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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11

Contact-Less Integrity Verification of Microelectronics Using Near-Field EM Analysis

Modern microelectronics life-cycle and supply chain ecosystem bring multiple untrusted entities, which can compromise their integrity. A major integrity issue of microelectronics stems from piracy of intellectual properties (IP) and counterfeiting, which causes significant revenue loss to the semiconductor manufacturers. Further, these components often lead to compromised functionality, reliability, security, and safety of an electronic system. This paper presents secure information transmission and probing methods for verifying the integrity of digital integrated circuit (ICs) based on their electromagnetic (EM) near-field emissions and thereby protecting systems against counterfeit components. The proposed method has been tested on both high-level instructions executed by microprocessors or Systems-on-Chip (serving as examples of software), and also logic circuits within FPGA fabrics and ASICs (serving as examples of hardware). The authentication information required by each digital system is generated using a pseudo-random number generator circuit and securely transmitted via near-field magnetic emissions. The authorized party can probe these emissions using a near-field probe, process the acquired signals to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and then recover the secure information through matched filtering. Experimental results from commercial SoCs are used to demonstrate the proposed technique. Methods for reducing EM interference during integrity verification of both FPGAs and ASICs are also described.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Partial defect verification of spent fuel assemblies by PDET: Principle and field testing in Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden

Here, the need for the development of a credible method and instrument for partial defect verification of spent fuel has been emphasized over a few decades in the safeguards communities as the diverted spent fuel pins can be the source of nuclear terrorism or devices. The need is increasingly more important and even urgent as many countries have started to transfer spent fuel to so called "difficult-to-access" areas such as dry storage casks, reprocessing or geological repositories. Partial defect verification is required by IAEA before spent fuel is placed into "difficult-to-access" areas. Earlier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has reported the successful development of a new, credible partial defect verification method for pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies without use of operator data, and further reported the validation experiments using commercial spent fuel assemblies with some missing fuel pins. The method was found to be robust as the method is relatively invariant to the characteristic variations of spent fuel assemblies such as initial fuel enrichment, cooling time, and burn-up. Since then, the PDET system has been designed and prototyped for 17×17 PWR spent fuel assemblies, complete with data acquisition software and acquisition electronics. In this paper, a summary description of the PDET development followed by results of the first successful field testing using the integrated PDET system and actual spent fuel assemblies performed in a commercial spent fuel storage site, known as Central Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden will be presented. In addition to partial defect detection initial studies have determined that the tool can be used to verify the operator declared average burnup of the assembly as well as intra-assembly bunrup levels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of Real-Time Mitigation Techniques forCyber Security in IEC 61850 / IEC 62351Substations

This paper presents the design logic and implementation aspects of three potential real-time mitigation techniques capable of countering GOOSE-based attacks: (i) IEC 62351-compliant message authentication code (MAC) scheme, (ii) a semantics-enforced rule- based intrusion detection system (IDS), and (iii) a hybrid approach integrating both MAC verification and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). A comparative evaluation of these real-time mitigation approaches is conducted using a cyber-physical system(CPS) security testbed. The results show that the hybrid integration significantly enhances mitigation capability. Furthermore, the processing delays of all three methods remain within the strict delivery requirements of GOOSE communication. The study also identifies limitations that none of the techniques can fully address, highlighting areas for future work.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and St↗

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The development and application of the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA).

Advanced sealing technologies are often an integral part of a containment surveillance (CS) approach to detect undeclared diversion of nuclear materials. As adversarial capabilities continue to advance, the sophistication of the seal design must advance as well. The intelligent integration of security concepts into a physical technology used to seal monitored items is a fundamental requirement for secure containment. Seals have a broad range of capabilities. These capabilities must be matched appropriately to the application to establish the greatest effectiveness from the seal. However, many current seal designs and their application fail to provide the high confidence of detection and timely notification that can be appreciated with new technology. Additionally, as monitoring needs rapidly expand, out-pacing budgets, remote monitoring of low-cost autonomous sealing technologies becomes increasingly appealing. The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes this technology and has implemented cost effective security concepts establishing the high confidence that is expected of active sealing technology today. RMSA is a system of relatively low-cost but secure active loop seals for the monitoring of nuclear material containers. The sealing mechanism is a fiber optic loop that is pulsed using a low-power LED circuit with a coded signal to verify integrity. Battery life is conserved by the use of sophisticated power management techniques, permitting many years of reliable operation without battery replacement or other maintenance. Individual seals communicate by radio using a secure transmission protocol using either of two specially designated communication frequency bands. Signals are encrypted and authenticated by private key, established during the installation procedure, and the seal bodies feature both active and passive tamper indication. Seals broadcast to a central 'translator' from which information is both stored locally and/or transmitted remotely for review. The system is especially appropriate for nuclear material storage facilities, indoor or outdoor, enabling remote inspection of status rather than tedious individual seal verification, and without the need for interconnected cabling. A handheld seal verifier is also available for an inspector to verify any particular individual seal in close proximity. This paper will discuss the development of the RMSA sealing system, its capabilities, its application philosophy, and projected future trends.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated Solutions for Optimized Performance (ISOP) Final Technical Report

The goal of this project was to demonstrate technical feasibility of an integrated approach for deep energy retrofits by packaging innovative technologies with smart communicating controls that represent the next generation of energy efficiency. The integrated solutions for optimized performance (ISOP) package integrates (i) advanced lighting and plug load controls; (ii) intelligent daylight harvesting through automated self-powered shades and window films; (iii) advanced HVAC controls sequences (ASHRAE Guideline (GDL) 36); and (iv) fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) and continuous commissioning (CCx) using advanced analytics. These technologies address energy use across multiple building end uses that represent more than 60% of the energy consumption in all commercial buildings. The project was structured to be implemented over three budget periods: Budget Period 1 scope included site selection, project design, site-specific customization of technology packages, procurement of technologies, initiation of installation of technologies, the development of a measurement and verification plan and collection of pre-retrofit data collection. The first year go/no-go decision was based on securing host sites representing 250,000 sq. ft. of occupied operational spaces, savings analysis, technology procurement and initiation of installation. Budget Period 2 planned to complete technology installations and initiate data collection of post-retrofit performance data. The second year go/no-go was to be the completion of technology installations and commissioning, metering and data collecting to support the requirements laid out in site specific M&V plans. Budget Period 3 planned to collect and analyze post-retrofit performance data and provide data and reporting to support energy efficiency rebate programs. After the team completed activities planned for Budget Period 1, the team reached a Go/No-Go Decision Point. At that point, TRC recommended that DOE discontinue the project without prejudice due to challenges with securing demonstration sites to meet the full 250,000 sf of occupied operational spaces and DOE concurred. In Budget Period 1, the TRC team developed criteria to recruit and evaluate potential demonstration host sites. TRC worked with Princeton University, the project demonstration partner, to identify buildings on their campus as potential candidates for the demonstration. Following the selection of demonstration sites, the TRC team customized energy technology packages according to the needs and characteristics of each site. TRC defined technology specifications, identified vendors, and conducted analysis to estimate energy and cost savings potential. The project team then developed schedules for technology procurement processes and scheduled for installation at all selected demonstration sites. The project team worked with Princeton University and DOE to develop an approach to verify energy savings achieved through measurement and verification (M&V) 2.0 methods. Princeton University initiated open bids to procure the necessary materials and installation contractors. Bid results came back higher than estimates due to a couple of factors – lack of familiarity of the bidders with the proposed technologies and lack of local trained installers to execute the installation of these new measures. Due to the higher bids, projects no longer met the internal cost-effectiveness criteria used by Princeton to proceed with procurement of the full suite of technologies as proposed in ISOP. Princeton had already procured parts of the ISOP package as part of a campus-wide initiative for FDD and lighting retrofits, but with the higher costs for other ISOP components, Princeton could no longer commit to the full ISOP package on the selected sites. Based on this, the team reached the Go/No-Go decision point, where they decided not to proceed with the project. Princeton is separately installing portions of the ISOP package where they individually meet Princeton’s payback criteria but on a different schedule than would have been needed for the DOE ISOP project. The team has learned several lessons from project progress in the first budget period. The team will utilize these lessons in future projects, as should any team which proceeds with a project around the ISOP technology. The first lesson is that more information about the proposed sites is required earlier in the process (perhaps even at the proposal stage) in order to have a successful demonstration. Technical details not evident earlier in the process (such as the TLED limitations for ALCS) can derail project execution. The second lesson is that pricing of emerging technologies is highly variable due to lack of familiarity of local installers and distributor with the proposed technologies as well as alternate bids using products they were more familiar with, but that cost more than the ones proposed by TRC. Finally, the last major lesson is that the host site’s internal project criteria is of critical importance. Based on these higher installed costs and lack of an informed installer base for the products proposed for this project, the project does not meet Princeton’s simple payback goals of five years.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Certified randomness using a trapped-ion quantum processor

Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers, realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy. Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations: a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.

computer science↗

Assuring and Securing Machine Learning

A short presentation highlighting using machine learning and topological data analysis to address the challenges of assuring and securing machine learning enabled systems.

Machine Learning↗

CY2020 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2020–December 2020, Revision 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (Figure 1-1). This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]); and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water use. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (NNSA/NFO, 2016) and its ensuing Records of Technical Change (ROTCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Verification of the Effectiveness of X-ray Machine Collimation

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was tasked by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) program with reducing the false alarm rate experienced by radiation portal monitors (RPM) installed near x-ray machines. Although the mechanism for interference between RPMs and x-ray machines is well understood, x-ray machines are often installed too near RPMs due to a variety of facility constraints. The result is underutilized RPMs that are plagued by a high false alarm rate from x-rays that escape the x-ray machine and are detected by the RPM. In this work, the effectiveness of an x-ray machine collimation system designed at ORNL is validated through the analysis of field data collected before and after the installation. The significant reduction in false alarm rate due to the collimation system is explicitly shown, and examples of field installations are provided. Utilization of the results presented here allows RPM systems to operate effectively even when installed near x-ray machines.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

The ability to track nuclear material is a challenge for resiliency of complex systems, e.g., harsh environments. RF tags, frequently used in national security applications, cannot be used for technological, operational, or safety reasons. Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) is a novel tag technology based on magnetoelastic sensing that circumvents these issues. This technology is enabled by a new, cost-effective, batch manufacturing electrochemical deposition (ECD) process. This new advancement in fabrication enables multi-frequency tags capable of providing millions of possible codes for tag identification unlike existing theft deterrent tags that can convey only a single bit of information. Magnetostrictive 70% Co: 30% Fe was developed as the base alloy comprising the magnetoelastic resonator transduction element. Saturation magnetostriction, λ S , has been externally measured by the Naval Research Laboratory to be as high as 78 ppm. Description of a novel MEMS variable capacitive test structure is described for future measurements of this parameter.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Momentum informed muon scattering tomography for monitoring spent nuclear fuels in dry storage cask

Development of an effective monitoring method for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a dry storage cask (DSC) is important to meet the increasing demand for dry storage investigations. The DSC investigation should provide information about the quantity of stored SNF, and quality assurance of materials should be possible without opening the cask. However, traditional nondestructive examination (NDE) methods such as x-rays are difficult to deploy for DSC investigation because a typical DSC is intentionally designed to shield against radiation. To address this challenge, cosmic ray muons (CRMs) are used as an alternative NDE radiation probe because they can easily penetrate an entire DSC system; however, a wide application of muons is often hindered due to the naturally low CRM flux (~10 4 muons/m 2 /min). This paper introduces a newly proposed imaging algorithm, momentum-informed muon scattering tomography (MMST) , and presents how a limitation of the current muon scattering tomography technique has been addressed by measuring muon momentum. To demonstrate its functionality, a commercial DSC with 24 pressurized light water reactor fuel assemblies (FAs) and the MMST system were designed in GEANT4. Three noticeable improvements were observed for MMST system as a DSC investigation tool: (1) a signal stabilization, (2) an enhanced capability to differentiate various materials, and (3) statistically increased precision to identify and locate missing FAs. The results show that MMST improves the investigation accuracy from 79 to 98% when one FA is missing and 51% to 88% when one-half FA is missing. The advancement of the NDE technique using CRM for DSC verification is expected to resolve long-standing problems in increasing demand for DSC inspections and nuclear security.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Recommendations for Radiological Data Assessment Implementation

Since thorough verification, validation, and data quality assessment (DQA) processes may delay incident commanders and elected and appointed officials from making key decisions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop tools and guidance for the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) responders using research, discussions with select FSLTT responders, and the experiences of subject matter experts in incident response. This report provides NUSTL with recommendations on best practices for verification, validation, and data quality assessment for the data collected by responders during a radiological or nuclear event. The purpose of this report is to inform the development of a DQA toolkit aimed at the needs of data assessors during the response to a radiological incident.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Why Models Don%3CU%2B2019%3Et Forecast.

The title of this paper, Why Models Don't Forecast, has a deceptively simple answer: models don't forecast because people forecast. Yet this statement has significant implications for computational social modeling and simulation in national security decision making. Specifically, it points to the need for robust approaches to the problem of how people and organizations develop, deploy, and use computational modeling and simulation technologies. In the next twenty or so pages, I argue that the challenge of evaluating computational social modeling and simulation technologies extends far beyond verification and validation, and should include the relationship between a simulation technology and the people and organizations using it. This challenge of evaluation is not just one of usability and usefulness for technologies, but extends to the assessment of how new modeling and simulation technologies shape human and organizational judgment. The robust and systematic evaluation of organizational decision making processes, and the role of computational modeling and simulation technologies therein, is a critical problem for the organizations who promote, fund, develop, and seek to use computational social science tools, methods, and techniques in high-consequence decision making.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Measuring Very Low Radiation Doses in PTFE for Nuclear Forensic Enrichment Reconstruction

Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon's quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing a detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. This work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.

Connick, Rachel↗

Next Generation National Security Leaders

It is generally accepted that the international security community faces an impending challenge in its changing leadership demographics. The workforce that currently addresses nonproliferation, arms control, and verification is moving toward retirement and there is a perceived need for programs to train a new set of experts for both technical- and policy-related functions to replace the retiring generation. Despite the perceived need, there are also indicators that there are not sufficient jobs for individuals we are currently training. If we had “right-sized” the training programs, there would not be a shortage of jobs. The extent and scope of the human resource crisis is unclear, and information about training programs and how they meet existing needs is minimal. This paper seeks to achieve two objectives: 1) Clarify the major human resource problem and potential consequences; and 2) Propose how to characterize the requirement with sufficient granularity to enable key stakeholders to link programs aimed at developing the next generations of experts with employment needs. In order to accomplish both these goals, this paper recommends establishing a forum comprised of key stakeholders of this issue (including universities, public and private sectors), and conducting a study of the human resources and resource needs of the global security community. If there is indeed a human resource crisis in the global security field, we cannot address the problem if we are uninformed. The solution may lie in training more (or fewer) young professions to work in this community – or it may lie in more effectively using our existing resources and training programs.

Mahy, Heidi A.↗

Design and package of a {sup 14}CO{sub 2} field analyzer The Global Monitor Platform (GMP)

Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) is widely accepted as a means to reduce and eliminate the fossil fuel CO{sub 2} (ff- CO{sub 2}) emissions from coal fired power plants. Success of CCS depends on near zero leakage rates over decadal time scales. Currently no commercial methods to determine leakage of ff-CO{sub 2} are available. The Global Monitor Platform (GMP) field analyzer provides high precision analysis of CO{sub 2} isotopes [12C (99%), 13C (<1%), 14C (1.2x10-10 %)] that can differentiate between fossil and biogenic CO{sub 2} emissions. Fossil fuels contain no {sup 14}C; their combustion should lower atmospheric amounts on local to global scales. There is a clear mandate for monitoring, verification and accounting (MVA) of CCS systems nationally and globally to verify CCS integrity, treaty verification (Kyoto Protocol) and to characterize the nuclear fuel cycle. Planetary Emissions Management (PEM), working with the National Secure Manufacturing Center (NSMC), has the goal of designing, ruggedizing and packaging the GMP for field deployment. The system will conduct atmosphere monitoring then adapt the system to monitor water and soil evaluations. Measuring {sup 14}CO{sub 2} in real time will provide quantitative concentration data for ff-CO{sub 2} in the atmosphere and CCS leakage detection. Initial results will be discussed along with design changes for improved detection sensitivity and manufacturability.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Automated UF 6 Cylinder Enrichment Assay: Status of the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) Project: POTAS Phase II

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) intends to automate the UF 6 cylinder nondestructive assay (NDA) verification currently performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at enrichment plants. PNNL is proposing the installation of a portal monitor at a key measurement point to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until inspector arrival. This report summarizes the status of the research and development of an enrichment assay methodology supporting the cylinder verification concept. The enrichment assay approach exploits a hybrid of two passively-detected ionizing-radiation signatures: the traditional enrichment meter signature (186-keV photon peak area) and a non-traditional signature, manifested in the high-energy (3 to 8 MeV) gamma-ray continuum, generated by neutron emission from UF 6 . PNNL has designed, fabricated, and field-tested several prototype assay sensor packages in an effort to demonstrate proof-of-principle for the hybrid assay approach, quantify the expected assay precision for various categories of cylinder contents, and assess the potential for unsupervised deployment of the technology in a portal-monitor form factor. We refer to recent sensor-package prototypes as the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA). The report provides an overview of the assay signatures and summarizes the results of several HEVA field measurement campaigns on populations of Type 30B UF 6 cylinders containing low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). Approaches to performance optimization of the assay technique via radiation transport modeling are briefly described, as are spectroscopic and data-analysis algorithms.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗