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DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Preliminary Plan to Inform Testing of a Heat Exchanger Test Article

This report presents a preliminary plan to guide the qualification testing of advanced heat exchanger (HX) components for nuclear-to-industrial heat transfer applications. The objective is to establish a defensible, physics-based methodology that integrates computational modeling, targeted experimentation, and in-service inspection considerations to demonstrate component performance and reliability under representative reactor conditions. The analysis identifies Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) and High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) systems as reference configurations in terms of temperature, pressure, and chemical environment. Within these operating envelopes, dominant degradation mechanisms— including creep–fatigue interaction, flow-induced vibration, corrosion, and diffusion-bond deterioration—were evaluated to define test requirements. A comprehensive computationalexperimental framework is proposed to support life prediction and qualification activities. The framework couples high-fidelity structural-mechanics, thermal-hydraulic, and fluid-structure interaction models with accelerated degradation testing to produce a traceable linkage between microstructural evolution, mechanical performance, and remaining useful life (RUL). The approach adheres to established Verification, Validation, and Uncertainty Quantification (VVUQ) standards (ASME V&V 10/20; NUREG-2152) and incorporates a digital-twin architecture for continuous model refinement through data assimilation. The plan further outlines testing methodologies, including pre-test analyses, test-loop design parameters, and sensor placement strategies that maximize information yield while maintaining mechanistic fidelity. Complementary sections describe in-service inspection (ISI), on-line monitoring (OLM), and structural-health-monitoring (SHM) techniques applicable to compact HX geometries typical of advanced reactors. Collectively, these activities establish the technical foundation for demonstrating 40-60-year equivalent service life of advanced heat exchangers in support of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Reactor and Integrated Energy Systems programs. The forthcoming phase will execute the defined pre-test analyses, initiate hardware fabrication, and implement the integrated testing campaign to validate the proposed qualification methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Army Reactor Program Regulatory Bases: Supporting Army Regulation 50–7

This report describes the regulatory bases for the 2025 revision of Army Regulation (AR) 50–7 - Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Army Reactor Program and the new associated Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) Army Reactor Program Procedures.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Responsible Artificial Intelligence for Insider Threat Mitigation

This report examines the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for insider threat mitigation (ITM) programs in nuclear security facilities. Insider threat detection presents unique challenges due to the subtle and adaptive nature of these threats, the complex signatures involved, and the scarcity of available data for analysis. Traditional human-centered approaches, while essential, face limitations in processing large amounts of data continuously and detecting subtle patterns across multiple systems. AI technologies can potentially address these limitations by providing 24/7 monitoring capabilities, identifying complex patterns that might escape human observation, and offering consistent application of security criteria. However, the deployment of AI in nuclear security contexts introduces significant new risks, including workflow disruption, expanded attack surfaces, potential for misuse, and ethical concerns regarding privacy, fairness, transparency, safety, and security. The high-consequence nature of nuclear security decisions demands careful consideration of these risks and systematic approaches to their mitigation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Shockwave Arrival Times from Operation Redwing and Operation Upshot-Knothole

Back in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, 210 nuclear tests were conducted in the atmosphere. As part of the testing program, EG&G performed shockwave arrival-time measurements for different shots in different operations using pressure transducers at different distances from ground zero. They then developed correlations unique to each set of data. They did not attempt to correlate all data onto one curve. As a fireball moves, material is picked up and pulled in, which is called entrainment. This extra material increases the mass of the fireball, and as the energy is spread out over a larger and larger mass, the specific internal energy of the fireball gases drops, which causes the temperature to drop as well. When the energy in the solid angle of a spherical shockwave hits the surface, it is reflected. Shortly thereafter, it catches up with the outward-moving shockwave and re-combines with it, causing it to expand at a slightly faster rate. As the shockwave grows, it approaches a hemispherical shape. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate that the shockwave arrival-time data can, in fact, be correlated onto a single function when the shockwave time-dependent solution is modified to include a geometric factor, θ, and is corrected for an entrainment coefficient.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Slow Strain Rate Testing of A537 Tank Wall Material

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade carbon steel tanks. This waste in part consists of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. Preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to localized corrosion. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion and/or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. The salt dissolution process also liberates interstitial liquid trapped between the salt crystals. This liquid is initially high in nitrite and hydroxide concentration. High pH and greater ratios of nitrite to nitrate act as inhibitors to minimize corrosion of carbon steel in high nitrate environments. However, as dissolution proceeds, the concentration of nitrate will increase, while the hydroxide and nitrite concentration of the interstitial liquid will deplete and become insufficient to prevent the onset of corrosion attack. Tank blending and the addition of inhibitors are used to ensure adequate concentrations of hydroxide and nitrite. However, this is not desirable during salt dissolution as it can reduce process efficiency and increase the amount of waste that needs processing. This testing program was designed to examine the risk of SCC associated with utilizing the pitting factor (PF) and nitrite/nitrate (NO 2 - /NO 3 - ) ratio limits for handling dissolved salt solutions at an elevated temperature in the carbon steel waste tanks. The previously identified limits are a PF of 1.2 and an NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio of 0.15. The results indicate that as long as the NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio exceeds 0.1 and the PF is above approximately 0.8, there is a discernible safety margin between the open circuit potential (OCP) and the critical cracking potential (CCP) observed during applied potential testing. However, this margin, defined by the difference between the OCP and CCP, is relatively narrow, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 volts. This small margin raises concerns about potential shifts in OCP during waste retrieval operations, which could inadvertently increase the risk of SCC if the OCP approaches or exceeds the CCP. These results confirm that dissolved salt solutions provide a potent chemistry that, under certain conditions, makes carbon steel susceptible to SCC. The next question to consider is the influence these results have on decisions for storage and retrieval of waste from the tanks. For Type III/IIIA waste tanks, the risk of SCC remains very low. First, and most importantly, the post-weld stress relief of the tanks has reduced the residual stress near the welds. Thus, without the stress component, SCC risk is minimized. The material of construction (A537 Carbon steel) for the Type III/IIIA tanks is superior to the steel in its resistance to SCC than the steel that was utilized for the Type I, II, and IV tanks (A285 carbon steel). From a chemistry control standpoint for a Type III/IIIA tank directly involved with handling dissolved salt solutions, the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio limits may be utilized wherein chemistry control provides an extra layer of defense against SCC. Chemistry control for a Type III/IIIA tank minimizes the risk for a tank that may receive the dissolved salt solution, particularly if that tank is a Type I, II, or IV waste tank. On the other hand, if the dissolved salt solution is handled by a Type I, II, or IV waste tank the risk of SCC is real. The potent chemistry, absence of stress relief, and inferior material result in a condition that is conducive to cracking. Efforts should be made to either avoid transferring waste that may not meet the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria to one of these tanks or if it is unavoidable, take measures to minimize the consequences of a leak. As shown by these tests, even if the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria are met, there is a risk that the tank potential may be disturbed in the positive direction and the risk of SCC increase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Opportunities for an Integrated Web-Based Workbench for Data Access and Analysis - 20244

Management of environmental issues can require integration of multiple types of data and information, conducting data analysis and interpretation, and providing data visualization for effective communications. These data elements are important for site management to support regulator interactions and provide defensibility for remedial decisions. Databases and information repositories are core elements of managing data; however, efficient data access and analysis also enable effective site management. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site is an example of a complex site with a voluminous quantity of environmental data and a need for efficient site management. Different tiers of data and information tools have been developed and deployed to address site needs. These tools are configured for ready access via the web site interfaces and meet the rigorous quality requirements for environmental site management. Evolving efforts are focused on an integrated platform to meet site environmental management needs. In this platform, users can access site information at multiple levels of detail based on their need and permissions, so that data and associated analyses are presented within the context of the site mission and the user's management or technical needs. This concept is not only applicable at individual sites like Hanford but also applicable at other sites within the DOE complex. An integrated web-based architecture that links data visualization, data analytics, and management tools can provide holistic access to large data sets, minimize complexity, and maximize interactivity and technical communication. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Collaborative Research and Development Program on Explosive Detection Technology

In September 2013, at the 6th Permanent Coordinating Group Meeting between the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) and the French Institut de Radioprotection et de Sureté Nucléaire (IRSN), France expressed an interest in bilateral cooperation with the United States because its newly revised regulations that require enhanced explosives detection capabilities at nuclear and radiological facilities. In the ensuing years, PNNL (DOE/NNSA) and IRSN sought to identify an area of collaboration within explosives detection that would leverage the specific technical strengths of each organization. Based upon awareness of each other’s technical acumen gleaned from the scientific literature on explosives detection, it was clear that specific organizations within each nation could provide the needed expertise to enable enhancement of explosives detection through a collaborative development effort. The French lnstitut Saint-Louis was determined to be an optimal partner for IRSN to develop a collaboration with DOE/NNSA using PNNL’s detection team in this effort. Thus, the dialog was started between the technical experts at each organization to define where complementary expertise in explosives detection could be best leveraged. The technical plans and objectives of this project were sound with promising results. In the end, the joint action sheet was not implemented. The challenge with executing the project was in the complexity of getting a signed agreement between DOE, IRSN and ISL. Most of the obstacles surrounded the ability to protect intellectual property and obtain an agreement which included all of the parties. At a high level, this report documents the interactions and attempt to develop a cooperative framework for explosives detection development from FY 2014 through FY 2020.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2020

Spatially-Resolved Characterization Techniques and Their Implications for Nuclear Debris Formation.

Debris from nuclear tests has a complex formation process and can inform multiple fields of study such as geology, atmospheric science, shock physics, and chemistry under extreme conditions. Macroscopic nuclear debris forms as the result of fireball interaction with surrounding materials (e.g., structural and environmental component), which rapidly undergo melting and vaporization followed by condensation, convective/diffusive mixing, and solidification over the course of seconds. In atmospheric events, some of this material may disperse over long distances, but much of the material is deposited close-in to ground zero, often in multicomponent, partially (or entirely) amorphous debris formations. During the U.S. nuclear testing program, this material was collected and analyzed, particularly for radionuclide composition. Fallout formation models were developed from nuclear test data based on such radionuclide compositional analyses. These models were not just used to understand fallout dispersion (i.e. the spread of radioactivity over geographical regions) but also guide radiochemical interpretations of historical nuclear tests.6 Developments in analytical techniques over the past several decades have made it possible to make new analyses on historical debris, some of which may be more than a half-century old. For example, inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) has been used to look at the trace elements in glassy fallout material from aboveground nuclear tests (including the Trinity test). Advanced analyses using X-ray absorption allowed for the measurement of oxidation state of fallout constituents, including actinides. The ability to measure trace actinides and their subsequent oxidation state is important to understanding how the surrounding environment may have influenced the resultant fallout composition and may have implications for why certain fractionation trends have been observed. Here we present data from historic nuclear test debris illustrating the power of spatially resolved methods to connect interaction of the near-field environment with the explosion and provide new insights into nuclear debris formation.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification and Validation of High Explosive Reactive Burn Models Implemented in LANL's EAP and LAP Code Base

Reactive burn models represent a significant leap in high explosive (HE) modeling capability. The first generation of engineering models of HE detonation are called programmed burn models and they are largely based on the distance between a prescribed detonation point and each zone in a simulation. There have been many advancements to programmed burn models over the years and when the assumptions upon which they are based are met, a properly tuned programmed burn model can be highly accurate but if any of their assumptions is not met, as is the case for corner turning or weakly initiated HE burn, they will give the wrong answer. Reactive burn models represent an entirely new way of modeling HE burn. They use the local conditions of a zone – e.g. temperature, pressure or density – as calculated by a hydrocode to determine if and when the zone is going to detonate and if so, how rapidly. This difference opens up an entirely new set of capabilities for HE modeling. It makes it possible to accurately and predictively model phenomena like the effect of confinement and the formation of dead zones. Reactive burn models have seen sustained development effort at LANL for at least the last decade but several recent developments make it timely to transition reactive burn models from a research topic to a production tool. The main goal of this milestone is to facilitate and accelerate the adoption of reactive burn as a commonly available modeling option, with recommendations on the resolution that will be required and uncertainties associated with their modeling choices. To achieve this, we have performed verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification (UQ) assessments of AWSD and SURF/SURFplus in xRage and FLAG on a variety of different problems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗