Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “hardware security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

Contact-Less Integrity Verification of Microelectronics Using Near-Field EM Analysis

Modern microelectronics life-cycle and supply chain ecosystem bring multiple untrusted entities, which can compromise their integrity. A major integrity issue of microelectronics stems from piracy of intellectual properties (IP) and counterfeiting, which causes significant revenue loss to the semiconductor manufacturers. Further, these components often lead to compromised functionality, reliability, security, and safety of an electronic system. This paper presents secure information transmission and probing methods for verifying the integrity of digital integrated circuit (ICs) based on their electromagnetic (EM) near-field emissions and thereby protecting systems against counterfeit components. The proposed method has been tested on both high-level instructions executed by microprocessors or Systems-on-Chip (serving as examples of software), and also logic circuits within FPGA fabrics and ASICs (serving as examples of hardware). The authentication information required by each digital system is generated using a pseudo-random number generator circuit and securely transmitted via near-field magnetic emissions. The authorized party can probe these emissions using a near-field probe, process the acquired signals to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and then recover the secure information through matched filtering. Experimental results from commercial SoCs are used to demonstrate the proposed technique. Methods for reducing EM interference during integrity verification of both FPGAs and ASICs are also described.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Four-Layer Cyber-Physical Security Model for Electric Machine Drives Considering Control Information Flow

Despite the IEEE Power Electronics Society (PELS) establishing Technical Committee 10 on Design Methodologies with a focus on the cyber-physical security of power electronics systems, a holistic design methodology for addressing security vulnerabilities remains underdeveloped. This gap largely stems from the limited integration of computer science and power/control engineering studies in this interdisciplinary field. Addressing the inadequacy of unilateral cyber or control perspectives, this article presents a novel four-layer cyber-physical security model specifically designed for electric machine drives. Central to this model is the innovative control information flow (CIF) model, residing within the control layer, which serves as a pivotal link between the cyber layer's vulnerable resources and the physical layer's state-space models. By mapping vulnerable resources to control variable space and tracing attack propagation, the CIF model facilitates accurate impact predictions based on tainted control laws. The effectiveness and validity of this proposed model are demonstrated through hardware experiments involving two typical cyber-attack scenarios, underscoring its potential as a comprehensive framework for multidisciplinary security strategies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Reproduction of the Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-LA Model Runs using TSPA Computing Systems

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted an evaluation of total system performance assessment (TSPA) related computing systems for the previously considered Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). This was done to maintain the operational readiness of the computing infrastructure (computer hardware and software) and knowledge capability for total system performance assessment (TSPA) type analysis, as directed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE 2010. This work is a continuation of the ongoing readiness evaluation reported in Lee and Hadgu (2014). The current work examined main components of the computing system identified in the previous work (Lee and Hadgu, 2014) to ensure the operational readiness of the TSPA-LA model capability on the server cluster. The TSPA computing hardware and storage system were replaced in late 2014 to maintain core capability and improve computation efficiency. One floating license of GoldSim Version 9.60.300 was installed on the upgraded cluster head node, and its distributed processing capability was mapped on the cluster processors. Other supporting software was tested and installed to support the TSPA-type analysis on the server cluster. All the TSPA-LA modeling cases were tested and verified for the model reproducibility on the upgraded 2014 server cluster (CL2014). All test runs were executed on multiple processors on the server cluster utilizing the GoldSim distributed processing capability, and all runs completed successfully. The model reproducibility verification was evaluated by two approaches: numerical value comparison and graphical comparison. The analysis demonstrated an excellent reproducibility of the TSPA-LA model runs on the upgraded server cluster. The 2014 server cluster and supporting software systems are fully operational to support TSPA- LA type analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Reproduction of the Yucca Mountain Project TSPA-LA Model Runs using TSPA Computing Systems

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted an evaluation of total system performance assessment (TSPA) related computing systems for the previously considered Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). This was done to maintain the operational readiness of the computing infrastructure (computer hardware and software) and knowledge capability for total system performance assessment (TSPA) type analysis, as directed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE 2010. This work is a continuation of the ongoing readiness evaluation reported in Lee and Hadgu (2014). The current work examined main components of the computing system identified in the previous work (Lee and Hadgu, 2014) to ensure the operational readiness of the TSPA-LA model capability on the server cluster. The TSPA computing hardware and storage system were replaced in late 2014 to maintain core capability and improve computation efficiency. One floating license of GoldSim Version 9.60.300 was installed on the upgraded cluster head node, and its distributed processing capability was mapped on the cluster processors. Other supporting software was tested and installed to support the TSPA-type analysis on the server cluster. All the TSPA-LA modeling cases were tested and verified for the model reproducibility on the upgraded 2014 server cluster (CL2014). All test runs were executed on multiple processors on the server cluster utilizing the GoldSim distributed processing capability, and all runs completed successfully. The model reproducibility verification was evaluated by two approaches: numerical value comparison and graphical comparison. The analysis demonstrated an excellent reproducibility of the TSPA-LA model runs on the upgraded server cluster. The 2014 server cluster and supporting software systems are fully operational to support TSPA- LA type analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Needs for Remote Microreactor Operations

As the nuclear industry develops new advanced reactor technologies, many companies are embracing this advancement by pursuing the development of microreactors. The term microreactor generally refers to a nuclear reactor with an operating power of 20 MW(thermal) or less. The power range of microreactors makes them appealing for many use cases, such as powering remote communities, mining sites, and military bases. Most of the microreactor designs being pursued are expected to incorporate remote facility operations into the final product. However, no framework has yet been developed to determine what remote operations systems require for reliable, resilient, and secure operation of a microreactor. Here, this work identifies the research needs for challenges that are unique to remote operations and monitoring for microreactors, specifically regarding instrumentation and control, communication methods, regulatory requirements, and operational policies. The types of commands and sensor measurements that must be transmitted between the facilities, as well as methods for verifying the trustworthiness of these signals, are assessed. This work evaluates the security, reliability, and performance requirements that must be met when considering the selection of communication hardware and protocols for use in remote operations. Also, an assessment was performed to study how remote operations fit within current regulatory requirements and what may need to be updated in regulatory policy to allow for remote operation. Finally, the operational contingencies unique to remote operations that must be in place for responses to abnormal events are identified. This paper identifies the challenges and research opportunities within the areas of importance for the design of remote operation systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Achieving American Leadership in the Electric Grid Supply Chain Factsheet

The U.S. electric grid consists of more than 22,000 generators; 55,000 substations; 642,000 miles of high-voltage lines; and 6.3 million miles of distribution lines that serve 153 million customers. To date, much of the smart grid transformation has focused on applying advanced digital information and communication technologies to the power grid to improve the system’s efficiency, flexibility, and security. To achieve the full value of grid modernization, we also need advances in grid hardware. Many critical components supporting the power grid have limited to no domestic manufacturing capacity and face complex challenges in supporting a rapid expansion of the grid to meet multiple objectives, including decarbonization goals.

Source record↗

Opportunities and Challenges for Remote Microreactor Operations

The nuclear industry is developing new advanced reactor technologies, and many companies are embracing this advancement by pursuing the development of microreactors. The term microreactor generally refers to a nuclear reactor with an operating power of 20 MW or less. The power range of microreactors makes them appealing for many use cases, such as powering remote communities, mining sites, and military bases. Most of the microreactor designs being pursued will incorporate remote facility operations into the final product. However, no framework has yet been developed to determine what remote operations systems require for reliable, resilient, and secure operation of a microreactor. This work identifies the challenges unique to remote operations and monitoring for microreactors specifically regarding instrumentation and control, communication methods, regulatory requirements, and operational policies. The types of commands and sensor measurements that must be transmitted between the facilities as well as methods for verifying the trustworthiness of these signals are assessed. This work evaluates the security, reliability, and performance requirements that must be met when considering the selection of communication hardware and protocols for use in remote operations. Also, an assessment was performed to study how remote operations fit within current regulatory requirements and what may need to be updated in regulatory policy to allow for remote operation. Finally, the operational contingencies unique to remote operations that must be in place for response to abnormal events are identified. This paper details these challenges and research opportunities to provide a foundation for the design of remote operation systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Management and Security Expert (MASE)

The Management and Security Expert (MASE) is a distributed expert system that monitors the operating systems and applications of a network. It is capable of gleaning the information provided by the different operating systems in order to optimize hardware and software performance; recognize potential hardware and/or software failure, and either repair the problem before it becomes an emergency, or notify the systems manager of the problem; and monitor applications and known security holes for indications of an intruder or virus. MASE can eradicate much of the guess work of system management.

Miller, Mark D.↗

Secure environment establishment for FPGA-based safety-critical systems: quality management system context - 159

The paper discusses importance of secure development and operational environment establishment process, its particular stages, including security-oriented analysis and assessment of safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. Two particular aspects are covered - security assessment and security assurance related to processes established by Quality Management System (QMS). One of the underlying ideas for the security assessment approach is in performance of gap analysis. Such analysis considers influence of all different factors within I and C system development process, and further application of Intrusion Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (IMECA) technique. It makes the approach applicable to various safety-critical systems, considering underlying technologies (for example, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Nowadays FPGA technology is often used in wide spectrum of hardware devices - from personal devices to complex I and C systems for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The problem of cyber security assessment and assurance for FPGA technology in general and its application in safety-critical I and C systems in particular is not completely solved due to several reasons that cover regulations, QMS processes, implementation of development and verification activities, etc. The paper overviews existing regulations, which cover various aspects of NPP I and C systems development and operation, FPGA technology implementation, and secure development and operational environment establishment and assurance. The paper also emphasizes that complex approach should be used to identify and mitigate all specific vulnerabilities thorough the whole life cycle on the basis on Intrusion Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis technique. The paper also proposes approach to the development of safety-critical I and C systems in the scope of cyber security assurance process at developer site. Secure development environment is described as a key factor during the development process and the paper also discusses establishment and maintenance of such environment as a part of company's Nuclear Quality Assurance's QMS. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A full-scope, high-fidelity simulator-based hardware-in-the-loop testbed for comprehensive nuclear power plant cybersecurity research

Nuclear power plant (NPP) cybersecurity research often relies on hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbeds that integrate real hardware components into simulated environments. These testbeds allow researchers to identify vulnerabilities, evaluate attack impacts, and test security measures in a controlled setting. Furthermore, previous HIL testbeds lacked fidelity to accurately represent real nuclear systems, limiting the scope of cybersecurity analysis. This study presents the creation of a HIL testbed, devised upon a full-scope, high-fidelity NPP simulator, to facilitate realistic and comprehensive cybersecurity research. To demonstrate its capabilities, the control logic for the steam generator water level was migrated from the simulator to an external programmable logic controller. As a practical application of the developed testbed, supply chain attack scenarios were simulated by injecting malicious code into the controller logic, and the effects of manipulating sensor inputs and control commands were observed. While this HIL testbed provides more detailed simulations, enhanced realism, and wider applicability compared to other options utilizing a less complex simulator, it is also more intricate and costly. For this reason, we include a detailed comparison with some alternative architectures to aid fellow researchers and practitioners in the selection of a suitable HIL architecture based on specific research objectives.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Moving Toward Trustworthy Systems: R&D Essentials

Under the game-change metaphor, strate- gies developed to address hard problems will potentially lead to breakthroughs in many different interrelated cybersecuri- ty areas. For software assurance, a game change should focus on improving resil- iency and hardening new technologies that implement moving-target defenses aInd tailored trustworthy spaces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

PNNLs Data Intensive Computing research battles Homeland Security threats

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratorys (PNNL's) approach to data intensive computing (DIC) is focused on three key research areas: hybrid hardware architecture, software architectures, and analytic algorithms. Advancements in these areas will help to address, and solve, DIC issues associated with capturing, managing, analyzing and understanding, in near real time, data at volumes and rates that push the frontiers of current technologies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Application of JMP and design of experiments to security system technology testing.

JMP and design of experiments (DOE) have been successfully applied to security system technologies from sensors to communication and display systems. In all cases, the technologies have been complex enough to warrant the need for a statistical determination of significant factors and/or the generation of predictive models. For the sensors, it was the task of calibrating a fiber optic intrusion detection sensor (FOIDS) with 32 adjustable settings. In addition to the numerous settings, the FOIDS also had two software processors for detecting different types of alarms. The problem was made more complex when the different types of alarms occurred on the wrong processors, causing nuisance alarms. JMP's ability to optimize several predictive models simultaneously with JMP's Prediction Profiler flash files was an important factor in producing field solutions. For the Communications and Display testbed system, numerous hardware and software network components had been integrated to build a functional system. Although the components of the system had been tested individually, the system's performance could not be piecewise evaluated. Through the application of JMP's design of experiments and data mining capabilities, it was possible to test some of the factors affecting the system's performance and to differentiate between some of the software and hardware contributors. This paper will discuss design of experiments and the JMP tools applied to the solutions for both security systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗

Venipuncture and intravenous infusion access during zero-gravity flight

The purpose of this experiment is to establish the difficulty associated with securing an intravenous (IV) catheter in place in microgravity flight and the techniques applicable in training the Crew Medical Officer (CMO) for Space Station Freedom, as well as aiding in the selection of appropriate hardware and supplies for the Health Maintenance Facility (HMF). The objectives are the following: (1) to determine the difficulties associated with venipuncture in a microgravity environment; (2) to evaluate the various methods of securing an IV catheter and attached tubing for infusion with regard to the unique environment; (3) to evaluate the various materials available for securing an intravenous catheter in place; and (4) to evaluate the fluid therapy administration system when functioning in a complete system. The inflight test procedures and other aspects of the KC-135 parabolic flight test to simulate microgravity are presented.

Krupa, Debra T.↗

Study of NSI and related cable performance during tests performed in the NASA Hot Gas Facility

Some seven different configurations of the NSI and other cables were tested in the NASA-MSFC Hot Gas Facility (HGF). The tests were conducted to study what happens to the cables when they are exposed to hot flow as was the case in the first two Shuttle flights, the STS-1 and STS-2. Protection of these components is vital for various functions especially to attain proper nozzle separation. The tests in the HGF demonstrated the severity of the aerodynamic forces combined with aero heating environment on the test cables and helped, in general, to evaluate the cable wrap materials and cable mounting hardware and technique. Blastape 2 cable wrap which is adequate for thermal protection of the cables must be properly clamped at its ends. The nylon clamps (or ties) used to secure cables to metal components inside the skirt could not withstand the heating. K5NA closeout material used on the outboard surface of the aft skirt when troweled over the cables performed excellently in protecting the cables and mounting hardware.

Karu, Z. S.↗

Drop Tower Statement of Work

This document details the needs and requirements for a propulsion-assisted drop tower system (further referenced simply as Drop Tower) to perform hardware testing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). LLNL is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). LLNL requires a robust testing platform that will allow for the characterization of interactions between objects of interest. The initial siting of the equipment will be located in an existing test facility (B191). When another test facility becomes online, the objective will be to move the test capability to the new facility as a final location (B132N). The Drop Tower will be a cornerstone capability for testing and model validation for LLNL interested programs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Architecture and Implementation of OpenPET Firmware and Embedded Software

OpenPET is an open source, modular, extendible, and high-performance platform suitable for multi-channel data acquisition and analysis. Due to the versatility of the hardware, firmware, and software architectures, the platform is capable of interfacing with a wide variety of detector modules not only in medical imaging but also in homeland security applications. Analog signals from radiation detectors share similar characteristics-a pulse whose area is proportional to the deposited energy and whose leading edge is used to extract a timing signal. As a result, a generic design method of the platform is adopted for the hardware, firmware, and software architectures and implementations. The analog front-end is hosted on a module called a Detector Board, where each board can filter, combine, timestamp, and process multiple channels independently. The processed data is formatted and sent through a backplane bus to a module called Support Board, where 1 Support Board can host up to eight Detector Board modules. The data in the Support Board, coming from 8 Detector Board modules, can be aggregated or correlated (if needed) depending on the algorithm implemented or runtime mode selected. It is then sent out to a computer workstation for further processing. The number of channels (detector modules), to be processed, mandates the overall OpenPET System Configuration, which is designed to handle up to 1,024 channels using 16-channel Detector Boards in the Standard System Configuration and 16,384 channels using 32-channel Detector Boards in the Large System Configuration.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗