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At least 325 records · Page 18

A Section 106 Evaluation of Building CP-1, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

On December 17, 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) vacated Building CP-1 (Building 06-CP-1) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Starting in 1951, nearly all nuclear tests during the Cold War were controlled from this building on the facility, known as the Nevada Test Site for most of its years of operation. The test site was renamed the NNSS in 2010. CP-1 was the command and control center where decisions about NNSS activities were sought and made; where authorization for movements about the areas forward (north) of Mercury base camp were coordinated, granted or declined, and monitored; and where problems and emergencies in the forward areas were communicated and relayed to the appropriate agencies for solution. Some of the testing duties for the Control Point included the timing and firing of nuclear tests, air operations, security, communications, weather monitoring, and radiation safety. During tests, communications were maintained through various channels to receive and pass instructions or information to the numerous testing operations, to Washington, D.C., the national laboratories, and overhead aircraft monitoring the tests. At one time, the Security Control Center, a Class A Weather Station, and the Radiation Safety Headquarters were located in CP-1, which also contained a cafeteria, a dining area, and bunk rooms. This survey was prompted by recognition that closure of the building in place creates a situation where CP-1 is vulnerable to decay in its present and unused condition. Activities at CP-1 have been reduced gradually over time since the end of nuclear testing in 1992. The Area of Potential Effects (APE) was determined by NNSA/NFO to be a two-acre area historically considered the space directly associated with CP-1 and available to CP-1 personnel for use. The APE is bounded on the south by an unnamed main paved road into the guarded Control Point area, on the west by the edge of the parking lot for adjacent Building CP-9, on the east by the edge of the bladed cut-and-fill terrace for CP-1, and on the north by a barbed wire security fence (Figure 2). All of this lot is either bladed or covered with asphalt. Contained within the lot are eight Accessary Resources (AR) which are much more closely aligned with CP-1 than with adjacent buildings. AR are defined by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) (2013) as “…related but subordinate to the principal building. Accessory resources would not exist were it not for the principal resource.” The Visual APE was determined by NNSA/NFO to be the same as the APE used for intensive survey because no exterior modifications to the resource are anticipated. The APE is located in Section 34 T11S R53E MDBM (projected) within the NNSS base called the Control Point in Area 6. It is on the 1986 Yucca Lake USGS 7.5 min. series topographic quadrangle. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the APE with the assistance of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), resulting in recordation and evaluation of CP-1 (SHPO Resource Number B14490) and eight accessory resources (AR1-AR8). This recording of CP-1 was done in three sessions. Copies of the building form and report are on file at Nevada Cultural Resources Information System (NVCRIS), DRI, and with the NNSA/NFO, Las Vegas, Nevada. Control Point refers to the support facilities of which Building CP-1, with its 126 rooms, is the most important part (Campbell et al. 1983:165). CP-1 refers to the entire building but it also is the designation for the first phase of construction, i.e. the original building. There were three major subsequent phases of additions to the building. The first two were called CP-1A (the east wing) and CP-1B (the west wing with the new War Room). A final phase filled in the hyphen between CP-1 and CP-1B with a Field Office. For convenience this last phase is called CP-1C in this report. Hence, CP-1 can refer either the entire building or to the first phase of the building exclusive of additions. The context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended in the various sections of this report. There were also two minor expansions consisting of a small battery room and a shelter for an emergency exit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Section 110 Evaluation of the Project 57 Rad-Safe Area Personnel Decontamination Building, Nye County, Nevada

Project 57 was an open-air, plutonium-dispersal safety test conducted by the United States in 1957 on a portion of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range). The Project 57 test area, once known as Area 13, was a block of land abutting the northeastern boundary of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS was renamed the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in 2010. In keeping with the historical Cold War period designation, NTS will be used when discussing historic period events, while NNSS will be applied for contemporary activities. During Project 57, the high explosives of a nuclear weapon were triggered asymmetrically to simulate an accidental detonation. The test was conducted to study the extent of plutonium contamination from a nonnuclear yield accident, as well as assess the biological and environmental hazards such an event could create. Following the conclusion of the experiment, the contaminated area surrounding the ground zero (GZ) was fenced off and some of the contaminated equipment was buried in place. The Project 57 Rad-Safe area was abandoned. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) decontaminated and decommissioned the Project 57 site. This Section 110 documentation was prompted by recognition that more than five decades have passed since the abandonment of the Project 57 Rad-Safe area, particularly the personnel decontamination building, which leaves the temporary structure vulnerable to natural forces of weathering and decay. However, these temporary facilities remain partially standing, allowing for a condition assessment and recommendations regarding the Rad-Safe area’s historical significance. The National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) determined there was no area of potential effect (APE) (direct, indirect, or visual) because there is no planned undertaking and the Project 57 Rad-Safe area will continue to remain unused. Instead, a 4.5-acre study area was established to facilitate recording the Project 57 personnel decontamination building and the remaining accessory resources. The study area is bounded on the east by Valley Road and it extends to the east far enough to encompass the former Project 57 Rad-Safe area (Figure A-2). The Section 110 study area is located in the northwest quarter of Section 35, Township 07S Range 54E Mount Diablo Base and Meridian. It is on the 1962 Groom Mine SW USGS 7.5-minute series topographic quadrangle. Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the Section 110 study area, resulting in the recording and evaluation of the Project 57 Rad-Safe area personnel decontamination building and four accessory resources (AR-1 through AR-4). Copies of the building form and report are on file at DRI and with the NNSA/NFO in Las Vegas, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Air Dispersion Modeling of Radioactive Releases During Proposed 236Z Rubble Pile Removal Activities

This report is part of the planning process for the removal of the 236Z rubble remaining as of January 1, 2018, at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site. This report documents an analysis considering standard techniques for the removal of demolition rubble. It does not document any decisions about the removal approaches. This document is intended to guide the establishment of a boundary for the application of an air monitoring regime. Atmospheric dispersion modeling using estimated release rates has been conducted to provide information on the location and levels of radioactive contamination that may be expected as the result of rubble removal activities. Hourly meteorological data collected over a 6-year period (2004–2009) were used to examine the effects of wind speed, direction, and stability on projected concentrations of contaminants in air and deposited on nearby surfaces. The source terms modeled in this report were based on the residual transuranic contamination levels that are anticipated to remain in the 236Z rubble following building demolition. The potential airborne concentrations were established using the five-factor formula from DOE-HDBK-3010 (DOE 1994) considering material-at-risk, damage ratio, airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and leak path factor. Radioactive contamination emissions were calculated by release mechanism and rubble pile area for on-shift and off-shift activities. The emissions from the applicable sources were combined to provide emissions estimates for each day from each cleanup area. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) AERMOD computer code was used to estimate atmospheric dispersion and deposition of the released radioactive materials in the immediate vicinity of the planned rubble removal activities Both airborne and surface concentrations were modeled with AERMOD. Hourly derived air concentrations (DAC) were modeled for an array of receptors covering the rubble pile site and surrounding area. Peak (95th and 99th percentile) values of time-integrated air concentrations at these receptor points are derived from these hourly values, with modeling results reported as total incremental air concentrations in DAC-hours occurring over the selected time period. Total accumulated deposition amounts were also evaluated with AERMOD using the same array of receptors, with results reported as disintegrations per minute (dpm) per 100 cm2. Each rubble pile was considered in terms of its size, location, and estimated contamination levels. The modeling was based on the assumed sequence of the rubble removal activities. The results in this report are based on cleanup schedules and methods proposed by CHPRC. As of January 1, 2018, there are broadly three large rubble piles (west, footprint, and east) remaining of the 236Z Building process cell. It is assumed that the overall cleanup will require either 1) 30 days over a 6-week period, or 2) 60 days over a 12-week period. Work was assumed to be performed during 10-hour day shifts. The analysis shows that some releases of radioactive material are to be anticipated during the cleanup of the 236Z rubble piles. The modeling results presented here are closely tied to the details of how the rubble removal is to be conducted. The results indicate that for the rubble removal, the radiological exposures from the planned activities are predicted to be well below the designated limits for air and soil exposures. The cleanup of the 236Z main process cell rubble is expected to release some alpha-emitting radionuclides. However, results based on 6 years of hourly climatological data, two representative cleanup periods, realistic mitigating actions, and a bounding source term indicate that concentrations at the fence line of the PFP facilities should remain well below 12 DAC-hours/week. The results presented in this report are a reevaluation of a subset of the results presented in PNNL-20173 Rev. 4.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site - E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System: Fourth Quarter 2019

This report includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for October, November, and December 2019. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on October 15, November 26, and December 18, 2019. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, soil conditions on and around the berms, erosion or sloughing of the slopes of the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurements of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS) discharge. Annual sample results of the effluent water from the ETDS are also included in this report. The effluent sample was collected on September 11, 2019, and analyzed for the parameters listed in Table 1-B of Permit NEV 96021. In addition, Permit NEV 96021 requires the collection and analysis of representative groundwater samples from Well ER 12-1 every 24 months. This summary report provides the information pertaining to the sampling and analysis of groundwater samples collected on April 10, 2019.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System Quarterly Monitoring Report, Water Pollution Control Permit NEV 96021 (First Quarter Calendar Year 2020)

This report includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for January, February, and March 2020. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on January 15, February 12, and March 17, 2020. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, soil conditions on and around the berms, erosion or sloughing of the slopes of the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurements of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System discharge.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Determination of Wind Exposure Category and Basic Wind Speed for B332 and Other Facilities Located within Superblock

This document assesses of the typical surface terrain for the LLNL Site 200 Campus surrounding B332 in accordance with ASCE 7-16 and demonstrates that wind Exposure Category B can be applied to B332 and the other buildings and structures located within the fenced perimeter of Superblock. When compensating for the Exposure Category B surface terrain surrounding B332 and Superblock, calculations show that the ANS 2.3 WDC-3 Basic Wind Speed for B332 is adjusted from 118 mph to 100 mph and the WDC-2 Basic Wind Speed is adjusted from 115 mph to 98 mph.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Demonstration of a new unstructured mesh IMC x-ray transport capability in LAP codes

The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Transport project’s Jayenne Implicit Monte Carlo (IMC) transport library now includes an unstructured mesh capability and is available in a Lagrangian Applications Project (LAP) code. In this presentation, we discuss recent work by the LAP and Transport projects that provides an IMC transport capability for radiation hydrodynamics in the Lagrangian frame. Verification problems testing the new capabilities have been simulated and analyzed, i.e. Marshak wave, Mach 45, Su-Olsen, picket fence, and crooked pipe, both in one and two dimensions. We also present results on two stretch goal problems: a simplified COAX high energy density physics experiment and a supernova shock simulation. Finally, we identify current limitations and future work needed to bring a full capability to the user community.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

E-Tunnel wastewater discharge permit quarterly monitoring report. Water pollution control permit Nev 96021, third quarter 2020

Monitoring and sampling activities are performed at the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS ) in accordance with the requirements of Water Pollution Control (WPC) Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, which is effective October 1, 2013. Although the end date of the WPC permit is September 30, 2018, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), in a letter dated September 21, 2018, provided guidance that indicated the WPC Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, is in effect until NDEP notifies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office otherwise. This QMR includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for July, August, and September 2020. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on July 21, August 19, and September 16, 2020. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, soil conditions on and around the berms, erosion or sloughing of the slopes of the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurement s of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the ETDS discharge. The report will be submitted to the State of Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

E-Tunnel Wastewater Discharge Permit Quarterly Monitoring Report

Monitoring and sampling activities are performed at the E-Tunnel Wastewater Disposal System (ETDS) in accordance with the requirements of Water Pollution Control (WPC) Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, which is effective October 1, 2013. Although the end date of the WPC permit is September 21, 2018, provided Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), in a letter date September 21, 2018, provided guidance that indicated the WPC Permit NEV 96021, Revision 1, is in effect until NDEP notifies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office otherwise. This QMR includes the results of monthly inspections and monitoring for April, May, and June 2020. Monthly inspections and monitoring were conducted on April 21, May 28, and June 24 2020. Inspections include a visual assessment of the berms, ponding, water levels relative to the overflow pipes, tunneling or burrowing into the berms, seeps at the toe of the berms, deep-rooting botanicals on the berms, and fencing. Monthly monitoring includes measurements of the instantaneous flow rate, hydrogen ion activity (pH), and specific conductance of the ETDS discharge.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Summary Report for the Anti-Climb Coating Test Project: Simulated Attack and Skid-Resistance Tests

The Sandia National Laboratories Physical Security Center of Excellence (PSCOE) has been tasked by the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Diplomatic Security Research and Development branch to investigate the potential anti-climb benefits of newly developed skid-resistant paint coatings - one light base and one dark base. DOS is interested in studying the application of the coatings on passive barriers commonly used at diplomatic facilities. The purpose of the anti-climb coating in this context is to deter and delay adversaries from climbing onto the passive barriers. PSCOE was tasked to perform delay testing that focused on the effectiveness of the coatings on the two DOS perimeter passive barriers - the DS-41 anti-ram fence and a 9 foot high by 1 foot thick reinforced concrete wall intended to mimic the DS-30 anti-ram perimeter wall. PSCOE was also tasked in performing skid-resistance testing using a British Pendulum skid-resistance tester. Delay testing and skid-resistance testing were also performed on two different passive barriers without any anti-climb coating to determine a baseline.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Valentine’s tribute to Lab love: Watch clips from 1943 wedding of two staff

She was a secretary for Director J. Robert Oppenheimer. He was a physicist who helped create the world’s first atomic bombs. And for 65 years they were Mr. and Mrs. Bradner. Hugh Bradner was the first person that Marjorie Hall met upon arrival to join the Lab’s clandestine war-time efforts. He happened to be in Dorothy McKibbin’s Santa Fe office when Marjorie walked in. It was love at first sight, Marjorie recalled years later in an interview. The Bradners were married in September 1943 at McKibbin’s home. It was one of many weddings there during the Manhattan Project era. Los Alamos was fenced and guarded during this time, as staff raced to secretly develop nuclear weapons to help end World War II. Most were young – the average age was late 20s – and many, like the Bradners, met their lifelong partners then. The Bradners left Los Alamos after the war ended in 1945. Hugh is credited with inventing the neoprene wetsuit in 1951. The couple had one daughter. Marjorie, 89, and Hugh, 92, died just a few weeks apart in 2008 in California. Many of their home movies from their time in Los Alamos are preserved at the Lab. They are part of the collections in the National Security Research Center, which is the Lab’s classified library and also houses unclassified artifacts.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Statement of Work. Y-12 National Security Complex Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program Project - Combination Inspector

The Y-12 SIRP Quadrant 1, Quadrant 2, and Vehicle Barrier project involves the following summary elements. The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) is an existing system at the Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a government-owned facility located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and managed by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) is the engineering design agent and construction manager (CM) for the Y-12 SIRP effort. The Quadrants 1 and 2 portion of the project involves the replacement of the PIDAS, and the vehicle barrier portion of the project involves the installation of a continuous passive vehicle barrier alongside the inner PIDAS fence.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Hermalinda Coronado: Bringing kindness to every interaction

Of the more than 400 employees who find themselves in and out of the RLUOB building at TA-55 on any given day, there is one person that almost everyone knows, and that’s Hermalinda Coronado. Hermalinda is on the janitorial staff for both RLUOB and areas behind the fence near PF-4. She’s known for always wearing a smile and doing her work with excellence and integrity.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Site 300 Small Firearms Training Facility Project Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Project Management Office (PMO) is planning to execute a construction project at the Small Firearms Training Facility within LLNL's Experimental Test Site, Site 300 (S300). The proposed project will include extensive dirt work from a removal of a berm, the installation of a cinder block wall, and the replacement of a canopy and a fence with an access gate. This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) outlines the procedures to collect environmental samples for the management and/or disposition of excess soil generated from the project site and geotechnical samples for building pad and pavement designs. This SAP has been prepared and is organized to be consistent with LLNL's Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) (LLNL, 2021), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Data Quality Objectives (DQO) programs (EPA, 2006).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site (Figure 1) surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada (NNSA/NV 2001), hereafter called the CAU 417 Closure Report. The site closure process was completed in 2001 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. Responsibility for environmental site restoration was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from September 2018 through August 2020. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2020 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, site. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the CAU 417 Closure Report (NNSA/NV 2001) and a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996). Responsibility for environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from July 2014 through July 2016. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2016 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of data collected during the biennial post-closure site inspections conducted in July 2014 at the surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, site. The every-other-year post-closure site inspections included inspections of the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan provided in the CAU 417 Closure Report (NNSA/NV 2001). The biennial inspection conducted at the UC-1 Central Mud Pit (CMP) indicated that the site and soil cover were in good condition. No new fractures or extensions of existing fractures were observed and no issues with the fence or gate were identified. The vegetation on the cover continues to be healthy. Precipitation measured from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2013, totaled 179.6 millimeters (mm) or 7.1 inches. Precipitation measured from July 1, 2013, through June 3, 2014, totaled 157.0 mm or 6.2 inches. Soil moisture content data show that the UC-1 CMP cover is performing as designed, and vapotranspiration is effectively removing water from the cover.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Floodplain Assessment for the Technical Area 8 to Technical Area 22 Natural Gas Line Replacement Project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is proposing new construction that crosses through upper Pajarito Canyon and upper Starmer Canyon from Technical Area (TA) 8 to TA-22 at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The project proposes to install a new 12 inch natural gas line to replace the existing 70+ year old natural gas line. Replacement will prevent loss of service to several LANL TAs and Bandelier National Monument. The project activities within the 100- year floodplains include 1) new natural gas line installation to replace and existing aging gas line, 2) relocating a section of fence and 3) three construction equipment and materials storage areas. NNSA has prepared this floodplain assessment in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1022 Compliance with Floodplain and Wetland Environmental Review Requirements (10 CFR Part 1022) (CFR 2003) which was promulgated to implement DOE requirements under Executive Order 11988 Floodplain Management (EO 1977). A floodplain is defined in 10 CFR 1022 as “the lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas and flood prone areas of offshore islands,” and a base floodplain as “the 100-year floodplain, that is, a floodplain with a 1.0 percent chance of flooding in any given year (CFR 2003).” This floodplain assessment evaluates potential impacts to floodplain values and functions from implementation of the proposed action, identifies alternatives to the Proposed Action, and allows for meaningful public comment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗