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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16

Declining Global Per Capita Agricultural Production and Warming Oceans Threaten Food Security

Despite accelerating globalization, most people still eat food that was grown locally. Developing countries with weak purchasing power tend to import as little food as possible from global markets, suffering consumption deficits during times of high prices or production declines. Local agricultural production, therefore, is critical to both food security and economic development among the rural poor. The level of local agricultural production, in turn, will be controlled by the amount and quality of arable land, the amount and quality of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, etc.), as well as farm-related technology, practices, and policies. In this paper we discuss several emerging threats to global and regional food security, including declining yield gains that are failing to keep up with population increases, and warming in the tropical Indian Ocean and its impact on rainfall. If yields continue to grow more slowly than per capita harvested area, parts of Africa, Asia, and Central and Southern America will experience substantial declines in per capita cereal production. Global per capita cereal production will potentially decline by 14 percent between 2008 and 2030. Climate change is likely to further affect food production, particularly in regions that have very low yields due to lack of technology. Drought, caused by anthropogenic warming in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, may also reduce 21 st century food availability by disrupting Indian Ocean moisture transports and tilting the 21 st century climate toward a more El Nino-like state. The impacts of these circulation changes over Asia remain uncertain. For Africa, however, Indian Ocean warming appears to have already reduced main growing season rainfall along the eastern edge of tropical Africa, from southern Somalia to northern parts of the Republic of South Africa. Through a combination of quantitative modeling of food balances and an examination of climate change, we present an analysis of emerging threats to global food security.

Funk, Chris C.↗

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Analysis of Line Distance Elements for Various Ibr Controllers and System Conditions

The large-scale penetration of inverter-based resources in power systems has challenged protection engineers because of the different fault behaviors these sources provide compared to conventional generation systems. The main challenges include a low level of fault current magnitude, unpredictable angles of sequence currents, and lack of inertia that can lead to maloperation of conventional phasor-based protection elements. This paper presents a sensitivity analysis of transmission line distance protection elements during phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase faults for different inverter controllers and power system conditions. It also summarizes which line protection elements remain secure near IBR terminations and identifies the ones affected by the inverter-based response. The paper concludes by highlighting that regulating negative-sequence current injection during the fault aids correct protection decisions, but does not address the entire challenge. Finally, alternative protection elements to those affected by the inverter fault response are discussed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Enhancing Short-Term Flexibility through Characterization of HVDC Transmission Systems

Efficient power grid operation hinges on maintaining safety and reliability through adaptable system flexibility standards. However, in a future power grid characterized by extensive renewable energy integration, conventional system flexibility and predetermined requirements may falter under extreme conditions. This paper addresses the formidable challenge of sustaining secure and dependable power grid operations under these circumstances, emphasizing the role of controllable high voltage direct current (HVdc) transmission systems in amplifying overall system flexibility and tackling operational complexities. To quantitatively assess short-term flexibility and its associated economic benefits from HVdc within specific regions, we propose a Power Flow Distribution Factors (PTDFs) based approach. This methodology takes into account both dispatchable generators and HVdc systems, pinpointing their contributions. Through an analysis of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system, we demonstrate the practical application of this approach to scrutinize the impacts of existing and future HVdc lines.

Operational Flexibility, Multi-terminal HVdc, tran↗

X-ray Security Imaging on Personal Dosimetry [Slides]

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Electric propulsion for communications satellites

Electric propulsion systems derive their low overall mass, relative to chemical propulsion systems, from an optimized mix of independently controlled power and mass flow rate. A significant reduction in mass can be secured by substituting electric propulsion for conventional hydrazine systems for all the major propulsion tasks of a communications satellite. Additional advantages for all electric propulsion maneuvers are precision location and higher pointing accuracy. Three auxiliary electric propulsion systems are now available for application on communications satellites: the electrically augmented hydrazine system, the Teflon pulsed plasma system, and the mercury ion thruster system. Primary electric propulsion will be available in the mid to late 1980s as a spin-off of NASA's program of interplanetary exploration.

Free, B. A.↗

Intern Sized Poster for Dosimetry Research

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Intern Sized Poster for Dosimetry Research

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

X-ray Security Imaging on Personal Dosimetry

Federal regulations mandate that personal dosimetry devices — like optically stimulated luminescence (OSLs) — must be worn by all US Department of Energy (DOE) and associated radiation workers to track their occupational dose. Unfortunately, the inadvertent passage of OSLs through x-ray security scanners can compromise their validity. With the advent of high energy, advanced resolution security technology used in airports, this once insignificant issue now requires that Radiological Control (RadCon) be able to accurately discern non-occupational dose to effected OSLs. This presentation will discuss the principles, methods, and, rather surprising, models for establishing the corrective dose estimates at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and its implication across the DOE.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

A practical control strategy for demand flexibility with ensured occupant comfort in grid-interactive efficient buildings

This study proposes a practical and simplified demand response (DR) control strategy from the perspective of grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs), aiming to secure demand flexibility while ensuring occupant thermal comfort. Focusing on summer on-peak periods, a linear demand response (LDR) strategy that integrates cooling setpoint adjustment and lighting dimming was designed, and its performance was quantitatively evaluated. A case study was conducted using EnergyPlus-based simulations for a U.S. DOE small office prototype building under summer on-peak weather conditions. Compared with a conventional rapid demand response (RDR) strategy, the proposed LDR approach gradually reduced electrical loads while maintaining occupant thermal comfort indices, including predicted mean vote (PMV) and predicted percentage of dissatisfied (PPD), within acceptable comfort ranges. Quantitative analysis of demand flexibility using the grid-interactive impact index (GII) and the flexibility strength index (FSI) showed that the LDR strategy provided approximately 12.5% demand flexibility during DR periods and achieved an electricity cost reduction of about 8.8%. In addition, the results of the part-load ratio (PLR)-based cooling system performance analysis showed that, in the on-peak period, the LDR strategy exhibited improved cooling performance compared with the baseline. Overall, this study shows the potential of a practical DR control strategy that can simultaneously achieve occupant comfort and demand flexibility without relying on complex advanced control technologies.

Jung, Dong Eun↗

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Deceleration-Limiting Roadway Barrier

Roadway barrier system and method are disclosed for decelerating a moving vehicle in a controlled manner and for retaining the decelerated vehicle. A net or mesh of the roadway barrier system receives and captures the moving vehicle. The net or mesh is secured to anchors by energy absorbing straps. The energy absorbing straps deploy under a tensional load to decelerate the moving vehicle, the straps providing a controlled resistance to the tensional load over a predefined displacement or stroke to bring the moving vehicle to rest. Additional features include a sacrificial panel or sheet in front of the net that holds up the net or mesh while deflecting vehicles that collide only tangentially with the roadway barrier system.

Schneider, William C.↗

Semiautonomous Avionics-and-Sensors System for a UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) autonomous or remotely controlled pilotless aircraft have been recently thrust into the spotlight for military applications, for homeland security, and as test beds for research. In addition to these functions, there are many space applications in which lightweight, inexpensive, small UAVS can be used e.g., to determine the chemical composition and other qualities of the atmospheres of remote planets. Moreover, on Earth, such UAVs can be used to obtain information about weather in various regions; in particular, they can be used to analyze wide-band acoustic signals to aid in determining the complex dynamics of movement of hurricanes. The Advanced Sensors and Electronics group at Langley Research Center has developed an inexpensive, small, integrated avionics-and-sensors system to be installed in a UAV that serves two purposes. The first purpose is to provide flight data to an AI (Artificial Intelligence) controller as part of an autonomous flight-control system. The second purpose is to store data from a subsystem of distributed MEMS (microelectromechanical systems) sensors. Examples of these MEMS sensors include humidity, temperature, and acoustic sensors, plus chemical sensors for detecting various vapors and other gases in the environment. The critical sensors used for flight control are a differential- pressure sensor that is part of an apparatus for determining airspeed, an absolute-pressure sensor for determining altitude, three orthogonal accelerometers for determining tilt and acceleration, and three orthogonal angular-rate detectors (gyroscopes). By using these eight sensors, it is possible to determine the orientation, height, speed, and rates of roll, pitch, and yaw of the UAV. This avionics-and-sensors system is shown in the figure. During the last few years, there has been rapid growth and advancement in the technological disciplines of MEMS, of onboard artificial-intelligence systems, and of smaller, faster, and smarter wireless telemetry systems. The major attraction of MEMS lies in orders-of-magnitude reductions of power requirements relative to traditional electronic components that perform equivalent functions. In addition, the compactness of MEMS, relative to functionally equivalent traditional electronics systems, makes MEMS attractive for UAV applications. Recent advances in MEMS have made it possible to produce pressure, acceleration, humidity, and temperature sensors having masses in subgram range and possessing sensitivities and accuracies comparable to those of larger devices.

Shams, Qamar↗

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) (Final Technical Report)

Electric grids have historically been susceptible to both physical attacks and environmental hazards but the implementation of smart grids, remote management, and self-healing networks, has now made the grid vulnerable to cyber attacks. To address risks introduced by routable connectivity, utilities must establish dynamic solutions to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. In response to the evolving threat landscape U.S. Department of Energy-Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER) initiated the Cybersecurity for the OT Environment (CyOTE) pilot program, a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) effort designed to leverage U.S. intelligence capabilities to prevent, detect, or mitigate a cyber attack on utility operational technology (OT) networks. As part of the CyOTE pilot, The Southern Company (Southern Company or Southern) researched, evaluated and deployed emerging Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technologies and cyber security monitoring architectures to provide previously unrealized network visibility and situational awareness through deep packet inspection and data analytics. This Final Scientific/Technical Report documents the objectives, methodology, lessons learned, and results of Southern Company’s participation in the CyOTE pilot from December 2018 to September 2023.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Review of High-Throughput Surface Treatments for Microlens Arrays

Microlenses are increasingly being integrated into modern manufactured devices. From printed security devices and screens to solar panels and microscopes, these optical materials offer high control over light focusing. Thus, understanding how to treat the surfaces of these fragile, transparent devices on an integrated manufacturing line is essential. Here, in this study, we review the surface treatments for the following application categories: cleaning, increasing surface energy, decreasing surface energy, and tunable surface modifications. This overview describes methods available for the large-scale manufacturing of microlens arrays and the potential impact of those treatments on common optical surfaces. Objectives and qualitative compatibility parameters are compared, and outlooks are provided for further study to aid in streamlining the method selection and process optimization for microlenses and similar optical components.

lens manufacturing↗