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NASA NTRS1992

Correlation, Cost Risk, and Geometry

The geometric viewpoint identifies the choice of a correlation matrix for the simulation of cost risk with the pairwise choice of data vectors corresponding to the parameters used to obtain cost risk. The correlation coefficient is the cosine of the angle between the data vectors after translation to an origin at the mean and normalization for magnitude. Thus correlation is equivalent to expressing the data in terms of a non orthogonal basis. To understand the many resulting phenomena requires the use of the tensor concept of raising the index to transform the measured and observed covariant components into contravariant components before vector addition can be applied. The geometric viewpoint also demonstrates that correlation and covariance are geometric properties, as opposed to purely statistical properties, of the variates. Thus, variates from different distributions may be correlated, as desired, after selection from independent distributions. By determining the principal components of the correlation matrix, variates with the desired mean, magnitude, and correlation can be generated through linear transforms which include the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix. The conversion of the data to a non orthogonal basis uses a compound linear transformation which distorts or stretches the data space. Hence, the correlated data does not have the same properties as the uncorrelated data used to generate it. This phenomena is responsible for seemingly strange observations such as the fact that the marginal distributions of the correlated data can be quite different from the distributions used to generate the data. The joint effect of statistical distributions and correlation remains a fertile area for further research. In terms of application to cost estimating, the geometric approach demonstrates that the estimator must have data and must understand that data in order to properly choose the correlation matrix appropriate for a given estimate. There is a general feeling by employers and managers that the field of cost requires little technical or mathematical background. Contrary to that opinion, this paper demonstrates that a background in mathematics equivalent to that needed for typical engineering and scientific disciplines at the masters or doctorate level is appropriate within the field of cost risk.

Dean, Edwin B.↗

NASA NTRS2014

An Example of Risk Informed Design

NASA Engineering requested a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to compare the difference in the risk of Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) between different designs of a fluid assembly. They were concerned that the configuration favored by the design team was more susceptible to leakage than a second proposed design, but realized that a quantitative analysis to compare the risks between the two designs might strengthen their argument. The analysis showed that while the second design did help improve the probability of LOC, it did not help from a probability of LOM perspective. This drove the analysis team to propose a minor design change that would drive the probability of LOM down considerably. The analysis also demonstrated that there was another major risk driver that was not immediately obvious from a typical engineering study of the design and was therefore unexpected. None of the proposed alternatives were addressing this risk. This type of trade study demonstrates the importance of performing a PRA in order to completely understand a system's design. It allows managers to use risk as another one of the commodities (e.g., mass, cost, schedule, fault tolerance) that can be traded early in the design of a new system.

Banke, Rick↗

NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g. manufacturing and systems operations). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographically distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across the Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g., manufacturing and systems operation). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost, risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographical distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Prototype Tool Support for SEI Process and Risk Knowledge

We have developed a prototype of tool support for risk assessment that uses selected components of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) information, specifically: Capability Maturity Model (CMM) process activities, CMM process goals and the SEI taxonomy of software project risks.

risk management risk assessment SEI CMM software r↗

DOE OSTI2025

PyTUQ: Python Toolkit for Uncertainty Quantification

SAND2025-03661O PyTUQ is a user-friendly software toolkit designed to help researchers and professionals understand and manage uncertainty in several scientific fields. By providing tools for analyzing how uncertainties affect outcomes, PyTUQ can be applied in areas such as energy production, and biology. Its unique approach allows users to make more informed decisions by assessing risks and improving predictions. Whether you're studying combustion processes or exploring complex biological systems, PyTUQ empowers you to gain deeper insights and enhance the reliability of your results. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

SciDAC↗

NASA NTRS1997

Risk Analysis and System Trades inthe Mars Sample Return (MSR) Mission

Risk Managenent advocates have long sought to directly influence the early stages of the systems engineering process through a more effective role in system design trade studies. The principal obstacle to this has been the lack of credible ways to represent and quantify mission risk that is, missios return form a probablistic viewpoint-for the project manager and the rest of the design team.

Risk Analysis Mars Sample Return↗

NASA NTRS2002

Second Generation RLV Space Vehicle Concept

NASA has a long history of conducting development programs and projects in a consistent fashion. Systems Engineering within those programs and projects has also followed a given method outlined by such documents as the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. The relatively new NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI) is taking a new approach to developing a space vehicle, with innovative management methods as well as new Systems Engineering processes. With the program less than a year into its life cycle, the efficacy of these new processes has yet to be proven or disproven. At $776M for phase 1, SLI represents a major portion of the NASA focus; however, the new processes being incorporated are not reflected in the training provided by NASA to its engineers. The NASA Academy of Program and Project Leadership (APPL) offers core classes in program and project management and systems engineering to NASA employees with the purpose of creating a "knowledge community where ideas, skills, and experiences are exchanged to increase each other's capacity for strong leadership". The SLI program is, in one sense, a combination of a conceptual design program and a technology program. The program as a whole doesn't map into the generic systems engineering project cycle as currently, and for some time, taught. For example, the NASA APPL Systems Engineering training course teaches that the "first step in developing an architecture is to define the external boundaries of the system", which will require definition of the interfaces with other systems and the next step will be to "define all the components that make up the next lower level of the system hierarchy" where fundamental requirements are allocated to each component. Whereas, the SLI technology risk reduction approach develops architecture subsystem technologies prior to developing architectures. The higher level architecture requirements are not allowed to fully develop and undergo decomposition and allocation down to the subsystems before the subsystems must develop allocated requirements based on the highest level of requirements. In the vernacular of the project cycles prior to the mid 1990's, the architecture definition portion of the program appears to be at a generic Phase A stage, while the subsystems are operating at Phase B. Even the management structure of the SLI program is innovative in its approach to Systems Engineering and is not reflected in the APPL training modules. The SLI program has established a Systems Engineering office as an office separate from the architecture development or the subsystem technology development, while that office does have representatives within these other offices. The distributed resources of the Systems Engineering Office are co-located with the respective Project Offices. This template is intended to provide systems engineering as an integrated function at the Program Level. the program management of SLI and the MAT agree that "program/project managers and the systems engineering team must work closely together towards the single objective of delivering quality products that meet the customer needs". This paper will explore the differences between the methods being taught by NASA, which represent decades of ideas, and those currently in practice in SLI. Time will tell if the innovation employed by SLI will prove to be the model of the future. For now, it is suggested that the training of the present exercise the flexibility of recognizing the new processes employed by a major new NASA program.

Bailey, Michelle↗

NASA NTRS2016

Leadership Development Program Final Project

TOSC is NASA's prime contractor tasked to successfully assemble, test, and launch the EM1 spacecraft. TOSC success is highly dependent on design products from the other NASA Programs manufacturing and delivering the flight hardware; Space Launch System(SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle(MPCV). Design products directly feed into TOSC's: Procedures, Personnel training, Hardware assembly, Software development, Integrated vehicle test and checkout, Launch. TOSC senior management recognized a significant schedule risk as these products are still being developed by the other two (2) programs; SVE and ACE positions were created.

Design products required for Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using Systems Engineering to Develop an Integrated Crew Health and Performance System to Mitigate Risk for Human Exploration Missions

New space exploration missions are currently being designed to take humanity beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) to cis-lunar space, the lunar surface, and eventually to Mars. These missions carry increased risks due to a number of factors, including distance from Earth, exposure to deep space hazards, reduced capacity and ability to resupply and evacuate, and increased communication delays. As distance from Earth grows and mission length increases, a growing proportion of mission risk can be attributed to the “human system.” Almost twenty years ago, the Institute of Medicine in the United States recommended the early and complete integration of the human system into the spacecraft and mission design process to mitigate this increased risk inherent in exploration missions. Exploration missions will require increasing levels of crew self-sufficiency that will challenge the current operational paradigms established in LEO. Enabling progressive Earth independence requires management of the increasingly complex interactions among spacecraft systems and integration of all the data and functions that affect human health and performance into one coordinated system –the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. This system is a critical spacecraft system that is analogous to other systems such as propulsion, guidance and navigation, or avionics. Design and integration of the CHP system requires the evidence-based merger of typically disparate disciplines such as medicine, human factors, and life support system design, using systems engineering (SE) practices. SE provides traceability of spacecraft requirements and enables reliable and repeatable trade space analysis of the many competing options for hardware and software to be included in the mission architecture. The approach described here enables spacecraft and mission designers to align the scope of a CHP system with mission specific requirements, decrease risk to the crew, and increase the probability of mission success.

Kerry McGuire↗

NASA NTRS1991

Probabilistic load simulation: Code development status

The objective of the Composite Load Spectra (CLS) project is to develop generic load models to simulate the composite load spectra that are included in space propulsion system components. The probabilistic loads thus generated are part of the probabilistic design analysis (PDA) of a space propulsion system that also includes probabilistic structural analyses, reliability, and risk evaluations. Probabilistic load simulation for space propulsion systems demands sophisticated probabilistic methodology and requires large amounts of load information and engineering data. The CLS approach is to implement a knowledge based system coupled with a probabilistic load simulation module. The knowledge base manages and furnishes load information and expertise and sets up the simulation runs. The load simulation module performs the numerical computation to generate the probabilistic loads with load information supplied from the CLS knowledge base.

Newell, J. F.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Non-Toxic Reaction Control System for the Reusable First Stage Vehicle

This paper presents the Boeing Reusable Space Systems vision of a Reaction Control System (RCS) for the Reusable First Stage (RFS) being considered as a replacement for the Solid Rocket Booster for the Space Shuttle. The requirement is to,achieve reliable vehicle control during the upper atmospheric portion of the RFS trajectory while enabling more efficient ground operations, unhindered by constraints caused by operating with highly toxic RCS propellants. Boeing's objective for this effort is to develop a safer, more efficient and environmentally friendly RCS design approach that is suitable for the RFS concept of operations, including a low cost, efficient turnaround cycle. The Boeing RCS concept utilizes ethanol and liquid oxygen in place of the highly toxic, suspected carcinogen, ozone- depleting mono-methyl-hydrazine and highly toxic nitrogen tetroxide. The Space Shuttle Upgrade program, under the leadership of the NASA Johnson Space Flight Center, is currently developing liquid oxygen and ethanol (ethyl alcohol) technology for use as non-toxic orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and RCS. The development of this liquid oxygen and ethanol technology for the Space Shuffle offers a significant leverage to select much of the same technology for the RFS program. There are significant design and development issues involved with bringing this liquid oxygen and ethanol technology to a state of maturity suitable for an operational RCS, The risks associated with a new LOX and Ethanol RCS are mitigated by maintaining kerosene and hydrogen peroxide RCS technology as an alternative. These issues, presented within this paper, include managing the oxygen supply and achieving reliable ignition in the short pulse mode of engine operation. Performance, reliability and operations requirements are presented along with a specific RCS design concept to satisfying these requirements. The work reported in this paper was performed under NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Contract to define Reusable First Stage design concepts for the Space Shuttle.

Keith, E. L.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Non-Toxic Reaction Control System for the Reusable First Stage Vehicle

This paper presents the Boeing Reusable Space Systems vision of a Reaction Control System (RCS) for the Reusable First Stage (RFS) being considered as a replacement for the Solid Rocket Booster for the Space Shuttle. The requirement is to achieve reliable vehicle control during the upper atmospheric portion of the RFS trajectory while enabling more efficient ground operations, unhindered by constraints caused by operating with highly toxic RCS propellants. Boeing's objective for this effort is to develop a safer, more efficient and environmentally friendly RCS design approach that is suitable for the RFS concept of operations, including a low cost, efficient turnaround cycle. The Boeing RCS concept utilizes ethanol and liquid oxygen in place of the highly toxic, suspected carcinogen, ozone-depleting mono-methyl-hydrazine and highly toxic nitrogen tetroxide. The Space Shuttle Upgrade program, under the leadership of the NASA Johnson Space Flight Center, is currently developing liquid oxygen and ethanol (ethyl alcohol) technology for use as non-toxic orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and RCS. The development of this liquid oxygen and ethanol technology for the Space Shuttle offers a significant leverage to select much of the same technology for the RFS program. There are significant design and development issues involved with bringing this liquid oxygen and ethanol technology to a state of maturity suitable for an operational RCS. The risks associated with a new LOX and Ethanol RCS are mitigated by maintaining kerosene and hydrogen peroxide RCS technology as an alternative. These issues, presented within this paper, include managing the oxygen supply and achieving reliable ignition in the short pulse mode of engine operation. Performance, reliability and operations requirements are presented along with a specific RCS design concept to satisfying these requirements. The work reported in this paper was performed under NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Contract Number NAS8-97272 to define Reusable First Stage design concepts for the Space Shuttle.

Keith, E. L.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Research and Technology Challenges for Human Data Analysts in Future Safety Management Systems

Enabling new and novel concepts of operations for Advanced Air Mobility poses an important need to evolve current safety management systems (SMS) and is posited to be realized through advances in Machine Learning (ML) Data Sciences and Artificial Intelligence. The “In-time Aviation Safety Management System” (IASMS) concept of operations supports the need to evolve today’s SMS to become more tailorable, scalable, and interoperable in response to forecasted changes expected for the future airspace system. Key to IASMS is integration of proactive and predictive ML algorithms trained to provide “in time” detection and mitigation of hazards and emergent risks through new methods and novel data types. IASMS research and technology development includes human factors design considerations for these systems to include human-system teaming, innovations in human interfaces and management of complex digital data information, human-system interaction/model-based system engineering, and verification and validation for data assurance and trust.

Chad L Stephens↗

NASA NTRS2017

Designing to Sample the Unknown: Lessons from OSIRIS-REx Project Systems Engineering

On September 8, 2016, the third NASA New Frontiers mission launched on an Atlas V 411. The Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) will rendezvous with asteroid Bennu in 2018, collect a sample in 2020, and return that sample to Earth in September 2023. The development team has overcome a number of challenges in order to design and build a system that will make contact with an unexplored, airless, low-gravity body. This paper will provide an overview of the mission, then focus in on the system-level challenges and some of the key system-level processes. Some of the lessons here are unique to the type of mission, like discussion of operating at a largely-unknown, low-gravity object. Other lessons, particularly from the build phase, have broad implications. The OSIRIS-REx risk management process was particularly effective in achieving an on-time and under-budget development effort. The systematic requirements management and verification and the system validation also helped identify numerous potential problems. The final assessment of the OSIRIS-REx performance will need to wait until the sample is returned in 2023, but this post-launch assessment will capture some of the key systems-engineering lessons from the development team.

Asteroid↗

NASA NTRS1984

Space activities - A review and a look ahead

The paper reviews the progress made in manned and unmanned space programs during the last 25 years and names several major accomplishments. The ingredients of success are identified as good engineering, good technology, and good management of a very complex enterprise. An argument is made that the pace of progress will be governed not by technological advances, which can be very rapid, but rather by future institutional arrangements, which are much slower to evolve. It is predicted that the most likely space activities for the next 20 years will be those relating to space commercialization, and several examples are cited. A hope is expressed that policy makers and entrepreneurs will match the spirit of adventure and risk-taking exhibited by engineers in exploring uncharted territory.

Durrani, S. H.↗

NASA NTRS2024

How NASA Accounts for Weather Throughout Artemis Mission

Development and operations of NASA spacecraft and launch vehicles are influenced by the natural environment (i.e. weather) across all applicable mission phases. Defining the natural environments provides engineers the applicable factors, along with exposure ranges, that must be accounted for in the hardware design. Effects from exposure to these environments must be addressed through structural design of the hardware, mitigated through operational controls, or accepted as risk by the governing program. Managing and mitigating these environmental factors was crucial to ensure the safe and successful launch of the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket, the transit of the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) around the moon and the recovery of MPCV after landing off the California coast in November 2022. A summary of how the Artemis I mission accounts for both the terrestrial and space environments, as well as the impacts, will be provided.

Ryan K Decker↗

NASA NTRS1999

The Faster, Better, Cheaper Approach to Space Missions: An Engineering Management Assessment

NASA was chartered as an independent civilian space agency in 1958 following the Soviet Union's dramatic launch of the Sputnik 1 (1957). In his state of the union address in May of 1961, President Kennedy issued to the fledging organization his famous challenge for a manned lunar mission by the end of the decade. The Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs that followed put the utmost value on high quality, low risk (as low as possible within the context of space flight), quick results, all with little regard for cost. These circumstances essentially melded NASAs culture as an organization capable of great technological achievement but at extremely high cost. The Space Shuttle project, the next major agency endeavor, was put under severe annual budget constraints in the 1970's. NASAs response was to hold to the high quality standards, low risk and annual cost and let schedule suffer. The result was a significant delay in the introduction of the Shuttle as well as overall total cost growth. By the early 1990's, because NASA's budget was declining, the number of projects was also declining. Holding the same cost and schedule productivity levels as before was essentially causing NASA to price itself out of business. In 1992, the helm of NASA was turned over to a new Administrator. Dan Goldin's mantra was "faster, better, cheaper" and his enthusiasm and determination to change the NASA culture was not to be ignored. This research paper documents the various implementations of "faster, better, cheaper" that have been attempted, analyzes their impact and compares the cost performance of these new projects to previous NASA benchmarks. Fundamentally, many elements of "faster, better, cheaper" are found to be working well, especially on smaller projects. Some of the initiatives are found to apply only to smaller or experimental projects however, so that extrapolation to "flagship" projects may be problematic.

Hamaker, Joseph W.↗