of these tests to the orbital environment. Current methods for testing devices for single event effects are reviewed, and methods for upset rate prediction, including a new technique based on Monte Carlo simulation, are presented.
This research describes the development of an experimental radiation testing environment to investigate the single event effect (SEE) susceptibility of the 486-DX4 microprocessor. SEE effects are caused by radiation particles that disrupt the logic state of an operating semiconductor, and include single event upsets (SEU) and single event latchup (SEL). The relevance of this work can be applied directly to digital devices that are used in spaceflight computer systems. The 486-DX4 is a powerful commercial microprocessor that is currently under consideration for use in several spaceflight systems. As part of its selection process, it must be rigorously tested to determine its overall reliability in the space environment, including its radiation susceptibility. The goal of this research is to experimentally test and characterize the single event effects of the 486-DX4 microprocessor using a cyclotron facility as the fault-injection source. The test philosophy is to focus on the "operational susceptibility," by executing real software and monitoring for errors while the device is under irradiation. This research encompasses both experimental and analytical techniques, and yields a characterization of the 486-DX4's behavior for different operating modes. Additionally, the test methodology can accommodate a wide range of digital devices, such as microprocessors, microcontrollers, ASICS, and memory modules, for future testing. The goals were achieved by testing with three heavy-ion species to provide different linear energy transfer rates, and a total of six microprocessor parts were tested from two different vendors. A consistent set of error modes were identified that indicate the manner in which the errors were detected in the processor. The upset cross-section curves were calculated for each error mode, and the SEU threshold and saturation levels were identified for each processor. Results show a distinct difference in the upset rate for different configurations of the on-chip cache, as well as proving that one vendor is superior to the other in terms of latchup susceptibility. Results from this testing were also used to provide a mean-time-between-failure estimate of the 486-DX4 operating in the radiation environment for the International Space Station.
This paper addresses the accuracy of radiation-induced upset-rate predictions in space using the results of ground-based measurements together with standard environmental and device models. The study is focused on two part types - 16 Mb NEC DRAM's (UPD4216) and 1 Kb SRAM's (AMD93L422) - both of which are currently in space on board the Microelectronics and Photonics Test Bed (MPTB). To date, ground-based measurements of proton-induced single event upset (SEM cross sections as a function of energy have been obtained and combined with models of the proton environment to predict proton-induced error rates in space. The role played by uncertainties in the environmental models will be determined by comparing the modeled radiation environment with the actual environment measured aboard MPTB. Heavy-ion induced upsets have also been obtained from MPTB and will be compared with the "predicted" error rate following ground testing that will be done in the near future. These results should help identify sources of uncertainty in predictions of SEU rates in space.
State of the an programmable devices are utilizing advanced processing technologies, non-standard circuit structures, and unique electrical elements in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based, high-performance devices. This paper will discuss that the above factors, coupled with the systems application environment, have a strong interplay that affect the radiation hardness of programmable devices and have resultant system impacts in (1) reliability of the unprogrammed, biased antifuse for heavy ions (rupture), (2) logic upset manifesting itself as clock upset, and (3) configuration upset. General radiation characteristics of advanced technologies are examined and manufacturers' modifications to their COTS-based and their impact on future programmable devices will be analyzed.
ABSTRACT Closed-loop HIRF experiments were performed on a fault tolerant flight control computer (FCC) at the NASA Langley Research Center. The FCC used in the experiments was a quad-redundant flight control computer executing B737 Autoland control laws. The FCC was placed in one of the mode-stirred reverberation chambers in the HIRF Laboratory and interfaced to a computer simulation of the B737 flight dynamics, engines, sensors, actuators, and atmosphere in the Closed-Loop Systems Laboratory. Disturbances to the aircraft associated with wind gusts and turbulence were simulated during tests. Electrical isolation between the FCC under test and the simulation computer was achieved via a fiber optic interface for the analog and discrete signals. Closed-loop operation of the FCC enabled flight dynamics and atmospheric disturbances affecting the aircraft to be represented during tests. Upset was induced in the FCC as a result of exposure to HIRF, and the effect of upset on the simulated flight of the aircraft was observed and recorded. This paper presents a description of these closed- loop HIRF experiments, upset data obtained from the FCC during these experiments, and closed-loop effects on the simulated flight of the aircraft.
The Xilinx Vix-11 Pro is a platform FPGA that embeds multiple microprocessors within the fabric of an SRAM-based reprogrammable FPGA. The variety and quantity of resources provided by this family of devices make them very attractive for spaceflight applications. However,these devices will be susceptible to single event effects (SEE), which must be mitigated. Observations from prior testing of the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro suggest that the PowerPC core has significant vulnerability to SEES. However, these initial tests were not designed to exclusively target the functionality of the PowerPC, therefore making it difficult to distinguish processor upsets from fabric upsets. The main focus of this paper involves detailed SEE testing of the embedded PowerPC core. Due to the complexity of the PowerPC, various custom test applications, both static and dynamic, will be designed to isolate each Unit of the processor. Collective analysis of the test results will provide insight into the exact upset mechanism of the PowerPC. With this information, mitigations schemes can be developed and tested that address the specific susceptibilities of these devices. The test bed will be the Xilinx SEE Consortium Virtex-II Pro test board, which allows for configuration scrubbing, design triplication, and ease of data collection. Testing will be performed at the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility using protons of varying energy levels and fluencies. This paper will present the detailed test approach along with the results.
A particle sensor array which in a preferred embodiment comprises a static random access memory having a plurality of ion-sensitive memory cells, each such cell comprising at least one pull-down field effect transistor having a sensitive drain surface area (such as by bloating) and at least one pull-up field effect transistor having a source connected to an offset voltage. The sensitive drain surface area and the offset voltage are selected for memory cell upset by incident ions such as alpha-particles. The static random access memory of the present invention provides a means for selectively biasing the memory cells into the same state in which each of the sensitive drain surface areas is reverse biased and then selectively reducing the reversed bias on these sensitive drain surface areas for increasing the upset sensitivity of the cells to ions. The resulting selectively sensitive memory cells can be used in a number of applications. By way of example, the present invention can be used for measuring the linear energy transfer of ion particles, as well as a device for assessing the resistance of CMOS latches to Cosmic Ray induced single event upsets. The sensor of the present invention can also be used to determine the uniformity of an ion beam.
The CALIPSO (Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations) mission is a comprehensive suite of active and passive sensors including a 20Hz 230mj Nd:YAG lidar, a visible wavelength Earth-looking camera and an imaging infrared radiometer. CALIPSO flies in formation with the Earth Observing System Post-Meridian (EOS PM) train, provides continuous, near-simultaneous measurements and is a planned 3 year mission. CALIPSO was launched into a 98 degree sun synchronous Earth orbit in April of 2006 to study clouds and aerosols and acquires over 5 gigabytes of data every 24 hours. The ground track of one CALIPSO orbit as well as high and low intensity South Atlantic Anomaly outlines is shown. CALIPSO passes through the SAA several times each day. Spaced based remote sensing systems that include multiple instruments and/or instruments such as lidar generate large volumes of data and require robust real-time hardware and software mechanisms and high throughput processors. Due to onboard storage restrictions and telemetry downlink limitations these systems must pre-process and reduce the data before sending it to the ground. This onboard processing and realtime requirement load may mean that newer more powerful processors are needed even though acceptable radiation-hardened versions have not yet been released. CALIPSO's single board computer payload controller processor is actually a set of four (4) voting non-radiation hardened COTS Power PC 603r's built on a single width VME card by General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS). Significant radiation concerns for CALIPSO and other Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites include the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), the north and south poles and strong solar events. Over much of South America and extending into the South Atlantic Ocean the Van Allen radiation belts dip to just 200-800km and spacecraft entering this area are subjected to high energy protons and experience higher than normal Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Latch-up (SEL) rates. Although less significant, spacecraft flying in the area around the poles experience similar upsets. Finally, powerful solar proton events in the range of 10MeV/10pfu to 100MeV/1pfu as are forecasted and tracked by NOAA's Space Environment Center in Colorado can result in Single Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Latch-up (SEL) and permanent failures such as Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) in some technologies. (Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCRs) are another source, especially for gate rupture) CALIPSO mitigates common radiation concerns in its data handling through the use of redundant processors, radiation-hardened Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), hardware-based Error Detection and Correction (EDAC), processor and memory scrubbing, redundant boot code and mirrored files. After presenting a system overview this paper will expand on each of these strategies. Where applicable, related on-orbit data collected since the CALIPSO initial boot on May 4, 2006 will be noted.