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Fault testing of resistive manufacturing defects is done on a recently developed single event upset immune logic family. Resistive ranges and delay times are compared with those of traditional CMOS logic. Reaction of the logic to these defects is observed for a NOR gate, and an evaluation of its ability to cope with them is determined.
Very often servicing of satellites is necessary to replace components which are responsible for anomalous behavior of satellite operations due to adverse interactions with the natural space environment. A major difficulty with this diagnosis is that those responsible for diagnosing these anomalies do not have the tools to assess the role of the space environment causing the anomaly. To address this issue, we have under development a new rule-based, expert system for diagnosing spacecraft anomalies. The knowledge base consists of over two-hundred rules and provides links to historical and environmental databases. Environmental causes considered are bulk charging, single event upsets (SEU), surface charging, and total radiation dose. The system's driver translates forward chaining rules into a backward chaining sequence, prompting the user for information pertinent to the causes considered. When the user selects the novice mode, the system automatically gives detailed explanations and descriptions of terms and reasoning as the session progresses, in a sense teaching the user. As such it is an effective tutoring tool. The use of heuristics frees the user from searching through large amounts of irrelevant information and allows the user to input partial information (varying degrees of confidence in an answer) or 'unknown' to any question. The system is available on-line and uses C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS), an expert shell developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center AI Laboratory in Houston.
We now have considerable experience with successfully designing science systems to function properly, even during and after exposure to ionizing radiation approaching one Megarad, and during large solar particle events with substantial high Z fluxes such as the events that happened in August, 1972 and in the fall of 1989. Nevertheless, with changing device dimensions and properties, newer technologies and new applications, new problems arise. Some recent basic research has shed light on these problems and pointed the way to better diagnostic tests. In the case of single event upsets, clearly one cannot always accurately predict upset probabilities simply by knowing the quiescent Linear Energy Transfer (LET) threshold and the asymptotic cross-section of the device.
A model for the differential energy spectra of galactic cosmic radiation as a function of solar activity is described. It is based on the standard diffusion-convection theory of solar modulation. Estimates of the modulation potential based on fitting this theory to observed spectral measurements from 1954 to 1989 are correlated to the Climax neutron counting rates and to the sunspot numbers at earlier times taking into account the polarity of the interplanetary magnetic field at the time of observations. These regression lines then provide a method for predicting the modulation at later times. The results of this model are quantitatively compared to a similar Moscow State University (MSU) model. These model cosmic ray spectra are used to predict the linear energy transfer spectra, differential energy spectra of light (charge less than or = 2) ions, and single event upsets rates in memeory devices. These calculations are compared to observations made aboard the Space Shuttle.
A new rule-based, expert system for diagnosing spacecraft anomalies is under development. The knowledge base consists of over two-hundred (200) rules and provides links to historical and environmental databases. Environmental causes considered are bulk charging, single event upsets (SEU), surface charging, and total radiation dose. The system's driver translates forward chaining rules into a backward chaining sequence, prompting the user for information pertinent to the causes considered. When the user selects the novice mode, the system automatically gives detailed explanations and descriptions of terms and reasoning as the session progresses, in a sense teaching the user. As such it is an effective tutoring tool. The use of heuristics frees the user from searching through large amounts of irrelevant information and allows the user to input partial information (varying degrees of confidence in an answer) or 'unknown' to any question. The system is available on-line and uses C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS), an expert shell developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center AI Laboratory in Houston.
The goals for a radiation hardened (RAD-HARD) and high reliability (HI-REL) field programmable gate array (FPGA) are described. The first qualified manufacturer list (QML) radiation hardened RH1280 and RH1020 were developed. The total radiation dose and single event effects observed on the antifuse FPGA RH1280 are reported on. Tradeoffs and the limitations in the single event upset hardening are discussed.
This report summarizes the use of SX series devices and their JTAG 1149.1 circuitry. 'JTAG' circuitry was originally designed to standardize testing of boards via a simple control port interface electrically without having to use devices such as a bed of nails tester. JTAG is also used for other functions such as executing built-in-test sequences, identifying devices, or, through custom instructions, other functions designed in by the chip designer. The JTAG circuitry is designed for test only; it has no functional use in the integrated circuit during normal operations. The JTAG circuitry and the mode of the device is controlled by a circuit block known as the 'TAP controller,' which is a sixteen-state state machine along with various registers. The controller is normally in an operational state known as TEST-LOGIC-RESET. In this state, the device is held in a fully functional, operating mode. However, a Single Event Upset (SEU) may remove the TAP controller from this state, causing a loss of control of the integrated circuit, unless certain precautions are taken, such as grounding the optional JTAG TRST signal.
This report summarizes the use of SX series devices and their JTAG 1149.1 circuitry. 'JTAG' circuitry was originally designed to standardize testing of boards via a simple control port interface electrically without having to use devices such as a bed of nails tester. JTAG is also used for other functions such as executing built-in-test sequences, identifying devices, or, through custom instructions, other functions designed in by the chip designer. The JTAG circuitry is designed for test only; it has no functional use in the integrated circuit during normal operations. The JTAG circuitry and the mode of the device is controlled by a circuit block known as the 'TAP controller,' which is a sixteen-state state machine along with various registers. The controller is normally in an operational state known as TEST-LOGIC-RESET. In this state, the device is held in a fully functional, operational mode. However, a Single Event Upset (SEU) may remove the TAP controller from this state, causing a loss of control of the integrated circuit, unless certain precautions are taken, such as grounding the optional JTAG TRST signal.
The modern market is placing increasing pressure on launch costs. This is particularly true for small university science payloads, where the cost of the experiment itself is relatively low, and the launch frequency is potentially very high. It is the stated goal of the Bantam Program to dramatically reduce the costs of launching this class of payloads. This is a goal that will require that the avionics not only be reduced in production costs, but also in maintenance and operation costs, because the Bantam vehicle is envisioned as a reusable launch system. However, the costs of avionics is a relatively small fraction of the overall cost of launching a payload, and a simple reduction in the avionics costs will not immediately realize the necessary gains. Instead, to reduce the total system launch costs, it is also necessary to improve avionics performance. Only by reducing weight, volume, and power, while enhancing computational capability can the avionics be used to address the system-level cost reduction requirements. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is currently pursuing technology development tasks, in order to support the Bantam requirements. One technology task is to develop a low-cost, high-performance reconfigurable avionics core unit. In addition to providing low cost and high performance, the use of reconfigurability will be used to explore the options of accommodating multiple launch configurations, and addressing such areas as redundancy management, single-event upset immunity, and low maintenance. This paper will address how emerging developments in reconfigurable avionics can be used to meet these challenges.
On December 13th 1998, the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer - Earth Probe (TOMS-EP) spacecraft experienced a Single Event Upset which caused the system to reconfigure and enter a Safe Mode. This incident occurred two and a half years after the launch of the spacecraft which was designed for a two year life. A combination of factors, including changes in component behavior due to age and extended use, very unfortunate initial conditions and the safe mode processing logic prevented the spacecraft from entering its nominal long term storage mode. The spacecraft remained in a high fuel consumption mode designed for temporary use. By the time the onboard fuel was exhausted, the spacecraft was Sun pointing in a high rate flat spin. Although the uncontrolled spacecraft was initially in a power and thermal safe orientation, it would not stay in this state indefinitely due to a slow precession of its momentum vector. A recovery team was immediately assembled to determine if there was time to develop a method of despinning the vehicle and return it to normal science data collection. A three stage plan was developed that used the onboard magnetic torque rods as actuators. The first stage was designed to reduce the high spin rate to within the linear range of the gyros. The second stage transitioned the spacecraft from sun pointing to orbit reference pointing. The final stage returned the spacecraft to normal science operation. The entire recovery scenario was simulated with a wide range of initial conditions to establish the expected behavior. The recovery sequence was started on December 28th 1998 and completed by December 31st. TOMS-EP was successfully returned to science operations by the beginning of 1999. This paper describes the TOMS-EP Safe Mode design and the factors which led to the spacecraft anomaly and loss of fuel. The recovery and simulation efforts are described. Flight data are presented which show the performance of the spacecraft during its return to science. Finally, lessons learned are presented.
All six Rossi Timing Explorer (RXTE) observations approved for this proposal were car- ried out. Four of the observations were simultaneous with BeppoSAX (two of the source 4Ul820-30, and one each of 4U1636-536 and 4U0614+091) and two were simultaneous with ASCA (of 4Ul636-536 and of 4U0614+091). RXTE experienced a single event upset and went into a safe hold mode during the first 4U0614+091 observation and remained in safe hold until after the scheduled start of the second 4U0614+091 observation. An additional observation of 4U0614+091 was performed with RXTE to make up for the lost time. However, it was not possible to arrange for simultaneous observations with either BeppoSAX or ASCA. Our work has led to three papers directly related to observations made - one paper for each source observed - and one additional paper summarizing our progress in this field. In addition, several reports on these results were made at various conferences.
Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are subject to numerous environmental hazards. Here I'll briefly discuss three environment factors that pose acute threats to the survival of spacecraft systems and crew: atmospheric drag, impacts by meteoroids and orbital debris, and ionizing radiation. Atmospheric drag continuously opposes the orbital motion of a satellite, causing the orbit to decay. This decay will lead to reentry if not countered by reboost maneuvers. Orbital debris is a by-product of man's activities in space, and consists of objects ranging in size from miniscule paint chips to spent rocket stages and dead satellites. Ionizing radiation experienced in LEO has several components: geomagnetically trapped protons and electrons (Van Allen belts); energetic solar particles; galactic cosmic rays; and albedo neutrons. These particles can have several types of prompt harmful effects on equipment and crew, from single-event upsets, latchup, and burnout of electronics, to lethal doses to crew.All three types of prompt threat show some dependence on the solar activity cycle. Atmospheric drag mitigation and large debris avoidance require propulsive maneuvers. M/OD and ionizing radiation require some form of shielding for crew and sensitive equipment. Limiting exposure time is a mitigation technique for ionizing radiation and meteor streams.
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is continually looking for ways to reduce the costs and schedule and minimize the technical risks during the development of microgravity programs. One of the more prominent ways to minimize the cost and schedule is to use off-the-shelf hardware (OTS). However, the use of OTS often increases the risk. This paper addresses relevant factors considered during the selection and utilization of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) flight computer processing equipment for the control of space station microgravity experiments. The paper will also discuss how to minimize the technical risks when using COTS processing hardware. Two microgravity experiments for which the COTS processing equipment is being evaluated for are the Equiaxed Dendritic Solidification Experiment (EDSE) and the Self-diffusion in Liquid Elements (SDLE) experiment. Since MSFC is the lead center for Microgravity research, EDSE and SDLE processor selection will be closely watched by other experiments that are being designed to meet payload carrier requirements. This includes the payload carriers planned for the International Space Station (ISS). The purpose of EDSE is to continue to investigate microstructural evolution of, and thermal interactions between multiple dendrites growing under diffusion controlled conditions. The purpose of SDLE is to determine accurate self-diffusivity data as a function of temperature for liquid elements selected as representative of class-like structures. In 1999 MSFC initiated a Center Director's Discretionary Fund (CDDF) effort to investigate and determine the optimal commercial data bus architecture that could lead to faster, better, and lower cost data acquisition systems for the control of microgravity experiments. As part of this effort various commercial data acquisition systems were acquired and evaluated. This included equipment with various form factors, (3U, 6U, others) and equipment that utilized various bus structures, (VME, PC104, STD bus). This evaluation of hardware was performed in conjunction with a trade study that considered over twenty (20) different factors relevant to the selection of an optimum design approach. These factors included; safety, sizing and timing, radiation hardness and single event upset, power consumption, heat dissipation, size and volume, expected service life, maintainability, heritage, operating systems, requirements for software reuse, availability of compatible interface boards, relative cost, schedule, reliability, EMI/EMC factors, "hot swap" capability, standards for conduction cooling, I/O capabilities, unique carrier requirements and operating system considerations. The approach to evaluate Safety as part of this study included a review of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for each of the experiment designs and a determination of how each hazard could be addressed and eliminated when different processors were selected. This included evaluating various design approaches and trade-offs between fault tolerant designs and fail-safe designs in accordance with NSTS 1700.7B. This will include the results of radiation testing where available. Various operating systems, such as VxWorks, Linux, QNX, and Embedded NT are evaluated and the advantages and disadvantages of their utilization are also addressed. Design implementation strategies for the various operating systems are considered and discussed. This paper presents the results and recommendations from this trade study. Preliminary conclusions from this study are that safety concerns from lack or radiation testing on COTS equipment can be addressed by additional testing and design considerations, the PC104 bus provided adequate I/O for the SDLE and EDSE microgravity experiments, and PC104 bus components offered significant advantages over VME and cPCI for weight and space reductions.
Nonvolatile memory (NVM) system that could reliably function in extreme environments is one of the most critical components for many spacecrafts being developed for NASA missions to be launched in next four to seven years. NVM supports the computer system in saving and updating critical state data required for a warm restart after power cycling or in case of a power bus failure. It also provides a power independent mass storage capacity for the scientific data gathered by the instruments. In some cases the window for gathering such data is very small and occurs only once in a given mission. Commercially popular and fully developed Flash NVM technology is inappropriate for many reasons such as the limited read write cycles with slower access speeds, radiation intolerance, higher Single Event Upsets (SEU) rates, etc. It is desirable to have an NVM system based upon a robust cell technology making it immune to the SEUs and with sufficient radiation hardness. Availability of such NVM system seems to be still 5 to 10 years in the future. Meanwhile, it is possible to provide an interim hybrid solution by combining the existing rad-hard technologies. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.
A single event upset (SEU)-hardened flip-flop has been designed and developed for antifuse Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) application. Design and application issues, testability, test methods, simulation, and results are discussed.
The availability of high density, radiation tolerant, nonvolatile memories is critical for space applications. Ferroelectric memories, when fabricated with radiation hardened complementary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS), can be manufactured and packaged to provide high density replacements for Flash memory, which is not radiation tolerant. Previous work showed ferroelectric memory cells to be resistant to single event upsets and proton irradiation, and ferroelectric storage capacitors to be resistant to neutron exposure. In addition to radiation hardness, the fast programming times, virtually unlimited endurance, and low voltage, low power operation make ferroelectric memories ideal for space missions. Previously, a commercial double level metal 64-kilobit ferroelectric memory was presented. Although the capabilities of radiation hardened wafer fabrication facilities lag behind those of the most modern commercial wafer fabrication facilities, several paths to achieving radiation tolerant, dense ferroelectric memories are emerging. Both short and long term solutions are presented in this paper. Although worldwide major semiconductor companies are introducing commercial ferroelectric memories, funding limitations must be overcome to proceed with the development of high density, radiation tolerant ferroelectric memories.
Radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar particle events (SPE) is a serious hazard to humans and electronic instruments during space travel, particularly on prolonged missions outside the Earth s magnetic fields. Galactic cosmic radiation (GCR) is composed of approx. 98% nucleons and approx. 2% electrons and positrons. Although cosmic ray heavy ions are 1-2% of the fluence, these energetic heavy nuclei (HZE) contribute 50% of the long-term dose. These unusually high specific ionizations pose a significant health hazard acting as carcinogens and also causing microelectronics damage inside spacecraft and high-flying aircraft. These HZE ions are of concern for radiation protection and radiation shielding technology, because gross rearrangements and mutations and deletions in DNA are expected. Calculations have shown that HZE particles have a strong preference for interaction with light nuclei. The best shield for this radiation would be liquid hydrogen, which is totally impractical. For this reason, hydrogen-containing polymers make the most effective practical shields. Shielding is required during missions in Earth orbit and possibly for frequent flying at high altitude because of the broad GCR spectrum and during a passage into deep space and LunarMars habitation because of the protracted exposure encountered on a long space mission. An additional hazard comes from solar particle events (SPEs) which are mostly energetic protons that can produce heavy ion secondaries as well as neutrons in materials. These events occur at unpredictable times and can deliver a potentially lethal dose within several hours to an unshielded human. Radiation protection for humans requires safety in short-term missions and maintaining career exposure limits within acceptable levels on future long-term exploration missions. The selection of shield materials can alter the protection of humans by an order of magnitude. If improperly selected, shielding materials can actually increase radiation damage due to penetration properties and nuclear fragmentation. Protecting space-borne microelectronics from single event upsets (SEUs) by transmitted radiation will benefit system reliability and system design cost by using optimal shield materials. Long-term missions on the surface of the Moon or Mars will require the construction of habitats to protect humans during their stay. One approach to the construction is to make structural materials from lunar or Martian regolith using a polymeric material as a binder. The hydrogen-containing polymers are considerably more effective for radiation protection than the regolith, but the combination minimizes the amount of polymer to be transported. We have made composites of simulated lunar regolith with two different polymers, LaRC-SI, a high-performance polyimide thermoset, and polyethylene, a thermoplastic.
This viewgraph presentation provides information on radiation tests on encoders intended for a constellation of microsatellites. The encoders use CMOS Ultra-Low Power Radiation Tolerant (CULPRiT) technology. The presentation addresses power consumption, radiation dosage, and Single Event Upset (SEU).