SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
The development and future requirements of life support systems are considered, and the choice of equipment for long-duration missions is examined. The need for programmatic flexibility, capability growth, and integration of life support systems is discussed. Water supply, CO2 control, oxygen supply, trace contaminant control, and waste management are surveyed, and evolution forecast is presented.
Logical, cost-effective steps in the evolution of manned space platforms are investigated and assessed. Tasks included the analysis of requirements for a manned space platform, identifying alternative concepts, performing system analysis and definition of the concepts, comparing the concepts and performing programmatic analysis for a reference concept.
The performance specifications to be realized in the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) for Space Station operations will be the culmination of design efforts which began during the Gemini project. The types of MMUs which have been built and tested over the past two decades are described, including handheld, jet shoe, and initial rigid backpack configurations. Efforts to enhance the control laws and human factors aspects of the Skylab MMU to meet long-duration, flexible use Space Station requirements are summarized, noting the successes and deficiencies with the Shuttle MMU. The design requirements which must be met to allow the Space Station MMU to be used to perform rescue, transportation, inspection, assembly, contingency, and programmatic missions are explored.
The United States? current fleet of launch vehicles is largely derived from decades-old designs originally made for payloads that no longer exist. They were built primarily for national security or human exploration missions. Today that fleet can be divided roughly into small-, medium-, and large-payload classes based on mass and volume capability. But no vehicle in the U.S. fleet is designed to accommodate modern payloads. It is usually the payloads that must accommodate the capabilities of the launch vehicles. This is perhaps most true of science payloads. It was this paradigm that the organizers of two weekend workshops in 2008 at NASA's Ames Research Center sought to alter. The workshops brought together designers of NASA's Ares V cargo launch vehicle (CLV) with scientists and payload designers in the astronomy and planetary sciences communities. Ares V was still in a pre-concept development phase as part of NASA?s Constellation Program for exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). The space science community was early in a Decadal Survey that would determine future priorities for research areas, observations, and notional missions to make those observations. The primary purpose of the meetings in April and August of 2008, including the novel format, was to bring vehicle designers together with space scientists to discuss the feasibility of using a heavy lift capability to launch large observatories and explore the Solar System. A key question put to the science community was whether this heavy lift capability enabled or enhanced breakthrough science. The meetings also raised the question of whether some trade-off between mass/volume and technical complexity existed that could reduce technical and programmatic risk. By engaging the scientific community early in the vehicle design process, vehicle engineers sought to better understand potential limitations and requirements that could be added to the Ares V from the mission planning community. From the vehicle standpoint, while the human exploration mission could not be compromised to accommodate other payloads, the design might otherwise be tailored to not exclude other payload requirements. This paper summarizes the findings of the workshops and discusses the benefits of bringing together the vehicle design and science communities early in their concept phases
For 6 years prior to the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program, the shuttles carried an onboard repair kit with a tool for emergency use: two tubes of NOAX, or "good goo," as some people called it. NOAX flew on all 22 flights following the Columbia accident, and was designed to repair damage that occurred on the exterior of the shuttle. Bill McMahon, a structural materials engineer at Marshall Space Flight Center says NASA needed a solution for the widest range of possible damage to the shuttle s exterior thermal protection system. "NASA looked at several options in early 2004 and decided on a sealant. Ultimately, NOAX performed the best and was selected," he says. To prove NOAX would work effectively required hundreds of samples manufactured at Marshall and Johnson, and a concerted effort from various NASA field centers. Johnson Space Center provided programmatic leadership, testing, tools, and crew training; Glenn Research Center provided materials analysis; Langley Research Center provided test support and led an effort to perform large patch repairs; Ames Research Center provided additional testing; and Marshall provided further testing and the site of NOAX manufacturing. Although the sealant never had to be used in an emergency situation, it was tested by astronauts on samples of reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) during two shuttle missions. (RCC is the thermal material on areas of the shuttle that experience the most heat, such as the nose cone and wing leading edges.) The material handled well on orbit, and tests showed the NOAX patch held up well on RCC.
The CEV TPS Advanced Development Project (ADP) is a NASA in-house activity for providing two heatshield preliminary designs (a Lunar direct return as well as a LEO only return) for the CEV, including the TPS, the carrier structure, the interfaces and the attachments. The project s primary objective is the development of a single heatshield preliminary design that meets both Lunar direct return and LEO return requirements. The effort to develop the Lunar direct return capable heatshield is considered a high risk item for the NASA CEV development effort due to the low TRL (approx. 4) of the candidate TPS materials. By initiating the TPS ADP early in the development cycle, the intent is to use materials analysis and testing in combination with manufacturing demonstrations to reduce the programmatic risk of using advanced TPS technologies in the critical path for CEV. Due to the technical and schedule risks associated a Lunar return heatshield, the ADP will pursue a parallel path design approach, whereby a back-up TPS/heatshield design that only meets LEO return requirements is also developed. The TPS materials and carrier structure design concept selections will be based on testing, analysis, design and evaluation of scalability and manufacturing performed under the ADP. At the TPS PDR, the preferred programmatic strategy is to transfer the continued (detailed) design, development, testing and evaluation (DDT&E) of both the Lunar direct and LEO return designs to a government/prime contractor coordinated sub-system design team. The CEV prime contractor would have responsibility for the continued heatshield sub-system development. Continued government participation would include analysis, testing and evaluation as well as decision authority at TPS Final System Decision (FSD) (choosing between the primary and back-up heatshields) occurring between TPS PDR and TPS Critical Design Review (CDR). After TPS FSD the prime CEV contractor will complete the detailed design, certification testing, procurement, and integration of the CEV TPS.
Onorbit resupply of fluids will be essential to the evolving generation of large and long-life orbital stations and satellites. These types of services are also needed to improve the economics of space operations, and not only optimize the expenditures for government funded programs, but also pave the way for commercial development of space resources. To meet these requirements, a family of tankers must be developed to resupply a variety of fluids. Economics of flight hardware development will require that each tanker within this family be capable of satisfying a variety of functions, including not only fluid resupply from the Space Shuttle Orbiter, but also resupply from Space Station and the orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV). This paper discusses the justification, the programmatic objectives, and the advanced planning within NASA for the development of this fleet of multifunction orbital fluid resupply tankers.
Humankind will detect the first gravitational wave (GW) signals from the Universe in the current decade using ground-based detectors. But the richest trove of astrophysical information lies at lower frequencies in the spectrum only accessible from space. Signals are expected from merging massive black holes throughout cosmic history, from compact stellar remnants orbiting central galactic engines from thousands of close contact binary systems in the Milky Way, and possibly from exotic sources, some not yet imagined. These signals carry essential information not available from electromagnetic observations, and which can be extracted with extraordinary accuracy. For 20 years, NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), and an international research community have put considerable effort into developing concepts and technologies for a GW mission. Both the 2000 and 2010 decadal surveys endorsed the science and mission concept of the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA). A partnership of the two agencies defined and analyzed the concept for a decade. The agencies partnered on LISA Pathfinder (LPF), and ESA-led technology demonstration mission, now preparing for a 2015 launch. Extensive technology development has been carried out on the ground. Currently, the evolved Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (eLISA) concept, a LISA-like concept with only two measurement arms, is competing for ESA's L2 opportunity. NASA's Astrophysics Division seeks to be a junior partner if eLISA is selected. If eLISA is not selected, then a LISA-like mission will be a strong contender in the 2020 decadal survey. This Technology Development Roadmap (TDR) builds on the LISA concept development, the LPF technology development, and the U.S. and European ground-based technology development. The eLISA architecture and the architecture of the Mid-sized Space-based Gravitational-wave Observatory (SGO Mid)-a competitive design with three measurement arms from the recent design study for a NASA-led mission after 2020-both use the same technologies. Further, NASA participation in an ESA-led mission would likely augment the eLISA architecture with a third arm to become the SGO Mid architecture. For these reasons, this TDR for a future GW mission applies to both designs and both programmatic paths forward. It is adaptable to the different timelines and roles for an ESA-led or a NASA-led mission, and it is adaptable to available resources. Based on a mature understanding of the interaction between technology and risk, the authors of this TDR have chosen a set of objectives that are more expansive than is usual. The objectives for this roadmap are: (1) reduce technical and development risks and costs; (2) understand and, where possible, relieve system requirements and consequences; (3) increase technical insight into critical technologies; and (4) validate the design at the subsystem level. The emphasis on these objectives, particularly the latter two, is driven by outstanding programmatic decisions, namely whether a future GW mission is ESA-led or NASA-led, and availability of resources. The relative emphasis is best understood in the context of prioritization.
"Qualification" of fiber optic components holds a very different meaning than it did ten years ago. In the past, qualification meant extensive prolonged testing and screening that led to a programmatic method of reliability assurance. For space flight programs today, the combination of using higher performance commercial technology, with shorter development schedules and tighter mission budgets makes long term testing and reliability characterization unfeasible. In many cases space flight missions will be using technology within years of its development and an example of this is fiber laser technology. Although the technology itself is not a new product the components that comprise a fiber laser system change frequently as processes and packaging changes occur. Once a process or the materials for manufacturing a component change, even the data that existed on its predecessor can no longer provide assurance on the newer version. In order to assure reliability during a space flight mission, the component engineer must understand the requirements of the space flight environment as well as the physics of failure of the components themselves. This can be incorporated into an efficient and effective testing plan that "qualifies" a component to specific criteria defined by the program given the mission requirements and the component limitations. This requires interaction at the very initial stages of design between the system design engineer, mechanical engineer, subsystem engineer and the component hardware engineer. Although this is the desired interaction what typically occurs is that the subsystem engineer asks the components or development engineers to meet difficult requirements without knowledge of the current industry situation or the lack of qualification data. This is then passed on to the vendor who can provide little help with such a harsh set of requirements due to high cost of testing for space flight environments. This presentation is designed to guide the engineers of design, development and components, and vendors of commercial components with how to make an efficient and effective qualification test plan with some basic generic information about many space flight requirements. Issues related to the ~ physics of failure, acceptance criteria and lessons learned will also be discussed to assist with understanding how to approach a space flight mission in an ever changing commercial photonics industry.
The ATONA project is focused upon exploring the improvements in uranium isotope ratio measurements by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) provided by a new, capacitor-based, amplifier technology. These “ATONA” Faraday amplifiers (Isotopx Ltd, UK) promise accurate, low-noise measurements of very small signals (< 1 femto-amp) in a traditional Faraday cup, which was only previously possible using an ion counter. This report outlines a series of experiments that were performed to assess the performance of the system in samples that test our rapid analysis procedures, and then compare the results against other mass spectrometry techniques currently available for environmental analyses. The following major goals were achieved: (1) illustrated the importance of 236 U measurements for the screening and analysis of environmental samples; (2) improved sensitivity for 236 U, and then identified 236 U in the 4350B standard at ultra-trace levels (3) Provided comparison of the 236 U sensitivity to multi-collector inductively coupled mass spectrometry techniques (4) Illustrated high TRL for the ATONA based measurement technique. This completes the reporting requirements for task 4 in the project LCP and highlights the utility of the system to make highly sensitive 236 U measurements in programmatically relevant sample matrices and at relevant uranium concentrations.
A synoptic of programmatic and technical lessons learned in the development of aerothermodynamic data bases for the X-33 and X-34 programs is presented in general terms and from the perspective of the NASA Langley Research Center Aerothermodynamics Branch. The format used is that of the "aerothermodynamic chain," the links of which are personnel, facilities, models/test articles, instrumentation, test techniques, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD). Because the aerodynamic data bases upon which the X-33 and X-34 vehicles will fly are almost exclusively from wind tunnel testing, as opposed to CFD, the primary focus of the lessons learned is on ground-based testing. The period corresponding to the development of X-33 and X-34 aerothermodynamic data bases was challenging, since a number of other such programs (e.g., X-38, X-43) competed for resources at a time of downsizing of personnel, facilities, etc., outsourcing, and role changes as NASA Centers served as subcontractors to industry. The impact of this changing environment is embedded in the lessons learned. From a technical perspective, the relatively long times to design and fabricate metallic force and moment models, delays in delivery of models, and a lack of quality assurance to determine the fidelity of model outer mold lines (OML) prior to wind tunnel testing had a major negative impact on the programs. On the positive side, the application of phosphor thermography to obtain global, quantitative heating distributions on rapidly fabricated ceramic models revolutionized the aerothermodynamic optimization of vehicle OMLs, control surfaces, etc. Vehicle designers were provided with aeroheating information prior to, or in conjunction with, aerodynamic information early in the program, thereby allowing trades to be made with both sets of input; in the past only aerodynamic data were available as input. Programmatically, failure to include transonic aerodynamic wind tunnel tests early in the assessment phase led to delays in the optimization phase, as OMLs required modification to provide adequate transonic aerodynamic performance without sacrificing subsonic and hypersonic performance. Funding schedules for industry, based on technical milestones, also presented challenges to aerothermodynamics seeking optimum flying characteristics across the subsonic to hypersonic speed regimes and minimum aeroheating. This paper is concluded with a brief discussion of enhancements in ground-based testing/CFD capabilities necessary to partially/fully satisfy future requirements.
A never-ending major goal for the Space Shuttle program is to continually improve flight safety, as long as this launch system remains in operational service. One of the options to improve system safety and to enhance vehicle performance as well, that has been seriously studied over the past several decades, is to replace the existing strap-on four segment solid rocket boosters (SRB's) with more capable units. A number of booster upgrade options have been studied in some detail, ranging from five segment solids through hybrids and a wide variety of liquid strap-ons (both pressure and pump fed with various propellants); all the way to a completely reusable liquid fly back booster (complete with air breathing engines for controlled landing and return). All of these possibilities appear to offer improvements in varying degrees; and each has their strengths and weaknesses from both programmatic and technical points of view. The most beneficial booster upgrade/design, if the shuttle program were to continue long enough to justify the required investment, would be an approach that greatly increased both vehicle and crew safety. This would be accomplished by increasing the minimum range/minimum altitude envelope that would readily allow abort to orbit (ATO), possibly even to zero/zero, and possibly reduce or eliminate the Return to Launch Site (RTLS) and even the Trans Atlantic Landing (TAL) abort mode requirements. This paper will briefly survey and discuss all of the various booster'upgrade options studied previously, and compare their relative attributes. The survey will explicitly discuss, in summary comparative form, options that include: five segment solids; several hybrid possibilities; pressure and/or pump-fed liquids using either LO2/kerosene, H2O/kerosene and LO2/J2, any of which could be either fully expendable, partly or fully reusable; and finally a fully reusable liquid fly back booster system, with a number of propellant and propulsion system options. Performance and configuration comparison illustrations and tables will be included to provide a comprehensive survey for the paper.
Current roadmaps point to landing heavy masses (cargo, followed by manned vehicles) on Mars in the 2030's and the existing entry, descent and landing (EDL) technology will not be sufficient to facilitate such missions. In 2009 the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) established the Entry, Descent and Landing Technology Development Project (EDL TDP), to be managed programmatically at Langley Research Center (LaRC) and technically a Ames Research Center (ARC). The purpose of the project is to further the technologies required to land heavy (approximately 40 metric ton) masses on Mars to facilitate exploration. The EDL TDP contains three technical elements. They are: 1) Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) development 2) Modeling and Tools (MAT) development 3) Supersonic Retropropulsion (SRP) development The primary goals of the EDL TDP TPS element is to design and develop TPS materials capable of withstanding the severe aerothermal loads associated with aerocapture and entry into the Martian atmosphere while significantly decreasing the TPS mass fraction contribution to the entry system. Significant advancements in TPS materials technology are needed in order to enable heavy mass payloads to be successfully landed on the Martian surface for robotic precursors and subsequent human exploration missions. The EDL TDP TPS element is further divided into two different TPS concepts for Mars EDL those being: 1) Rigid TPS for a mid L/D aeroshell with the capability to withstand dual pulsed heating environments as high as 500 W/square cm for aerocapture and 130 W/square cm for entry 2) Flexible TPS for a deployable aerodynamic decelerator with the capability to withstand dual pulsed heating environments as high as 120 W/square cm for aerocapture and 30 W/square cm for entry NASA, along with its vendors, has begun developing and testing materials for each of the deceleration approaches. These include multi-layer rigid ablators and flexible ablative materials. In order to model the response of these types of materials, new and improved modeling techniques will be required. This presentation will outline the types of materials that are under development and illustrate the need for advancement in modeling of ablative materials.
The Elpida EDS5104(08)ABTA 512Mb SDRAM is examined for programmatic impact of SEE. Use cases for the devices including EDAC and mode register reload are examined. Results indicate some SEE mitigation methods require careful application to achieve system-level benefits, while some event types are essentially mitigated by the application use. In the studied devices MBE and SEFI are identified and investigated as mechanisms requiring special consideration.
Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.
Engineers need to effectively communicate the justification and value of their modal testing and model correlation in terminology familiar to decision makers as it relates to the program’s risk tolerance. This communication must relate to the program’s risk tolerance and the metrics used to judge the performance of both the program and individual decision makers. The challenge is the terminologies familiar to engineers and decision makers are quite different and seemingly unrelated. The engineering profession has developed a specific terminology to solve highly technical issues, which are many times themselves unique to very specific engineering problems. It is all too easy for engineers to believe that everyone in their organization, including the decision makers, has an intrinsic understanding of what they do and the value it brings to the program’s success. This is especially true for young engineers who have recently spent the last four plus years in an academic engineering learning environment, which has a highly technical research oriented atmosphere. Effective communication with decision makers is increasingly important as the technical breadth and practical program and project experience level for up and coming decision makers diminishes. It is not unusual for the decision makers to have technical knowledge in a domain different from structural dynamics (e.g., electronics or systems). Competition among satellite manufactures has increased the focus on programmatic cost and ability to deliver on schedule. NASA programs are also seeing more restrictive programmatic cost and schedule constraints, which impact both analysis and testing. It should also be noted that a comprehensive suite of tests are required to verify a satellite’s design capability with some margin. These tests include static strength verification tests, shock, acoustic, and vibration tests (sine and random) of systems, subsystems, and components. Each of these verification tests provide opportunities for model correlation and risk reduction. It is important to recognize dynamic loads/modal test models may not include all of the flight hardware (i.e., harness, coax, waveguides, connectors, etc.) and the previously mentioned tests are still required for qualification/verification of the design. This paper provides tips to young engineers on how to bridge this communications gap, have a better understanding of the environment in which decision makers operate, and assist them to better support successful missions. While this paper primarily focuses on modal testing and model correlation as related to spacecraft missions, the concepts and recommendations presented here are equally applicable to other fields such as aeronautics, automotive, power generation, etc.
The goal of this white paper is to highlight some of the key issues associated with the instrumentation and testing of ground and flight hardware. The information is arranged topically and follows a line of organization that begins with the development of test objectives, the development of requirements, the purchase and installation of instrumentation, and covers many considerations to ensure that measurements will provide the required data during the conduct of the test. Ideally, all of these considerations would be factored into a test program; however, due to programmatic, budgetary, and calendar restraints, only a subset of these factors will typically be considered. Although the primary emphasis of this text is on thermal measurements, all disciplines can benefit from these recommendations.
The NASA Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Program is responsible for providing the essential connectivity to robotic and human space explorers. The missions relying on SCaN range from suborbital and balloon missions to those traveling beyond the edge of the solar system. The demands for communications and navigation services enabled by SCaN (and its affiliated partners) are projected to increase and outpace the current network capacity. At the same time, the Agency finds itself surrounded by a burgeoning commercial space marketplace, technological advancement, and other government agencies that share common interests in space resiliency, robustness, and performance. As a result, SCaN has begun pivoting toward commercial services and collaborating with partners to close capacity and capability gaps. Given these growing demands of the Agency there is increasing need for multi-network solutions. Future mission concepts will rely on both government and commercial capabilities, both Near Space Network capacity and Deep Space Network capacity. Integrating these diverse support services together from a technical, programmatic and implementation standpoint will be key to meet the growing needs of the future. To accomplish this, a more substantive shift is required, and SCaN is reshaping itself to be a customer-centric, service-oriented, high-performance leader in the space communications community. This paper outlines the SCaN One Team, One Mission, One Network approach, and provides a vision for future mission community experience that includes streamlined mission commitment interfaces and clear processes, dynamic network scheduling and load balancing, and higher efficiency data transport and delivery through the integration of cloud infrastructure and services.