NASA IV&V Program NASA's Independent Verification and Validation Program
General overview of NASA's IVV Program organizational structure and office functions.
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V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes
This paper describes the results of a special breakout session of the NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Workshop held in the fall of 2012 entitled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes." The NASA IV&V Program is in a unique position to interact with projects across all of the NASA development domains. Using this unique opportunity, the IV&V program convened a breakout session to enable IV&V teams to share their challenges and successes with respect to the V&V of Fault Management (FM) architectures and software. The presentations and discussions provided practical examples of pitfalls encountered while performing V&V of FM including the lack of consistent designs for implementing faults monitors and the fact that FM information is not centralized but scattered among many diverse project artifacts. The discussions also solidified the need for an early commitment to developing FM in parallel with the spacecraft systems as well as clearly defining FM terminology within a project.
Verification↗
Formal Methods of V&V of Partial Specifications: An Experience Report
This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe an experiment in the application of the method SCR. to testing for consistency properties of a partial model of requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification is valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.
Easterbrook, Steve↗
Robust Requirements Tracing via Internet Search Technology: Improving an IV and V Technique
There are three major objectives to this phase of the work. (1) Improvement of Information Retrieval (IR) methods for Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) requirements tracing. Information Retrieval methods are typically developed for very large (order of millions - tens of millions and more documents) document collections and therefore, most successfully used methods somewhat sacrifice precision and recall in order to achieve efficiency. At the same time typical IR systems treat all user queries as independent of each other and assume that relevance of documents to queries is subjective for each user. The IV&V requirements tracing problem has a much smaller data set to operate on, even for large software development projects; the set of queries is predetermined by the high-level specification document and individual requirements considered as query input to IR methods are not necessarily independent from each other. Namely, knowledge about the links for one requirement may be helpful in determining the links of another requirement. Finally, while the final decision on the exact form of the traceability matrix still belongs to the IV&V analyst, his/her decisions are much less arbitrary than those of an Internet search engine user. All this suggests that the information available to us in the framework of the IV&V tracing problem can be successfully leveraged to enhance standard IR techniques, which in turn would lead to increased recall and precision. We developed several new methods during Phase II; (2) IV&V requirements tracing IR toolkit. Based on the methods developed in Phase I and their improvements developed in Phase II, we built a toolkit of IR methods for IV&V requirements tracing. The toolkit has been integrated, at the data level, with SAIC's SuperTracePlus (STP) tool; (3) Toolkit testing. We tested the methods included in the IV&V requirements tracing IR toolkit on a number of projects.
Hayes, Jane↗
Validation (not just verification) of Deep Space Missions
ion & Validation (V&V) is a widely recognized and critical systems engineering function. However, the often used definition 'Verification proves the design is right; validation proves it is the right design' is rather vague. And while Verification is a reasonably well standardized systems engineering process, Validation is a far more abstract concept and the rigor and scope applied to it varies widely between organizations and individuals. This is reflected in the findings in recent Mishap Reports for several NASA missions, in which shortfalls in Validation (not just Verification) were cited as root- or contributing-factors in catastrophic mission loss. Furthermore, although there is strong agreement in the community that Test is the preferred method for V&V, many people equate 'V&V' with 'Test', such that Analysis and Modeling aren't given comparable attention. Another strong motivator is a realization that the rapid growth in complexity of deep-space missions (particularly Planetary Landers and Space Observatories given their inherent unknowns) is placing greater demands on systems engineers to 'get it right' with Validation.
verification↗
IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II
As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.
Gerek Whitman↗
IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II
As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.
Whitman, Gerek↗
Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis IV and V
NASA s ARES I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) flight data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710. Some products included in the flight data package were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelope trajectories, and malfunction turn trajectories. These data are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure Eastern Range public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data in regards to public safety and mission success, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. Multiple NASA centers and contractor organizations were assigned specific products to IV&V. The data generation and IV&V work was coordinated through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel s Trajectory Working Group, which included members from the prime and IV&V organizations as well as the 45SW. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures ARES I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for an RS product. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.
Tarpley, Ashley↗
Development of Methodologies for IV and V of Neural Networks
Non-deterministic systems often rely upon neural network (NN) technology to "lean" to manage flight systems under controlled conditions using carefully chosen training sets. How can these adaptive systems be certified to ensure that they will become increasingly efficient and behave appropriately in real-time situations? The bulk of Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) research of non-deterministic software control systems such as Adaptive Flight Controllers (AFC's) addresses NNs in well-behaved and constrained environments such as simulations and strict process control. However, neither substantive research, nor effective IV&V techniques have been found to address AFC's learning in real-time and adapting to live flight conditions. Adaptive flight control systems offer good extensibility into commercial aviation as well as military aviation and transportation. Consequently, this area of IV&V represents an area of growing interest and urgency. ISR proposes to further the current body of knowledge to meet two objectives: Research the current IV&V methods and assess where these methods may be applied toward a methodology for the V&V of Neural Network; and identify effective methods for IV&V of NNs that learn in real-time, including developing a prototype test bed for IV&V of AFC's. Currently. no practical method exists. lSR will meet these objectives through the tasks identified and described below. First, ISR will conduct a literature review of current IV&V technology. TO do this, ISR will collect the existing body of research on IV&V of non-deterministic systems and neural network. ISR will also develop the framework for disseminating this information through specialized training. This effort will focus on developing NASA's capability to conduct IV&V of neural network systems and to provide training to meet the increasing need for IV&V expertise in such systems.
Taylor, Brian↗
Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation and Analysis IV and V
NASA s Ares I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) product data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710. Some products included were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelopes, and malfunction turn data. These products are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures the Ares I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for certain RS products. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.
Merry, Carl M.↗
A practical experience with independent verification and validation
One approach to reducing software cost and increasing reliability is the use of an independent verification and validation (IV & V) methodology. The Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) applied the IV & V methodology to two medium-size flight dynamics software development projects. Then, to measure the effectiveness of the IV & V approach, the SEL compared these two projects with two similar past projects, using measures like productivity, reliability, and maintain ablilty. Results indicated that the use of the IV & V methodology did not help the overall process nor improve the product in these cases.
Page, Gerald↗
Independent verification and validation for Space Shuttle flight software
The Committee for Review of Oversight Mechanisms for Space Shuttle Software was asked by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Office of Space Flight to determine the need to continue independent verification and validation (IV&V) for Space Shuttle flight software. The Committee found that the current IV&V process is necessary to maintain NASA's stringent safety and quality requirements for man-rated vehicles. Therefore, the Committee does not support NASA's plan to eliminate funding for the IV&V effort in fiscal year 1993. The Committee believes that the Space Shuttle software development process is not adequate without IV&V and that elimination of IV&V as currently practiced will adversely affect the overall quality and safety of the software, both now and in the future. Furthermore, the Committee was told that no organization within NASA has the expertise or the manpower to replace the current IV&V function in a timely fashion, nor will building this expertise elsewhere necessarily reduce cost. Thus, the Committee does not recommend moving IV&V functions to other organizations within NASA unless the current IV&V is maintained for as long as it takes to build comparable expertise in the replacing organization.
Source record↗
Independent Verification and Validation of Complex User Interfaces: A Human Factors Approach
The Usability Testing and Analysis Facility (UTAF) at the NASA Johnson Space Center has identified and evaluated a potential automated software interface inspection tool capable of assessing the degree to which space-related critical and high-risk software system user interfaces meet objective human factors standards across each NASA program and project. Testing consisted of two distinct phases. Phase 1 compared analysis times and similarity of results for the automated tool and for human-computer interface (HCI) experts. In Phase 2, HCI experts critiqued the prototype tool's user interface. Based on this evaluation, it appears that a more fully developed version of the tool will be a promising complement to a human factors-oriented independent verification and validation (IV&V) process.
Whitmore, Mihriban↗
Formal Methods for Verification and Validation of Partial Specifications: A Case Study
This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented. Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors, without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe a case study of the use of partial formal models for V&V of the requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights gained from formalizing a specification are valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a problem, and deserves further study.
Easterbrook, Steve↗
Applying Independent Verification and Validation to Automatic Test Equipment
This paper describes a general overview of applying Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) to Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). The overview is not inclusive of all IV&V activities that can occur or of all development and maintenance items that can be validated and verified, during the IV&V process. A sampling of possible IV&V activities that can occur within each phase of the ATE life cycle are described.
Calhoun, Cynthia C.↗
A Case Study of 4 & 5 Cost Effectiveness
This paper looks at the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of NASA's Space Shuttle Day of Launch I-Load Update (DoLILU) project. IV&V is defined. The system's development life cycle is explained. Data collection and analysis are described. DoLILU Issue Tracking Reports (DITRs) authored by IV&V personnel are analyzed to determine the effectiveness of IV&V in finding errors before the code, testing, and integration phase of the software development life cycle. The study's findings are reported along with the limitations of the study and planned future research.
Neal, Ralph D.↗
Experimental Evaluation of Verification and Validation Tools on Martian Rover Software
We report on a study to determine the maturity of different verification and validation technologies (V&V) on a representative example of NASA flight software. The study consisted of a controlled experiment where three technologies (static analysis, runtime analysis and model checking) were compared to traditional testing with respect to their ability to find seeded errors in a prototype Mars Rover. What makes this study unique is that it is the first (to the best of our knowledge) to do a controlled experiment to compare formal methods based tools to testing on a realistic industrial-size example where the emphasis was on collecting as much data on the performance of the tools and the participants as possible. The paper includes a description of the Rover code that was analyzed, the tools used as well as a detailed description of the experimental setup and the results. Due to the complexity of setting up the experiment, our results can not be generalized, but we believe it can still serve as a valuable point of reference for future studies of this kind. It did confirm the belief we had that advanced tools can outperform testing when trying to locate concurrency errors. Furthermore the results of the experiment inspired a novel framework for testing the next generation of the Rover.
Brat, Guillaume↗
Reducing software security risk through an integrated approach research initiative model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol
This document discusses the verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration of the Model Based Verification (MBV) portion of the verification instrument set being developed under the Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach research initiative. Code Q of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funds this project. The NASA Goddard Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) facility manages this research program at the NASA agency level and the Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) manages the research locally at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California institute of Technology) where the research is being carried out.
software security↗