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Application of quantitative risk assessment to address stakeholder questions in geologic carbon storage

Ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets demand a rapid transformation to a low-carbon economy. This transformation includes the accelerated adoption of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, as with any large-scale engineering enterprise, the widespread commercial-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage (GCS) raises important questions about technology and cost-effectiveness, safety, environmental risk, and long-term liability. Effectively assessing and managing risks and liability associated with GCS projects is a key technical need throughout the project life cycle-from site selection and permitting to monitoring design, operational risk management, and post-operational site closure. This presentation highlights recent advancements in tools for quantitative risk assessment, being developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP is a multi-year, multinational laboratory research collaboration sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. Our focus will be on these tools' applications in addressing critical stakeholder questions related to supporting permitting to ensure secure and environmentally protective storage; designing effective and efficient monitoring plans; evaluating the effectiveness of remedial actions and risk management alternatives; and informing liability assessment and investment decisions. This paper will detail the key functionality of NRAP’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), a computational framework for assessing leakage risk and containment assurance. This model features streamlined workflows for calculating leakage risk profiles, delineating risk-based area of review, and assessing contingency plans and post-injection site care requirements. ORION is an open-source, observation-based ensemble forecasting toolkit to help operators assess the seismic hazard at a carbon storage site. The State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT), designed to assess subsurface stress conditions and evaluate geomechanical risk resulting from CO2 injection in an area of interest will also be presented. We will also introduce a prototype model to evaluate storage project costs and liability associated with risk management. The Technoeconomic and Liability Evaluation for Storage (TALES) model uses results from forecasts of leakage and induced seismicity risk to estimate the lifecycle cost of managing risk. Finally, a preliminary example of how the NRAP Risk-based Adaptive Monitoring Plan (RAMP) tool can be used to design efficient and effective site monitoring plans and estimate the detectability of fluid leakage will be provided. The relevance of these tools for addressing key stakeholder questions amidst uncertainty will be emphasized.

decision support↗

Learning Lessons from the X-37 Project

The X-37 was planned as an automated vehicle capable of flight-testing new aerospace technologies in combined environments that are beyond the capability of existing ground or flight platforms. Flight demonstration with the X-37 architecture and configuration in relevant environments was planned to reduce the risk of developing launch vehicle technologies for sustainable, affordable exploration and other aerospace applications. Current plans are for the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) to be atmospheric tested in 2005 from Scaled Composite's White Knight carrier aircraft at up to 40,000 feet over California's Mojave Spaceport, with and turnaround maintenance performed. The fight Operations Control Center will conduct the mission, using a streamlined operations concept. Taxi-tow and captive-carry tests will be conducted prior to the atmospheric-test series. Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with NASA participation, technical objectives are to: (1) mature Computed Air Data System/Remote Pressure Sensor technology, (2) manage energy during Terminal Area Energy Management/Heading Alignment Cone maneuvers, and (3) validate the aerodatabase. The X-37 Project began in 1999 under a cooperative agreement as an element of NASA's Future X Program and transitioned to a NASA Research Announcement under the Space Launch Initiative. In mid-2004, NASA transferred ownership to DARPA, with its heritage of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and development. NASA contributes technical expertise, including risk analysis and system integration. The Boeing Company is the prime contractor, with nationwide suppliers. This recent partnership exemplifies the synergy attainable when NASA Centers, other Government agencies, and industry work together toward a common goal - contributing to the knowledge base for U.S. exploration and other aerospace endeavors. The X-37 team represents a range of space transportation disciplines - from engineering to management. Some members have been with the project since its inception. All have gained priceless experience during the design, manufacturing, and testing of the ALTV, as well as through developing advanced orbital flight technologies, such as state-of-the-art Thermal Protection Systems and hot structures. Throughout this process, the X-37 Project team captures lessons that are directly applicable to other such efforts. The upcoming ALTV flights offer another dimension of data and first-hand experience that will prove invaluable to those designing new generations of reusable spacecraft. And ongoing technology developments will expand the aerospace knowledge base. Delivering prototype hardware is always a risky proposition. During the course of the X-37 effort, the team has experienced many challenging opportunities, delivering significant accomplishments and learning numerous lessons in the process. The ability to manage the risk landscape is key to overcoming obstacles, especially technical hurdles that are encountered in progressing hardware from design to flight. The approach to managing risk under this partnership is evolving but, in general, the team allocates resources to reduce the likelihood of severe-consequence risks, thus maximizing mission success and ensuring that the X-37 Project delivers value to its stakeholders. As the team sharpens its focus on operations, it continues to contribute knowledge to those who would undertake high-risk, high-payoff research and development and provides valuable experience to implement the exploration vision.

Turner, Susan↗

AIAA Aerospace America Magazine - Year in Review Article, 2010

NASA Stennis Space Center has implemented a pilot operational Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) capability. The implementation was done for the E-2 Rocket Engine Test Stand and a Chemical Steam Generator (CSG) test article; and validated during operational testing. The CSG test program is a risk mitigation activity to support building of the new A-3 Test Stand, which will be a highly complex facility for testing of engines in high altitude conditions. The foundation of the ISHM capability are knowledge-based integrated domain models for the test stand and CSG, with physical and model-based elements represented by objects the domain models enable modular and evolutionary ISHM functionality.

Figueroa, Fernando↗

A Systems Model for System-Wide Safety Safety Demonstrator (SD-1): Wildfire Response Operations

The aim of this internship-based project was to contribute to the ongoing development of a systems model for System-Wide Safety’s first Technical Challenge 5 (TC5) series Safety Demonstrator (SD-1), which will be a demonstration of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) in emerging wildfire response operations. Using Models-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles to develop the model, I organized and traced previously collected stakeholder needs from the Spring 2022 NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Virtual Workshop (https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/sws-wildfire) to system elements, creating connections which can be used in the future by the project engineers to identify and address requirements gaps throughout the system design process. I also identified and modeled preliminary use case scenarios for aerial assets in the demonstrator and, building on previously produced preliminary high-level models of the 8 SD-1 Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) and their IASMS data flows, worked to model the Real-Time Risk Assessment (RTRA) tool as an implementation of Risk Assessment and Management that can take in multiple sets of data monitored by SFCs. Project deliverables include stakeholder requirements tables and matrices and systems model diagrams produced with MagicDraw software in the SysML Systems Modeling Language, with eventual plans to connect model diagrams to a Department of Defense Operational Viewpoint (OV-1) graphic, a high-level operational concept graphic that will be used to visualize the SD-1 scenarioin a future phase. The system model serves to provide a common understanding of the scope of and activities necessary for the completion of SD-1,and traces how stakeholder needs are to be addressed.

model-based systems engineering↗

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

Hill, Janice L.↗

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗

Williston Basin Resource Study for Commercial-Scale Subsurface Hydrogen Storage

The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), the EERC’s State Energy Research Center (SERC), MPLX Operations LLC, and TC Energy Development Holdings Inc. (a subsidiary of TC Energy Corporation), studied the potential for subsurface hydrogen storage and recovery in the Williston Basin of western North Dakota. The project’s goal was to evaluate the feasibility of large-scale, secure geologic H 2 storage to support future hydrogen generation, storage, and use. This work included laboratory testing, H 2 –rock–fluid exposure experiments, literature reviews on H 2 embrittlement, and reservoir modeling and simulations. The study included an assessment of storage potential across three types of storage reservoirs using both reservoir simulation and DOE’s web-based tool SHASTA-HELP (Subsurface Hydrogen Assessment, Storage, and Technology Acceleration – Hydrogen Estimator for Logistical Planning), as well as investigation of potential H 2 production and markets for commercial-scale deployment. Building on prior EERC gas storage research, three storage options were selected for detailed evaluation: the Broom Creek Formation (a clastic saline reservoir), the Dickinson Lodgepole Mounds (DLM) complex (carbonate mud mound structures) of the Lodgepole Formation (an active oil and gas producing reservoir), and the Dunham Salt Interval of the Piper Formation (to be used for engineered salt cavern development). These targets were prioritized based on prior EERC research using datasets related to seal capacity, reservoir quality, mechanical integrity, and injectivity. Exposure tests on Broom Creek and DLM samples showed mineral dissolution and precipitation that increased brine salinity and altered reservoir rock surfaces. Although these results provide useful insight, they are limited by small sample sizes and short-term (30-day) exposure, requiring further study to assess long-term storage integrity. Salt formations were not tested because of their known nonreactivity and established mechanical stability. Results of reservoir simulations performed for a single site demonstrated that the Broom Creek Formation may be capable of receiving up to 42,000 tonnes of injected H 2 over 7 months via one well. H 2 recovery took place over 5 months, resulting in approximately 26,000 tonnes (~62% without cushion gas [CG]). This work suggests water production may be important and subsequent cycles of injection and production may perform more efficiently; however, significant site-specific work in the future is needed to assess actual reservoir performance of injection and withdrawal of H 2 storage. For oil reservoir potential, a multiple-well model was used to simulate injection of approximately 32,000 tonnes of H 2 into a single wellbore while simultaneously producing in place reservoir fluids from four offset wells to maintain reservoir pressure. The simulation results suggested a high recovery (~98%); in addition, cost advantages through existing infrastructure could be realized. Challenges in this reservoir include vi managing gas purity and leakage risks. In both scenarios, production of H 2 takes place in a single-well scenario with 10 cycles (7 months of injection and 5 months of production) over 10 years. Finally, the use of engineered caverns in the Dunhan Salt was evaluated, and the results suggest that while they have a smaller capacity (<1000 tonnes per cavern), they exhibit nearly complete gas recovery (>99%), fast response times, and low purity risk. While caverns in North Dakota may be smaller in capacity, fields can be developed in galleries to accommodate the volumetric needs and rapid turnaround times necessary to meet market demands. Geographic limitations and thin salt intervals in North Dakota may represent less total storage potential than salt domes elsewhere, but significant opportunities exist to expand this market for gas storage in North Dakota. A basinwide assessment was performed to estimate a first-of-its-kind value for H 2 storage on a large scale. DOE’s SHASTA-HELP, combined with EERC simulation work, was used to perform the assessment. Estimated H 2 storage potential varied widely for each formation type. The Broom Creek saline formation was estimated to have a storage potential of approximately 1.7–90.5 million tonnes (MMt). The DLM oil reservoirs were estimated to have 0.07–0.19 MMt of capacity. Notably, each of these estimates relies on significant assumptions regarding reservoir thickness, porosity, permeability, and CG needed for operation. Much research is needed to understand the true site-specific storage resource potential of each formation. Using the Dunham Salt Interval for cavern development may result in as much as 4.79 MMt (up to 2.87 MMt working gas) of H 2 storage potential. An important note for consideration is that the values presented here need significantly more geological characterization and engineering assessments prior to gaining confidence in performance. This will be a focal point for future research and development needs. The basinwide evaluation also indicated that North Dakota has significant H 2 generation potential, with estimates up to a possible 13 MMt annually, suggesting a substantial opportunity for H 2 market development and thus the need for commercial-scale H 2 storage to facilitate growth and resilience. Key Recommendations 1. Conduct detailed site characterization (3D seismic, well logs, core sampling) to reduce geologic uncertainty. 2. Perform techno-economic analyses incorporating market, regulatory, and incentive frameworks. 3. Investigate long-term interactions among H 2 , CGs, well materials, and formations to assess risks. 4. Develop pilot- and field-scale demonstrations to validate models and establish best practices.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Probabilistic Study Conducted on Sensor-Based Engine Life Calculation

Turbine engine life management is a very complicated process to ensure the safe operation of an engine subjected to complex usage. The challenge of life management is to find a reasonable compromise between the safe operation and the maximum usage of critical parts to reduce maintenance costs. The commonly used "cycle count" approach does not take the engine operation conditions into account, and it oversimplifies the calculation of the life usage. Because of the shortcomings, many engine components are regularly pulled for maintenance before their usable life is over. And, if an engine has been running regularly under more severe conditions, components might not be taken out of service before they exceed their designed risk of failure. The NASA Glenn Research Center and its industrial and academic partners have been using measurable parameters to improve engine life estimation. This study was based on the Monte Carlo simulation of 5000 typical flights under various operating conditions. First a closed-loop engine model was developed to simulate the engine operation across the mission profile and a thermomechanical fatigue (TMF) damage model was used to calculate the actual damage during takeoff, where the maximum TMF accumulates. Next, a Weibull distribution was used to estimate the implied probability of failure for a given accumulated cycle count. Monte Carlo simulations were then employed to find the profiles of the TMF damage under different operating assumptions including parameter uncertainties. Finally, probabilities of failure for different operating conditions were analyzed to demonstrate the importance of a sensor-based damage calculation in order to better manage the risk of failure and on-wing life.

Guo, Ten-Huei↗

ExMC Digital Engineering

Future missions beyond Artemis II will become increasingly complex as multiple vehicles (e.g., Gateway, Human Landing System (HLS), and Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP)), each having their own Program requirements and other associated documentation, which will need to be integrated into a single mission. Currently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate (HHPD)Program Support Teams mostly use documents to manage, perform, and archive their analyses. Identifying an opportunity for efficiency, ExMC demonstrated the ability to utilize MagicDraw, a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) tool, as a requirements database with traceability, dependencies, and relationships in one place. Rather than existing in documents, emails, and historical knowledge, ExMC pursued a Digital Engineering (DE) effort in coordination with HHPD by combining MBSE tools with other digital platforms to manage and develop user-defined databases and interfaces. This DE approach is aimed to simplify processes and reduce risk through the unification of requirements into a centralized digital network, improving collaboration, decision-making, and transparency compared to isolated documents and knowledge. However, manipulating data views and content in MagicDraw requires a steep learning curve not needed by all users and even the user-friendly web view comes with downsides due to the static views. To provide a more dynamic user interface, ExMC investigated the use of Microsoft Power Platform which does not require as steep of a learning curve to become proficient. This introduces analytics to the DE infrastructure, offering customizable and dynamic data dashboards. ExMC continues developing these dashboards and tailoring the DE infrastructure in alignment with HHPD workforce needs.

M Krihak↗

Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons Learned

Identification, resolution, and avoidance of technical and programmatic issues are important for ensuring safe and successful space missions. Although the importance of applying lessons learned to reduce risk is frequently stressed, there is little material available to help technical and management personnel research and document lessons learned. Collecting, researching, identifying, and documenting lessons learned that will be useful to current and future management and engineering personnel is not always a straightforward task. This white paper presents lessons learned and best practices concerning the research and documentation of technical and organizational lessons learned. It is intended to enable organizations to initiate or improve lessons learned research and documentation efforts. The content of this white paper is based on four technical lessons learned projects conducted by the United Space Alliance (USA) Flight Design and Dynamics Department, in support of the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Design and Dynamics Division. Each project published a report, titled as follows: (1) GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38; (2) Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions; (3) Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report; and (4) Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned. The four projects were different in availability of subject matter experts and primary source material, subject scope, and the level of effort required to produce the final report. However, generic lessons can be drawn from all of them. The best practices will be discussed by the phases of report research and development: (1) Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule; (2) Collection and Analysis of Source Material; (3) Writing and Integrating the Report; and (4) Review and Revision of the Report.

Goodman, John L.↗

NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook

This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Human Error Analysis for Human-Rated Space Systems

Humans bring unique capabilities to space systems and contribute to mission success in a manner that cannot be matched by machines. Nevertheless, from time to time, human error can present a threat to system performance, and system designers must anticipate and manage this risk. NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems call for program managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) during system development but does not specify how to do this. In 2018, NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center asked the authors to develop a guidance document on HEA. The resulting position paper outlines a suggested method for HEA and makes it clear that error analysis is about identifying and mitigating problems at a system level, and not about finding fault with individuals. Error management strategies must be directed at error-producing conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of human error, while retaining the positive contribution that humans make to system operations.

human error human-rated space↗

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Grid Communications Supply Chain & Emerging Regulation Challenges Session 1

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Contracting Quality Early in the Lifecycle Using AS9145 Data Deliverables

Development schedules and a highly dynamic supply chain are a challenge to developers of complex systems produced at low volume. Flaws in designs, parts and materials availability problems, poor manufacturability, and a lack of knowledge about critical items and key process attributes can be realized well before traditional second-party quality assurance activities begin. Supplier audits and product inspections may have little mitigating effect once these foundational problems have been realized. Their impacts can be significant lifecycle disruption, cost overruns, inability to deliver to plan, and even project cancellation. AS9145, Requirements for Advanced Product Quality Planning and Production Part Approval Process, can be used to drive quality engineering practices into early development lifecycles to significantly reduce this late-cycle risk and to reduce the cost of quality overall. Since its initial publication in 2016, it has had very limited adoption by the DoD, no adoption by NASA, and sparse adoption in the aerospace and defense supply chain. A task group within the Aerospace Industries Association's (AIA) Joint Strategic Quality Council (JSQC) identified that both acquirers and suppliers see as AS9145 as a cost-adder and are hesitant to use it as an alternative to late-stage-heavy quality assurance approaches. A lack of prior use creates large capability gaps in request-for-proposal (RFP) teams, proposal teams, suppliers’ quality management systems (QMS), and in experienced personnel executing the early lifecycle approach. To create a more realizable on-ramp for using AS9145 in the space and defense sectors, the AIA JSQC task team created five deliverable requirements descriptions (DRDs) that can be used in a contract to begin to engage both parties in early lifecycle quality engineering and quality assurance activities, that reduce exposure to late-stage cost and schedule collapse due to unidentified risks in design, supply chain, and manufacturability. These DRDs drive the parties to engage in planning and analysis discussions early on to understand what production risks can be known and how they will focus resources based on safety criticality and the key elements of design and construction. The suppliers and acquirers who will produce the data and information required by the DRD will be able to incrementally evolve their QMS and the acquirer will incrementally be able to track and understand the benefits of cost shifting from late to early development phases. A white paper describing this approach and the five recommended DRDs will be published by the AIA in late 2024 or early 2025.

Jeannette Plante↗

JPL Contamination Control Engineering

JPL has extensive expertise fielding contamination sensitive missions-in house and with our NASA/industry/academic partners.t Development and implementation of performance-driven cleanliness requirements for a wide range missions and payloads - UV-Vis-IR: GALEX, Dawn, Juno, WFPC-II, AIRS, TES, et al - Propulsion, thermal control, robotic sample acquisition systems. Contamination control engineering across the mission life cycle: - System and payload requirements derivation, analysis, and contamination control implementation plans - Hardware Design, Risk trades, Requirements V-V - Assembly, Integration & Test planning and implementation - Launch site operations and launch vehicle/payload integration - Flight ops center dot Personnel on staff have expertise with space materials development and flight experiments. JPL has capabilities and expertise to successfully address contamination issues presented by space and habitable environments. JPL has extensive experience fielding and managing contamination sensitive missions. Excellent working relationship with the aerospace contamination control engineering community/.

Molecular Contamination Spectral Effects (MCSE) Ch↗

Nondeterministic Approaches and Their Potential for Future Aerospace Systems

This document contains the proceedings of the Training Workshop on Nondeterministic Approaches and Their Potential for Future Aerospace Systems held at NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, May 30-3 1, 2001. The workshop was jointly sponsored by Old Dominion University's Center for Advanced Engineering Environments and NASA. Workshop attendees were from NASA, other government agencies, industry, and universities. The objectives of the workshop were to give overviews of the diverse activities in nondeterministic approaches, uncertainty management methodologies, reliability assessment and risk management techniques, and to identify their potential for future aerospace systems.

Ahmed K Noor↗