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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2023

The Viability of See-and-Avoid for Urban Air Mobility Operations

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) is an emerging aviation concept that could supplement today’s ground and air transportation systems. For UAM, it is generally assumed that the private sector will manage separation and not rely on the Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control system. To date, discussions of initial operations focus on using the visual abilities of the pilot to “see and avoid” (SAA) other aircraft. Decades of research on SAA has demonstrated that it is inadequate for reliable detection of aircraft that might pose a collision risk. The literature on multi-object tracking is also reviewed for findings on how well humans can visually track objects. The research shows that humans have limited resources for tracking and that this may be affected by object characteristics and cognitive skills. The conclusion is that SAA is a risky method for avoiding midair collisions. It is recommended that flight deck displays and automated collision avoidance systems be implemented for all UAM aircraft at the outset of their introduction.

urban air mobility↗
DOE OSTI2025

Future Circular Collider Feasibility Study Report

Volume 3 of the FCC Feasibility Report presents studies related to civil engineering, the development of a project implementation scenario, and environmental and sustainability aspects. The report details the iterative improvements made to the civil engineering concepts since 2018, taking into account subsurface conditions, accelerator and experiment requirements, and territorial considerations. It outlines a technically feasible and economically viable civil engineering configuration that serves as the baseline for detailed subsurface investigations, construction design, cost estimation, and project implementation planning. Additionally, the report highlights ongoing subsurface investigations in key areas to support the development of an improved 3D subsurface model of the region. The report describes the development of the project scenario based on the ‘avoid-reduce-compensate’ iterative optimisation approach. The reference scenario balances optimal physics performance with territorial compatibility, implementation risks, and costs. Environmental field investigations covering almost 600 hectares of terrain—including numerous urban, economic, social, and technical aspects—confirmed the project’s technical feasibility and contributed to the preparation of essential input documents for the formal project authorisation phase. The summary also highlights the initiation of public dialogue as part of the authorisation process. The results of a comprehensive socio-economic impact assessment, which included significant environmental effects, are presented. Even under the most conservative and stringent conditions, a positive benefit-cost ratio for the FCC-ee is obtained. Finally, the report provides a summary of the studies conducted to document the current state of the environment.

Benedikt, M. [European Organization for Nuclear Re↗
NASA NTRS2015

Forward Bay Cover Separation Modeling and Testing for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle

Spacecraft multi-body separation events during atmospheric descent require complex testing and analysis to validate the flight separation dynamics models used to verify no re-contact. The NASA Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) architecture includes a highly-integrated Forward Bay Cover (FBC) jettison assembly design that combines parachutes and piston thrusters to separate the FBC from the Crew Module (CM) and avoid re-contact. A multi-disciplinary team across numerous organizations examined key model parameters and risk areas to develop a robust but affordable test campaign in order to validate and verify the FBC separation event for Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1). The FBC jettison simulation model is highly complex, consisting of dozens of parameters varied simultaneously, with numerous multi-parameter interactions (coupling and feedback) among the various model elements, and encompassing distinct near-field, mid-field, and far-field regimes. The test campaign was composed of component-level testing (for example gas-piston thrusters and parachute mortars), ground FBC jettison tests, and FBC jettison air-drop tests that were accomplished by a highly multi-disciplinary team. Three ground jettison tests isolated the testing of mechanisms and structures to anchor the simulation models excluding aerodynamic effects. Subsequently, two air-drop tests added aerodynamic and parachute elements, and served as integrated system demonstrations, which had been preliminarily explored during the Orion Pad Abort-1 (PA-1) flight test in May 2010. Both ground and drop tests provided extensive data to validate analytical models and to verify the FBC jettison event for EFT-1. Additional testing will be required to support human certification of this separation event, for which NASA and Lockheed Martin are applying knowledge from Apollo and EFT-1 testing and modeling to develop a robust human-rated FBC separation event.

Ali, Yasmin↗
NASA NTRS2018

Safe2Ditch Autonomous Crash Management System for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems: Concept Definition and Flight Test Results

Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have the potential for a large array of highly-beneficial applications. These applications are too numerous to comprehensively list, but include search and rescue, fire spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few. Typically sUAS vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in the National Air Space (NAS). Certain sUAS applications, such as package delivery, will include operations in the close proximity of the general public. The full benefit from sUAS is contingent upon the resolution of several technological areas in order to provide an acceptable level of risk for widespread sUAS operations. Operations of sUAS vehicles pose risks to people and property on the ground as well as manned aviation. Several of the more significant sUAS technological areas include, but are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and deconfliction of sUAS from other sUAS and manned aircraft, communications and interfaces between the vehicle and human operators, and the overall reliability of the sUAS and constituent subsystems. While all of the technological areas listed contribute significantly to the safe execution of the sUAS flight operations, contingency or emergency systems can greatly contribute to sUAS risk mitigations to manage situations where the vehicle is in distress. The Safe2Ditch (S2D) system is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS. Its function is to enable sUAS to execute emergency landings and avoid injuring people on the ground, damaging property, and lastly preserving the sUAS and payload. A sUAS flight test effort was performed to test the integration of sub-elements of the S2D system with a representative sUAS multi-rotor.

Glaab, Louis J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Protorheology in practice: Avoiding misinterpretation

Protorheology is the paradigm that any observed flow or deformation is a chance to infer quantitative rheological properties. While this creates many opportunities for insight, there is significant risk of misunderstanding the physics involved, e.g. misinterpreting a liquid as a solid or mistaking viscous flow time as viscoelastic relaxation time. We describe these and other potential mistakes, use case studies to show how serious the problems can be, and contrast misinterpretations with correct approaches and interpretations. Some issues are especially important with materials involving colloidal particles and flows involving surface tension. Whether the reader is making inference from a tilted vial, time-lapse gravity-driven flow, a bounce test, die swell, or any other protorheology observation, the examples here serve as a guide for avoiding bad data in protorheology.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2010

Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance

Objective SACA-1: Determine the level of safety provided by tactical separation assurance safety monitoring systems for UAS missions. a) Rationale: Continuous mission-risk monitoring can provide equivalent levels of safety for UAS operations possibly reducing the burden on other safety systems. b) Approach: Utilize and adapt algorithms and approaches developed for the NextGen Airspace Systems Program for UAS applications.

Lauderdale, Todd↗
NASA NTRS2000

Dose limits for astronauts

Radiation exposures to individuals in space can greatly exceed natural radiation exposure on Earth and possibly normal occupational radiation exposures as well. Consequently, procedures limiting exposures would be necessary. Limitations were proposed by the Radiobiological Advisory Panel of the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council in 1970. This panel recommended short-term limits to avoid deterministic effects and a single career limit (of 4 Sv) based on a doubling of the cancer risk in men aged 35 to 55. Later, when risk estimates for cancer had increased and were recognized to be age and sex dependent, the NCRP, in Report No. 98 in 1989, recommended a range of career limits based on age and sex from 1 to 4 Sv. NCRP is again in the process of revising recommendations for astronaut exposure, partly because risk estimates have increased further and partly to recognize trends in limiting radiation exposure occupationally on the ground. The result of these considerations is likely to be similar short-term limits for deterministic effects but modified career limits.

Review↗
NASA NTRS2008

The NASA Robotic Conjunction Assessment Process: Overview and Operational Experiences

Orbital debris poses a significant threat to spacecraft health and safety. Recent events such as China's anti-satellite test and the Breeze-M rocket explosion have led to an even greater awareness and concern in the satellite community. Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established requirements that routine conjunction assessment screening shall be performed for all maneuverable spacecraft having perigees less than 2000 km or within 200 km of geosynchronous altitude. NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has developed an operational collision risk assessment process to protect NASA s high-value unmanned (robotic) assets that has been in use since January 2005. This paper provides an overview of the NASA robotic conjunction assessment process, including descriptions of the new tools developed to analyze close approach data and of the risk mitigation strategies employed. In addition, statistical data describing the number of conjunctions experienced are presented. A debris avoidance maneuver performed by Aura in June of 2008 is described in detail to illustrate the process.

Newman, Lauri Kraft↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Role of NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) in Advancing NASA’s Astrophysics Missions (Past, Present, and Future)

The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) was established in 2003 (after the Columbia accident) to provide an independent technical resource for the resolution of challenging technical problems (through the use of studies, analysis, tests, etc.) for NASA programs and projects. Since its inception, NESC has completed nearly 1000 technical assessments for NASA’s Human Exploration and Operation Mission Directorate (HEOMD), Science Mission Directorate (SMD), Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD), and Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). Of the SMD related assessments, several were for the resolution of technical problems, analysis, or studies related to NASA’s astrophysics missions in various phases of the project from design to operation. Some of the recent examples of NESC technical support for NASA astrophysics missions have been for: Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Chandra X-ray Observatory (CXO), Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope, Kepler Space Telescope, Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS), James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), and Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA). In this paper, we outline some of the technical challenges faced by these astrophysics missions and describe how NESC contributed to their resolution. The case studies cover a wide range of disciplines involving space telescopes, detectors, lasers, and attitude control systems. These efforts include innovative solutions for extending the life of the missions, technical resolution of challenging problems, strategies for risk mitigation, and failure investigations combined with lessons learned reports to advance discipline knowledge, enhance NASA capabilities, and avoid future problems.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS1985

Understanding and avoiding potential problems in implementing automation

Technology-driven efforts to implement automation often encounter problems due to lack of acceptance or begrudging acceptance by the personnel involved. It is argued in this paper that the level of automation perceived by an individual heavily influences whether or not the automation is accepted by that individual. The factors that appear to affect perceived level of automation are discussed. Issues considered include the impact of automation on the system and the individual, correlates of acceptance, problems and risks of automation, and factors influencing alienation. Based on an understanding of these issues, a set of eight guidelines is proposed as a possible means of avoiding problems in implementing automation.

Rouse, W. B.↗
NASA NTRS2011

An Earthling to an Astronaut: Medical Challenges

Humans can travel safely into space in low Earth orbit (LEO) or to near-Earth objects if several medical, physiological, environmental, and human factors issues risks are mitigated. Research must be performed in order to set standards in these four areas, and current NASA standards are contained in the Space Flight Human System Standards volumes 1 and 2, and crew medical certification standards. These three sets of standards drive all of the clinical, biomedical research and environmental technology development for the NASA human space flight program. These standards also drive the identification of specific risks to crew health and safety, and we currently manage 65 human system risks within the human space flight program. Each risk has a specific program of research, technology development, and development of operational procedures to mitigate the risks. Some of the more important risks tat will be discussed in this talk include exposure to radiation, behavioral health due to confinement in a closed cabin, physiological changes such as loss of bone, muscle and exercise capability, reduction in immune system capability, environmental threats of maintaining an adequate atmosphere and water for drinking, avoidance of toxic or infectious material, protection of hearing, and human factors issues of equipment and task design. A nutritious and varied food supply must also be provided. All of these risks will be discussed and current strategies for mitigating these risks for long-duration human space flight. In mitigating these 65 human system risks, novel approaches to problem solving must be employed to find the most appropriate research and technology based applications. Some risk mitigations are developed internally to NASA while others are found through research grants, technology procurements, and more recently open innovation techniques to seek solutions from the global technical community. Examples and results will be presented from all of these approaches including the more recent use of prizes to stimulate innovation.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Comparison of Rolling Moment Characteristics During Roll Oscillations for a Low and a High Aspect Ratio Configuration

Improvements in testing and modeling of nonlinear and unsteady aerodynamic effects for flight dynamics predictions of vehicle performance is critical to enable the design and implementation of new, innovative vehicle concepts. Any configuration which exhibits significant flow separation, nonlinear aerodynamics, control interactions or attempts maneuvering through one or more conditions such as these is, at present, a challenge to test, model or predict flight dynamic responses prior to flight. Even in flight test experiments, adequate models are not available to study and characterize the complex nonlinear and time-dependent flow effects occurring during portions of the maneuvering envelope. Traditionally, airplane designs have been conducted to avoid these areas of the flight envelope. Better understanding and characterization of these flight regimes may not only reduce risk and cost of flight test development programs, but also may pave the way for exploitation of those characteristics that increase airplane capabilities. One of the hurdles is that the nonlinear/unsteady effects appear to be configuration dependent. This paper compares some of the dynamic aerodynamic stability characteristics of two very different configurations - representative of a fighter and a transport airplane - during dynamic body-axis roll wind tunnel tests. The fighter model shows significant effects of oscillation frequency which are not as apparent for the transport configuration.

Brandon, Jay M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Model Based Mission Assurance: Emerging Opportunities for Robotic Systems

The emergence of Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) in a Model Based Engineering framework has created new opportunities to improve effectiveness and efficiencies across the assurance functions. The MBSE environment supports not only system architecture development, but provides for support of Systems Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis concurrently in the same framework. Linking to detailed design will further improve assurance capabilities to support failures avoidance and mitigation in flight systems. This also is leading new assurance functions including model assurance and management of uncertainty in the modeling environment. Further, the assurance cases, a structured hierarchal argument or model, are emerging as a basis for supporting a comprehensive viewpoint in which to support Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA).

Mission Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2018

USA Space Debris Environment, Operations, and Research Updates

Space Missions in 2017 Earth Satellite Population Collision Avoidance Maneuvers Post mission Disposal of U.S.A. Spacecraft Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) A total of 86 space launches placed more than 400 spacecraft into Earth orbits during 2017, following the trend of increase over the past decade NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS NASA has established conjunction assessment processes for its human spaceflight and uncrewed spacecraft to avoid accidental collisions with objects tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network - NASA also assists other U.S. government spacecraft owners with conjunction assessments and subsequent maneuvers The ISS has conducted 25 debris collision avoidance maneuvers since 1999 - None in 2016-2017, but an ISS visiting vehicle had one collision avoidance maneuver in 2017 During 2017 NASA executed or assisted in the execution of 21 collision avoidance maneuvers by uncrewed spacecraft - Four maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from Fengyun-1C - Two maneuvers were conducted to avoid debris from the collision of Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 The 2014-15 NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) assessment for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) provided the following findings - Millimeter-sized orbital debris pose the highest penetration risk to most operational spacecraft in LEO - The most effective means to collect direct measurement data on millimetersized debris above 600 km altitude is to conduct in situ measurements - There is currently no in situ data on such small debris above 600 km altitude Since the orbital debris population follows a power-law size distribution, there are many more millimeter-sized debris than the large tracked objects - Current conjunction assessments and collision avoidance maneuvers against the tracked objects (which are typically 10 cm and larger) only address a small fraction (<1%) of the mission-ending risk from orbital debris To address the millimeter-sized debris data gap above 600 km, NASA has recently developed an innovative in situ measurement instrument - the Space Debris Sensor (SDS) - One maneuver was conducted to avoid the ISS

Liou, J.-C.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Slow Strain Rate Testing of A537 Tank Wall Material

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade carbon steel tanks. This waste in part consists of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. Preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to localized corrosion. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion and/or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. The salt dissolution process also liberates interstitial liquid trapped between the salt crystals. This liquid is initially high in nitrite and hydroxide concentration. High pH and greater ratios of nitrite to nitrate act as inhibitors to minimize corrosion of carbon steel in high nitrate environments. However, as dissolution proceeds, the concentration of nitrate will increase, while the hydroxide and nitrite concentration of the interstitial liquid will deplete and become insufficient to prevent the onset of corrosion attack. Tank blending and the addition of inhibitors are used to ensure adequate concentrations of hydroxide and nitrite. However, this is not desirable during salt dissolution as it can reduce process efficiency and increase the amount of waste that needs processing. This testing program was designed to examine the risk of SCC associated with utilizing the pitting factor (PF) and nitrite/nitrate (NO 2 - /NO 3 - ) ratio limits for handling dissolved salt solutions at an elevated temperature in the carbon steel waste tanks. The previously identified limits are a PF of 1.2 and an NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio of 0.15. The results indicate that as long as the NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio exceeds 0.1 and the PF is above approximately 0.8, there is a discernible safety margin between the open circuit potential (OCP) and the critical cracking potential (CCP) observed during applied potential testing. However, this margin, defined by the difference between the OCP and CCP, is relatively narrow, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 volts. This small margin raises concerns about potential shifts in OCP during waste retrieval operations, which could inadvertently increase the risk of SCC if the OCP approaches or exceeds the CCP. These results confirm that dissolved salt solutions provide a potent chemistry that, under certain conditions, makes carbon steel susceptible to SCC. The next question to consider is the influence these results have on decisions for storage and retrieval of waste from the tanks. For Type III/IIIA waste tanks, the risk of SCC remains very low. First, and most importantly, the post-weld stress relief of the tanks has reduced the residual stress near the welds. Thus, without the stress component, SCC risk is minimized. The material of construction (A537 Carbon steel) for the Type III/IIIA tanks is superior to the steel in its resistance to SCC than the steel that was utilized for the Type I, II, and IV tanks (A285 carbon steel). From a chemistry control standpoint for a Type III/IIIA tank directly involved with handling dissolved salt solutions, the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio limits may be utilized wherein chemistry control provides an extra layer of defense against SCC. Chemistry control for a Type III/IIIA tank minimizes the risk for a tank that may receive the dissolved salt solution, particularly if that tank is a Type I, II, or IV waste tank. On the other hand, if the dissolved salt solution is handled by a Type I, II, or IV waste tank the risk of SCC is real. The potent chemistry, absence of stress relief, and inferior material result in a condition that is conducive to cracking. Efforts should be made to either avoid transferring waste that may not meet the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria to one of these tanks or if it is unavoidable, take measures to minimize the consequences of a leak. As shown by these tests, even if the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria are met, there is a risk that the tank potential may be disturbed in the positive direction and the risk of SCC increase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2005

Reuse International Space Station (ISS) Modules as Lunar Habitat

NASA currently projects ending the ISS mission in approximately 2016, due primarily to the expense of re-boost and re-supply. Lunar outposts are expected to be in place in the same timeframe. In support of these mission goals, a scheme to reuse ISS modules on the moon has been identified. These modules could function as pressurized volumes for human habitation in a lunar vacuum as they have done in low-earth orbit. The ISS hull is structurally capable of withstanding a lunar landing because there is no atmospheric turbulence or friction. A compelling reason to send ISS modules to the moon is their large mass; a large portion of the ISS would survive re-entry if allowed to de-orbit to Earth. ISS debris could pose a serious risk to people or structures on Earth unless a controlled re-entry is performed. If a propulsive unit is devised to be attached to the ISS and control re-entry, a propulsion system could be used to propel the modules to the moon and land them there. ISS modules on the lunar surface would not require re-boost. Radiation protection can be attained by burying the module in lunar regolith. Power and a heat removal system would be required for the lunar modules which would need little support structure other than the lunar surface. With planetary mass surrounding the module, heat flux may be controlled by conductance. The remaining requirement is the re-supply of life-support expendables. There are raw materials on the moon to supplement these vital resources. The lunar maria is known to contain approximately 40% oxygen by mass in inorganic mineral compounds. Chemical conversion of moon rocks to release gaseous oxygen is known science. Recycling and cleaning of air and water are currently planned to be accomplished with ISS Environmental Control & Life Support Systems (ECLSS). By developing a Propulsion and Landing Module (PLM) to dock to the Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM), several identical PLMs could be produced to rescue and transfer the ISS modules to the lunar surface, one by one. The propulsion does not need to be as swift as Apollo, nor would the modules need to be manned during transportation to the moon. The trajectory from low-Earth to lunar orbit would avoid or quickly pass through the Van Allen belts to minimize radiation exposure to electronics onboard. A landing technology similar to Apollo's could be utilized to land an ISS module on the moon. Since the mission will be unmanned, system redundancy could be minimized to keep the cost down. If the mission failed and a module crashed landed on the moon, the risk of debris landing on Earth would be avoided and the raw materials could be used in future lunar missions.

Miernik, Janie↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Maintainable Fusion Pilot Plant

The US fusion community has coalesced around the goal of building an FPP as described by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). In addition to demonstrating the viability of the technologies necessary to operate such a plant, including demonstration of net energy and electricity production, NASEM found that a “fusion pilot plant will need to demonstrate the ability to efficiently perform remote maintenance and replacement in support of the design of a power plant, taking into account details of the consequences of the fusion environment, such as material activation and tritium retention in components.” Current designs of fusion demonstration reactors do usually foresee a regular exchange of their first wall modules, including the tritium breeding blankets. In the European Power Plant Conceptual Studies, it is assumed that a fusion reactor will need to change its divertor every 2 years and its first wall blanket module every 5 to 6 years to reach acceptable availability. Underlying this capability are remote-handling technologies to keep the outage for the exchange of these components short. There are many uncertainties in the remote-handling schemes, and most schemes are at a preconceptual level at best. In addition, the exchange of these components would either produce an enormous rad-waste stream or would require an enormous refurbishment activity with huge cost-prohibitive hot-cells. Past Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) preconceptual studies have led to hot cell dimensions of an unbelievable size, likely costing tens of billions of dollars. Already at The Way (previously International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, ITER), hot-cells have become cost-prohibitive, demanding redesigns of the ITER first wall to reduce the toxic rad-waste/inventory. In this in-situ PFC repair project, a concept for a long-life, maintainable first wall module concept is developed and tested. This first wall concept relies on innovative remote handling to repair the first wall modules in-situ, avoiding costly refurbishments outside of the tokamak vessel. This approach was highlighted in the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) report on Transformative Enabling Capabilities for Efficient Advance Toward Fusion Energy. In general, the damage of the first wall armor is due to particle and radiation exposures. Load conditions vary from one fusion reactor design to another. In tokamaks, first wall Plasma Facing Components (PFCs) are exposed to far-Scrape-Off-Layer plasma fluxes, electromagnetic radiation, energetic CX neutrals, and potentially runaway electron beams. Protecting the first wall to the worst-case load conditions would require the design of a very thick first wall armor. Transient heat and particle fluxes due to disruptions or edge localized modes can lead to excessive heat loads resulting potentially in melting PFCs down to the cooling channel. Catastrophic events like these need to be avoided by appropriate disruption mitigation systems. However, failure of these systems will still put a first wall at an unacceptable risk. Hence, a first wall design needs to accommodate the occasional transient heat loads by introducing sacrificial limiters, which will absorb these transients.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗